According to Joseph Nye, one of the greatest threats that the U.S. faces is transnational terrorism (Nye, 2004). Lennon and Walker define terrorism as ‘violent acts that damage, weaken or oppose the state of the constitutional, public, or economic order, or the state’s territorial integrity’ (Lennon et al, 2005, p.35). Terrorism is also defined by Robert Pape as the ‘use of violence by an organization other than a national government to cause fear or intimidation among a target audience’ (Pape, 2003, p.345). Since the World Trade Center terrorist attack in September 2001, foreign policy on war on terrorism has generally taken a particularly offensive and military approach. Military action in the recent past, which has included combating Al-Qaeda in Iraq, the fight against the Taliban in Afghanistan, and sanctions on travel, finance, and communication, constitute use of hard power to fighting terrorism (Chertoff, 2008).
In contrast, there has been limited use of soft power against terrorism. The term ‘soft power’ was first defined by Joseph Nye as being the ‘ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payment.’ (Nye, 2004, p.256). Soft power is contrasted with hard power, which is the ability to coerce using a country’s military and economic might (Nye, 2004). Although critics of soft power claim that the unique attributes of terrorists make it impossible to utilize soft power to effectively deter terrorism, the limitation of hard policy in addressing terrorism and possible application of soft power to address terrorism suggest that use of soft power is a potentially effective approach.
Soft power emerges from the attractiveness of a country’s political ideals, policies, and culture. It rests on the ability to shape other people’s preferences by attracting them to want what you want. Soft power increases when a country’s actions and policies are perceived as legitimate by others (Nye, 2003). However, the use of soft power in addressing the threat of terrorism has not been fully exploited, especially since the September 11 terrorist attack. The United States, for instance, felt increasingly vulnerable to terrorism, which contributed to increased support in the use of hard power to fight terrorism. For instance, the establishment of the United States Department of Homeland or the Counterinsurgency strategy.
In 2006, President George Bush argued that a deterrence theory towards terrorism was no longer reasonable as a strategic principle in addressing the threat of terrorism. Deterrence involves use of diverse strategies such as strategic hindrance, punishment, and soft power, which can be achieved by delegitimization to shape and influence the ideological, religious, and political justification allowing the behavior of terrorists (Wilner, 2011). In reflecting the criticism against use of soft power to address terrorism threats, Bush stated that ‘terrorist enemies lack borders to protect, capital to defend, and hide in caves and shadows, which makes it impossible to use deterrence as a means of preventing terrorism’ (Wilner, 2011).
Critics of use of soft power as a deterrence against terrorism argue that the nature of terrorism makes it impossible to deter them. For instance, terrorists are perceived to be generally driven by fundamental political and religious extremism, which discourages the use of rational decision-making, and a desire for maximalist, risk-accepting, and stubborn behavior (Wilner, 2011). However, according to Pape, terrorism often follows a strategic logic aimed at achieving specific political aims, which ranges from coercing a target government by targeting innocent citizens to change the government’s policies, mobilization of financial support, and recruitment of new members (Pape, 2003). While the narrow viewpoint and understanding of the nature of terrorists conform with the general public and policy-makers, critical evaluations provides an appreciation for the logic upon which use of soft power can be used to influence the behavior of terrorist organizations.
According to Chertoff, use of hard power may result in short-term victory but is unlikely to lead to long-lasting victory in protecting countries against the threat of terrorism. Preventing people from becoming terrorists in the first place can only be achieved by addressing the two major factors that are the driving force behind most terrorism. These factors include the continued presence of failed economic and political systems in parts of the developing world and the emergence of vicious extremist groups as the most noticeable contending ideology (Chertoff, 2008). Evidently, use of soft power is better suited to fight the ideology of extremism and terrorist ideas by offering alternative ideals of democracy and liberty. Chertoff adds that the current scenario of terrorist activities must be seen as a contest of ideas, a war of ideology, and a battle for allegiance, which can only be won by using a soft power solution.
A theoretical consideration of use of soft power suggests that soft power approach is grounded within the theoretical framework of deterrence. Deterrence is described as the persuasion of an enemy to avoid a certain course of action in his or her own interest. The approach involves influencing behavior using fear, which includes two processes: inducing an adversary not to do a given action and compellence, which is the inducement of a given individual to do something. These two processes are aimed at preventing a behavior that is not desirable and compelling an adversary to comply with desired preferences (Wilner, 2011). Deterrence is divided into processes and causal logics (Wilner, 2011).
Deterrence by the process of punishment works by making an adversary calculate the cost of pursuing a given undesired action. Deterrence by process of denial, on the other hand, reduces the perceived benefits expected to be accrued from a certain action (Wilner, 2011). Deterrence theory is founded on the logic of persuading a target that the costs of taking a given action outweigh the potential benefits that may be obtained from taking the action (Wilner, 2011). Wilner argues that as long as deterrence is based on the manipulation of the behavior of an adversary, non-punishment based processes that contribute to deterrence results are associated with the logic informing the theory.
Considering that non-punishment influences such as the use of soft power determine the success of deterrence, Wilner suggests that deterrence should be expanded to include positive reassurance and incentives, debate and delegitimization, and denial and mitigation, which are not generally associated with deterrence. Such an expansion of deterrence is supported by the fact that influence adheres to the core beliefs of deterrence and is founded on the logical foundations of the deterrence (Wilner, 2011).
Subsequently, soft power can be used to manipulate terrorist behaviors by applying ideological and diplomatic leverages against their goals, assets, and beliefs (Wilner, 2011). Deterrence by delegitimization is one such example of use of soft power to prevent terrorism. Wilner asserts that the logic of deterrence can be used to manipulate the ideological, religious, and rationale that inform the behavior of terrorists. The main goal is reduction of the terrorist’s achieving their goals is by attacking the legitimacy of the beliefs that reinforce their behavior (Wilner, 2011).
Most terrorists use a given set of principles, which are often founded on social-religious and ideological beliefs that shape both their behavior and goals. For instance, Al Qaeda uses suicide terrorism, which they legitimize by relying on religious decrees that justify taking another person’s life. However, under Islamic law, suicide is a blasphemous act often contradicted by most individuals who share the Muslim faith (Wilner, 2011). Using soft power and applying the logic of deterrence, the goals informing terrorist violence can be delegitimized. By publicizing and strengthening opinions, information, and positions that are contradictory to legitimization of terrorism, it is possible to deter and compel some of the individuals who would have otherwise taken part in violence not to join it. The process works by degrading the justification that guides and motivates terrorist behavior thereby causing an adversary to change or abandon a preferred behavior.
Wilner argues that delegitimization mechanism involves influencing popular support, manipulating strategic culture, and debating religious interpretations in case they are utilized to direct terrorism. Delegitimization attains the goal of preventing terrorism by increasing the costs of participating in terrorism by challenging the religious, socio-political, and normative justifications that guide individuals’ decision-making in determining whether to join terrorism.
Soft power can be effectively applied to address the threat of terrorism by undermining terrorist groups and individual motivation to employ violence as a means to achieving their goals. By communicating how a given terrorist action is contradictory to social and religious tenets, soft power can be used to shape and influence the dominant ideology in a given community thereby reducing the threats of terrorism in communities that are at risk of terrorism (Lennon and Walker, 2015). Wilner adds that use of counter-motivation strategies is currently under-developed despite compelling evidence of their potential in addressing threats of terrorism.
Obviously, there is an increasing growth in terrorism over the recent past. The dominant strategy for addressing terrorism has been through use of hard power. However, considering that such an approach has not resulted in a reduction in terrorism, there is a need to explore alternative approaches to dealing with the threat of terrorism with use of soft power a worthy alternative to hard power.
It is essential that countries aiming at addressing the threats of terrorism utilize every option, tools, and strategies that they have at their disposal to counter this threat. Certainly, the use of soft power is one of the potentially effective strategies that may reduce terrorist attacks. The significance of soft power in preventing terrorism by influencing people and nations to fighting terrorism makes it a worthwhile and a proactive strategy for combating terrorism. Using soft power, the U.S. and its allies can significantly deter people from joining terrorist organizations by reducing their appeal (Chertoff, 2008). Evidently, despite criticism, using soft power to address terrorism in the transnational arena should be explored further considering the potential benefits in addressing terrorism.