The cosmological argument is often one of the most innately appealing and widely used arguments for the existence of God, because of this it is also among the most analysed and critiqued. Its use can be traced back to Ancient Greece, where causality plays a central role in the philosophy of the time (Craig, 2001). The notoriety of this argument is rooted in its simplicity, its advocates believing it to be its brilliance while opponents view it as its oversights. Put simply, a cosmological argument makes an inference from facts about the universe to the existence of a unique being, God (Reichenbach, 2016). These arguments, are therefore naturally based in empiricism, our observations of the world around us. Most a posteriori arguments for God’s existence hold little philosophical value, they are usually rooted in experiences, or tales of others experiences of God. Stories and scripture such as these seem incompatible with reasoned philosophical argument, neither quite in touch with the concepts of the other. Cosmological arguments attempt to bridge this gap, using deductive reasoning unseen in biblical texts to appeal to atheist objectors. Probably the most prominent figure to put forward a cosmological argument was St. Thomas Aquinas; which will be evaluated throughout this essay. In his most famous text, the Summa Theologica Aquinas posits five ways of arguing for the existence of God, the first four of these are cosmological arguments. This essay will critically evaluate the argument from contingency, which is based on his third argument.
Aquinas’s first two arguments hold very similar structures, the first focusing on motion, whereas the second considers causality on a broader scale, these are both categorised as ‘first-cause’ arguments. They each observe change in the universe, which must be caused by other things that are changed, he then denies an infinite regress, concluding that there must be a first cause of this change, namely God. Aquinas’s third argument, while holding similarities to the first two, possesses an additional dimension in its conclusion, the existence of a necessary and therefore eternal being. This argument again begins with an observation, that there are contingent things, meaning that it is possible that they begin to or cease or to exist. He continues that it is impossible for contingent things to always exist. Thus, if all things were contingent then it is possible that at one point nothing existed, but if this were true, then nothing would exist now (as nothing can begin to exist from nothing), but this is plainly false. From this Aquinas concludes that there must be a necessary being, one that must never begin or cease to exist, again God. The fourth of the cosmological arguments is less scientific, it begins by noting the degrees by which we measure properties, then states that for there to be degrees of perfection, there must be something perfect against which we measure, this perfect thing is God.
The argument from contingency has been debated at much length, and many notable philosophers have given arguments concerning the matter. This argument also differs from the former two as it allows for an infinite regress, which Aquinas admitted there was a lack of evidence or philosophical argument to deny. Copleston (1955) states that “Aquinas is clearly supposing for the sake of the argument the hypothesis of infinite time, and his proof is designed to cover this hypothesis.” This gives the argument added support, as one of the most common criticisms of cosmological arguments is of its denial of the infinite regress, Aquinas himself admitting the lack of philosophical evidence to deny this. However, this is not to say that the argument is not suspect in places, and many valid criticisms have been levelled at the argument.
In Philosophical Problems and Arguments: An Introduction (1992) by Cornman, Lehrer and Pappas, the argument is reconstructed as such:
1. Either there have been things for an infinite amount of time, or there have been things for a finite amount of time
2. If there have been things for an infinite amount of time, then each different sum-total of existing entities that can occur has occurred at some time
3. If the only things that exist are contingent, then one possibility is that at some time before now none of them existed
Therefore
4. If there have been things for an infinite amount of time, and the only things that exist are contingent, then at some point before now, nothing existed
5. If there have been things for only a finite amount of time, and the only things that exist are contingent, then at some time before now nothing existed
Therefore
6. If the only things that exist are contingent, then at some point in time nothing existed
7. If at some point in time before now, nothing existed, now nothing exists now
Therefore
8. If the only things that exist are contingent, then nothing exists now
9. It is false that nothing exists now
Therefore
10. It is false that the only things that exist are contingent, that is, there is a necessary being, namely God.
Premises (1), (5) and (9) are obvious truths and premise (7) is a version of the law of conservation of energy, that is that it can be neither created nor destroyed, only converted from one form to another (this is includes matter). However, when acknowledging the principles of mass-energy conservation, one must question the contingency of things, at least as it is presented in this argument. For if contingency is the possibility of something existing or ceasing to exist, then energy, which we know to exist, is in direct conflict with this definition as it cannot be destroyed, that is cease to exist. By this logic then can we not define energy as a necessary thing?
Many have also questioned the contingency of the universe itself, most famously Bertrand Russell, stating that the universe is simply “a brute fact”. Even if we are to assume that all things in the universe are contingent, Russell (1967) suggests that to infer that the universe is also contingent is to commit the fallacy of composition, giving the example that all humans have a mother, all of whom reside in the set of humanity, but to say that the human race as a whole must have a mother is untrue. If we are to grant the idea that the universe might be a necessary thing, which is causally independent, then we have no need another necessary being, or God.
Beyond this if we assume yet again that all things in the universe are contingent and the universe itself is contingent, does this bring us any closer to justifying a belief in God? Aquinas’ third argument does align more closely with the traits of a theistic God than those of his initial two arguments. This third way does account for Gods eternal and infinite nature as opposed to the potential interpretation of an “unmoved mover”, given by the opening first cause arguments, most likely due to the Aristotelian principles they’re built upon. But is philosophical evidence of any of God’s other qualities presented to us? This argument provides no display of God’s omniscience, omnipotence or infinite goodness. In many ways, it could be construed as a proof of a deistic God, with minimal current involvement in the universe. This seems to be the greatest leap in the logic of the argument, in premise (9) Aquinas moves from directly from the existence of necessary beings to that of God, this is impossible to do without accepting the cogency of the ontological argument also (Kant, 1781), which Aquinas did not.
Objectors may dispute my point of the contingency of energy, making the (valid) claim that energy is logically contingent as it is logically possible to create or destroy it, meaning that it does not violate the laws of logic to say this. However, advocates of this must also accept Kant’s assertion that God is also not logically necessary, as we can conceive of a world in which God doesn’t exist (Kant, 1781). Thus, this argument must aim to prove the existence of a factually necessary God, one that is physically possible and as such its premises should lie within the realms of physical possibility, where energy can neither be created nor destroyed. This division between logical and physical possibility also plagues the argument further as
Philosophers such as Samuel Clarke have attempted to link the necessary being, which the cosmological argument suggests, to God. Clarke endeavours to do this by linking God’s attributes to this being. While eternality and infinity are central to the idea of the necessary being, he uses a posteriori arguments to apply qualities of intelligence and goodness to it. This argument essentially takes the course that as qualities of intelligence and goodness can be observed in contingent things which are all dependent on the necessary thing, so these must also be qualities of the necessary thing, making it God. He holds this case in response to negative qualities which we observe, stating that these are simply the absences of the positive ones. However, this again does not suffice, as when we examine the qualities of matter (figure, motion, divisibility, etc.), which God himself cannot possess, we must wonder how these qualities are imperfect (Rowe, 1975).
In conclusion, Aquinas’s third cosmological argument is an ingenious attempt at proving God’s existence, the fact that it is still debated today, approximately 750 years after its introduction stands as a testament to this. Yet as time moves on and scientific discovery advances, the argument is beginning to show the signs of its age. The empirical evidence it was based on, while perhaps standard for its time, now seems dated.
Bibliography
Aquinas, T. 1485. Summa Theologica. Available online at: http://www.newadvent.org/summa/ (Accessed December 19th, 2016)
Craig, W. L. 2001. The Cosmological Argument from Plato to Leibniz. California: Wipf and Stock Publishers
Reichenbach, B. 2016. “The Cosmological Argument”, The Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy (Winter 2016 Edition). Available online at: https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/cosmological-argument
(Accessed January 3rd, 2017)
Copleston, F. 1955. Aquinas.