Paste your essay in here…Since the US have started the ‘War of Terror’ in 2001, there are more recurrent attempts to justify interrogational torture. Taking into account the fact that we live in times when legal scholars discuss about torture as a possible and legitimate ‘weapon’ in order to gain information, Bob Brecher, Professor of Moral Philosophy at the University of Brighton and director of its Centre for Applied Philosophy, Politics and Ethics excellently attempts to countered the multitude of academics who justify the use of torture in the ticking bomb scenario by exposing the spuriousness of their arguments. Brecher’s aim is to persuade the readers that ‘realism’, which would permit the legalization of interrogational torture, is ‘fundamentally misconceived’ (p.11) and, since ‘realism’ is based on the so-called ‘ticking bomb’ scenario, his first target is to show that is in fact based in fantasy. He attempts to do this by discussing in a clear and coherent way interrogational torture and its legalization throughout four chapters; he firstly introduces the intellectual and political context of the ‘ticking bomb scenario’, upon which he will build a major part of his book. In Chapter Two the author argues that the ticking bomb scenario is unreal and that it relies on a fantasy. In Chapter Three he discusses the consequences of legalizing interrogational torture and how this will subsequently lead to its institutionalization and thus to the creation of a torturous society. Moreover, Brecher argues that those who would allow the legalization of interrogational torture, such as Dershowitz, poorly argument their case and take little account of the reality. Finally, in the last chapter Brecher criticises the use of torture in every kind of circumstances, taking on the advocates of torture on their own utilitarian ground and claiming that: ‘We can not torture, because of who we are’ and that who we are ‘place limits on the sort of society in which we can live’ (p. 87).
Analysing deeply each chapter, in Chapter One Brecher attempts to explain what torture is, and, relying on the fact that ‘torture cannot and need not be defined’ (p.5), he proposes Tindale’s description: ‘any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person ‘ (p.5). However, the main part of the Chapter is focused on introducing and arguing what he calls the ‘most sophisticated’ (p. 6) of recent attempts to legalize the use of torture in so-called ‘ticking bomb’ scenarios made by Professor Alan Dershowitz. According to Brecher, is exactly because the general public is taking the ‘new realism’ of Dershowitz, -intending as ‘new realism’ the idea of using torture ‘when torture is the least evil of terrible options’ (p.6)- to seriously that there is an urgent need to discredit this thesis. Dershowitz’s argument, claims that although the use of torture is morally wrong, it should, however, be legalized in order to, firstly better control the practice of it and thus minimize its use to obtain the required information, and secondly, since torture is going to be present in the real world anyhow, we should not be hypocritical and legalize the use of interrogational torture in particular cases. However, Brecher does not try to support his position in the first Chapter, favouring to constraint his argument in two respects. Firstly he restricts his topic to interrogational torture, arguing that if he can demonstrate that this kind of torture is unjustifiable, then he will have made a case against torture in general. Secondly, he restricts himself, arguing for the rejection of torture with a utilitarian perspective; this represents the real strength of the book, as I am going to demonstrate thought out all the paper.
Chapter Two attempts to discredit the ticking bomb scenario as well as Dershowitz’s argument on several fronts. Brecher argues passionately that the ticking bomb scenario is based upon a fantasy because its conditions contradict each other. In fact, according to Brecher ‘the time and effectiveness conditions run against each other; the like hood of accurate information is very far from certain, and the necessity which the circumstances press upon the authorities can only ever be retrospective’. (p.16). Moreover, the ticking bomb scenario is characterized by probability and not by certainty. Furthermore, he argues that on the institutional background, the ticking bomb scenario fails to distinguish ‘between individuals’ and ‘any proper basis of public policy’ (p.22). In other words, since we cannot put ourselves in the position of the torturer nor of the supposed interrogated terrorist, we can’t now how and if the torture will work. Here we come to the main question of the Chapter: ‘Does torture work?’ Brecher gives an accurate answer to this question by referring to the US Field Manual, updated after the Abu Grahib scandal, which reports that the military ‘agree that torture is largely ineffective in eliciting intelligence’ (p. 25). Next, in the book, Brecher will concretely discuss how torture breaks the individual and how the tortured subject is no longer a person while tortured because it’s capacity to act has been broken. However, Brecher ends this Chapter by addressing an important indirect question: ‘are we willing to accept interrogational torture as morally right because it might avoid a tragedy?’ Moreover, why should we think that interrogational torture would decrease rather than increase terroristic actions when evidence shows us that: ‘legalizing interrogational torture would lead us to its spread, as well as being counterproductive in other ways.’ (p.75)? The author will answer accurately to this question next in the book.
Chapter Three highlights the social consequences of legalizing and thus permitting and normalizing interrogational torture. Before going on exanimating how institutionalizing the use of torture would impact four central areas –the broader use of torture, its legal impact, the response of terrorist, and the professionalization of torture- special attention is paid to clarify firstly, the idea of institutionalizing, secondly, that fact the practice of torture in the real world which differs from ‘what we think of the practice’ and finally: ‘how can someone who advocates the legalization of interrogational torture nonetheless insist that they are morally opposed to torture?’ (p.41).
In order to answer the last question, Brecher takes into account Dershowitz’s position on the issue as he supports the legalization of torture nonetheless he thinks is morally wrong. Brecher explains that on a utilitarian view there are no ‘bad choices’ but only choices with consequences, the choice with the best consequences it becomes morally right, is ‘morally right on account of its consequences’ (p.49). As Brecher’s demonstrates clearly in his book, the legitimacy of torture is an unsatisfactory defence for its moral satisfactoriness and consequences. Moreover, Brecher reasonably claims that the advocates of legal torture say very little about the consequences of its institutionalization. How do they know that it would not lead to increase public indifference? How can they know that it would lead to fewer, and not more case of torture? Brecher claims – quoting as a proof Amnesty International- that there are grounds to think that ‘it would be a step on a slippery slope towards a tortuous society’ (p.57). Moreover, evidence show us that the use of torture has not been used only in the ticking bomb scenario, but also as a way to ‘soften up’ (p.58) detainees -as in the Abu Grahib case-, so: once torture is legalized in the ticking bomb scenario and thus, it has been made ‘legally thinkable’ (p.59) how can we know that it will not be used in other situations? In short, Brecher judiciously believes that the legalization of interrogational torture will consequently lead to its normalization and it will ‘corrupt the very idea of the law’ (p.67).
Chapter Three is then followed by a concise and objective concluding Chapter where Brecher draws together the main points of his arguments as well as arguing how torture breaks people’s will and that legalizing its use will consequently lead to the creation of a grotesque and tortuous society. In the interest of rejecting the utilitarian argument that ‘torture leaves no lasting damage’ (p.75) and that is preferable to death, Brecher uses various evidences in order to prove that when tortured, the person’s ability to act is broken, and ‘since it is our capacity to act which makes us persons, the tortured subject is no longer a person’ (p.77). Furthermore, the strength of Brecher’s extraordinary book is that discusses that torture ‘is a crime of specific intent’ (p.84) and we cannot accept to legalize and thus normalize its use because in a very occasional circumstance it could possibly prevent a terrorist action.
To conclude, Brecher’s book is a powerful assertion about the significance of morality for human existence. The structure of each chapter requests the reader to involve into the legal and ethical difficulties that are concerned in discussing interrogational torture. The author is clear and unequivocal in his argument about the inefficiency, immorality and illegality of torture in all circumstances; throughout the entire book, he offers a coherent reasoning that discredits any argument in favour of interrogational torture, drawing out its practical and ethical implications.