Philosophy 203: Final Paper
“This form of moral determination by the actual is also paradoxical, but we can begin to see how deep in the concept of responsibility the paradox is embedded. A person can be morally responsible only for what he does; but what he does results from a great deal that he does not do; therefore he is not morally responsible for what he is and is not responsible for. (This is not a contradiction, but it is a paradox.”
– Moral Luck by Thomas Nagel
Thomas Nagel provides a conclusive, unwavering and yet uncertain explanation of moral luck and responsibility and their respective implications. In the quotation above Nagel suggests the crux of the issue at hand, in part, that we base our concept on responsibility partially on outcomes and hypothetical outcomes with varying levels of severity. Thus, as Nagel keenly points out: without certainty of one action leading to another definitive outcome, which will inevitably factor into how people conceive the severity of wrongdoing or value of a morally good, we cannot be morally responsible for what we are responsible for. This is not necessarily a definitively true statement however it provides an excellent starting point for a discussion on moral luck. It brings about central questions on the topic. Firstly, whether we attribute responsibility in a reasonable way, and whether we fall into a dilemma of confusing how something is from how something ideally should be. This quotation appears to question the factors which we include in deciding moral culpability of actions. Nagel, perhaps, suggests there is a flaw here with no obvious resolution, as it seems absurd to neglect consequences of actions as well as blame someone for something that was at least partially out of their control. Although I do not resoundingly support all the notions of Nagel’s argument, I would agree that he makes a valid point in asserting that any answer seems somewhat flawed or incomplete. However, I would argue that, as it stands, we assume culpability for uncertainty, to a degree, when we make a morally good or bad decision that can affect the consequences of an event. Thus, someone may not be anymore morally culpable but can still face a more extreme reaction based on the assumed culpability of the outcome that occurred. This argument, however, seems somewhat flawed as the actor is presuming guilt or commendation for an outcome which is at least partially out of his or her control.
Firstly, we must look at the current situational judgments we make in order to reach decisions of culpability, which as Nagel indirectly and perhaps correctly points out should be correlated with emotional response. In most current legal systems, crimes carry more severe penalties dependent on consequences. This is shown by the differing lengths of sentences for crimes with similar intentions but varying outcomes like murder and attempted murder. Similarly, the judicial system is more exacting on crimes where there is clear and violent intent. In this case, for example, simple robbery carries a shorter sentence than armed robbery because it does not carry the same assumption that the assailant is prepared to harm an individual while committing the theft. Many people agree on the assertions made in the latter example, however, those in the former cause more of an issue. This leads to the paradox we find in the quotation.
Nagel’s paradox hints at the idea that we wrongfully make this distinction based on consequence and provides a suggestion later that it is due to our mapping of emotion onto the given issue. Nagel suggests we have a “rough idea of the boundary between what is us and what is not, what we do and what happens to us.” This reveals Nagel’s view on consciousness as something deeply personal, subject and almost solipsistic, as it suggests that we see everything through the lens of our personal existence. Thus he suggests that it is this “subjective character experience” which we apply when making on moral culpability. We associate action with emotion, wrongdoing with shame, and pride with success, according to Nagel, but we also. to a certain extent, map these feelings onto others.
Though Nagel does not directly say this, I would extrapolate to suggest that we assign greater culpability based on our emotional response to an action as morally right or wrong. There is a greater emotional response to a moral act that leads to more severe consequences. If a doctor performs a last-resort operation that has little chance of success, we attribute it to an act of heroism if the operation is successful but we merely laud the respectable efforts of the doctor if the operation is unsuccessful. We do this because extreme consequences cause extreme emotional reactions. Some would argue, I have not factored in the doctor’s skill in this example, but even so, one can suggest that this example works even if the story suggests that the doctor performs the exact same actions in both hypothetical cases. This example is to demonstrate how we attribute responsibility and or plaudits in cases in which the outcome essentially comes down to luck. In the case of the operation, it was more probable than not that the patient would not survive. Furthermore, the same level of good intention was applied in each hypothetical case and yet one result appears to be considered inherently more valuable. Though I question Nagel’s suggestion that emotional experience is completely subjective, on the grounds of certain common reactions, I would agree the attribution of moral value to luck appears to be somewhat troublesome.
Some might argue that consequence should be considered due to the resulting effects of each action. In the case of the doctor, the saving of the individual was much more beneficial, as opposed to the unsuccessful surgery. It is clear that out of all hypothetical outcomes there can be and often will be options that are more mutually beneficial for the acting parties. However, this, by my estimation, cannot be judged with the same moral approach as a distinct and active good or bad decision, like the option to try and save the patient. There is and ought to be a place for moral luck within our judgment of moral decision making. But using the term moral luck is misleading, luck, by definition, is a matter of chance and thus cannot be attributed any significant moral value, it can positively or negatively affect an actor or an act, but this effect should not be confused with the need to assign moral parameters to it. Thus, it can be deduced that moral consequence and judgment should be applied to actions which one can be considered responsible for. The gap in reaction is based on an emotional response that is derived purely out of luck and should be treated as such. This view is not a complete resolution to Nagel’s “paradox” of moral responsibility, as it leaves many of the repercussions of moral and immoral actions purely down to chance, which appears to negate or diminish the importance of the outcome. Though it may seem terse, there is no other clear way to distinguish moral value to luck, nor should there be, because it is an unlucky occurrence out of the same actions. However, this is the only clear way to provide some level of resolution to the paradox.
In this case, it is important to note, that I have separated how the problem with moral luck ought to be ideally resolved. As it appears the supposition of the same moral responsibility for two identical actions with differing consequences supported by “a number of legal theorists.” Though I would argue that this is the most reasonable approach to moral luck, it is not the most practical. Though perhaps practicality should not be considered, it is. Once again, this is due to emotion, particularly when our judgments of morality can be altered by personal interpretation. There appears to be a human desire for vindication when emotion is involved. Empathy leads us to have an emotional response to the consequences of moral actions, which allows us to often attribute greater moral significance to actions that cause a greater emotional response. Furthermore, it would be problematic to do otherwise as we assess punishment, at least partially based on consequence. People demand a punishment befitting of their emotional response. For this reason, there is a distinction between manslaughter and murder: intention.
It is possible to further abstract this even further to a discussion of determinism, as the whole assumption of culpability and moral responsibility requires some sense that an actor in a moral situation could have done otherwise. If we exist in a determined state or even a probabilistic one, it seems all the more difficult to justify punishment, as the actor had no choice in their actions, and thus there would be no inherent moral responsibility of actions. An individual should surely not be charged for actions beyond his or her control. This question of determinism also brings in the question of luck as there is no luck in a truly deterministic universe. We can easily dismiss the latter, as in the valuation of moral responsibility, luck and determined external factors maintain the same importance as the individual should not be held accountable for either one. The issue of morality and determinism is itself questioned by Nagel as he writes: “how can one be responsible even for stripped-down acts of the will itself, if they are the product of antecedent circumstances outside of the will’s control.” Even with this apparent conflict between determinism and moral responsibility, we can refute the claim that determinism negates moral responsibility. It appears that with this in mind, we must adopt a compatibilist strategy, in the sense that the actor requires the feeling of choice in the matter. Harry Frankfurt provides a thoughtful example for the way in which determinism and moral responsibility can still function concurrently. In his example, a man called Jones kills a man called Smith, in this case we assume of course that Jones is compelled to do this by a hatred of Smith but nonetheless could have no killed Smith, even in a probabilistic universe there is still some sentiment of choice involved: to kill Smith or to not kill Smith. He is morally responsible. Even if Jones is affected by Black (another maleficent man) who implements a chip in Jones’ brain that would inadvertently, at a given time, kill Smith if Jones had not decided to do so already. However, in the example Jones kills Smith before the chip forced him to do so, according to Frankfurt, he is still equally morally responsible regardless of whether the chip is implanted in his brain or not.
Thus, according to Frankfurt, if we can prove their intention regardless of whether the consequence was inevitable, even in a determined state of the universe, we can uphold moral responsibility. This is due to the fact that determinations of moral responsibility are and should be based in the concept of intention. In both cases, Jones kills Smith out of a desire or intention to do so as opposed to a distinct determined state of affairs and is thus responsible, regardless of whether he could have done otherwise.
However, if we manipulate this example slightly, we can clearly see the strength of the paradox that Nagel puts forth in his article on moral luck. If, for example, the chip had the opposite effect and was turned on, Jones would not have killed Smith. In this example, the intention remains the same, but Jones is by no means in control of any possible outcomes. Jones is not morally responsible in the slightest for the fact that the murder did not take place and does not assume any moral responsibility for the desire to kill Smith. It appears that luck or intervention prevents Smith from being morally accountable or responsible as it prevented any nefarious act from taking place. This seems to bring into question whether moral responsibility can be completely based on intention itself, as in this case there would be no way to prove, without prior knowledge of his intentions, that Jones desired or even conspired to murder Smith.
In conclusion, there are three things that remain or have become abundantly clear. Firstly, that, I believe that Nagel’s paradox of moral responsibility remains intact though it does leave a certain uncertainty or lack of resolution when it is implemented. Secondly, that moral responsibility and moral luck are deeply intertwined and confused. Moral responsibility should be assumed for intended actions by an actor as well as acts that indirectly or through negligence lead to or could have led to morally good or bad outcomes. However, in the current (not ideal) and at times what appears to be intuitive way of making moral judgments, we attribute luck as an appendage to moral responsibility, though these should be separate. Finally, it follows that to a degree, luck, in terms of possible outcomes, must be accepted as separate from moral responsibility. It is possible that the reason we often combine the two is due to our emotional subjective and empathetic responses to moral actions. In repurposing Nagel’s final line in which he suggests that “we see how everything we do belongs to a world that we have not created,” I would suggest that from this sentence alone there cannot be an absolute moral responsibility as it pertains to certain uncontrolled factors that are separate from our personal and collective existences. Thus, there is space for luck and an at least somewhat determined natural state of affairs, along with moral responsibility.
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Works Cited
Frankfurt, Harry. “Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility” in The Norton Introduction to Philosophy ed. Gideon Rosen, Alex Byrne, Joshua Cohen and Seanna Shiffrin (New York: Norton, 2015). p. 612-619.
“Moral Luck.” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Online. Last modified April 10, 2014 https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-luck/
Nagel, Thomas. “Moral Luck.” Princeton University Course Materials. Last Accessed: 16 January 2017. https://blackboard.princeton.edu/bbcswebdav/pid-2078275-dt-content-rid- 2612806_1/courses/PHI203_F2016/NAGELMoralLuck.pdf
Nagel, Thomas. “What is it like to be a bat?” in The Norton Introduction to Philosophy ed. Gideon Rosen, Alex Byrne, Joshua Cohen and Seanna Shiffrin (New York: Norton, 2015). p.402-11.