Review of “Can Democracy Stop Terrorism?”
In his prescient yet flawed article for Foreign Affairs, F. G. Gause (2005) analyses whether democratizing an Arab country will make that country “less likely […] to produce terrorists and terrorist groups” (p. 62). The author investigates his subject in light of the Bush Administration’s policy of democratizing the Arab World to produce friendlier democratic governments and reduce the incidence of terrorism (Gause, 2005, p. 62). Gause concludes that the Bush policy fails both objectives (Gause, 2005, p. 62). First, available evidence shows no correlation between democracy and more or less terrorism (Gause, 2005, p. 62). Furthermore, Gause finds that democratizing the Arab world would likely produce more Islamist anti-American governments (Gause, 2005, p. 62).
Gause uses academic studies, governmental reports, anecdotal evidence, and logic to analyze the democratic effect on terrorism (Gause, 2005, pp. 65-67). A study on terrorist events occurring in the 1980s found that most incidents took place in democracies, meanwhile another study by the U.S. State Department in the early 2000s found that half of terrorist attacks between 2000 and 2003 occurred in “free” countries (Gause, 2005, p. 66). Ultimately, Gause finds that the evidence refutes the alleged link between the presence of democracy in a society and either increased or decreased terrorism (Gause, 2005, pp. 65-67).
Gause (2005) then uses logic to attack the notion that democracy would tame terrorists and induce their participation in the democratic process (pp. 68-69). Gause (2005) argues that, in principle, terrorists are likely to “reject the very principles of majority rule and minority rights on which liberal democracy is based” (p. 68). From a practical perspective, the author finds poor logic in the assumption that terrorists would respect democratic processes and abide by their results considering the lengths to which terrorists go to reach their objectives (Gause, 2005, p. 68).
Gause then engages the Bush Administration’s assumption that democratization would produce friendly Arab governments in the Middle East. He considers studies from the Pew Global Attitudes Project and Zogby International that show that, while Arabs appreciate American democracy and values, a majority of them have negative opinions of U.S. policies (Gause, 2005, pp. 70-71). Gause deduces that open elections in democratized Arab countries would benefit Islamists because Arab voters are likely to elect governments reflective of their anti-Americanism (Gause, 2005, pp. 70, 74). In addition, America’s unpopularity is based on the full spectrum of its foreign policies (Gause, 2005, p. 72). He claims that no data exists that would suggest an improvement in Arab views of America if the U.S. disowned the authoritarian regimes it has historically supported (p. 72). Ultimately, Gause’s (2005) solution is that the United States bolster liberal and moderate groups within Arab countries, and that the U.S. support elections only when conditions are ripe for liberal political success (p. 75).
Gause’s arguments about terrorist participation in the democratic process rest on what seem to be strong, logical arguments. Indeed, it does seem illogical to suggest that terrorist groups would suspend their activities, engage in the political process, and respect popular mandates if these conflicted with the group’s objectives. Like Gause (2005) states, terrorists “rarely represent political agendas that could mobilize electoral majorities” (p. 78). More so, liberal democracy is rarely their objective, but rather the ideological alternative of Islam (Gause, 2005, p. 76).
Events that occurred after this article’s publication reflected the author’s prescient contention that democratization would lead to Islamist successes at the polls. Hamas, an internationally recognized terrorist organization, experienced electoral success in Palestine in 2006 (Grant & Yahalom, 2016). Likewise, the Arab Spring removed several authoritarian regimes that were replaced by democratically elected Islamist governments in Tunisia, Yemen, and Egypt (Jones, 2013, p. 55). However, the success of Islamic fundamentalism at the polls contradicts the previous, logical assumption that terrorists would not tame their methods and adopt electoral politics. Perhaps a way of reconciling this is to consider that, while terrorist operatives may see little value in electoral democracy, the fundamentalist organizations that sponsor them see opportunity thanks to the anti-American inclinations of their electorates.
Conversely, the article’s strength, as stated above, is also the text’s main weakness. Gause relies too heavily on sheer logic, anecdotal evidence, or assumptions rather than facts to argue his points. At times the author reaches conclusions based, admittedly, on scant data in order to prove his point that terrorism thrives irrespective of political systems. For example, he asserts that Indian democracy presents a more fertile environment for terrorism than authoritarian China based on a single set of incomplete and faulty statistics (Gause, 2005, p. 67). Gause has no recourse but to make mathematical assumptions regarding questionable data supplied by the Chinese government.
Anecdotal evidence is the only foundation for other key points of the article. To his credit, Gause admits at several junctures that the evidence on which his arguments rely is anecdotal at best (Gause, 2005, pp. 67, 72-73). Nonetheless, Gause (2005) speculates that U.S. interests would fare no better if we stopped supporting authoritarian Arab regimes because Arabs would still disagree with the U.S. because of other foreign policies (p. 75). Gause (2005) uses the example of Syria, where the U.S. opposes the authoritarian Assad regime, but the Syrian people nonetheless object to U.S. policies (p. 75). The author picks a single country’s experience and extrapolates that fact as the norm for the rest of the Middle East.
Another drawback is that Gause does not present an alternative to the Bush Administration’s democratization policy. He resigns himself to asserting that there is no viable alternative to the existing policy of sustaining alliances with Middle Eastern authoritarian regimes (Gause, 2005, p. 75). While impeaching democratization, Gause does not explore how the status quo policy fosters Arab resentment and fundamentalism. To be fair, perhaps the author could claim that, if both options of democratization and sustaining regimes produce fundamentalism, democratization would be the worst option. Alas, the author does not explore this possibility.
Gause leaves other questions for future consideration. By dismissing the effects of changes in U.S. foreign policy relying solely on Syria’s example, Gause does not analyze whether U.S. policy shifts would favorably change Arab perceptions of the U.S, perhaps decreasing Islamist fervor against America. After all, most Arabs polled in 2004 objected to U.S. policies because of what they perceived as “Washington’s desire to control oil, protect Israel, and weaken the Muslim world” (Gause, 2005, p. 72). If U.S. policy is the primary cause of Arab unrest against America, then changing that policy could diffuse the situation.
Whatever the deficiencies of his article, Gause nonetheless makes an important contribution to the discussion of the policies America implements worldwide. By questioning the Bush Administration’s policy of Arab democratization because of its unintended consequences, Gause lets us ask what is the ultimate objective of democratization: democracy, however manifested, or U.S. interests. The first, principled objective promotes democracy for democracy’s sake, regardless of whether democratization produces a liberal government or a fundamentalist one. The second, realist option advances U.S. interests by establishing friendly governments that will support American foreign policy objectives.
Another important question that follows from Gause’s analysis, albeit a philosophical one, is the basic query of whether the U.S. should be exporting democracy in the first place. Should the U.S. government craft the world in its likeness to assure America’s security? Is it democratic to impose democracy? Should the U.S. act as a global policeman, intervening in foreign lands to preempt perceived threats? Kenneth Waltz (1979) might respond that if America, the sole remaining superpower, “does not lend a hand in trying to solve the most important and difficult problems, who will?” (p. 207). Then, if the previous question is answered in the affirmative, should democracy be installed immediately after the U.S. overthrows a regime? Gause (2005) agrees with other thinkers such as Jessica Stern who have written on the fragility of democracy after a conflict and who have concluded that conditions in newborn democracies are fertile ground for terrorism (p. 67).
Although his article is flawed, Gause serves his readers well by tackling fundamental questions and dissecting the reasoning behind the key American foreign policy objective of the 2000s, with all of its disruptive consequences in the Middle East and painful consequences domestically. Gause’s asseverations lack full support in data and rely too heavily on anecdote, but they open the door to further examination now that over a decade has passed since the article’s publication. Perhaps the evidence that was missing then is now available and ready to strengthen Gause’s main thesis.