According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 5,840,590 Colombians were registered as internally displaced peoples (IDPS) in December 2014. Unlike Syria, whose rise in IDPS can be attributed mostly to the onset of a recent civil war, Colombia has been locked into a civil war for 52 years, catalyzing a slow but steady increase of this internal refugee population. As political geographer Ulrich Oslender argues, the reporting on Colombia’s internal refugee crisis has been all about war and not numbers (Oslender, 2007). A normalization of war after 52 years of internal conflict has led the country and the international stage to treat Colombia’s crisis as commonplace. The country’s mass media reporting only focuses on war rhetoric and is color-blind; constructing rebel groups as the only “illegal” domestic terrorists while trivializing the disproportionate impact of the war on afro-Colombian and indigenous communities in the Pacific Coast and in rural areas (Paschel, 2010). In fact, victims and survivors of Colombia’s 52 year old conflict have been primarily afro-descendants, indigenous, and afro-indigenous, and this is reason why their plight has been continuously and easily ignored.
The following research paper consists of three sections: The first will set the context through a brief overview of Colombia’s 52 year old civil conflict including who are the perpetrators of war including their ideological and political origins. The second will answer who are the true victims of war by assessing the differential impact of the conflict on indigenous and/or afro-descendant peoples. I also want to recognize that a lack of consciousness about the impact of war on these communities has made it easy for a population far removed from direct effects of war, to vote “NO” on an October 2nd referendum for the Colombian peace accord.
The final section will be an analysis of the 2016 peace accord negotiated between current government and rebel group leaders over a period of four years in Havana, Cuba. I argue that the final accord is a major effort to reconcile conceptions of Colombian national identity. I will focus on specific sections of the accord including agrarian reform, end of conflict, reparation to victims, and the opening of the political process because they are major efforts to integrate and re-incorporate both vulnerable rural communities (largely afro-descendant and indigenous) and former guerrilla members who abide by the tenets of the treaty.
SETTING THE CONTEXT
An internal civil war has catalyzed a major refugee crisis in Colombia. The most prominent and long-standing insurgency in Colombia began 52 years ago with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia–People’s Army (FARC), an armed rebel group founded in revolutionary Marxist-Leninist ideology under former leader Pedro Antonio Marín Marín (war name: Manuel Marulanda Vélez). The group has been largely a rural guerrilla organization, which is important when discussing who the most vulnerable have been in the face of a merciless war between Colombia’s mostly conservative government’s, right-wing paramilitaries and the FARC.
A multi-ethnic Colombia made up of a complex topography of dense mountain ranges and low tropical jungles has kept its residents largely segregated (Leech, 4, 2011). This has facilitated a decentralized government and fostered distrust among rural Colombians for governments figures and institutions housed in the capital. Inspired by populist rhetoric and action, the FARC became the people’s rebel group, committed to the liberation of the poor at the expense of conservative neoliberal moguls (Leech, 2011). A lack of agrarian support in the form of land tenure and credit for struggling farm workers, mostly indigenous and afro-descendant, resulted in their armament and eventual recruitment into the FARC (Leech, 18). FARC became their greatest form of protection from state violence and large landowners as they chose rebellion and the protection of their land as the means of politically incorporating into a national identity (Leech, 22). According to the FARC’S Agrarian Reform Programme of the Guerillas: “There is indispensable condition to raise the standard of material and cultural life of the whole peasantry, free it from unemployment, hunger, illiteracy and the endemic illnesses that limit its ability to work, to eliminate the fetter of the large landholding system.” This peasantry, mostly afro-descendant and/or indigenous communities in rural Colombia, was using FARC to protect their territory and to incorporate politically. It is ironic, that at the height of the war there was devastating impact on the same communities that found safety in the insurgency. The FARC and government-backed paramilitary groups have ignored indigenous claims to traditional land as they look to increase control of their war territory. But, importantly, politicized peasants looking to write themselves into national identities founded the FARC (Latin American Newsletter, 2001).
The FARC is made up of subsidiary rebel groups all led by a group of Secretariat commanders. Their current leader is Timeleon Jimenez, alias “Timochenko”, a major figure in the negotiations for a peace treaty. However, the FARC military tactics have shifted over the years to some that include mass kidnapping, mass displacement, and drug trafficking in order to fund itself and maintain an annual income ranging between US$200 and US$500 million (Latin American Newsletter, 2001).
The seizing of land to create military sites for warfare has been the main cause for internal displacement. The government’s military, the FARC, and paramilitary groups have been responsible for this. The usurpation of land from entire communities has led to a major internal refugee crisis and most importantly, seized their opportunity for political incorporation in Colombia (Oslender, 2011). The responsibility of the Colombian military in orchestrating major displacement and death in the outskirts of the country, especially of Afro-descendant and indigenous communities, must be underscored as well(Leech, 2010). The differential impact of the war on the most vulnerable communities of this multi-ethnic society is the focus of the next section.
THE TRUE VICTIMS OF THE ARMED CONFLICT
In 2002, 119 Afro-descendant agricultural workers were killed after being caught in the crossfire between the FARC and government-backed right-wing paramilitary groups (Oslender, 2015). In the past four years, the municipality of Toribio, Cauca, with a 97% indigenous population, has received over 600 attacks by the FARC (Monroy Becerra, 2016). Moreover, since the 1990s, internal warfare has caused the largest displacement of Colombia’s Afro-descendant population since their arrival to the Pacific Coast as enslaved peoples over 150 years ago (Oslender, 2007) . Between January and February of 1997, 200,000 Afro-Colombians fled from their settlements in the Pacific Coast (Escobar, 2003). According to Oslender, invisibility of real victims of the war gives them license to act unjustly for political expediency in a war against the FARC. They do not have to fear retaliation or being found out if war rhetoric has focused on criminalizing the FARC and if they can hide behind the actions of paramilitary groups responsible for most human rights violations during the conflict (Latin American Newsletter, 2001). Mainstream media, and Colombia and US government officials have obscured or ignored the impact of the armed conflict on the most vulnerable communities by justifying its operations through the conflict with an “illegal group”, the FARC, (Leech, 2011).
Afro-descendant and/or indigenous communities of Colombia have been historically written out of national identity. Legal color-blindness, or the absence of legislation that distinguishes between ethno-racial groups especially when it comes to reporting on the effects of the war, has permitted such one-sided war-rhetoric (Paschel, 2010). There has been little room for these Afro and/or indigenous communities to lay any claim to territorial identities or rights to reparations since their particular vulnerability has been ignored. It was not until 1993 that former Colombian president Cesar Gaviria Trujillo passed “Law 70” that Afro-Colombians were finally recognized as a distinct ethnicity and granted them legal foundation by which to protect territorial rights (Pasche, 2010). But in the aftermath of major land usurpation and displacement because of government stakeholders and rebel groups including the FARC, indigenous Afro-colombians had already been pulled into a war that removed territorial identity as a possibility for national belonging. Moreover, the war has already marked them as “others” to the rest of the country making them vulnerable to the pursuits of rebel groups and right-wing governments. Most IDPs flee to some of the largest cities including Bogota, Medellin, and Cali where they face a host of difficulties.
IDPs Marginality
IDPs move because they fear for their lives. They risk abandoning their assets and their social and family networks for some sense of security in an urban place. The majority of IDPs move from a rural area to an urban environment, a move that has had serious social, political, and economic implications. IDPs, particularly, indigenous and Afro-Colombia live in extremely vulnerable conditions in marginal areas of Colombia’s main cities, including Medellin and Bogota. One of the main problems they encounter is the lack of proper identity papers. Without these they have no access appropriate healthcare or other social services. Many do not have access to proper identity papers, which inhibits their access to healthcare, social services and decent housing (Carrillo, 2009).
About 70% percent of the rural population in Colombia lives below the poverty line, but 99% of people displaced from rural areas to urban areas are living in poverty and 85% in extreme poverty (Carrillo, 2009). This is because the access to farmable land that maintained their food security in their rural territory is suddenly absent in major urban cities. Moreover, even though IDPs have the right to federal assistance for three months, hostilities arise often with the community members of the receiving city, who demand that the state provide them with assistance too or accuse IDPs of putting a strain on social service benefits (Carrillo, 2009). IDPs also rarely find employment, and when do they do it usually amounts to a wage lower than the minimum for the labor force in major urban centers.
They lack the income to lease a living space and so most arrive to family members, but when it comes time to find places to live, they build shacks made out of wasted material including cardboard, wood, or plastic making them more susceptible to fires. These places of residence, privately or publicly owned land or waste ground, are dubbed “invaded areas” where unhealthy living conditions abound. The lack of available land urges them to build on mountain ranges and in crowded spaces making them more vulnerable to landslides or floods (Carrillo, 2009).
Displacement produces not only negative economic and housing conditions, but also impacts mental health. According to a survey administered by the International Red Cross (IRC) in eight of Colombia’s main sites for displaced communities, 67% of displaced households reported psychological problems, usually depression, or anxiety. Of these, only 24% sought help and only 15% actually received any care. But these social consequences move beyond the home. Since most IDPs reside in the most marginal areas of the city, unable to find their footing in the traditional ground economy, they become more vulnerable to gang activity, crime, or illicit drug use.
NEGOTIATING NATIONAL BELONGING IN COLOMBIA’S
PEACE TREATY
In 2012, following a 48-year old armed conflict that saw an entire nation divided and Afro-Colombian and indigenous communities the most vulnerable to the impact of the war, the FARC and the current government headed by left-wing president Juan Manuel Santos’ began peace talks in Havana, Cuba. Following two major defeats in 2008, the FARC decided to engage in peace negotiation. Out of the negotiations came a six-point peace accord signed by government and the insurgency top commanders on September 27, 2016 (“Los 6 Puntos del Acuerdo de Paz”, 2016).
The peace accord titled, “Final Accord for the Termination of the Conflict and the Construction of a Stable and Durable Peace” addresses six major points: integral rural reform, political participation, solution to the problem of illicit drugs, end of the conflict, reparation to victims, and the implementation of the accord.
For this section of the research paper, I will summarize four of these points briefly in hopes that it will shed light on how peacemakers sought to recuperate their nation multilaterally through the integration of the FARC members and Afro and indigenous communities. A collective memory and shared sense of history helps to weave a nation together, the peace accord aimed to do that through specific “recovery of memory” provisions that would lead to reconciliation for a wounded nation.
Moreover, each piece of the accord is a move towards re-negotiating the national identity of a country. When the accord was put up for a referendum vote on October 2nd, the popular vote was “NO”. Regionally, however, parts of the country where the war had the most devastating effects, including departments of el Choco, Cauca, and la Guajira, predominantly afro and indigenous voted overwhelmingly “YES” to the accord (See Appendix A.) The failed referendum, however, has left negotiators scrambling to revisit the accord, specifically its efforts to incorporate guerilla members.
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Integral Rural Reform: This component of the treaty sought to breach el campo (the fields) with the city through a financial and agrarian support of rural towns. This is important because initial recruitment into the FARC happened because of distrust among disenfranchised poor peasants for a government housed in a distant capital (Leech, 2011). Fifty-two years later the treaty is looking to address this distrust by supporting rural communities in their rural contexts. The reform delineates a plan to distribute land to campesinos or farm workers, and provide the infrastructure necessary for these farm workers to live with dignity. Moreover, the section specifies development in these regions to breach this divide through the creation of “special programs for redevelopment with territorial focus;” a deployment of financial and agrarian support for the most affected agrarian communities (Acuerdo Completo, 13). Moreover, the reform includes a restitution component, whereby government and the FARC leaders agree to restitute displaced victims’ right to territory (Acuerdo Completo, 15). .
Political Participation; Opening the Political Process: The specific language of the accord reads, “A new democratic opening is necessary to promote political inclusion and to permit that new voices and new political projects emerge in order to enrich the debate.” This rupture of political participation intends to actively include the former war victims in political frameworks by establishing “special transitory circumscriptions” in areas most affected by the war, whereby inhabitants are able to elect congress people to represent their region in the implementation of the peace process. Significantly, this part of the treaty would open up political participation to former FARC members to eliminate former political incorporation through arms: “No one ever again will use arms to promote political causes. And those who have not left their arms to transition into politics guarantees that they will not be used as objects of violence.” Thus, the treaty explicitly permits the incorporation of former guerrilla members into the political process as decision-makers, dramatically shifting notions of national identity that have constructed the FARC members in opposition to it. This process agrees to the formation of a political party led by these former members and their eligibility for policy-making positions (Acuerdo Completo, 2016).
Reparation to the Victims: In the preamble of the peace accord, signatories write: “We underline that the final accord pays special attention to fundamental rights of women, of vulnerable social groups such as indigenous towns, girls, boys, and youth, afro-descendant communities, and other groups ethnically othered; the fundamental rights of farmworkers, the fundamental rights of disabled people and the displaced because of reasons of conflict; the fundamental rights of older adults, and of the LGBTI population.” (Acuerdo Completo, 2). It is a powerful affirmation that seeks to integrate traditionally “othered” communities into the fabric of a post-conflict society.
This process includes the formation of a commission for the consolidation of truth, coexistence and non-repetition, the creation of a unit to look for the disappeared, and a special jurisdiction for peace (“En detalles: los seis puntos del acuerdo final de paz con las FARC, 2016.) The commission for the consolidation of truth will provide a final document with an explanation of the 52 year old armed conflict, with special attention to centering the narratives of victims and focusing on the differential impact of war on ethno-racial communities. The peace treaty does not adopt a punitive justice model but one that seeks first and foremost to discover the “truth” that could reconcile a blurred national history. Actors in the armed conflict will testify before Colombian Magistrates where they agree to reveal the truths of their direct or indirect involvement. A national tribune will judge and sanction their crimes especially those who admit to having committed grave social injury such as rape, murder, torture, kidnappings, or forced disappearance (Acuerdo Completo, 135-137.)
End of conflict: In this section of the peace treaty, signatories address specifically what will be the mechanisms and infrastructures needed to end and maintain the end of the civil conflict. This includes the process to disarm the FARC, but most importantly addresses the integration of former guerrilla members into Colombia’s current socio-political fabric. The agreement will facilitate the transition of former FARC members into 23 different “transitional zones of standardization.” This “reincorporation” process into the political, social, and economic fabric facilitates the transformation of the FARC into actors within the democratic system and into society. The plan includes the creation of economic infrastructure to offer economic support for the reinincoportaration of these once they have disarmed and moved into “legal/non-criminal” status. These re-incorporation strategies include productive labor, education, government ID registration, and cleanup of mine land. The end of conflict process affirms their commitment to the possibility of incorporating FARC members who agree and cooperate into every aspect of society.
Conclusion
The “NO” campaign spearheaded by former president Alvaro Uribe Velez, relied on the notion of impunity. Most Colombians on October 2nd decided that to incorporate “criminals” into their socio-political fabric was unthinkable, even if there were reparations to victims of war . The negotiations reached between the FARC and government leaders included reparation to victims and their integration into the political system through land grants, electors, and judicial hearings to recover truth and national memory. But, importantly, the accord also called for the “reincorporation”, mostly political, of former FARC members (Acuerdo Completo, 2016). The inability to conceptualize a transitional justice model like the one the signatories imagined, has forced these into renegotiation.
The Pacific Coast and most of rural Colombia where afro-descendant and indigenous communities reside, voted overwhelmingly “YES” to the peace accord (See Appendix A). In a visit to Buenaventura in the Pacific Coast of Colombia, former president Uribe was confronted by one of these Afro-descendant communities who echo the sentiments of those who voted “YES” for a peace process that finally promised their security. It was a peace accord that was finally recognizing the differential impact on their communities and sought to incorporate and recuperate them too. A young Afro-descendant man from Buenaventura confronted the former president on this: “They–he said pointing to the ex-president’s entourage–are leaving the territory today, but those who will continue in the territory suffering the aftermath of the war is us, because we have been putting and will continue providing the dead.” (Pacifista, 2016).