The aim of this essay is to critically discuss Nietzsche’s treatment of the main topic of the First Essay in On the Genealogy of Morals (henceforth named GM). I will begin by outlining the story Nietzsche tells in GM1, namely his master and slave morality. In the second part of my essay I will examine Nietzsche’s intentions as he tells the story. Firstly, I will explore the idea that his genealogy of morality is intended to be a factual account of history. I will then demonstrate that this is implausible in light of Nietzsche perspectivism, in addition to the fact that the account is highly schematic and unconvincing. Secondly I will present Janaway’s argument that the story in GM1 is a provocative mechanism used to tempt the reader to reflect on their moral values. However, I will argue that this oversimplifies Nietzsche’s position. This will lead me to my final consideration of Nietzsche’s intentions in GM1: he is aiming to provide a roughly historically accurate genealogy of morality. I will argue this is the case because we can see elsewhere in GM and his other works that he conceives of genealogy as a historical ‘sense’.
The Origins of Morality
GM1 principally addresses three issues: the value of good, evil, right and wrong; whether the enterprise of morality is valuable and whether the practice of morality contributes to or undermines human flourishing.
The story Nietzsche tells in the first essay is that in the past there were two moral outlooks: the master morality and the slave morality. Firstly, there was the original master morality which descended from the perspective of the aristocrats. This is characterised by ‘good’ and ‘bad’, where goodness came from willingness to value their own noble characteristics such as strength and courage. The term ‘bad’ is coined for those who were unlike them: the herd. These people were not morally bad but they were contemptable and unworthy of consideration. The herd were in a state of frustration, festering in bitterness when they were too weak to revolt. Nietzsche names this state ressentiment. The herd imagined revenge on the masters and coined the unflattering term ‘evil’ to release ressentiment. This manifested itself in envy, spite, self-hatred and petty aggression.
The slave revolt in morality succeeded and then slave morality descended from the downtrodden, common man. For them, the original value is ‘evil’ which is a response to being oppressed by aristocrats. After that, the term ‘good’ was coined in contrast. The morality we have today descends from this weak, slave morality as the herd is able to take revenge on their superiors (Nietzsche, 2008).
Nietzsche notes that the struggle between the opposing value systems is not over. It had been fought again and again across generations and had even been internalised in the psychologies of his best contemporaries. By examining the origins of moral practices, Nietzsche gives his own analysis and concludes that our moral practices have dark and disreputable origins. By continuing to commit to these moral practices, mankind will be hindered. Since our moral practices are not what we think they are, we should rid society of them so we can flourish (Nietzsche, 2008).
Nietzsche’s Intentions
What Nietzsche says he is up to
In GM1, Nietzsche encourages the reader to take his account of the genealogy of morals at face value; he hopes this will make his ideas more accessible before he adds in any complexities. The sum total of his critical analysis in the first essay is setting up a contrast between noble morality as good and slave morality as bad (Norman, 1998, pp.132-133).
Nietzsche wishes to develop a critical, unbiased account of morality. He hopes that in contrast to the English Psychologist, he will develop a real history of morality. He criticises the ‘English hypothesis mongering into the blue’ (Nietzsche, 2008, p.9); the English Psychologist produces a clumsy historical account where the account of human nature is too homogenous. Instead, Nietzsche hopes to give an account of the grey, which is well-documented as existing and is clearly ascertainable. Nietzsche argues that these moral genealogists are so caught up in their modern experience that they have no resolve to know the past. Nietzsche criticises the English Psychologists for their lack of real historical sense and for failing to raise questions of value.
A Serious Historical Account
Migotti (1998, pp.766-778) claims that Nietzsche’s GM was envisioned as reconstruction of the foundation of our moral consciousness. Although GM was written to promote his moral critique, Nietzsche nevertheless does aim to further historical understanding. For example, in GM1 §5, Nietzsche turns to the roots of language to support this view. As a result, the claims he commits to demand evaluation in the light of historical or anthropological evidence.
However, we can see from his perspectivism in GM3 that Nietzsche is a relativist about truth; he rejects any notion of absolute truth that is independent from us. He believes that humans engage with the world from their own perspective. This suggests that our concepts about history cannot describe the way the world is, independently of us. On his own account, Nietzsche’s claims about genealogy are not world-grounded so they cannot be understood as true or false (Nietzsche, 2008, pp.97-99).
However, it is important to note that Nietzsche does believe we can say some things are true or false with authority. He certainly seems to believe that his own perspective is better than his contemporaries such as the English Psychologists. Furthermore, Nietzsche’s critiques are often based on empirical evidence such his account of bad consciousness in the prisoner (Nietzsche, 2008, pp.60-63)
Nevertheless, we are still left with a recognisable historical thesis and sequence which is highly schematic and unconvincing. This is because Nietzsche’s broad and generalised account doesn’t do justice to the complexities of actual historical developments. We know that people throughout history have been interested in the intricacies of moral debate: we can see examples of this in ancient Greek tragic drama. Here, moral values emerged into a more settled life in the Greek polis, unlike transition from noble to slave morality (Norman, 1998, p133).
On balance, in light of his perspectivism, it seems unlikely that Nietzsche actually intends for GM to present a factually accurate account of history. Furthermore, if it was designed to be factually accurate then it is quite unconvincing. In the next section of my essay I will examine another interpretation.
A Dramatic Mechanism
Others, such as Janaway (2002, pp.261-263) interpret Nietzsche’s GM as an artistic piece of literature, used to deliberately mislead the reader towards his conclusions. Nietzsche uses a wide range of grammatical devices such as exclamation, incomplete sentences, and direct speech. By shifting his historical account to a single authorial voice, Nietzsche sets out to embarrass, amuse, tempt, shame and revolt the reader.
Consequently, the reader finds their own attachment to Christian or post-Christian moral values hard to stomach. The reader is prompted to become conscious of themselves as inheritors of slavish moral values (p.272). According to Janaway, by initially directing his investigation towards past stages of history, the reader feels anxious about the nobles’ free exercise of power. This explains why the reader feels an aversion to the nobles: fear.
Janaway argues that this is a mechanism used by Nietzsche to detach the reader from their own sense of morality and prepares them to feel indifferently to morality as a whole. The second mechanism is for the reader to feel an inclination in favour of the noble morality from which they inherit heroism, prowess and exercise of power. As a result of his dramatic tale, the reader will reflect on whether they wish to continue in the moral system according to concepts of good and evil. By the end of GM1, Nietzsche enacts disgust on behalf of the reader: ‘Enough! Enough! I can stand it no longer’ (Nietzsche, 2008, p.32). Nietzsche hopes that this will be enough to break the reader’s allegiance to judging things as good and evil. He hopes that this will pave the way for a new moral system which he regards as healthier for society.
Nevertheless, it seems to me that this oversimplifies Nietzsche’s position. From reading other texts by Nietzsche about history and genealogy and in GM itself, we can see that he does believe that he is roughly right about history. Of course, it is perfectly understandable that Nietzsche would hope to persuade the reader to his conclusions; that is the nature of any philosophical investigation. However, I believe it is unlikely this was his only task, as I will demonstrate in the next section of this essay.
A Historical ‘Sense’
In the preface of GM, Nietzsche outlines the objective as an examination of the origin of moral preconceptions. He describes himself as providing a genealogy in the sense of an account of the historical origins of morality (Nietzsche, 2008, pp.3-5). In the preface §4-5, Nietzsche refers to his previous writings which addressed the historical question. He writes, ‘my real concern was with something much more important than my own or anyone else’s hypotheses about the value of morality…What was at stake was the value of morality’ (Nietzsche, 2008, pp.5-7). This suggests that Nietzsche is aiming to provide a factually accurate account of genealogy of morality.
Foucault (1980, pp. 139-164) looks into the relationship between Nietzsche’s genealogy and history. Nietzsche considers genealogy as a historical ‘spirit’ or ‘sense’. In the Second of his Untimely Meditations he criticises history that reintroduces and always assumes a suprahistorical perspective, whose function is to compose reduced time until it is fully closed up into itself. Nietzsche encourages subjective recognitions which implies a completed development. The historian pretends to base judgements objectively. The term genealogy, or as Nietzsche describes it, the ‘historical sense’, can become good as it refuses certainty or absolutes.
Nietzsche’s genealogy is less literal and more optimistically interventionist. Nietzsche states we need a critique of moral values (Nietzsche, 2008, p.6). Perhaps, genealogy here is envisaged as a historical study of the intersecting forces which produce our moral practices. The forces are described as a struggle whose outcome is yet to be decided and can be intervened with. Smith argues that Nietzsche rejects history as a necessary, rule-governed development which finds a definite future. Furthermore, Nietzsche rejects the view that history should necessarily be the given object of neutral scientific description. Instead, Nietzsche’s genealogy works outwards to prevent the disastrous state of humanity as he sees it. To conclude, for Nietzsche genealogy is not a literal, conventional history. Instead, genealogy is used as a metaphor to describe the development of human memory (Smith in Nietzsche, 2008, pp.xii-xv).
Conclusion
In conclusion, I believe that in relaying his account of the origins of morality, Nietzche was aiming to provide the reader with a roughly historical account. This appears to be the case as although he does reject certainty and absolutes in both his GM and other works, he believes his genealogy can be a historical study of powers which construct our moral practices. He hopes that his historical account will lead to reconsideration of our moral values which will contribute to human flourishing.
I have reached this conclusion by firstly outlining the main topic of GM1: his account of the master and slave morality. Secondly, I explained how Nietzsche tells the reader that he hopes to provide them with a well-documented and factually accurate account of the genealogy of morality. Thirdly, I examined Migotti’s claim that Nietzsche does in fact aim to be a historian and as a result is open to evaluation in light of historical or anthological evidence. I argued that this was implausible in light of Nietzsche’s own account of perspectivism. Fourthly, I detailed Janaway’s argument, that GM is a mechanical device used to persuade the reader that they should reconsider their moral values. However, I argued that this oversimplified Nietzsche’s position. There is plenty of evidence that Nietzsche does hope to provide the reader with a roughly accurate genealogy of morality.