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War has many causes. But the single most precipitating factor (permissive condition) in the outbreak of war is international anarchy.
Introduction
War and anarchy have been inextricably linked since the origin of the civilized society. Historically, the absence of a centralized governing authority among states has almost always resulted in a war. Therefore, while this paper accepts the premise that there are numerous causes of war, it argues that anarchy is, in fact, the most significant cause. Drawing from the theories of international relations such as the Waltz’s images, Balance of Power, and Security Dilemma, it further expands upon the thesis and explains the significance of these theories in context of international anarchy. This paper also goes on to address the critics of the anarchy, namely the constructivist theory and liberalism. Finally, having addressed both sides of the argument, it concludes by summarizing the key points and addressing the new developments in the field of international relations, along with their potential effects on policy decisions.
Realist Perspective on the Causes of War and Anarchy
Waltz’s Images:
In 1959, a noted scholar of International Relations, Kenneth N. Waltz, published a book that would go on to change the discipline of International Relations and our understanding of it forever: “Man, the State and War.” In this book, Waltz broadly puts forward three perspectives (images) of interpreting the causes of global conflict: Individual image (human nature), State Image (domestic affairs), and International Image (anarchy).
While the first two images play an important role in the outbreak of war, they have several pitfalls. Firstly, the main fallacy in the individual image is that it assumes human nature to be evil. This a gross generalization of human nature based on a very narrow understanding of the human psychology and history. Similarly, the pitfall in the state image is that it oversimplifies the nature of the states. Since most states are very diverse in terms of their policies, economy, geography, and demographics, it is extremely difficult to construct a sophisticated model of domestic system that would be applicable to all states. Therefore, Waltz advocates the third image, anarchy, as the most significant cause of war. In “Man, The State, and War”, he says, “Then what explains war among states? Rousseau's answer is really that war occurs because there is nothing to prevent it” (Waltz 1959, 118).
Waltz’s main argument in the book states that the primary cause of war among states is the lack of a centralized authority. Therefore, when nations engage in diplomacy on international matters, they are most likely to put their selfish interests above the common interests of their counterparts. This leads to an increase in tension and mistrust among nations. In the absence of a central supervising authority, the tension further increases, often leading to a violent conflict.
Balance of Power
The notion of the Balance of Power among states in an anarchy leading to war is based on five fundamental assumptions (Mearsheimer 2001, 70-78):
International system is anarchic in nature.
All powerful states possess offensive military capability, which gives them the means to attack and destroy other states.
Uncertainty about intentions of the other states regarding the use of military power.
Survival is the primary goal of states.
States act rationally by thinking carefully about international balance of power before taking any offensive actions.
It can be inferred from the above assumptions that states are power-hungry entities that strive to achieve hegemony in the international political system. This desire of political supremacy often leads to an unending series of power maximization and competition among states. It is also interesting to note that when a great power achieves a military advantage over its counterparts, its “hunger” for power does not end there. Mearsheimer claims that this pursuit of power ends only when states achieve hegemony. Therefore, most states are on a constant look-out for opportunities to maximize their territorial and economic dominance. This does not necessarily imply that states constantly look for opportunities to invade each other. On the contrary, they may even choose non-security agendas to seek greater economic prosperity and peace. However, this logic holds true as long as it does not conflict with the Balance of Power theory. Occasionally, states might even choose to forego their fundamental ideologies in furtherance of power. To quote Mearsheimer, “In World War II, the liberal democracies put aside their antipathy for communism and formed and alliance with the Soviet Union against Nazi Germany. “I can’t take communism” Franklin Roosevelt emphasized, but to defeat Hitler “I would hold hands with the Devil.” (Mearsheimer 2001, 76).
Security Dilemma
Security Dilemma is a situation in international relations where the actions taken by a state to increase its own security cause reactions from the other states, which leads to a decrease, rather than an increase, in the state’s security. According to some experts, Security Dilemma is one of the major causes of conflict among nations in the international system. According to this theory, states constantly attempt to increase their defenses by acquiring more military technology and weapons. However, its counterpart states may misinterpret this move and feel threatened by the increased military prowess as they have no way of knowing whether the armed state will use its increased weaponry for offense or defense. Resultantly, the states have two alternatives: either increasing their own military capabilities to regain the balance of power or launching an attack on the state to prevent it from creating an imbalance in the international power dynamics in the first place. If they choose the first alternative, they create an unending spiral of power maximization, leading to a war in the long run. If they choose the second alternative, war is anyway guaranteed. Therefore, in both situations, an absence of a superior authority invariably leads to war.
The dynamics of Security Dilemma are also affected by the type of weaponization. For example, if a state clearly has more defensive weapons than offensive, its relations with the other states become more peaceful and cordial, as the states no longer view it as an adversary, at least for the time being. Interestingly, these security dynamics change completely in the case of nuclear weapons. In the situation of a nuclear deterrence, offensive weapons are those that provide defense. For example, nuclear missiles like ICBMs are useful for offense, as well as defense. Therefore, when a state acquires a large number of ICBMs, it becomes extremely difficult to infer its intentions from its military posture, inadvertently paving the way for another series of Security Dilemma and ultimately ending in a war (R Jervis 1978, 118).
Criticism of the Realist Perspective
Constructivist Approach
Constructivism is a relatively recent development in the field of International Relations. The constructivist approach to anarchy can be popularly summarized by the famous quote, “Anarchy is what states make of it.” (Wendt 1992, 78). The constructivist approach believes that interests and identities of nations are more significant in international relations than anarchy. Alexander Wendt, one of the pioneers of the Constructivist theory, believes that states have multiple identities. Therefore, he rejects the realist notion of states having a single identity of power maximizers. He also argues that the presence of international peace and co-operation among nations after the Cold War is an example of the states gradually accepting the idea of identities and interests in global politics. However, the main fallacy behind the constructivist argument is the fact that it undermines the nature of states to prioritize individual interests over collective interests. While co-operation in an international system is important, it is not pragmatic to assume that states will readily forego their selfish interests to foster the interests of the community of nations.
Liberal Approach Liberalism is a positive and an optimistic concept. As a political philosophy, it emphasizes on the equal rights and freedom of individuals. Liberalism believes in four basic institutions: popular sovereignty, market forces governing demand and supply, equality before law, and private property rights. The liberal perspective towards war states that even though liberal states have historically engaged in war against non-liberal states, they are yet to engage in war against other liberal states. This argument attempts contrasts the realist notion of anarchy through the theory of norm externalization (nations with similar ideologies solve their problems peacefully). It also counters the notion of war being the inevitable outcome in an international anarchic system through two theories: Cost of War (Kantian ethics) and Institutional factors (checks and balances). However, the main fallacy behind these theories is that if factors like the Cost of War (lives and money) and the Institution are really important, why did most liberal nations ignore them when going to war against non-liberal states?
Conclusion
Through the course of the paper, we examined different theories of international relations in support of and against the thesis of anarchy being the permissive condition for war. While the realist perspective on anarchy is generally considered to be a pragmatic approach, it also has some pitfalls, as observed through the constructivist and the liberal arguments. Despite its criticism, realism still represents one of the most widely accepted and dominant schools of thought in the theory of international relations. Here, it is also important to note that with the change in the global geopolitical landscape, and the establishment of organizations such as the United Nations, the role of anarchy in the outbreak of conflicts has been gradually decreasing. Therefore, while the realist arguments still hold true, it would be interesting to see how these new developments affect the influence of realism over international affairs and its applicability in public policy in the coming years.