It is regularly observed that more academics study European Union (EU) foreign policy than there are civil servants to make it work.
(Dijkstra and Vanhoonacker, 2016)
Following the recent survey of 451 published articles on EU foreign policy, Keuleers et al (2016) concluded that academics ought to stop ‘naval gazing’ and focus disproportionately on studying internal dimensions of EU foreign policy system, and rather analyze its consequences for recipient countries. What Keuleers et al failed to realize is that the very pursuit of a common foreign policy primarily serves an internal function. As Ginsberg argues, it is “confidence building among EU member states”, “creating a common viewpoint” and “preventing disputes over foreign policy from adversely affecting other areas of European integration” (Ginsberg and Smith, 2007: 5), which should be recognized as the chief priority and necessary, the analytical focus.
As this essay will elucidate, despite the implicit prioritization of these internal goals in the strife for integrating foreign policy, the very nature of foreign affairs and consequently the EU procedures to direct it, render integration unsuccessful by design. Specifically, this essay argues that European Foreign policy integration may have occurred on the informal level leading to a conversion in foreign policy practices as a result of elite socialization. Nevertheless, the macro level constraints of intergovernmental foreign policy institutions in concert with a lack of incentives for the Member states to delegate competencies to the supranational level will continue to impede on integration.
The argument will proceed in three parts: First, the current state of EU foreign policy challenges will be highlighted. Secondly, the vertical and horizontal hurdles within the institutional structure of foreign policymaking on the European level will show the persistence of intergovernmentalism and national interest preferences Lastly, the integrative effects of micro-level elite socialization and common foreign policy practices shall be critically assessed, showing that they have failed to mitigate structural constraints and lack of political will.
In reference to theoretical lenses, it is not the objective of this study to engage in the recurrent neofunctionalist/intergovernmental debate in reference to EU integration, however, this essay does not view these approaches as mutually exclusive, and will show that although the foreign policy realm remains institutionally intergovernmental, functional ‘spillover’ serves to explain the evolution of common diplomatic practices and, to a certain extent, policy preferences on the level of individual policymakers.
In 2017, as Aggestam and Johansson summarize eloquently,
“The European Union is currently experiencing one of the severest crisis in its existence (…) The solidarity between EU Member States is tested like never before over terrorism, the migration crisis, and Russian assertiveness and defiance of the rules of European order.” (p. )
However, as Müller (2016) concludes, significant progress or integration at the policy level has not ensued in response to what appears the perfect storm of foreign policy crises.
Necessity, in this case, is not the mother of invention, as Ginsberg has argued it had been in 2001 when he described EU Foreign policy as ‘baptized by fire’ having been spurred into action by the ensuing security risk emanating from the Yugoslav crisis. In fact, as Lehne (2012) has contended “Outside the EU institutions member states are today more likely to take their own national positions without coordinating with their partners. And on the inside, they are more tempted to impose their narrow national agendas on EU policies” (24).
Finally, the EU’s High Representative herself (henceforth HR), along with the European Parliament and the European Commission, cautioned that despite reforms advanced by the Lisbon treaty, the EU has failed to realize its potential effectively, particularly given the current context of crises (Müller, 2016: 367). This notion of disappointed expectations is not new, in fact, in 1995, the European Commission President Jacques Santer observed that ‘the European Union is simply not punching its weight’ (Thomas, 2012: 457).
While integration of member states does not equate to efficiency of outcomes (Thomas 2012, 472), it is imminent to acknowledge that an inability of member states to form common positions and act through the comprehensive EU framework has hampered any possibility of ‘politics of scale’ (Ginsberg, 1989) to produce “common good” (Wagner, 2003: 583). To put it simply, EU foreign policy successes, most notably in the realms of weapon trafficking, are underwhelming and pale in both scope and impact when compared to the foreign policy activities of its largest member states.
Although space constraints do not allow for elaborate case studies, it suffices to note the indisputable failure of the EU during the Libya crisis of 2011, in which it neither conducted joint operational action through the CSDP nor contributed to stabilization of Libya (Müller, 2016: 370). More recently Simcox (Foreign affairs) laments that even efforts diminish cross-border terrorist threats has been incredibly unsuccessful despite several member states (France) calls for greater integration in this realm. As the French-led NATO intervention in Libya and the unilateral French intervention in Rwanda before it have shown is that CFSP/CSDP cannot effectively constrain member states from undermining the EU foreign policy agenda through unilateral action
Formally the explanation appears simple, “the CFSP/CSDP represents a ‘voluntary negotiation system’ that member states can avoid if they feel they can pursue their preferences more effectively outside the EU framework” (Müller, 2016: 361).Despite the recurrent argument viewing the Lisbon treaty as a push in the supranational direction (Portela and Raube, 2012: 16) the fact that ultimate power in the foreign policy realm falls to the European Council where intergovernmental decision making prevails is indisputable. Specifically, the creation of the HR and the European External Action Service as a ‘formally independent body’ (Edwards?) as a result of Lisbon, has little impact on the macro decision-making level, as they overarchingly serve to implement policy that has already been agreed upon by the Member states. From interviews and survey with Member state representatives, Aggestam and Johannson (2017) note that since “EEAS and HR are still newcomers in the field” (p.9), Member states view them as ornamental representatives rather than functional decision makers,
A final argument for formal supranational foreign policy may lie in the fact that decisions in the council can be made by qualified majority voting, however, as Regelsberger notes, it has remained a ‘dead letter’ (Regelsberger 2002: 239), used at best as a threat and is undermined by the veto provisions. Thus, while QMV is present de jure, the unanimity requirement prevails de facto, meaning that “policy-making in the EU is likely to result in stalemate or lowest common denominator deals” (Müller, 2016: 360).
Having demonstrated the formal intergovernmental nature of foreign policy decision making, comprehending why member states have chosen this path is arguably more difficult, given that significant integration has proven possible in other policy areas, most notably of course monetary policy. While it may be tempting to blame simply a ‘pathetic lack of ambition’ (Dempsey, 2015) on the part of EU members, it is useful to ask the counterfactual question, why would member states choose to pool their sovereignty in order to integrate in the first place?
Gordon (1997) provides the perceived benefits of institutionalized cooperation, based on both perceived conversion of national interests and tangible advantages of politics of scale must outweigh the potential costs of losing exclusive control (p.80).
Writing in a pre-Lisbon treaty context, Gordon concludes that these preconditions had not been met, predicting a continued differentiation of member states’ security interests particularly in light of potential enlargement. His predictions have proven correct.
To commence, in reference to conversion of interests, a plethora of scholarship has highlighted key prevailing differences in foreign policy preferences rooted in national interest considerations (Aggestam 1999; Balfour, Carta, and Raik 2015; Hoffmann 2000).
An example particularly relevant to the previously noted case of Libya is the division over the use of force. Countries such as the UK, Poland or France are more willing to use force whereas Germany is notable proponent of civilian power (Müller, 2016: 361).
This leads to the second key element, namely the “perceived benefits of institutionalized cooperation” in the foreign policy realm. Wagner (2003) emphasizes this notion in particular, arguing that the “specific design of international institutions will depend on the nature of the co-operation problem at stake” (580). Foreign affairs is a wide-ranging policy field encompassing economic elements such as development aid, peacekeeping missions etc, arguably the overarching concerns tackled by CFSP/CSDP and prioritized by the European council lies in crisis management.
Based on this, Wagner contends that it is precisely the “nature of crisis management as a ‘fast co-ordination game’ (which) explains why there are few incentives for delegating sovereignty to supranational institutions” (584). Thus, the key factor to consider by way of explanation is quite simply, speed, which, as Edwards notes has not necessarily been a feature of EU policy implementation (Edwards, 2013: 287).
Finally, when placing EU foreign policy in a wider context, one cannot forget that “CFSP is not the ‘only game in town’” (Müller, 2016: 361). Other multilateral agencies, such as the UN and most notably NATO, or bilateral cooperation (see Aggestam and Johannson (2017)), may prove more time efficient or provide more resources.
In brief, given
Naturally, this rationalist focus on the formal institutional level can be critiqued as too reductionist without considering the micro-level perspective of informal policy making (see for example (Ginsberg and Smith, 2007)). In fact, a popular source of evidence when arguing that integration is, in fact, occurring in EU foreign policy, namely on the micro-level of shared foreign policy practices of European policymakers converging over time. These shared practices are argued to lead to an “upgrade of the common interest among member states through processes of functional adaptation and learning”, as a possible means of ‘circumventing’ intergovernmental restraints (Müller, 2016: 362)
To understand this notion of foreign policy practices, Adler’s (2008) theoretical approach of ‘communities of practice’ is particularly valuable to comprehend the impact of informal politics. Practices are understood as “knowledge-constituted, meaningful patterns of socially recognized activity embedded in communities, routines and organizations that structure experience” (PN), creating transnational communities of practices bound by like-mindedness which continue to constitute the ‘background knowledge’ based on which practices continue to be, that limits the realm of actions perceived as possible or legitimate (PN).
Proponents of this view argue that the analytical focus should shift to the “socialization processes and learning by doing by lower-level officials” (Ginsberg and Smith, 2007: 5) which is viewed to have caused a shift from egoistic instrumental rationality to socially constructed rationality . National interests in foreign policy are not formed in a vacuum and have, as a result of shared ‘background knowledge’, been collectively redefined (Smith, 2004:99).
Smith (2004) underlines this argument by looking back to the roots of CFSP/CSDP commencing with the 1970s EPC network, demonstrating the incremental creation of coordination as habitual practice among foreign policy officials through the EPC’s ‘transgovernmental’ network encouraging cooperation and consensus-seeking, as well as national policy adaption to common EU positions citing the common Euro- Arab dialogue of 1974 as a particular achievement, given the pro-Israel stance of member states such as Germany and the Netherlands. However, when assessing the ‘record’ if the EPC in terms of tangible outcomes, Gordon (1997) finds that while an increased mutual understanding among diplomats facilitated a common approach, “European foreign policies were still nationally made, with EPC playing little more than a consultative function”(85). Its successor, CFSP/CSDP has similarly been criticized for its primarily consultative role (Edwards, 2013: 287).
The crucial point of contention, as summarized by Chelotti (2016) is that “the transformative character of socialization processes in EU foreign policy must be carefully demonstrated, not (usually tacitly) assumed” (535). Her survey of 138 national delegates, demonstrated that “the European political system remains on the whole state-centric, and the outputs are generally determined by the nationally oriented geopolitical and economic considerations” (529).
While certainly not exhaustive, Chelotti’s work has served to explain what appears a dichotomy between formal rationalism and intergovernmental decisionmaking on the one hand and ‘transgovernmental’ informal policy level on the other. The key insight is that such convergence of practices is “agnostic” on the nature of the interactions output (Chelotti, 2016: 530).