Article 1 – Bob Franklin, ‘The Future of Journalism’ (2014)
Bob Franklin’s comprehensive 2014 article examines the implications of the “age of digital media” upon the field of journalism, asserting that it is causing “radical change” and unprecedented consequences for the industry (Franklin, 2014, p.469). He argues that new economic difficulties, are forcing traditional legacy media to evolve in order to survive within this new era, frantically searching for “alternative business models to fund sustainable journalism” (Franklin, 2014, p.469). Franklin’s exploration of the debates and concerns addressed at the 2013 Future of Journalism conference enables him to assess journalism’s key recent developments and ultimately, question the industry’s uncertain future.
The critical decline of legacy media due to the “crisis of financial viability” has undoubtedly impacted its ability to serve vital democratic watchdog functions (Franklin, 2014, p.470). The conference’s focus on encouraging practical financial business strategies capable of supporting a well-adapted, “democratic digital journalism”, is thus emphasised and systematically examined by Franklin, who assesses the efficiency of multiple models using recent research and scholarly opinions (Franklin, 2014, p.469). From a somewhat broad, open perspective, he further urges his audience to consider the changing nature of journalistic professionalism and academia within the digital era. Delving into fundamental shifts in the industry’s ethics, education and identity as well as scholarly study, Franklin ponders upon how these may continue to develop and reshape journalism in the future
Article 2 – Thomas Jacobsen, ‘Trending theory of the public sphere’ (2017)
Within his complex 2017 article, Thomas Jacobson discusses the evolution of the public sphere theory, examining how it has advanced and extended since Jürgen Habermas’ book, “The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere” (1962). He particularly focuses on how the theory is expanding and facing new challenges in three core areas: social learning, globalisation and religion. By reviewing three contemporary books on these areas alongside Habermas’ original and updated research, Jacobson reveals the current, conflicted landscape of public sphere theory. Throughout this analysis, he seemingly upholds and positions himself in defence of Habermas’ work, responding to theorists’ criticisms and debating that most critiques result from misunderstandings or have already been met with improvements in his updated research.
Habermas’ original public sphere notion is being extended to the “processes of social learning” following a desire from theorists like O’Mahony for a “fuller account of the public sphere” using cognitive sociology, which considers the implications of social interactions (Jacobsen, 2017, p.74). Globalisation has also significantly impacted upon the theory, spurring debates regarding whether the public sphere should be “scaled up” to a transnational level to accommodate new global challenges (Jacobsen, 2017, p.80). Finally, contemporary religious trends have led to reconsiderations about the link between religion and secular society, resulting in the questioning of religion’s revised “role in the public sphere” (Jacobsen, 2017, p.80). Thomas ultimately concludes that these new elaborations and challenges have had immense implications for public sphere theory and “communication research”.
Critical Reflection
This week focused on liberalism, journalism and media democracy and the impacts of changes to these concepts. I found questions surrounding journalism’s current and future societal role particularly insightful to reflect upon. As the lecture established, the historical liberal ideals underpinning journalistic media provide us with a broader understanding about its journalism’s assumed functions and evolving societal role. Shaped by liberal notions like ‘press freedom’ through minimal government regulation and private media ownership, the media is often considered the “fourth estate”, functioning a “servant of the people” (Errington and Miragliotta, 2011, p.136) through its democratic role as watchdog, information provider and public sphere facilitator. However, it is clear that the media’s ability to complete these functions is being increasingly challenged and “battered” by various processes and agendas. (Schulze, 2003, p.1). Adding pre-existing issues such as the idealistic, theoretical nature of liberal notions, the emergence of a new “age of digital media” has created an array of new challenges for journalism (Franklin, 2014, p.469).
This is discussed within Bob Franklin’s 2014 article, “The Future of Journalism”, wherein he examines why and how journalism is frantically evolving in response to new complications (Franklin, 2014, p.469). Though it would benefit from updated research, his reliable, comprehensive text contains considerable evidence and scholarly debate. Extending upon the lecture, Franklin notes revolutionary changes to journalism in response to legacy media’s economic decline, spurred by the development of the Internet, digital media platforms, and newly-emerging media conglomerates. The ensuing instability of many media corporations, (especially local), unable to meet “commercial obligations” resulted in the declining ability to effectively perform watchdog functions and retain a stable audience (Schulze, 2003, p.1). This unstable framework underpins the current journalism landscape, characterised by unprecedented change and a desperate search to find viable new business models which will sustain journalism within this digital era. From Franklin’s argument and my own research, it is my understanding that these strategic changes may be entirely reshaping the journalistic media industry; theorists such as McChesney (2013, p.616) further argue that many adaptive changes have decreased the value of journalism, affecting the quality of content and the industry itself. This can be attributed to the perceived decrease in journalistic professionalism due to alternative business strategies such as the rise of “entertainment-based journalism” and amateur “citizen journalists”, as well as the use of digital distributors as sources and platforms (Gillmor, 2004, p.58). This is exemplified within…
Use of Twitter
This assessment ultimately spurs me to question how journalistic media’ functions as society’s fourth estate have been shifted and reshaped. While I believe that the media still performs important fourth estate functions, supported by Lewis, Williams and Franklin (2008, p.11) it is certainly undermined by these recent challenges EXAMPLE, and must thus evolve to survive and remain relevant and viable. However, the declining quality and professionalism accompanying these adaptations remains a huge concern, leaving professional journalism’s future, as Franklin states, “uncertain (Franklin, 2014, p.469).
We must also consider the impact of the emergence of the Internet as a possible “fifth estate” on journalism societal contribution (CITE) – as these estates compare and overlap in many places. One of these areas is its diminishing role as facilitator of the “public sphere” (Jacobsen, 2017, p.74), is arguably being overtaken by the Internet’s platforms; the public can interact in “electronic assemblies”, seemingly reviving the otherwise declining liberal notion – devised by HABERMAS (CITE) – within a contemporary context
Research Scope
I believe that I would be most interested in further questioning what the future holds for the journalism industry, as the field’s frantic evolution and uncertain future were the components I found most engaging this week. I would also perhaps conduct further research into Habermas’ work on public sphere theory. While I found Jacobsen’s article very complex and scrupulous, the content was rather interesting – particularly regarding theory’s expansion into other areas.
READING 2
Argumentative, logical
Very little statistical evidence and research
Possible merging of platforms
Entry 2: The Impact and Implications of WikiLeaks (Lecture 12)
Literature review
Article 1 – Alasdair Roberts, WikiLeaks: the illusion of transparency (2012)
Within his insightful 2012 article, Alasdair Roberts critically examines and ultimately argues against the common perspective that WikiLeaks’ 2010 disclosures prompted the beginning of a new era of “radical transparency” (Roberts, 2012, p.116). He urges his audience to reassess the significance of WikiLeaks’ global contributions, debating that its influence has been greatly exaggerated. Furthermore, using recent studies and statistical evidence, he criticises the flawed logic of the notion of radical transparency, highlighting its difficulties by exploring the 2010 leaks in detail.
An analysis of the 2010 leaks supports Roberts’ labelling of WikiLeaks’ “new era in transparency” as an illusion (Roberts, 2012, p.116). Roberts first scrutinises the significance of the 2010 disclosures, placing them in “proper perspective” by asserting that WikiLeaks’ overwhelming volume of leaked material constitute only a small proportion of total confidential information. An examination of WikiLeaks’ key difficulties further displays the “political naivety” of its program (Roberts, 2012, p.129). Specifically, Roberts examines the site’s failure to consider the Internet’s commercial and political influences or the forceful response of governments to leaks, their neglect to organise and interpret information, and the lack of public reaction. From this, Roberts ultimately concludes that WikiLeaks’ 2010 disclosures did not significantly impact the American, or global, public sphere.
Article 2 – Lisa Lynch, ‘“WE’RE GOING TO CRACK THE WORLD OPEN”: WikiLeaks and the future of investigative reporting’ (2010)
Lisa Lynch’s perceptive 2010 article examines WikiLeaks’ role in the troubled field of investigative journalism, ultimately emphasising its positive potential by thoroughly analysing its complex relationship with the media and researching how reporters utilising the site. Using her findings, she endorses WikiLeaks’ value as a journalistic resource and its possible potential as an intervening force to “reinvigorate” investigative journalism – despite its current perception as a subversive “outlier” (Lynch, 2010, p.310) by much of the contemporary journalistic world.
Examining WikiLeaks’ strained relationship with the media reveals its “evolving dynamic” (Lynch, 2010, p.311). Lynch explores journalists’ unease with the site, recognising that this may stem from its deviation from traditional journalistic values through radical nature and assumption of some “Fourth Estate” watchdog functions (Lynch, 2010, p.311). Lynch concurrently questions tense relationship’s future due to these profound differences, WikiLeaks’ “cyberlibertarian” principles often conflicting with journalistic ethics (Lynch, 2010, p.317). She further emphasises WikiLeaks’ value as a journalistic tool, using recent research to support its significance as a source for leakers, citizens and reporters. Her data portrays a diverse use of WikiLeaks both regularly and as a one-time source by reporters, as well as increasingly for the storage of legally unstable documents removed from other outlets. Ultimately, Lynch suggests perhaps that the site assume a more central role within investigative journalism.
Critical Reflection
Within this week’s material, concerning WikiLeaks and the concept of internet freedom, I found the debates concerning WikiLeaks’ “new model of journalism” (Andreasson, 2012, p.171) and ultimate significance the most thought-provocative. Recorded in Andreasson’s academic text, WikiLeaks declares itself a ‘new model of journalism’ encouraging complete transparency by leaking often-confidential information to the public. Arguing that, as discussed in the previous entry, the current journalism landscape is “compromised” politically and economically, now “less independent” and unable to aptly perform democratic watchdog functions, it asserts that journalistic media must engage in fearless, inquisitive scrutiny (Lewis, Williams and Franklin, 2008, p.11) (Andreasson, 2012, p.171). In her 2010 article, “WE’RE GOING TO CRACK THE WORLD OPEN”, Lisa Lynch emphasises the site’s value as a journalistic tool. Referring to reliable, albeit slightly outdated statistic research, she asserts that this radical new model could “reinvigorate” the declining journalism industry (Lynch, 2010, p.310). While it is clear that the journalism industry must search for alternative models that will ensure its survival in the contemporary era, the effectiveness of WikiLeaks’ model of total transparency is greatly disputed.
Although the site’s “private ownership” and freedom from government influence perhaps enables it to better perform democratic checks on authorities than the currently struggling journalistic media (Errington and Miragliotta, 2011, p.135), this also raises questions as to how far “press freedom” should go, as well as when digital democracy transforms into terrorism. While this liberal notion can be used in defence of WikiLeaks’ often-radical methods, I would argue that there are limits to this, particularly within cases of serious law-breaking or life endangerment due to the release of sensitive information. This is exemplified within the site’s 2010 release of the “Afghan war logs”, which encapsulated its lack of competence in dealing with delicate information (Roberts, 2012, p.123). The logs were leaked without redacting the names of many individuals whose lives could be endangered if their identities were revealed, placing them at risk. Incidents like this, wherein far more harm is done than good, have led to negative societal reception and WikiLeaks members being branded “terrorists” by the much of the public (McFarland, 2010, n.p.).
Another consideration is the significance and scale of WikiLeaks’ contributions, examined within Alasdair Roberts’ 2012 article, “WikiLeaks: the illusion of transparency”. His thoroughly researched and evidenced text combats the popular belief that WikiLeaks’ disclosures have been vastly influential, asserting instead that its contributions have been greatly “overstated” (Roberts, 2012, p.116). This article particularly interested me, challenging my prior assumptions and enabling me to critically reflect upon the reasons why its leaks are far less influential than typically assumed. One of these factors concerns the implications of government intervention after security leaks, which greatly lessen WikiLeaks’ influence and global reach in cases such as PayPal’s suspension of its donation account in response from US pressure, severely impacting its revenue (Wikileaks.org, 2010). Also significant is the site’s neglect in organising and interpreting disclosed information, often making leaks difficult for viewers to comprehend and contextualise, and resulting in a muted audience reaction. Roberts further argues that the public is more concerned with “spectacle” than with learning the truth (Roberts, 2012, p.116); US public discourse has hardly changed following the release of documents detailing power corruption. These disclosures were not destabilising but were instead seemingly accepted by the public. While Lynch convincingly displays WikiLeaks’ usefulness as a journalistic tool, recent research assessed by Roberts clarifies that its disclosures have had very little impact upon the public sphere overall.
Research Scope
I feel that this is one of the most interesting topics we’ve covered in the course and thus would definitely be interested in researching WikiLeaks further. In particular, I might like to pursue more specific examples of its impacts and implications, as well as perhaps questioning further into whether its actions privilege digital democracy or are closer to terrorism.
Entry 3: Fake news’ and Our Media Landscape (Lecture 13)
Literature review
Article 1 – Hunt Alcott and Matthew Gentzkow, ‘Social Media and Fake News in the 2016 Election’ (2017)
Hunt Allcott and Matthew Gentzkow’s analytical 2017 article investigates how the outcome of the 2016 US election may have been impacted by social media and the spread of ‘fake news’ (Allcott and Gentzkow, 2017, p.211). Approaching this debate from a seemingly apolitical, methodical perspective, they focus on recent concern about social media’s role in relaying unfiltered, unchecked content to large readerships. Rather than directly addressing the argument that the circulation of false stories was integral in President Trump’s victory, they instead make broader clarifications – determining voters’ “level of overall exposure to fake news”, among other deductions, from their meticulous collection of recent data (Allcott and Gentzkow, 2017, p.232).
Allcott and Gentzkow establish a historical, theoretical framework for this debate before delving into the “economics of fake news”, accounting for the concept’s rising significance, providing reasons for the production of false stories, and constructing a model for fake news “media markets” (Allcott and Gentzkow, 2017, p.212). Importantly, they also encourage their audience to contemplate the implications of fake news circulation, particularly the social costs, and provide possible resolutions for these adverse impacts. While their results confirm a higher exposure to fake articles favouring Trump and provide some indication of how persuasive fake news would need to be to have directly influenced his victory, they avoid drawing direct, immediate assumptions from this, concluding that fake news’ effect on election results largely depends on how effective exposure is in influencing votes.
Article 2 – Alexandra Juhasz, ‘Four Hard Truths About Fake News’ (2016)
Within her 2016 academic article, Alexandra Juhasz sardonically examines the development and rise of fake news online. She argues that in a period underpinned by confusion about online content, we are in “ironic free-fall”; irony and fakery have become so prominent that we must consume everything with uncertainty and suspicion (Juhasz, 2016, n.p.). She urges her audience to assume a new perspective of self-awareness, caution and scrutiny when browsing online content, ultimately presenting “four self-evident truths” about the current online “fake news “landscape and how we can approach it (Juhasz, 2016, n.p.).
It is important to be aware of the “unruly sea of lies” the internet is founded upon, largely as a result of its commercialised, commodified nature (Juhasz, 2016, n.p.). Referring to case studies, Juhasz asserts that it is driven by corporate and political forces perceiving the public’s attention as a monetised commodity – hailing the platform “the perfect incubator for fake news” (Juhasz, 2016, n.p.). It is also evident that the rise of fake news is a logical, natural extension of the Internet’s amoral framework, which values entertainment, mass consumption, capitalism and popularity above all. Critically, she argues that the Internet cannot be trusted, recommending that consumers adopt a critical self-awareness digital data interactions and ultimately seek to “learn how to better read (and understand) digital media” (Juhasz, 2016, n.p.).
Critical Reflection
Within this week’s examination of ‘fake news’ in our contemporary media landscape, I found the rise of fake news and its appeal to modern audiences especially interesting to reflect upon. An assessment of our current media landscape reveals that the growing popularity of false stories has resulted from numerous key factors and recent changes. These factors, seemingly indicative of “deeper issues” within our new and journalistic media and the “circulation of public information” today, primarily stem from the emergence of the Internet – which has greatly increased the prevalence of fake news (Ball, 2017, p. 14). Within her critical 2016 article, ‘Four Hard Truths About Fake News’, Alexandra Juhasz describes the Internet as “the perfect incubator for fake news” due to its capitalist foundations, exposing its political and commercial “motivations” through case studies, though lacking statistical research (Juhasz, 2016, n.p.) (Bednar, 2012, p.133). The emergence of online platforms has hugely amplified the profitability of fake news by reducing publishing and distribution costs, decreasing the value of long-term reputations, making it easier to attract large readerships and providing an overwhelming current of information far too difficult to regulate (Allcott and Gentzkow, 2017, p.214).
Applying a PEM lens to the fake news crisis additionally reveals its connection to changes in the struggling journalism landscape discussed previously. The aforementioned “economic failure” of traditional business models has led to revolutionary journalistic changes which increasingly facilitate fake news circulation, including a shift to “entertainment-based journalism”, the use of amateur or “citizen journalists”, and the increased role of social media within news distribution (Schulze, 2003, p.1) (Gillmor, 2004, p.58). Large online social media platforms like Facebook, Twitter and Google thus enable the circulation of fake news content due to financial motivations, revealing the Internet’s “commercialisation” (Wasko, 2014, p.260). As asserted by Titcomb (2017, n.p.), their primary interest in advertising revenue incentivises them to overlook the nature of the content itself, focusing only on attracting audience attention. This is visible within an incident earlier this year, wherein Google and Facebook admitted to “promoting politicised fake news” following the Las Vegas massacre (McCauley, 2017, n.p.). These inaccurate articles received significant user traffic and misled much of the online public – exemplifying this massive, commercial spread of misinformation.
An assessment of contemporary media audiences, viewed in relation to audience fragmentation, provides integral insight into why fake news appeals to today’s consumers. Theorists such as Roberts (2012, p.116) support that the newly fragmented attention of modern audiences is increasingly drawn by “spectacle” by media distributors solely focused on seeking user’s attention rather than providing reliable information. In addition, it can be argued that the internet’s “fragmentation of audiences” into niched groups may have serious implications in regard to fake news (Webster and Ksiazek, 2012, p.39). It is often suggested that the plethora of content choice available to users through online platforms has segregated them into polarised “gated communities”, wherein individuals spend an “increasing amount of time in homophilous networks” and encounter few opinions which oppose their own – leaving little space for critical debate or contradictory beliefs (Turow, 1997, p.2). (Mihailidis and Viotty, 2017, p.441). Within their 2017 article, ‘Social Media and Fake News in the 2016 Election’, Hunt Alcott and Matthew Gentzkow link the negative impacts of audience fragmentation to the prevalence of fake news. Forming a model for fake news “supply and demand”, they suggest, from a meticulous database of research, that consumers – who tend to avoid “costly fact-checking” – may psychologically prefer articles which support or confirm their prior worldly assumptions (Schulze, 2003, p.17). Such findings provide incentive for news firms to manipulate or falsify news stories for financial or popular gain, as individuals are statistically likelier to be satisfied with information which does not challenge their beliefs (Allcott and Gentzkow, 2017, p.213. An analysis of these societal issues largely accounts for fake news’ spread and appeal to contemporary audiences
Research Scope
I found the topics this week vastly intriguing and relevant to current events and would like to look further into certain aspects. In particular, I would love to learn more about its connections to the current journalism landscape and other current events. Additionally, I feel I would enjoy researching the historical framework underpinning the concept of ‘fake news’ further, as well as examining possible resolutions proposed by theorists.