The Kurdish Worker’s Party, known as the PKK, has been around for a few decades and has caused thousands of deaths and cost billions of dollars to deal with. They are an officially recognized terrorist organization by the United States, the United Nations, and other world powers. This paper will examine the history and the future of the PKK and consider possible solutions to its eradication. The aim of this paper is to examine the history of the Kurdish Worker’s Party and explore how and why they operate through literature reviews of research on the group previously conducted. Policy recommendations about the methods that have the potential to be utilized to combat and eradicate the Kurdish Worker’s Party successfully will also be presented.
Terrorism is not specifically defined across the globe, but its main feature is that it is done to broadcast a political message to a targeted group. The Kurdish Workers’ Party, or Kurds, is a Marxist-Leninist terrorist organization made up of Turkish Kurds. They inhabit southern Turkey, northern Iraq, northern Iran, Syria, and Armenia. There are about 30 million Kurds living in the world, half of them in Turkey making up 20% of their national population and are the biggest stateless minority on the globe. The PKK was founded on November 27, 1978 to fight for an autonomous state, Kurdistan, something they have been trying to do since the 1920s with rebellions every few years prior to their official establishment in 1978 (Phillips, 2008). It operates in Turkey and Europe, targeting Europeans, Turks, rival Kurds, and Turkish government supporters. The PKK was imagined as the ‘‘vanguard of the global socialist movement’’ in which the revolution’s central power would be a ‘‘worker–peasant alliance.’’ They rebuked ‘‘the repressive exploitation of the Kurds’’ and called for a ‘‘democratic and united Kurdistan” (Phillips, 2008).
Although in 1920 the Treaty of Sevres created an independent Kurdistan, it was never created. Turkey in 1937 after a rebellion tried to reject the existence of Kurds by banning the Kurdish language, culture, and geographical place names (Phillips, 2008). Operations of the Kurdish Worker’s Party began in 1978 with the goal to start a guerilla war. The PKK was not strong enough by themselves to wage a guerilla war without support, and its political orientation prevented them from allying with other Kurdish groups. In 1980, they moved into Lebanon to try and increase their organization. They trained alongside some of the most successful terrorists in the world. In 1982, the Kurds allied with Syrians after the Israeli invasion of Lebanon and began receiving weapons and money.
In 1984, the formerly weak group began their first attacks using guerrilla warfare with the first attack on August 15, 1984, and within a few years, the PKK had murdered more than ten thousand people, focusing mainly on civilians. Turkey responded by operating security forces heavily and isolating them from their support bases and attacking PKK groups. In 1990, the PKK changed tactics from attacking civilians to security forces and economic targets as a result of the Kurds condemning violence on civilians.
The Kurdish Worker’s Party was established to be like a dictatorship, with their leader Abdullah Ocalan having the ultimate power, he “cultivated a cult of personality, brutally suppressed dissent, and purged opponents” (Phillips, 2008).
Literature review
As with cultural differences that exist in various cities within a country, so do differences within a terrorist organization, the PKK being included. Beren in 2012 found that “armed attacks and bombings against the security forces are carried out in some cities, explosive materials used in these attacks are smuggled into the country through other cities.” Beren also found that in certain cities, merely lawful activities such as press declarations and marches are conducted. The Kurdish Worker’s Party has used different strategies and tactics to their advantage in order to produce the most amount of damage possible.
Recruitment
In order to fulfill their missions, terrorist organizations needs members. They often recruit in places with vulnerable people with issues such as “socioeconomic inequalities, poverty, over-population, education level, age, gender, ethnic structure, and state policies” (Ozeren, Sever, Yilmaz, & Sozer, 2014). People with these types of demographics are much more susceptible to following an influential group, but there is no single cause as to why someone may become a terrorist. One researcher gives four types of reasons for involvement- prospect for action, the desire for a feeling of fitting in, want for social status, and possibility of financial prosperity (Ozeren et. al, 2014). Other reasons for potential involvement in a terrorist organization include radicalization, experiences as a child and during school, and political exposure. Terrorists use injustice, unfairness, or inequalities to reason for their existence.
The choice to be become a terrorist “is rarely made by individuals on their own” (Ozeren et. al, 2014). The PKK uses various methods and strategies in the recruitment, including driving young individuals to crime that leads to conviction, kidnapping, forcing, intimidating, deceiving, using structures related to the organization within the recruitment process, the influence of organizational media, prison activities, and activities in Europe. Children are kidnapped by the PKK, the average age of which someone joins is 15-21, sometimes as young as 10. Young people make up the biggest majority of new members. One out of every four members is female, a result of good recruiting. 92 percent of members are unmarried, and the majority of members that are married had done so prior to joining. 72 percent of members only received a primary school education or lower. 78 percent of members were unemployed at the time of membership, 71 percent of members’ families were also unemployed. Members typically have a high number of siblings, with 10 being the most frequent and only 13 percent of members have a family member in the organization. A sample of 901 members showed that 34 percent of them had lost a family member to the organization (Ozeren et. al, 2014). People that live in rural areas that have a lot of children are more likely to join, and often times the children are forced to join by the organization (Ozeren et. al, 2014). Along with kidnapping, the PKK will use such intimidation to get people to join that they feel there is no other choice (Ozeren et. al, 2014). There is no escape from the organization because if they were try to avoid the recruiting efforts, they would most likely be killed.
Reasons for joining the PKK include family issues, the kinship effect, friendship factor, continuing trial/fugitive standing, ethnic nationalism, unemployment and financial problems, the yearning for retaliation, pretentiousness and the want for attention, and escape from individual difficulties. Not every person will have the same reason for deciding to join; it varies from person to person. There could be a combination of a few of the issues that makes up the full reason they decided to commit to the organization. Family issues (forced marriage, the desire to be rebellious, and dealing with violence at home) are the highest-ranking influence factor to join. Forced marriages are the main family issue, followed by the want to break free from authority and then exposure to violence at home in the frequency of which members decided to join. Friendship fosters joining as well; members followed their close friends to foster the relationships. One member said people looked at those that fought with the group as heroes, (Ozeren et. al, 2014), and that kind of attention can be coveted by young people, especially males. To avoid legal troubles, membership is seen as an alternative. “Ethnic nationalism has almost become the language of resistance to many forms of life problems, or individuals’ response to the negative conditions surrounding them” (Ozeren et. al, 2014) something that can be seen in all parts of the world. It is an easy explanation and one that stands out immediately to justify why. Along with ethnic nationalism can come the desire for revenge for the wrongdoings that are perceived to have been committed against the group .The United States has seen this issue come to light lately with protests in Charlottesville and elsewhere.
A lot of members joined at the suggestion of family members involved, this makes up a large portion of members (Ozeren et. al, 2014). In this case, it turns out that peer pressure is not just limited to friends but extends to family members as well. In the case of the Kurdish Worker’s Party, it seems to relate similarly to joining a cult. The people joining the PKK could be seen as almost brainwashed because they are seeking the approval and satisfaction from the friends or family that is convincing them to join. Just like the Manson family operated where the ringleader of the entire operation was never the person doing the specific act of murdering, they were responsible for the people that did. In the case of the PKK, it is very plausible something similar has happened within the organization.
Joining the organization can be viewed as a way out of economic issues. Revenge for wrongdoings against someone’s friends and family was also an explanation for joining. Individuals lacking attention and appreciation, especially during their childhood, would be good candidates for the Kurdish Worker’s Party; they think they will obtain that by joining the organization. People escaping personal problems like family illnesses and money find escape in the terrorist organization. Feelings of despair and separation and damaging actions done by the government including torture or peer pressure while in prison can lead people to feelings of humiliation thus making them more vulnerable to becoming a terrorist (Ozeren et. al, 2014). The advertisements the organization puts out via the television, radio, and in print also plays a part as “such media are especially effective with children and young individuals who have not yet completely developed their own personality (Ozeren et. al, 2014). This example can also be tied to a similarity to a cult. The very essence of getting people to join is finding someone vulnerable enough and unable to be a strong enough thinker that understands the group they are associating with is actually bad for them.
Strategies
The PKK attacked the Kurdish rich and powerful who were loyal with the Turkish government and Kurds who were employed by government establishments. From 1984 to 1987, the PKK kidnapped or killed 217 teachers, attacked hospitals, killed doctors and nurses, and burned down hundreds of schools (Phillips, 2008). As a result, Turkey declared a state of emergency and placed several provinces under martial law in the late 80s.
Since 1990, the PKK has utilized the language of nationalism. Since 1995, it has used religion. They chose terrorism rather than a propaganda war. In 1995, the PKK’s leader, Abdullah Ocalan asked the United States to intervene and support the creation of a solitary state, which was rejected. Also in 1995, the PKK began appealing to Muslim Kurds to expand their base. Between 1995 and 1999, 21 suicide attacks were conducted. The shift to religious terrorism rejuvenated the PKK. They gained support thorough the Kurd community as well as throughout the Middle East. The PKK was forced into Syria by Turkey’s military pressure in the late 90s, but Syria declared them a terrorist organization in 1998. In 1999, Ocalan was captured and told the group to exit Northern Iraq and to become inactive (Beren, 2012). The group then pledged for peace but the group continued to operate military organizations under different names. They ended their peace truce in 2004. As a result of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks at the World Trade Center and the invasion of Iraq, the PKK acknowledged an authority gap that was present there and began using Iraq as a training center and resumed bombings and armed terrorist attacks (Beren, 2012). In 2003, the United States began cracking down on the PKK in northern Iraq. The PKK works with other international terrorist groups and some revolutionary groups in Turkey. The PKK has evolved their name numerous times over the years to try and re-establish themselves. They were the Kurdistan Labour Party in 1978, Freedom and Democracy Congress of Kurdistan in April 2002, the Kurdistan People's Congress in November 2003, the Democratic Confederation of Kurdistan in March 2005, and the Peoples’ Confederation of Kurdistan as of May 2007.
The PKK has changed its tactics over the years, they used ‘intensive terror’ between 1984 and 1989, an ‘attempt to proceed to the guerrilla stage’ was between 1989 and 1995, ‘Intensive terror’ was used again, encompassing large cities between 1995 and 1999 and ‘terror, passive disobedience and politization’ was between 1999 and 2005. Intensive terror was used “to construct the Kurdish identity by gaining ground upon Turkish nationalism” (Beren, 2012). This failed to draw the attention of the Kurdish people.
During the use of intensive terror, the PKK failed to receive the required support from the Kurds for the acts it intended to recognize in the cities in the West, and the intelligence of the police as well as the associated actions prevented the majority of the intended operations of the organization in the area (Beren, 2012).
In 2010 in Turkey, the PKK conducted a variety of attacks: 39 percent were actions of direct violence, 12 percent of them were collective activities and providing members to the organization unlawfully, and 41 percent were lawful acts such as publicity of the terrorist organization (Beren, 2012). Ocalan is still able to somewhat lead the PKK while in jail, he puts out instructions via his lawyers and by European based media, but the PKK does not have a clear authority structure.
Conflictions
Beren called the Kurdish Worker’s Party “the organization of contradictions” (2012) because of their conflicting messages. They were upset about the absence of state investments, but would bomb civil servants in order to stop the investments; they conducted heinous murders but wanted human rights (Beren, 2012). Despite all the PKK has done, polls show that most Kurds want to live in peace within Turkey and trust they can progress their objectives with the political procedure (Phillips, 2008).
Funding
The PKK is funded by a revolutionary tax from Kurdish businessmen in Turkey who had to either pay or possibly be killed. Cultural centers such as the Kurdish Employers Association, the Kurdish Islamic Movement, and the Kurdish Red Crescent have donated money. Drugs, weapons smuggling, human trafficking, and extortion are also sources of revenues. In 1998, the PKK was providing Britain with 40% of heroin sold in Europe and at its height, their annual income was $500 million. Turkey maintains that as of 2005, the PKK still receives at least $150 million annually in revenue. The PKK manages financial pursuits in European countries through the Coordination of the European Kurdish Democratic Society and organizes pilgrimage and umrah organizations to give financial backing for the terrorist organization through the Kurdistan Islamic Society (Beren, 2012).
Recognition as a Terrorist Organization
The United States only recognized the PKK as a foreign terrorist organization in 2001, followed by Canada and the United Kingdom, and then followed by the European Union in 2002. This delay may explain why the PKK has been able to be so prolonged in their efforts. In 2007, Turkey’s democratization had increased that the PKK was forced to reorganize again in order to survive. The PKK was acting with both political and violent strategy. Turkey and Iraq formed a Counterterrorism Agreement in 2007 that created a legal base for collaborating on its finance and intelligence efforts but Iraq does not allow Turkey to cross borders to fight the PKK. In the 80s, Turkey attempted a strong approach to the PKK by enacting martial law in some areas and declaring a state of emergency. Over the years it did the opposite by fostering unemployment and poor towns, a magnet for PKK operations. Beginning in 2012, the Turkish government has been attempting to reconcile with the PKK. It is still ongoing. Turkey estimates they have spent $200 billion on the fight against PKK.
Policy Recommendations
Currently the PKK does not have a clear command or control structure, but they are still executing attacks and killing people. In December 2012, the Turkish government launched a reconciliation process that is still ongoing. The PKK has not killed any security personnel since it began, but only 10 percent of the PKK has left Turkey and there has been possibly upwards of around 2,000 new recruits (Ozeren et. al, 2014). The PKK announced a ceasefire with Turkey in October 2015, but the country refused. Since July of 2015, about 2,000 people have been killed as a result of the group.
There are a few strategies that can be put in place to combat the PKK. The international community can target its financing and propaganda infrastructure, the European Counterterrorism Group could take the lead in investigating illicit revenues that fund them the UN Counterterrorism Committee could request that the EU and member states that tolerate PKK front organizations document their efforts aimed at cutting off funding, and the licenses for European-based PKK media outlets that incite hatred or endorse violence should be revoked.
Fighting terrorism requires different strategies and tactics for different areas including different characteristics, kinds and effects. Beren (2012) found that the most significant detail is to develop and objectify a roadmap for the antiterrorism policy appropriate for the local characteristics and variances that is a procedure explicit for each city, nation, and globally.
They also advise that “the primary problems of each city must be detected by means of the threat and risk assessments and unique solutions for each city must be offered” and “issues of strategy and discourse including cultural, political and social components” (Beren, 2012) need to be considered for antiterrorism measures just as fighting terrorism measures. Regional features must be taken into account when considering which approach to take (Beren, 2012). Antiterrorism plans need to be flexible and adaptable. There is not a one-size fit all approach when it comes to terrorism. Beren also advised that using problem-oriented policing is the strategy to use and routines need to be identified, events need to be correctly analyzed, and intervening before the attacks take place is crucial (2012).
Military action is a tactic that works fighting terrorism, but sometimes at the expense of civilians. Turkey used heavy military force against the PKK in 1989 and 1992, but it only lead to a surge in PKK conflicts by 1993. Phillips in his 2008 journal advised against military action in northern Iraq, saying that Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan of Turkey is “under pressure to act decisively.” He also advises that it would have grave consequences, it would “undermine Turkey’s democratic development, radicalize Turkish Kurds, and risk a regional conflagration that would both adversely affect relations between the United States and Turkey and compromise Turkey’s candidacy for membership in the European Union (EU).” Although military action is not the first option Phillips (2008) calls for, he suggests Iraq allow Turkey to chase the PKK across the border to continue the success the Turkey–Iraq Counterterrorism Agreement of September 28, 2007 was. A 12-month ceasefire is something else Phillips (2008) suggests between the Iraqi President and the PKK in order to decrease the chance for military action by Turkey, allows Turkey to consider strategies against the PKK, and implement recommended programs. By improving relations between Iraq and Turkey, it “could also yield a windfall of economic benefits in the form of oil transport fees, water rights, construction deals, oil development contracts, and cross border trade” (Phillips, 2008).
An aspect that may not always be looked at to fight terrorism is improving the quality of life and public services. Phillips (2008) advises that improving the economic conditions in southeast Turkey by creating jobs through privatization and land reform, improving infrastructures, expanding healthcare and education (especially or women), and allowing funding from international donors are all ways that terrorism can be eradicated by offering a better way of living. Turkey did this from 1982 to 1992 by investing $20 billion dollars building dams that created jobs and increased agricultural production and incomes. Turkey can continue dam projects to deliver low-cost electricity to further economic growth. Transportation investments of upgrading airports can accommodate international flights and further expand the economy. Turkey’s government energy company could use funds to explore and progress possible energy options in the southeast. The southeast part of Turkey has a 30 percent unemployment rate, this can be reduce through improvements in the agricultural and animal industry and increased trade cooperation (Phillips, 2008).
By targeting the PKK’s publicity and sponsoring through the UN’s Counterterrorism Committee asking the European Union to document funding to the PKK in order to cut it off and PKK media outlets sanctioning violence be revoked, the international community can increase pressure on them (Phillips, 2008). Turkey needs to increase cultural rights such as allowing Kurdish language in government media and Turkey’s military must also comply with international human rights principles (Phillips, 2008) to give them more legitimacy and accountability.
After peace can be achieved by the PKK, Phillips (2008) recommends Turkey offer amnesty to any former PKK members and examines how other nations successfully used amnesty programs. Amnesty should only be offered to those members that first joined after 2002, and second were not part of the command staff (command staff can seek asylum in their home country). Phillips believes that unless amnesty is offered, the PKK will never fully get rid of the issue. The United States can aid Turkey by strengthening relations with them in order to prove they are not trying to diminish them by protecting the PKK in Iraq and supporting an independent Iraqi Kurdistan; the United States also needs Turkey to backing the missions in Iraq, including sustained consent to use Incirlik Air Base, which 70 percent of air supplies to U.S. troops in Iraq is transported (Phillips, 2008). Unfortunately according to a 2007 poll, only 9 percent of Turks have a positive opinion of the United States (Phillips, 2008).
A simple aspect of fighting terrorism that needs to be done in order to efficiently combat it is to define it. By the world sharing a common definition for terrorism, it can be learned what needs to be done in order to create the correct strategies against it. By not having a shared definition, one country may not deem an action to be terroristic in nature that another does. “Success in antiterrorism strategies can be gained only by means of the proper analysis of terrorist organizations and terrorist actions” (Beren, 2012). Knowing the enemy knows how to bring them down. Working together as a united front globally will help solve the terrorism crisis that continues to grow.