Philosophers have argued on the relationship between the mind and the body for centuries. The many differing perspectives, opinions and arguments have created a philosophical dialogue on the subject. In this paper, I will be discussing three different views given by philosophers; namely: Descartes’ “Cartesian Dualism” which argues the separation of the mind and bodily realms, Ryle’s objections to Descartes’ views and, finally, the Churchlands’ “Eliminative Materialism”; arguing for the materialist perspective against the propositional attitudes of “Folk Psychology”. Furthermore, I, as an informed participant, included my personal views on the arguments discussed on the mind-body problem.
Descartes’ thesis, essentially, separates the mind and the body as two distinct realms of which he calls: “Mind-body Dualism” also known as “Cartesian Dualism”. He lays out his claim through three premises: 1) I can doubt that I have a body 2) I cannot doubt that I think, therefore I am and 3) I cannot doubt that I exist as a thinking thing, but I can doubt that I have a physical body. Therefore, the mind and body are completely separate. He acknowledges that the mind is a thinking thing, and part of a non-extended realm, in that; it does not occupy physical space. While the body is a non-thinking thing, and has a spatial location and physical existence; consequently, it is an extended realm. Because of this, Descartes also argues that it is possible for one realm to exist without the other. Moreover, Descartes entertained the thought that if, for example, a body part were to be amputated, it would affect the body (the body would now occupy less space); however, nothing would be taken away from the mind. These reasons are why Descartes’ claims the two as separate realms.
Gilbert Ryle, a British philosopher, disagreed with Descartes; he claims that the mind and body are not separate entities and that they cannot exist without the other. He responds to Descartes’ claim by arguing that Descartes made a “category-mistake”, a linguistic confusion, in overseeing the whole issue. Ryle provides three analogies to make his point: the analogy of the university, of division and of team spirit. Firstly, the university analogy starts with a person on tour to a university; they are shown the faculty, the students, the library, the offices etc. However, at the end of the tour, they ask where the university is. Ryle claims that, herein lies the category-mistake; the university is taken as another infrastructure, not unlike the various buildings shown before. When in reality, the university is simply another way to categorize the faculty, students, buildings and everything else that comes together with a like goal of education. Next, Ryle offers the division analogy; for example, with a military marching band, instrument players, flag bearers, squadrons and all, the oddity comes from questioning where the division is. The subject is wrong in assuming that the division is a separate concrete entity and not the whole of what they had already witnessed, that is, the military marching band of a division. The final analogy sees the subject in the situation where they’re watching a sports game; they see the players, goals, ball etc. but they then ask where the team spirit is. Again, team spirit is not something physical; consequently, it cannot be pointed out as one. These analogies connect to what Ryle sees as the logical absurdity in the concept of the separate realms of the mind and the body. Ryle is arguing that mentalistic words (thoughts e.g. knowing, understanding etc.) do not refer to mental objects and/or activities in the way behavioral words (physical actions e.g. drank, punched etc.) do. They are simply a way to refer to behavioral dispositions; therefore, it does not make sense to separate them into realms of their own. Conclusively, Ryle describes mental states as merely a way through which the physical realm can be explained; he also sees most mental states as reducible to physical explanations i.e. seeing the color red would be the result of neurons accepting and processing stimuli. Thusly, Ryle disagrees with Descartes’ claim that the mind and body are two separate realms.
Patricia and Paul Churchland provided another perspective towards the argument; they called it “Eliminative Materialism” (EM). EM is based on the fallacy in the common process of folk psychology (FP), the process through which one makes inferences on another subject’s thoughts and feelings based on their behavior. FP, better known as “common sense”, allows us to explain human behavior by accepting propositional attitudes e.g. beliefs, desires etc. and interpreting them based on prior knowledge. It also accepts that the majority of human behavior and propositional attitudes are consistent within each other, hence, why assumptions using FP show high success rates. The materialist point of view also acknowledges that many propositional attitudes e.g. belief, desire, thoughts; as mentioned before, have no concrete neural basis. Consequently, the Churchlands, argued that most mental states, in fact, do not exist; they are easily reducible to a biological level (i.e. they can be explained by neural activity cause and effect). The argument is given as follows: 1) FP is an empirical theory 2) Since FP is an empirical theory, it can be evaluated in the same way as any other theory and 3) FP is lacking fruitfulness. Unlike Descartes and Ryle, the Churchlands argue for the inexistence of mental states. Unfortunately, there are many objections to the claims offered by the Churchlands. Firstly, the eliminative materialist view can be seen as self-refuting. EM is the perspective that goes against having any propositional attitudes, including having beliefs, yet to accept the EM claim, one must believe in it. Secondly, EM does not properly take into account the successfulness of FP in daily life. It is difficult to completely remove the use of FP because of its high accuracy and effectiveness. Finally, one must realize that FP is not attempting to categorize itself with other robust theories. It is incomparable to other sciences and does not claim explanatory power; it is closer to an imaginative simulation; hence, EM cannot argue against it the way it does.
Personally, I see all three claims, to be too extreme in their views to be entirely convincing; they are weakened by their ultimatums. Moreover, the arguments seem to each have hamartias- fatal flaws. Nevertheless, I can identify most with Ryle’s conclusion: that the mind and body are not distinct from each other and cannot exist independently. I interpret this argument logically; in that, if the mind and body were distinct, how could they then manipulate the other? i.e. how could your thoughts translate into your actions? In theory, the simplicity of Ryle’s core argument would have been sufficient; however, Ryle’s argument shows weakness when countering Descartes’ claim. Ryle’s argument is heavily focused on behavior and dispositions; he does not, however, argue that the mind cannot sufficiently explain actions by itself. He accepted that human behavior and dispositions could be referred to without referring to the mind. Therefore, Ryle’s perspective is too narrow to completely encompass the concept and is not strong enough to argue against Descartes fully. However, I chose his conclusion because it is the only claim I see logic through; if Ryle were to develop his argument further in proving his logical conclusion, his claim could have been the strongest one out of all three philosophers’. This is not to say that Descartes argument is perfect; I am objecting to all three premises (see par 2) on his part. Firstly, there is a reason as to why very few people still believe in Cartesian Dualism; for one, advancements in scientific research have shown clear connections between mind and body. For example, it is now a fact that the mind is responsible in processing the senses and thus, bodily experiences- such a thing cannot be possible if Descartes’ claims were true. Additionally, it must be acknowledged that Descartes was a religious man, and so, his prejudices became a part of his philosophical theories. By arguing that the mind and body are separate, Descartes is promoting the possibility of the consciousness or “soul” surviving after the death of the body in the afterlife. Such bias can only minimize a philosopher’s credibility in presenting his arguments. It would be very difficult to prove Descartes’ argument without proving first the existence of the afterlife in which the consciousness is preserved. Finally, I disagree most with the premises laid out by the Churchlands; that 1) FP is an empirical theory 2) Since FP is an empirical theory, it can be evaluated in the same way as any other theory and 3) FP is lacking fruitfulness. All three premises can be easily countered by the response that FP does not ever claim to be a scientific theory and so 1) is not an empirical theory 2) cannot be evaluated as any other scientific theory and finally, 3) does not lack fruitfulness because it has proven to be successful in daily usage, not as a scientific theory, but as a imaginative exercise. Because all the premises that make up EM can be broken down so easily, it can be said that the Churchlands have the weakest argument of the three discussed.
In conclusion, the mind-body problem has been dealt with through many philosophical theories. Descartes, Ryle and the Churchlands offer different perspectives and arguments, all with their own strengths and weaknesses. Descartes saw the mind and body as separate realms, made up of different substances; therefore, it is possible for one to exist without the other. Ryle opposed this idea by arguing that the mind or body cannot exist without the other. He saw Descartes’ argument to be a result of a category mistake; by separating the two, Descartes is linguistically confusing mentalistic words with behavioral dispositions. Finally, the Churchlands’ “Eliminative Materialism” theory opposes “Folk Psychology”, the process of making assumptions based upon propositional attitudes. EM is a view that FP is completely flawed, and that we should abandon all propositional attitudes for neural processes instead. Finally, I gave my own views on the mind-body problem: even though I saw weaknesses in all three arguments discussed, I could see the most potential in Ryle’s argument. In terms of logic and application to real life, his theory fit the best; however, his claims still have room for improvement. The mind-body problem continues to be one of the most important and mysterious of philosophical topics. Many great philosophers have each had a say on the issue, yet none can fully support their claims to win the majority over. It is important for research on the subject to be continued, as the implications for the mind-body problem may prove valuable in the reasoning behind human meaning and existence.