The international relations framework of realism conceptualizes the global political scene as characterised by a zero-sum game dilemma, where the success of one states is necessarily at the expense of another. Realism propagates that statesmen’s actions are driven by their nature – a Hobbesian state of being in which individuals are defined by selfishness. This paper will examine the reigns of Gamal Abdel Nasser and Anwar Sadat from a realist perspective, to assess the claim that both acted as agents of conflict and regional instability during their respective reigns. The first section of this paper integrates the theoretical framework of realism with Nasser’s reign, specifically focusing on the 1950s – arguably the peak of his rule. The second part of the paper applies a realist rationale to Sadat’s reign, focusing primarily on the 1970s. The third portion of the paper entails a comparison of both leaders, drawing from the conclusion of the previous sections. The main thesis is that from a realist perspective, neither Nasser nor Sadat acted in ways that increased conflict and regional instability during the height of their respective reigns.
Nasser rose to power as a revolutionary leader with a clearly defined set of goals, namely the destruction of the “monarchy, the British military occupation, foreign political influence, and the corruption of Egypt’s own public life” (Mansfield p.670). Accordingly, the achievement of these goals defined Nasser’s domestic and foreign policies. During the 1950s, at the height of his reign, Nasser’s domestic policies were characterized by nationalist economic policies – policies such as nationalisation of the most lucrative sectors of the economy (with the oil industry being of key importance), the provision of a wide range of social safety nets for the Egyptian population (such as universal education and relatively easier access to health care), and the transformation of Egypt into a one-party state . His foreign policy was decidedly anti-imperialist, with an overtly aggressive attitude towards the British, and an affinity towards nationalist independence movements in other parts of Africa.
The height of Nasser’s reign was arguably in the 1950s, when he took drastic measures to consolidate his authority in both Egypt and on the global scene. To entrench his power domestically, Nasser began by purging both left and right wing political activists and parties, which alienated them from the governance process and effectively turned Egypt into a one-party state. The alienation of the left and right was achieved by attacking the supporting base of both – industrial workers and farmers respectively . Political purges were complemented by the creation of a clandestine paramilitary force, which ensured that opposition elements were silenced. According to the realist framework of international relations, the Hobbesian state of nature vis-à-vis the state is driven by the need for security, which implies that any real or perceived threat to security will be eliminated for the purpose of stability . Nasser’s aggression against political opposition was therefore a predictable outcome from this perspective, and contrary to the assertion that this induced instability in Egyptian political circles, his calculated moves created a stable political environment in a domestic context.
Another key tenet of domestic Nasserism, during the peak of his reign, was economic nationalism, which was applied to almost all sectors of economic production. For instance, Nasser implemented land reforms, nationalised oil refineries and employed a socially developmental state that invested in sectors such as education and health. Economic nationalism caused both domestic and international tension, because it upset local private business entrepreneurs and/or investors, as well as multinational oil corporations operating in Egypt at the time (most notably the British and to a lesser extent the French) . This policy was predictable from the realist interpretation of politics, as it contributed towards achieving national security albeit in socio-economic terms. Nasser’s affinity towards nationalism was closely related to his anti-imperialist stance on foreign affairs, as both were motivated by the political goal to make Egypt socio-economically and politically independent of foreign influence.
Nasser’s foreign policy was also predicated on anti-imperialism and nationalism. The most pivotal foreign policy events during Nasser’s reign were the Suez Crisis in 1956 and the American-Syrian crisis of 1957. In the former, Nasser upset British and French imperial interests by barring their access to the strategically important Suez Canal. In the latter incident, Nasser intervened in a crisis contextually defined by the Cold War, which had resulted in the ascension of a pro-Soviet Union government in Syria, much to the distaste of the United States. Consequently, Nasser’s intervention in 1957 was a calculated move to consolidate Egyptian regional authority, especially in the face of a Saudi Arabian threat . According to the realist theory, an important element in determining events on the global political scene is based on balance of power considerations . In the Suez Crisis, the most important political power was wielded by the British – which Nasser sought to overturn. The existence of anarchy as a governing principle of international relations implied that the lack of an enforcement mechanism to maintain the status-quo balance of power would necessarily cause tension between the countries concerned. Similarly, with the American-Syrian crisis, the regional balance of power was threatened by Saudi influence, which was spreading at Egypt’s expense. It was therefore necessary, according to realist theory, for Nasser to employ an aggressive foreign policy to tilt the global and regional balance of power in his favour. Although his actions did make the international political arena more unstable – from a realist perspective, that was a natural outcome.
Another important variable in Nasser’s foreign policy was the overt affinity towards nationalist and populist ideals, which affected the Cold War and independence movements across Africa. Nasser intended to shape the entire Arab world in the image of his core values, which threatened imperial powers that had vested political and economic interests in the region . Through the Non-Aligned Movement, Nasser participated in various colonial liberation wars against colonialism in Africa, thereby further undercutting the imperial prowess and presence of great European powers and the United States. This was complementary to Nasser’s pro-communist attitude, which manifested in close diplomatic ties to the Soviet Union, as well as funding for nationalist, anti-imperialist and socialist independence movements. From the realist perspective, Nasser’s foreign policy did not necessarily contribute to instability because it occurred within an anarchically structured international relations framework, which is inherently characterised by instability. Nasser’s foreign policy sought to rearrange the global and regional balance of power in favour of Egypt, to further complement Egypt’s growing economic and military strength, as well as its identity as a Middle Eastern regional powerhouse.
Anwar Sadat rose to power after Nasser, and had a decidedly different approach to both domestic and foreign policies. He will be assessed within the 1970s decade, which represents the height of his power. Sadat focused on the complete opposite of Nasserism, as evidenced by his commitment to free-market economic policies (instead of a socialist and nationalist developmental state), closer diplomatic ties with the United States (rather than the Soviet Union), a restoration of the balance of power without Egypt at the helm (as opposed to instituting Egypt as a regional and global powerhouse), and political cooperation with most political parties in Egypt (instead of purging political parties with contrary views). Ironically, Sadat had less popular support than Nasser, despite the former’s commitment towards eliminating tension in both domestic and international contexts . Sadat’s Corrective Revolution and the “October War” in the early 1970s culminated in the expulsion of Soviet diplomats and personnel, purportedly to “(deliver) the country from injustice, terrorism and humiliation” . An important tenet in realist theory is the assumption that alliances in the international political scene are made on the basis of common goals – which are almost always centred on maintaining or restructuring the existing balance of power. Sadat possessed the foresight to predict that the Soviet Union would lose the Cold War and it influenced his decision to expel Soviet personnel.
Sadat’s calculations in this case, were aligned with the perceived balance of power – naturally creating tension with the global powerhouse, though its international authority was on the wane. Another related aspect of Sadat’s foreign policy were the 1978 Camp David Accords and 1979 peace treaty with Israel – both of which sated tensions between Egypt and Israel, thereby contributing to regional stability (at least, on the surface) . The cessation of hostilities with Israel was largely conditioned by the facilitation of Egypt’s diplomatic relations with the United States, which would go on to count Israel among one of its most valuable allies. An alliance with the United States therefore meant an alliance with Israel. Assessed from the realist perspective, Sadat, like Nasser, made calculations based on preserving the balance of power in Egypt’s favour (i.e. through its alliance with the United Sates), and consolidating the importance of Egypt, which was defined by the proximity of diplomatic ties to the ascending hegemony that was the United States. This in turn, created tension in the global political arena (through the alienation of the declining hegemon, the Soviet Union).
Sadat’s domestic policy was also economically defined by a commitment to free market values heralded by the United States as the most prudent economic blueprint. In 1974 and 1975, Sadat opened Egypt’s economy to global trade; essentially undoing the progress made under Nasser’s social-nationalism approach, and re-opened the Suez Canal to foreign powers, respectively . In contrast to Nasser, Sadat reintroduced the private sector and encouraged foreign investment – but this came at the price of discarding a developmental state model that overtly committed to raising the socio-economic standards of the Egyptian populace. From a realist perspective, Sadat weakened the global integrity of Egypt, by accepting and encouraging a less influential or dominant Egypt – especially in comparison to the ideals espoused by Nasserism. However, this calculation was based on preserving or tilting the balance of power in favour of Egypt, which is the realist norm. According to realism, statesmen are motivated by a Hobbesian state of nature, which dictates that selfish motivations are the explanatory factor behind actions and reactions. Consequently, it could be argued that Sadat’s policies had been driven by the Hobbesian state of nature, in that they were calculated to improve Sadat’s image and reputation as a progressive statesman in the eyes of the global hegemon, the United States.
In conclusion, this paper evaluated the reigns of Nasser and Sadat through a realist interpretation of international relations. Both Nasser and Sadat instituted policies that are deemed predictable under the realist interpretation of international relations. Nasser’s domestic policies included a nationalist and socialist developmental state, the elimination of all politically divisive elements, and the institution of a clandestine paramilitary force to enforce his domestic agenda. According to the realist perspective, this was to preserve Egypt’s security and consolidate it as a regional powerhouse. Though anti-imperialism, pro-nationalism and pro-socialism defined Nasser’s foreign policy and within the realist framework, this did not contribute towards an already unstable international political arena, but sought to re-organize the balance of power in Egypt’s favour. Sadat’s domestic policy was characterised by a free-market economic ideology, buttressed by a pro-American sentiment. Correspondingly, his foreign policy was characterised by a commitment towards the United States, which manifested in the alienation of the Soviet Union and a simultaneous restoration of diplomatic ties with Israel. From a realist perspective, Sadat’s actions were driven by a Hobbesian state of nature and balance of power calculations intended to preserve Egypt’s position on the global pecking order. As such, according to the realist theoretical framework, neither Nasser nor Sadat’s actions can be interpreted as causing conflict and regional instability.