In the First Essay of On the Genealogy of Morality (GM), Nietzsche takes upon the ambitious task of ‘proving’ the origins of morality. In this paper, I will outline the findings of Nietzsche’s ‘genealogical’ research of these origins. This will first involve clearly defining the difference between the “master” and “slave” systems of value that Nietzsche discusses, and explaining exactly what he means by the “slave revolt in morality.” Then, using close analysis of the text, I will move on to discuss what exactly it is that Nietzsche holds against “the slave revolt.” Finally, I will launch into a discussion of whether I can accept his negative view of the slave revolt. A cursory reading of On the Genealogy of Morality can cause the reader to balk because what Nietzsche holds against the slave revolt can easily appear to be written prescriptively. By this I mean, Nietzsche’s objections to the slave revolt could be taken as asserted truths to the reader. If Nietzsche’s objections were written in this manner, as an initial reading suggests, then it is something that I would not be able to accept, as I will explain with reference to Nietzsche’s previous concept of perspectivism. However, upon a closer inspection of the text, my interpretation finds that Nietzsche is not actually prescribing anything here, and that his commentary on the slave revolt is merely descriptive. It is a ‘historical’ overview rather than any sort of manifesto. Thus, I conclude that I can accept his view in opposition to the slave revolt as I infer that Nietzsche intended to write it in the descriptive sense.
In tracing the ‘genealogy’ (line of descent) of morality, Nietzsche utterly revokes the traditional interpretation of morality as defined by “these English psychologists” (GM 24). In contrast to their utilitarian, objective morality based perspective, he believes that what we consider to be “good” has in fact changed over time. In order to decipher how this has occurred, Nietzsche uses etymology, and looks to the roots of the words “good” and “evil” themselves. He found that in many different languages, the word “good” had developed from words that equated to being “noble” and “aristocratic” (GM 27). For example, the Latin root of the word “good” (bonus) had roots in the word for “man of war,” whilst the German word “gut” had roots in their word for “the godly one” (GM 31). The word has roots in the characteristics of the noble. In contrast, the word “bad” stemmed from words such as “common” and “plebian” (GM 28). In the master system of values, the word “good” would be used to describe someone who is considered aristocratic or war-like (what we might crudely consider today as ‘alpha male’ characteristics). The word “bad” would be used to refer to someone who was not this. Simply, those who were “good” were at the top of society, and those who were bad were the ‘other’ (i.e. not at the top of society).
Nietzsche calls this “master” morality. Master values are those that embody what the human wills – it is the result of a “noble” creating their own values. Nietzsche considers master values as noble and life-affirming. Indeed, he notes that the “chivalric-aristocratic value judgements are based upon… everything else that contains strong, free, happy, action” (GM 33). By this quote, he means that the ruling class of the time had no restraints upon themselves, and so these “good” people were masters of their morality. Master morality is distinct because it allows the creation of one’s own values. This is what Nietzsche means when he proclaims that “all noble morality grows out of a triumphant saying ‘yes’ to itself” (GM 10). “Master” values are those that can exist independently of anything else.
In contrast, “slave” morality arose in “reaction” to the “master” system of values. Nietzsche points out that historically, those who were ruled over as “slaves” (Jews) felt ressentiment towards the noble ruling class. In, On the Genealogy of Morality, he writes how the result of this ressentiment was “creative,” and that the creative deed in question was the concept known as the “evil enemy,” to which the slave “thinks up a copy and counterpart, the ‘good one’ – himself” (GM 37). The creative aspect of ressentiment, resulted in the “master” values, that were traditionally thought of as good because of how they affirmed the will to power, being rebranded by the oppressed as “evil.” From this, they then defined themselves as “good,” in contrast to this “evil” morality, and thus, traditional morality was flipped on its head. What was formerly known as “good” and “bad” became branded as “evil” and “good” respectively. This historical usurping of master morality, caused by the spread of Christo-Judaic values – the epitome of a “slave” system of values – is what Nietzsche referred to as “the slave revolt in morality.”
“Only those who suffer are good, only the poor, the powerless, the lowly are good; the suffering, the deprived, the sick, the ugly, are the only pious people, the only ones saved, salvation is for them alone, whereas you rich, the noble and powerful, you are eternally wicked, cruel, lustful, insatiate, godless, you will also be eternally wretched, cursed and damned!’” (GM 34)
As the above passage illustrates, the new “slave” morality prides itself in exactly opposite to that of “master” morality. The slavish Christo-Judaic system of values calls humility and deference a virtue, and criticices ruthlessness and power as a vice. Whilst both “master” and “slave” morality have a conception of good (a similarity), this word means very different things for the two contexts. The main difference between the two systems of value, aside from the inverse conception of good, is that “slave” morality is a “reaction” rather than a “creation.” Unlike in a
“master” system of value, “slave” values cannot be generated independently. Nietzsche finds that, in contrast to “master” morality, “slave morality from the outset says No to what is…. ‘not itself’; and this No is its creative deed.” By this, Nietzsche means that whereas “master” values are created by the person’s will, “slave” values are formulated as a “reaction” to previously established “master” values. The internal jealousy and frustration (ressentiment) which the slave felt towards the more powerful nobles led them to brand the noble’s actions as “evil” rather than “good.” What is considered “good” in the “slave” system of values is merely an afterthought – (i.e. what is not evil). This is in direct contrast to the “master” system of values, where what is “bad” is somewhat of an afterthought (i.e. comparison). In summary, the important distinctions to make between “master” and “slave” systems of value are that:
I. “Slave” morality is a reaction to “master” morality and cannot exist independently, whereas “master” morality is its own creation, that can.
II. “Master” morality considers values “good” if they are will-fulfilling, and “bad” if they are not this, whilst “slave” morality considers values “evil” if they are “master” values, and “good” if they are not.
Having outlined what Nietzsche means by “the slave revolt in morality,” it is now appropriate to discuss what exactly he objects to about it. As I interpret it, he holds against “the slave revolt in morality” the fact that it labelled strength as evil, and glorified weakness, thus leading to an overall weakening in human society. Whereas “master” morality was formed independently and is creative, “slave” morality is reactive in the sense that it can only exist in response to other values it declares as evil. This view is indicated by Nietzsche’s suggestion that slave morality’s “action is fundamentally reaction” (GM 37). He dislikes slavish values, as they are not those that we create ourselves. Indeed, Nietzsche holds that those who adhere to a “slave” morality, “desires his enemy for himself, as his mark of distinction” (GM 39). Effectively Nietzsche holds against slave morality that it simply does not create its own values, which he believes to be life denying. The “slave revolt,” as Nietzsche sees it, eradicated most people’s value creation, and hence he believes that human beings rarely affirm life anymore. This is the context by which he calls for a man who “justifies man.” Someone who follows the “slave” system of values, cannot justify man, as the values that they follow and believe in are mere shadows of “master” morality. Nietzsche dislikes the slave revolt, because it draws our attention away from creating values. It only declares “master” values as evil because of a sense of ressentiment: envy and self-loathing. Nietzsche objects to “slave” morality as it does not create new values, but rather labels the status quo as good, simply by virtue of the fact that it is not what they have designated “evil. He observes that the slave revolt has stagnated human society.”
Given this interpretation of what Nietzsche holds against “the slave revolt in morality,” is this something that I can accept? Upon an initial reading of On the Genealogy of Morality, it is easy to not do so, as the language Nietzsche uses to object to “slave” morality seems awfully prescriptive. This is a problem as it comes into direct contradiction with Nietzsche’s previous belief in perspectivism. The language which Nietzsche uses seems so prescriptive because it is extremely emotive. For example, he describes those who follow a slavish system of values as “plebeians,” and refers to the “slave revolt” as a “poison” which is passing through the body (GM 36). Calling the “slave revolt” a poison, and those who enacted it “plebeians” could be analysed as an example of Nietzsche imploring the reader to adopt a form of “master” morality in response. This impression is compounded by evidence in Section 13, when he likens the traits of “slave morality” with those that “even insects possess” (GM 46). The language Nietzsche uses falls very hard on “slave morality.” The images that Nietzsche harks to of insects, plebeians, and poison, are significantly more negative than the images he uses to describe “master” morality (e.g. “a bird of prey” (GM 45)). It is easy to forgive a reader for seeing this, and instinctively think that Nietzsche is prescribing “master morality” over “slave morality.” This impression could be particularly heightened by his words in Section 17 of the First Essay. Referring to an awakening of the battle between “slave” and “master” morality, Nietzsche asks “must one not desire it with all one’s might? (GM 54). This appears to be a direct call upon the reader to leave behind the shackles of “slave morality,” and redefine their morality in terms of the traditional “master” morality. In other words, it seems awfully prescriptive. Given Nietzsche’s anti-dogmatic approach (see footnote 4), this would make his opposition to slave morality inconsistent with his own philosophy, and thus, if we were to take his writing as prescriptive, I could not accept his objection due to” this inconsistency.
However, although a cursory reading of Nietzsche’s writing might make it appear as though he is writing prescriptively, I interpret that he is actually writing descriptively. This avoids the problem of perspectivism, as he is not actually calling upon the reader to do anything, but rather narrating a history. Given this interpretation, I am able to accept Nietzsche’s view regarding the slave revolt in that it is a plausible and logical explanation. As vitriolic as the language that Nietzsche uses is, it is not prescriptive in nature. It is rather a characteristic of his writing style to use exceptionally vivid and emotive language in order to explain this history. Also importantly, when he asks “must not one desire it,” in the last section, this is still not a clear and cut demand. In fact, it seems more likely, given his anti-dogmatic approach, to be projecting what he thinks those capable of master morality might be feeling. More evidence that supports my interpretation that Nietzsche is not writing prescriptively, is the fact that whilst he uses vehement language to describe the slave revolt and slave morality, he is balanced in the way that he both praises slave morality to a degree, and criticises master morality. For example, he both acknowledges that a race of men of ressentiment will become “cleverer than any noble race” (GM 39), and gives credence to the fact that slave morality “has hitherto triumphed again and again over all other ideals” (EM 35). The emphasis on the slave revolt’s victory, and critique he offers against master morality for creating a race of less intelligent men, seems more akin to a descriptive history of morality than a manifesto on what morality should be. I interpret his commentary on the history of morality to be only written in the descriptive sense, and therefore, I can accept what he says about the slave revolt, without worry that it is undermined by his perspectivist outlook.
To conclude, On the Genealogy of Morality radically redefines the history of morality by detailing the sea change in society’s conception of morality, which took place in the slave revolt. Nietzsche offers an objection to this slave revolt during his commentary – the idea that slave morality’s prevlance causes stagnation in society, as people no longer create their own values. Although Nietzsche uses language which one could think is prescriptive in talking about the negatives of slave morality, his note to both criticize and praise both slave and master morality, are enough to convince me in my interpretation that Nietzsche is only intending to provide a descriptive outlook of the history of morality. As such, I can accept the views he has about slave revolt, in the historical, descriptive sense. Ultimately, I think that the biggest takeaway that one can get from Nietzsche’s history is that it should wake us up, and make us aware of the fact that the traditional, eternal, conception of morality, should not be taken for granted.