Logan A Petty
Professor Carla De Ycaza
Submitted: Friday, July 28, 2017
Term Paper International Relations Honors
The Effects of the 2016 Turkish coup d’état Attempt on the Turkish Political System and Interstate Relations
ABSTRACT
The failure of the 15 July coup attempt in Turkey contributed to a shift in the Turkish political system and further impacted interstate relations between the Republic of Turkey and other sovereign states. This commentary explores and analyzes the effects that the coup attempt had on the Turkish political system and the relations between the Republic of Turkey and other sovereign states. To better analyze and explain the current domestic and international response to the coup, I will compare the July 15 attempted coup to other coups or attempted coups throughout the history of the Republic of Turkey.
INTRODUCTION
A coup is a sudden, violent, and illegal seizure of power from a government, usually by a group belonging to the state, such as the military. A coup is successful when those attempting to carry out the coup take over control of the government; if a coup is unsuccessful, one of two things generally occurs: civil war will ensue, or the government will reinstate democratic rule.
In the case of the attempted 15 July coup in Turkey, the main belligerents were the Peace at Home Council (supported by elements of the First Army, factions of the Second Army, the Presidential Guard, elements of the Third Army, elements of the Turkish Air Force, elements of the Turkish Navy, and elements of the Turkish Gendarmerie, with alleged support by the Gülen movement, the United Arab Emirates, and Egypt) and the Government of the Republic of Turkey (supported by the Turkish Armed Forces, the Turkish National Police, the Police Special Operations Department, the National Intelligence Organization, and local supporters).
As a result of the attempted coup, 104 putschists, 67 pro-government forces, and 179 civilians were killed. Due to the failure of the coup, 15,846 people were arbitrarily detained (10,012 soldiers, 1,482 members of the judiciary), 48,222 government officials and workers were suspended, and three news agencies, sixteen TV stations, twenty-three radio stations, forty-five newspapers, fifteen magazines, and twenty-nine publishers were ordered to shut down. Furthermore, over 120 journalists and non-governmental organization (NGO) workers have been detained in Turkey for violating anti-terrorism legislation. In the wake of the mass unrest caused by the coup, the Turkish Government was successful in maintaining its power and reinstating rule of law.
EFFECT ON DOMESTIC POLITICS
The attempted 15 July coup in Turkey had various effects on domestic politics in the country. To begin with, the Turkish civil service was extensively purged following the coup attempt. President Erdoğan warned conspirators that “They will pay a heavy price for this”. The purges have further been described by some as a “counter-coup”, with many people believing that President Erdoğan has exploited the crisis in order not only to punish those involved, but also to further his own agenda and quash any and all dissent left in Turkey. This assertion can be supported by the fact that President Erdoğan has taken measures to consolidate his power in the wake of the coup. For example, President Erdoğan called for a constitutional referendum in order to expand the powers of the presidency. The “Yes” (Evet) side of the constitutional referendum succeeded, thus abolishing the existing parliamentary system of government in Turkey and replacing it with an executive presidency and a presidential system. The controversial referendum was held under a state of emergency and was criticized by both the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) as being undemocratic and not meeting international voting standards. The “Yes” (Evet) vote greatly increased the powers of President Erdoğan by abolishing the post of Prime Minister and transferring executive power to the President by allowing the President to issue decrees and appoint many of the judges and officials responsible for scrutinizing his decisions. The constitutional amendments also limit the president to two five-year terms, but the President could theoretically run for a third term if Parliament cuts short the second term by calling for early snap-elections. Under the new constitutional amendments, the President has the authority to extend, remove, or shorten states of emergency within the country. This is especially important, as, during a state of emergency (such as during the 2017 constitutional referendum), the President can impose restrictions on public gatherings, radio broadcastings, and other actions required for a democracy to function fairly and efficiently. Many academics and opposition members of parliament believe that the newly ratified amendments threaten the traditional separation of powers, and could bring an end to western liberal democracy in the Turkish Republic.
Furthermore, the Turkish coup resulted in a purge of government and military officials suspected of plotting, carrying out, or supporting the coup d’état. Although exact figures are not known, it is estimated that the Turkish state has seized 2,431 properties, detained 8,831 army officers, 2,100 judges and prosecutors, 1,329 police officers, fifty-two civilian administrators and 689 civilians for supposed connections to the Gülenist movement. Turkey's Prime Minister has also stated that 163 generals and admirals have been detained, which amounts to roughly 45% of the commissioned officers of the Turkish military. Furthermore, nearly 60,000 public sector employees have been suspended or removed from their posts. 1,577 college deans have been forced to resign, 21,000 teachers had their licenses revoked, and nearly 15,000 employees were suspended from the ministry of education.
Following the coup, the Turkish government has also cracked down on NGOs in the country, such as Human Rights Watch, and Amnesty International, which have both been critical of the Turkish government’s response to the failed coup. For example, the director of Amnesty International in Turkey, Taner Kilic, who has been highly critical of the Turkish government’s response to the coup, has been detained. Kilic was arrested and arbitrarily detained along with twenty-three other lawyers, all of whom are accused of “aiding and abetting terrorism” and supposed links to the Gülenist movement.
In the post-coup environment, the Turkish government has cracked down on freedom of the speech and of the press. Citizens have been arrested for posting against President Erdoğan on social media. Three news agencies, sixteen TV stations, twenty-three radio stations, forty-five newspapers, fifteen magazines, and twenty-nine publishers were ordered to shut down. Furthermore, over 120 journalists have been detained. Seventeen journalists and managers at the Turkish opposition newspaper Cumhuriyet went on trial on Monday (24 July, 2017) on charges of aiding a terrorist organization. If found guilty, they could each face individual sentences of up to forty-three years in jail. Ten of the journalists have already been in arbitrary pre-trial detention for almost nine months.
EFFECT ON INTERSTATE/INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS
Additionally, the attempted Turkish coup, or, more specifically, the Turkish government’s response to the attempted coup, has strained the relationship between Turkey and its western allies. The most prominent example of how the coup has negatively affected interstate relations is the diplomatic dispute caused by campaigning regarding the 2017 Turkish constitutional referendum in order to expand President Erdoğan’s powers to prevent an event such as the coup from occurring again. The issue of campaigning to the Turkish diaspora caused a diplomatic crisis between the Netherlands, Germany, Denmark, Switzerland, and Turkey, as all four European countries imposed bans on or revoked permission for Turkish government officials to campaign for the constitutional referendum in their countries.
On 11 March, 2017, the Turkish Foreign Minister Çavuşoğlu's official plane had its permission to land revoked by the Dutch government mid-air ahead of a scheduled campaign speech. Later the same day, Minister for Families and Social Policy Fatma Betül Sayan Kaya had her convoy stopped by Dutch police, who blocked her access to the Turkish consulate in Rotterdam. Minister Kaya was declared persona non grata by the Dutch Government and the government of Rotterdam declared a temporary state of emergency, and Minister Kaya was asked to leave the country. The Dutch government had given the Turkish ministers prior notice to refrain from campaigning in the country, in order to prevent the divisive campaign rhetoric from creating divisions within the Turkish diaspora community. According to Prime Minister Rutte, the Dutch government was attempting negotiations with the ministers, but Minister Çavuşoğlu publicly threatened the Dutch government with sanctions. The Dutch government found these actions to be unacceptable and then barred the ministers from the country.
In Germany, on the other hand, local states and municipalities withdrew event permits for Justice Minister Bekir Bozdağ and Economy Minister Nihat Zeybekçi's campaign events. German authorities citied security concerns, insufficient capacities at the speaking venues, and irregularities in the organizational process. The Turkish government condemned the cancellations and claimed that they the German government had an anti-Turkish agenda. Turkish foreign minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu claimed that Germany showed a disregard for “human rights and freedom of speech” by cancelling the campaign events. After the German federal government refused to approve a speech by President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, President Erdoğan proceeded to accuse the German government of “Nazi-style tactics”. This comment caused a condemnation by German government officials and further worsened the relations between the two former NATO allies. The Turkish government further made accusations that the German government funded and supported the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), which happens to be a designated terrorist group in both countries.
HISTORICAL ANALYSIS
Throughout the history of the Republic of Turkey, there have been two other military coup attempts, and two Turkish military memorandums, all of which were successful in achieving their main objectives. The 1960 coup, for example, was staged by 38 Turkish military officers against the government of the Democrat Party, which was becoming increasingly authoritarian. The coup essentially removed a democratically elected government with the express intent of installing a new democratically elected government. After the successful coup, however, the newly instated government also carried out a purge. The junta forced 235 generals and over 3000 other commissioned and non-commissioned officers to resign, suspended over 500 judges and public prosecutors, and over 1400 faculty members at public universities in the country. The new government also put officials from the previous government on trial, and charged the President, Prime Minister, and several other ministers with high treason.
In 1980, another military coup was successfully carried out against the Turkish government. The purpose of this coup was to bring stability to the country, which was being destabilized by left-wing and right-wing armed conflicts. After the coup, the violence stopped, and it was widely welcomed for restoring order. The government acted in a similar fashion to the previous Turkish government, in that it executed 50 people, and arrested around 500,000. The Turkish Armed Forces ruled the country for three years through the National Security Council, before restoring democracy.
From the information above, one can conclude that the modern-day response by the Turkish governmnent could be expected, as the current Turkish government is responding to the coup in a manner similar to that which occurred following the successful military coups in 1960 and 1980, namely by purging military officials and civil servants who are believed to have subverted democracy.
Conclusion
In conclusion, the aftermath of the July 15th Turkish coup d’état attempt influenced a shift in the domestic political system and climate of Turkey, and also caused interstate relations between Turkey and its previous European partners grow increasingly tense and strained due to the Turkish government’s response to the coup. When analyzing the coup and looking at it from a historical perspective, however, one can see the striking similarities between the response of the current Turkish government and the responses of previous post-coup governments in Turkey.
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