Andrew Jackson, the United States’ seventh president, made an enormous impact on American politics. Despite his contributions and strengths, he was considered one of the most controversial presidents due to his unwavering attitude, his life before his presidency, and his political decisions. Even today, people still debate on whether his presidency was successful or unsuccessful.
When South Carolina decided to nullify a tariff that many South Carolinians thought was unfair, Jackson firmly stated that this law breaking would not be tolerated in the United States. In Michael Dougherty’s article Andrew Jackson was America’s Worst “Great” “President”, Dougherty claims that along with Jackson’s “Jeffersonian rage” and many vetoes, Jackson was “fearsome in defending the prerogative of the federal government in tariff policy.” Dougherty thought that these actions made Jackson unpredictable in his motives. In historian Jon Meacham’s book on Jackson and his presidency, American Lion, Meacham claims that Jackson’s firm treatment of nullifiers was “what he believed was in the best interests of the ordinary, the unconnected, the uneducated” (230) people. Although Dougherty thought that Jackson’s actions regarding the Nullification Crisis was harsh and uncalled for, Meacham saw his actions as something to protect laypeople who needed guiding. Dougherty quotes Jackson’s bitter words towards the nullifiers of South Carolina to show his temper, but Meacham states that Jackson’s care for the common people he came from is what guided his actions in correcting the nullifiers.
In 1832, although the bill passed both through both houses and seemed in the interest of the rich and powerful, Jackson vetoed the National Bank’s recharter. With challenging powerful people by taking away a most valuable resource to them came controversy on Jackson’s seemingly authoritarian ways. Meacham states that Jackson’s decision to veto the Bank was “arguing that the goal of government should better the lives of the many, not reward the few” (209-210) (the many being laypeople and the few being the wealthy), but in Harry Watson’s article Andrew Jackson, America’s Original Anti-Establishment Candidate, says that Jackson vetoed the bank because he “was also sure the Bank made dubious loans and campaign contributions to influence politicians and editors and even to buy elections.” Although these two sources agree that Jackson thought the Bank’s large influence was a problem, they address different reasons for his veto. Both cite quotes from Jackson when he vetoed the Bank’s recharter, but Watson looks deeper into Jackson’s words about powerful politicians becoming more powerful through the bank.
Although Jackson was not the current president during the Trail of Tears, it was Jackson’s policy that caused the Cherokee removal west of the Mississippi River to be executed the year after Jackson finished his two four-year terms. In Daniel Feller’s article, Andrew Jackson’s Shifting Legacy, Feller states that Jackson believed “American Indians could not, without violating the essential rights of sovereign states, remain where they were” and that “the terms offered for their evacuation were seasonable and even generous.” However, Meacham shows that the Treaty of New Echota, the treaty for the terms of the Cherokee removal, was poorly negotiated with the Cherokee. The “Treaty party” (Meacham, 317) of the Cherokee tribe was only a minority of the tribe, yet they signed for the treaty for the entirety of the tribe. The main party of the Cherokee was Chief John Ross’s party, and “Ross, who represented an estimated 16,000 out of 17,000 Cherokees, was against removal” (Meacham, 317) and “wanted to hold out for a more advantageous deal with the government” (Meacham, 317-318). While Feller acknowledges Jackson’s true motives in allowing the Cherokee to be away from the chaos of the American Indians and the people of the United States constantly fighting each other, Meacham shows that the execution of the plan to move the Cherokee was poorly negotiated with the Cherokee tribe. Feller shows Jackson’s real motives in moving the American Indians as opposed to some of critics of Jackson claiming the movement of people was due to Jackson being a racist towards nonwhites, but Meacham brings to light the controversy over the signing of the Treaty of New Echota in relation to the execution of moving the Cherokee.
In 1834, “France declined to honor its obligations” (Meacham, 279) to a debt to the United States that France already agreed to pay in a treaty. Jackson took this as an insult to the United States’ pride and was then determined to have this debt paid in full. Despite his anger towards this insult, he hid this anger when speaking to Louis Sérurier, the French minister in Washington and was “kind” and “very polite” (Meacham, 285) to Sérurier. Over time, Jackson began to grow angry with France for their rudeness towards their debt. Eventually Britain “stepped in to play a mediating role” (Meacham, 295), and France decided that it would “pay its debt” (Meacham, 296). Meacham shows that Jackson’s politeness towards Sérurier and Jackson’s decisiveness paid off in making the French pay their debt. Meacham’s evidence to support this is through quotes showing politeness from Sérurier and quotes from Jackson showcasing his (and in turn the United States’) “inflexible determination” (Meacham, 292) on having this debt paid.
In his presidency, Jackson introduced many new powers to the executive branch of the government. He used often used vetoes and introduced the spoils system to the United States’ politics. According to Feller, Jackson began “purging the federal bureaucracy of his political opponents and instituting what he called ‘rotation in office’”, otherwise known as the spoils system, in order to gain control over government. In Meacham’s book, he explains Jackson’s frequent use of vetoes as being because Jackson saw himself “as the embodiment of the people standing against entrenched interests, combined with his appetite for control and for power” (141). Both sources agree that Jackson’s quest to control the political sphere led him to certain actions, but while Feller concludes that this led to the spoils system, Meacham concludes that this led to him often using vetoes. To support his claim, Feller uses the removal of the American Indians as an example of when the spoils system was put to use for Jackson’s “presidential agenda.” Meacham uses quotes from C. Perry Patterson, a scholar who wrote about how Jackson’s use of vetoes made the use of vetoes more common for later presidents, to show that Jackson’s more frequent use of vetoes forged a path for today’s politics and use of vetoes.
Jackson’s presidency was successful because he paved the way for the modern political sphere. Reading these sources have changed my limited, misinformed understanding on Jackson’s presidency to be more than just a man who incited the Trail of Tears and have helped me understand how Jackson’s actions helped form the United States’ ways in politics, especially regarding presidential powers. I find many of the issues discussed in these readings are still relevant today because most of these issues deal with controversy over presidents. Often, I see news articles on controversy over politicians that is barely relevant to politics, and seeing how Jackson was one of the first presidents with personal controversy brought into his campaign has helped me understand where this need for politicians to appear perfect even outside of politics, as it lies in Jackson’s beginning to appeal to the public people as much as to the people within the government.
If I were asked to handle a national issue regarding states disobeying federal law, such as some states ignoring federal marijuana bans, I would use a part of how Jackson dealt with South Carolina essentially ignoring a tariff but instead of using forces to stop the nullifiers, I would suggest cutting off state funding for any states ignoring these bans. Both would result in a state needing to either secede or comply with the bans.