The rise of populism is altering our understanding of the term nationalism. Discuss.
The purpose of this essay is to expose the recent rise in populism as the perpetrator for the
dramatic change in the way nationalism is understood on a global scale. To achieve this, this
essay will examine the following points; the ascension of the United Kingdom Independence
Party (UKIP) into mainstream UK politics, and how such an advance has led to the ultimate demonstration of a rise in populistic attitudes within the United Kingdom – Brexit. Such an influx of populist thinking has completely transformed the way nationalism is perceived within the UK. Another point of analysis comes from across the pond, where the shock election of Donald Trump has instigated a dramatic shift in American nationalism. Trump has capitalised on the fear of the many in the midst of a time where the popular opinion is one of discontent, apprehension and resentment towards the elite, as supported by the argument presented by Hochschild (2016). In Europe, populism is gathering momentum as citizens of Germany, Sweden and Italy become increasingly concerned not only with the economic reasoning behind nationalism, but also with the diminishment of national identity and self-worth. By doing so it will be argued that the exploitation of populistic opinion has come to widen the definition of nationalism, causing more aspects of 21st century life to be deemed necessary to ‘protect’ if they are to be sustained. The rise of populism is altering our understanding of nationalism.
The greatest modern-day example of a populist eruption resides within the UK. It is here that the right-wing populist party UKIP was able to claim a seat on the political podium, growing to become the third largest party in both; the 2014 election for European Parliament, and the UK’s 2015 general election. However, UKIP’s ultimate achievement within UK politics occurred when it’s focal campaign point was enacted in a referendum held on the 23rd of June 2016, and the UK subsequently voted to leave the European Union. Although Brexit was not achieved solely by UKIP, the party was the dominant front runner in bringing failures of the EU to the UK public’s attention. UKIP therefore followed the distinct path that populist parties have a tendency to take, such path being one in which the party portrays themselves, and the public, “as victims of a political system that does not address the needs of ordinary people”. Abts and Rummens argue that there are four key elements critical to defining a populist party. Recurrent in populism is the portrayal of an “antagonistic relationship” between the ‘common man’ and the ‘elite’, with populist parties themselves professing an ability to return power to the people, allowing for “popular sovereignty’ over the land. Third, populism gestates the people as a parallel entity, within which the interests of the majority are in some way being harmed by the minority ‘elites’. The fourth and final characteristic of a populist party according to Schedler is the anti-disestablishment aspect. With this, the party accommodates itself to the level of the people, so to juxtapose itself from the other elitist parties which are acting against the common-sense ideals of the electorate. I shall subsequently analyse how UKIP used each of these elements in order to secure the vote to leave the European Union from the UK public. In turn, this will develop my argument, by demonstrating the reverberations that nationalism has felt, as a direct result of UKIP’s rise and actions. UKIP has consistently attempted to employ the populist technique of depicting the EU as the antagonist of the UK economy, overtly stating, “We send the EU £350 million a week, let’s fund the NHS instead”. UKIP’s strategy of pitching the masses against the elite was highly effective as a means of drawing attention to the supposed failings of the EU on behalf of the British people as the split between commonality and elite became evident within the votes. The ‘elite’, generally holding high status occupations, with easy access to resources, are able to benefit from the reduction of trade barriers maintained by the European Union, and therefore voted accordingly. However, lower class (‘common’) citizens found themselves competing for jobs against an influx of workers arriving from other EU nations. Not only does UKIP’s involvement of the economy in their campaign demonstrate the efficacy of populism in achieving political aspirations, but also the rebranding that nationalism has acquired within the UK, as economic security has become an integral consideration of the parties and people that deem themselves nationalists.
Trump’s shock win of the 2016 Presidential election in the US, demonstrated not only the triumph of populism in America, but also the widespread endorsement of nationalism throughout the nation. Trump’s forefront abstraction that he presented to the American people was one of solidarity among those “left behind by globalization”. Indeed, this strategy worked very effectively. Various polling studies, such as the one created by the Pew Research Centre, exhibit the influence that Trump’s populist campaign had on the electorate. White voters preferred Trump over Clinton by a margin of 21 percentage points, as did males by a percentage difference of 53% to 41%. Similarly, those with low levels of education preferred Trump drastically, by a margin of 67%. Trump’s electoral base can therefore be described as the white-male working class. Arlie Hochschild, author of Strangers in Their Own Land: Anger and Mourning on the American Right, chronicles the feelings of such a base in what she describes as the ‘deep story’. “As you wait your turn, Obama is using the money in your pocket to help the line-cutters. He and his liberal backers have removed the shame from taking. The government has become an instrument for redistributing your money to the underserving. It’s not your government anymore, it’s theirs.” Not only does Hochschild’s simplification of the working classes ideology demonstrate how economic concerns play a substantial role in contemporary nationalist thinking, but also how resentment over who are the beneficiaries of such delegated welfare is now a consideration of the commonality. Trump directly asserted his view on such opinions in a rally stating, “We have to listen to the concerns that working people, our forgotten people, have over the record pace of immigration and its impact on their jobs, wages…and security”. This leads me to my next conception of what nationalism has become to be understood as, in the face of a populist surge. Once again using the data collected by the Pew Research Centre, it is clear to see that patriotic sentiments have altered. 66% of voters considered immigration to be a major issue facing the US, along with 65% feeling the same way regarding terrorism. Consequently, it is reasonable to perceive such statistics as evidence that physical security is now a major component of nationalism in America. The overriding demonstration of this can be seen in response to Executive Order 13769 which “suspended for 90 days the entry of certain aliens from seven countries: Iran, Iraq, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria and Yemen. These are countries that had been identified as presenting concerns about terrorism and travel to the United States”. A survey conducted by the Rasmussen Reports found that “57% of Likely US Voters favour a temporary ban on refugees from countries deemed high risk”. Therefore, security from terrorism and the right to inhibit unwanted immigration are now imbedded into nationalism, kindled by populistic campaigning.
Nationalism has also been effected by the impact of populism in Europe. The political scene in Germany and Sweden has succumb to the pull of populism, in a variety of forms. In Germany, the unprecedented success of the Alternative for Germany party (AfD) since its creation in 2013 has demonstrated the shared ideology amongst the people of Germany. AfD exhibits strong anti-establishment attitudes, therefore meeting the criterion for a populist party, whilst maintaining an open policy of demanding the truth for the people. In effect, Afd and right-wing populism in Germany have caused one major alteration of nationalism – an elevated sense of nativism. AfD portray and amplify threats to the people, not only from the political elite (traditional populism) but also from cultural outsiders. In essence, nativism is the ideology that postulates the prerogatives of the ‘indigenes’ over ‘aliens’. Although nativism is not an unfamiliar aspect of nationalism, the AfD have altered it somewhat, by placing specific emphasis on Anti-Islam directives. Therefore, due to the developments made in Germany by the AfD, nationalism has accrued authoritarian, racist and xenophobic characteristics. Correspondingly, in Sweden the same exponential growth of the populist right, categorically the Sweden Democrats, has swept across the nation. The wish of the Sweden Democrats is very similar to that of the AfD in Germany: “tough on law and order, and big on national identity”. The Sweden Democrats have effectively capitalised on the fears of the Swedish people, where concerns over the diminishment of national identity, as well as the ability to effectively self-determine have become distinguished political issues. In 2016, support for the right-wing populist party rose to 21.5%, astonishingly close to the Social Democrats, who achieved 25.7% The paramount issue for Sweden therefore, is the adverse effects of multiculturalism that are causing antipathy between indigenes citizens, and those portrayed as threats by the populist right. However, the threat conveyed by such parties is merely a scapegoat for elevating concerns over national identity. Returning to the question, how has populism altered nationalism, in Europe, the mutation that has occurred is in the form of inflated apprehension over national identity.
In turn, the argument that I have presented within this essay should communicate the various ways in which the rise of populism has altered our understanding of nationalism. Firstly, in the case of right-wing British politics, the main adjustment to appear is in the form of economic security integrating itself into nationalism. Secondly, the rise of Trump has sparked the unmitigated desire for physical security on behalf of the American people. As globalisation has become common place in today’s society, Donald Trump and what he stands for has shown that contemporary nationalism seeks the expulsion of perceived threats against physical security. Finally, the demonstration of how nationalism has changed Europe is one of great concern, as it has added an elevated fascination of national identity for the sake of political gain – a strategy that has worked with great efficacy. The rise of populism has altered our understanding of nationalism.
References:
Alistair Clark, Political Parties in the UK, 2012, Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 119-127
Abts, K. and Rummens, S. 2007, Populism Versus Democracy, Political Studies, vol 55, no. 2, pp. 405-424
Taggart, P. 2000, Populism, Buckingham: Open University Press
Schedler, A. 1996, Anti-Political-Establishment Parties, Party Politics,2, pp. 221-312
The Guardian, ‘Why has Boris Johnson revived the £350m-a-week Brexit claim’, 2017
Martin, P. Migration Letters, 2017, Vol 14, pp. 161-171
Montgomery, M. Authenticity, populism and the electoral discourses of Donald Trump, 2017, pp. 620-630
Hochschild, A. 2016, Strangers in Their Own Land: Anger and Mourning on the American Right, Chapter 9, ‘The Deep Story’
Trump, D. Campaign Rally Speech, 31/08/2016, Phoenix Arizona
Clinton, Trump Supporters Have Starkly Different Views of a Changing Nation, Pew Research Centre, 2016
The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Executive Order 13769, March 2017.
Barbuir, N. Lewandowsky, M. Siri, J. German Politics, Vol.24, Iss 2, 2015
Leape, S. The Far Right is on the Rise in Sweden, The Independent, 2016
www.reuters .com/article/us-sweden-politics-poll/far-right-sweden-democrats-close-in-as-second-largest-party-poll-idUS
Bergman, E. Nordic Nationalism and Right-Wing Populist Politics, 2017, Palgrave Macmillan, pp 159-183