Within this essay I will be discussing Berlin’s positive and negative freedom as well as assessing the distinction between the two concepts and validity of his concerns about the former. I will be showing how there are significant counter-arguments to Berlin’s distinction between positive and negative freedom as well as the reasoning behind his acceptance of the later over the former. Firstly, through the acceptance of the one concept claim over the two concept claim and secondly, through showing the flaws in the Berlin’s rejection of positive freedom in favour of the negative. This is a noteworthy question for discussion as it reflects on how the author’s definitions of freedom translate into a conception of political freedom which has become an increasingly essential question in modern philosophical thought.
Berlin’s argument
The concepts of both positive and negative freedom attempt to explain the political questions of ‘obedience and coercion’ (Berlin, p168) most significantly ‘why should I, or anyone, obey anyone else?’ (Berlin, p168). To answer this question, Berlin defines two concepts of liberty. He calls these negative liberty and positive liberty. The notion of negative freedom is defined as the extent to which ‘a person or group of persons’ (Berlin, p169) is governed rather than being ‘left to do or be what he is able to do or be, without interference by other persons’ (Berlin, p169). The notion of positive freedom is defined as who is ‘the source of control or interference’ (Berlin, p169) when you are being governed. Berlin makes general claims that both of these concepts are distinct and show separate standards although noting at the same time that their premises can conflict.
Gray’s counter-argument
We’ve seen how Berlin attempts to define freedom into two concepts of positive and negative. I will now present two counter-arguments that present how Berlin’s distinction of positive and negative freedom is not sufficient to define freedom in political terms. To explain the first argument, I will use two concepts defined by Gray. He calls the two concepts ‘value-free’ and ‘value-laden’. The notion of ‘value-free’ is a definition of freedom which is empirical and has a general standard. The notion of ‘value-laden’ is a definition of freedom which is prescriptive and can hold different values for different people. My first argument is whether ‘freedom’ is a value-free notion or value-laden ‘contested’ one. Freedom does not seem to have one general standard, we commonly disagree on what it means to have liberty. For example, ‘the absence of opposition (by opposition, I mean external impediments of motion’ (Hobbes) against ‘freedom of the expression of opinion’ (Mill). However, if it is prescriptive and ‘reflects the different values held by different people’ (Gray, p4) it therefore must be a ‘value-laden concept’. However, ‘unless freedom can be defined in value-free terms’ (Gray, p4) we will struggle to define and make comparisons between different types of freedom as well as between ‘the freedom of one person and another, or between one country and another’ (Gray, p4). Berlin may respond to these arguments is by claiming that although ‘there is a considerable degree of ambiguity’ (Gray,p10) we bring these terms into play to define the contrast between ‘freedom from (negative liberty) and freedom to (positive liberty)’. However, I believe this response fails because as Gray points out, these labels do not help us add anything to the term of freedom. Moreover, ‘virtually any kind of liberty could be expressed in terms of either ‘freedom from’ or ‘freedom to” (Gray, p9). Therefore, if freedom has no descriptive standard, we cannot reduce it to two concepts such as Berlin’s positive and negative concepts.
Maccullum’s counter-argument
My second argument against Berlin’s use of positive and negative freedom is that there is only one concept of freedom, not two. Maccullum offers an argument of general denial of the two concept claim, suggesting that freedom claims always refer to a triadic relation. The triadic relation refers to freedom being shown in the following form: ‘x is (is not) free from y to do (not do, become, not become) z’ (Maccullum, p102). Therefore, we can see how something can be both freedom from and freedom to at the same time. Berlin might respond to this argument in several ways. For instance, he may suggest that there is not always a ‘z’ factor within a freedom claim. For example, a person (x) may want to be free of being locked in a room (y) without there being any particular thing that they wish to be free to do. If we accept this objection from Berlin we are back to arguing for the two concept claim. However, I believe this response fails because the terms positive and negative do not seem to be self-descriptive in any way. As noted by Gray, ‘there is nothing particularly negative about the area of a person’s freedom from control; and there is nothing particularly positive about the source of control over a person’ (Gray, p9). Therefore, ultimately ‘he fails to demonstrate why the terms negative and positive are employed to distinguish between two meanings of freedom’ (Gray,p8) and why they are significant enough to be used instead of Maccullum’s one concept claim.
Berlin’s argument
However, if we ignore the counter-arguments for accepting the distinction between positive and negative freedom, are Berlin’s reasons for accepting the former and rejecting the later valid? If we refer back to Berlin’s two definitions – positive freedom consisting of acting in accordance with one’s higher, more rational nature, and negative freedom consisting of what one wants to do in the absence of interference or coercion – Berlin outlines the dangers inherent in the former. For Berlin, the key issue with positive freedom is as follows. Given that a one person or persons may know better than another person, what constitutes the right and reasoned way of living? For example, person x may legitimately coerce person y into living a certain way because person x may know better than person y, and this is all done ‘in the name of freedom’. However, it is important to notice that person y would not be made unfree because they are being coerced into doing what they really should do even if they may think that they will to do the opposite. Hobbes justifies coercion in the name of security however, Berlin thinks that coercion in the name of freedom is objectionable. Giving up one’s own choice the in name of freedom is the key issue with positive liberty. Therefore, Berlin concludes that this form of liberty is destructive and despite its faults, negative freedom is to be preferred politically.
Counter-argument
We’ve seen how Berlin attempts to reject the positive in favour of the negative. However, there are two reasons to oppose the rejection of positive freedom. Firstly, and the weakest argument, Berlin’s definition of positive freedom may not be the type of positive freedom that we are considering in a modern society. Taylor suggests that positive freedom doesn’t necessarily take the form that Berlin is criticizing. He was influenced by Mill who was much more focused on a personal positive freedom including advocating self-expression due to his writing post French revolution, demonstrating the distinction between the liberty of the ancient’s verses that of the modern. Taylor suggests that positive freedom should in fact take the form of personal flourishing which can be implemented by government. Furthermore, ‘Berlin himself admits that there is nothing inherent in the positive concept of freedom that entails a justification for coercion in the name of liberty’ (Gray, p8) however, it is merely history that has made Berlin’s notion of positive liberty more of an issue when it comes to the ‘splitting of personality into two’ (Gray, p8). However, I believe this easily fails because this line of argument picks on the problems with the definition of positive freedom. It could be suggested that the type of positive freedom we are discussing is in fact a very significant question. Ought we to be interested? Is Berlin’s definition of positive freedom correct? However, this falls outside of the scope of what we are discussing here – whether the definition of positive freedom that Berlin provides is one we should reject in favour of the negative.
Counter-argument – the rejection of positive freedom (coercion)
Secondly, Berlin’s key argument for rejecting the positive is that a person or group of person’s may know what constitutes the most reasoned way of living and acting in comparison to ourselves. Therefore, we may allow ourselves to be coerced in the name of freedom. However, how can someone else know what is more rational for us to do than ourselves? We are surely the best judge of ourselves and know why we act the best. Therefore, it is better that we accept the one concept of freedom, such as from Maccullum while recognizing that there are ‘many conceptions of that single concept’ (Gray, p7) as this avoids the issue of who should be the ‘ultimate judge’. I think this is a strong argument because, as demonstrated by the many definitions offered by different philosophers, everyone has a personal opinion on what freedom is. Furthermore, even if we were to narrow down the different definitions available to us when we talk about freedom, it would be impossible for everyone to reach a unanimous decision on one singular empirical understanding. Philosophers even struggle to agree that the words ‘freedom’ and ‘liberty’ refer to the same thing. If we were being sympathetic towards Berlin, it could be suggested that Berlin provides us with two concepts of freedom and if we were to universally accept these notions of freedom the problem of individuality could be avoided. However, I believe that this objection does not succeed as again, it would not be possible to impose this general standard and notion of freedom upon everyone as there would always be an alternative view. Furthermore and lastly, the original argument against Berlin could be made stronger by suggesting that positive freedom fails in another way besides encouraging coercion. Taylor defines the two definitions of positive and negative freedom in different terms. He calls these ‘exercise concept’ and ‘opportunity concept’. The notion of positive freedom is an exercise concept, in this case exercising control over one’s own life. The notion of negative freedom is an opportunity concept, for example the opportunities available to us regardless of whether we act on them or not. This creates the dilemma that the negative concept presupposes ideas which lead to the positive concept. In which case, positive freedom is not an independent notion of freedom. Therefore, whether we reject the positive or negative, the notions do not seem to be two independent concepts. Therefore, through these two arguments I have assessed the validity of Berlin’s worries about positive freedom and demonstrated how he may be too hasty in rejecting it for the negative.
Conclusion
In conclusion, we can see that Berlin offers two concepts of freedom which, if assessed, do not seem to offer clear understanding of freedom in comparison to Maccullum’s single concept claim. Furthermore, Berlin does not seem to have valid reasons for rejecting positive freedom in favour of the negative due to the notion of positive freedom leading to the acceptance of coercion. Therefore, we can clearly outline the invalid arguments in the distinction between positive and negative freedom and the dangers Berlin thinks are inherent in the former.