A comparative discussion of relations between Islam and the states of India and Pakistan may at first seem strained, as one has a Muslim majority of 97% out of a total of approximately 207 million people1, and the other has a Muslim minority, albeit a large and growing one of 172.2 million (14.23%) according to the 2011 census.2 However, until seventy years ago Pakistan was non-existent, and citizens of the British Raj struggled together to break down the confines of colonial rule in the region. Following the Partition of India in 1947 and the creation of West and East Pakistan (the latter now known as Bangladesh), one state adopted what it has itself described as a ‘socialist, secular and democratic republic’, while the other is an Islamic theocracy.3 It can be argued that one of the main purposes of setting up Pakistan as a separate state was for it to be a refuge for Indian Muslims as an attempted solution to persistent interreligious conflict with Hindu nationalists.4 As a consequence of post-colonialism, nationalism, interference from outside groups, and socio-economic factors these states respective growths have been shaped in very different ways, dividing them in their attitudes towards Islam.
STACY WRENN 15318759
1 2
http://www.censusindia.gov.in/2011census/C-01.html
3 4
421.
279.
Pakistan Bureau of Statistics. “Provisional Summary Results of 6th Population and Housing
Census – 2017,” 2017 census, accessed November 21, 2017, http://www.pbscensus.gov.pk
Office of the Registrar General & Census Commissioner, India, “C-1 Population By
Religious Community,” 2011 census, accessed November 21, 2017,
Malika B. Mistry, “Muslims in India: A Demographic and Socio-Economic Profile,” Journal
of Muslim Minority Affairs 25, no. 3, (December 2005),
Thomas W. Simons Jr, “Pakistan and Islam Sixty Years Further On,” Proceedings of the
American Philosophical Society 153, no. 3 (September 2009),
1
For the purpose of clarity this essay will focus on the state as a legislative body through the states’ respective constitutions and amendments, and I will compare and contrast the relationships between Islam and these states through the examination of their constitutions in theory and in practice by the governing political bodies, Muslim representation in state activities, and how the dynamics have been affected by the perceived threat of fundamentalist Islamism.
The first official piece of legislation that connects Islam with the state of Pakistan is the 1973 constitution. From the outset, the tone is clear. The preamble begins by stating that principles such as those of democracy, tolerance, and social justice will be observed, but this shall be ‘as enunciated by Islam’.5 It goes on to state that the people of Pakistan will be conscious of their ‘responsibility before Almighty Allah’ and ‘cognisant of the sacrifices made by the people in the cause of Pakistan’.6 Islam and the state, in terms of legislation at least, are intrinsically linked as the latter would not exist without the former, and the closeness of this relationship results in the implication that defying the articles in this constitution is tantamount to defying Islam – which the second article of the constitution declares is ‘the state religion’.7 Overall the articles professing freedom of association, religion, expression, and protection for minorities are quite similar in both the 1973 Constitution and the Indian Constitution of 1950, but there are numerous conditions in the former that show how limited these truly are. Article 19. of both allows for the standard right to freedom of speech and expression, but in Pakistan, these rights are controlled by regulations, which according to the signatories, are ‘in the interest of the glory of Islam’.8
The rights of women and children in Pakistan have been negatively affected by the state’s courting of Islamic orthodoxy at the expense of diverse political representation. In January 2016 a bill to raise the legal minimum age of marriage to 18 for girls was withdrawn following pressure from the official Council of Islamic
5
6 Ibid., 2.
7 Ibid., 3.
8 National Assembly of Pakistan, “Constitution,” 12.
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National Assembly of Pakistan, “Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan,” accessed
November 16, 2017, 1, http://www.na.gov.pk/uploads/documents/1508233652_713.pdf
2
Ideology, who argued that it was “un-Islamic and blasphemous”, Amnesty International continues to campaign on this.9
Article 31, titled ‘Islamic way of life’, declares that the state will facilitate the education and practice of Islam through unspecified ‘facilities’, though later on it also establishes a Federal Shari’at Court regulating the application of shari’a law.10 This shows the complex nature of Islam’s stronghold in Pakistan as the constitution purports to ‘promote unity’11 but as there is a mixture of Sunni, Shia, and other denominations of Islam residing in the country this is extremely difficult to achieve in practice. Measures regarding zakat and the exact level of involvement the state has in Islamic institutions, for example, have differed depending on the political body in power at the time and where their ideology fits. The Shi’ite Muslims, who represent up to 20% of the population, generally support the more secular Pakistan’s People’s Party (PPP), fearing that the militant orthodoxy might turn against them, as it had earlier against the Ahmadiyyas – who are still classified as ‘non-Muslims’ in the constitution.12 13
Although there are protections in place for non-Muslim minorities in Pakistan, the influence of Islam over the constitution continues to infringe on their personal life. For instance, there is a complete ban on the consumption of alcoholic beverages (except for religious purposes), sex work, and gambling. This article, Article 37, is titled ‘Promotion of social justice and eradication of social evils’, and there are numerous other instances throughout the constitution where ‘decency’ and ‘morality’ are put forth as conditions that must be met. The role of the President and the Prime Minister are restricted by the constitution to only Muslim candidates, and the oaths that they must swear to be accepted into office begin with a declaration of their Islamic beliefs – automatically restricting any ‘non-Muslim’ from upward mobility within the government, bringing their idea of democracy into suspicion.14
9
10
11 Ibid.,17.
13 14
110.
159.
188, 189.
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“Pakistan 2016/17,” Amnesty International, accessed November 19, 2017.
https://www.amnesty.org/en/countries/asia-and-the-pacific/pakistan/report-pakistan/
National Assembly of Pakistan, “Constitution,”
12 Frédéric Grare, “The Evolution of Sectarian Conflicts in Pakistan and the Ever-Changing Face of Islamic Violence,” South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies 30, no. 1 (April 2007), 128.
National Assembly of Pakistan, “Constitution,” National Assembly of Pakistan, “Constitution,”
3
Pakistan’s foreign policy, as Article 40 stipulates, focuses on strengthening relations with other Muslim majority countries based on that single commonality.15 The long term ramifications of this failed attempt at unity may lead to serious problems down the line for the stability of Pakistan as the different denominations, both within the country and in other countries, will continue to fight for power so long as the constitution remains vague on the application of the faith.
As mentioned previously, there are several articles in India’s constitution that are there to protect rights such as freedom of association, religion, expression, etc., but whether these protections have been fully and equally implemented is debateable. Although the preamble to the constitution does say it is a secular society, academics such as Rollie Lal argue that ‘non-secular politics’ is more fitting a term for how the country is actually governed, and this has meant that the dominant position of the Hindu population as the political majority has led to an infringement upon the practice of Muslim law.16 There have been amendments to the constitution in recent years which show the degradation of the relationship between Islam and the state of India from one of relative stability, outside of the disputed territory of Kashmir, to one of almost constant confrontation.
While Article 25 states that all citizens are ‘equally entitled’ to practice their religion, this equality has not been seen in practice.17 The true imbalance in the enforcing of this is best demonstrated in the discussion around the ritual sacrifice and consumption of cattle by Indian Muslims. Article 48 states that they will ‘endeavour’ to prohibit the slaughter of cattle, as cows are sacred under Hindu tradition. Although the restriction on the slaughter of cattle for trade was lifted after a Supreme Court decision in July 2017, the right-wing Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) government advocate for its strict enforcement and this has led to cases of extreme violence against Muslims.18 In March 2016, the bodies of two Muslim cattle traders were found hanging from a tree, and in August of the same year a woman in Haryana said
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15 Ibid., 20. 16
17 18
297.
Rollie Lal, “Islam in India,” in The Muslim World After 9/11, by Angel M. Rabasa et al.,
(Santa Monica, USA: RAND Corporation, 2004),
Indian Government, “Constitution of India,” accessed November 16, 2017, 13,
https://www.india.gov.in/my-government/constitution-india/constitution-india-full-text
The Hindu Business Line, “Supreme Court suspends ban on cattle trade for slaughter,”
The Hindu Business Line, July 11, 2017, http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/news/supreme-
court-suspends-ban-on-cattle-trade-for-slaughter/article9759259.ece
4
that she and her 14- year-old cousin had been gang-raped by men who accused them of eating beef. 19
There has been notable bias and state discrimination against this group in areas including housing, jobs, and education since partition happened, with the majority of Muslims left on the Indian side of the border being working class, rural residents. They have a lower family income and lower levels of literacy than their Hindu counterparts, and figures gathered by the All India Milli Council show that for a significant minority of over 14% they are severely underrepresented in both political and business organizations at 2.98% of all administrative service officers.20
Indian Muslims continue to find themselves in a precarious position when it comes to their personal freedoms, with the government taking away certain provisions while guaranteeing others – such as the level of respect given to shari’a law. Article 26 of the constitution guarantees the freedom to manage religious affairs, which also applies to the application of Muslim Personal Law (henceforth MPL) which is also protected by the MPL Application Act – which preceded the constitution by 13 years.21 22 This is a legal system based upon the presumption that Muslims should be governed by shari’a law in their personal and family affairs, so long as it does not directly contradict with Indian constitutional law. It covers inheritance, guardianship, marriage, and divorce, the latter of which remains the most controversial issue. The regulating body of MPL is the All India Muslim Personal Law Board, and they have come under sharp criticism from Islamic feminists for their reading of the normative code of law which allows for the continuation of the practice known as triple talaq. This is an antique form of divorce in the Hanafi school of Sunni Islam where a husband has to simply say the word talaq (meaning ‘divorce’) in oral, written, or electronic form three times to end his marriage.23
In terms of representation, Indian Muslims have significantly less political power than their counterparts in Pakistan. Although there are Islam-oriented political
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19
20 21 22
23
184,
Amnesty International, Amnesty International Report 2016/17: The State of the World’s
Human Rights (London: Amnesty International, 2017),
https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/POL1048002017ENGLISH.PDF
Lal, “Islam in India,”
Mistry, “Muslims in India: A Demographic and Socio-Economic Profile,”
Justin Jones, “‘Signs of churning': Muslim Personal Law and public contestation in twenty-
first century India,” Modern Asian Studies 44, no. 1, (January 2010),
Ibid.,
177.
310.
421. 179.
5
parties they are not well organised on a national level with the wider community suffering due to this weakness.24 The average practitioner of Islam is therefore disconnected from the state, as the party that Indian Muslims have traditionally supported — the Indian National Congress — have done little to counter the persistent violence and discrimination against them by the party’s political rivals – the BJP and their Hindu nationalist ally, Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS).25 The current Prime Minister, Narendra Modi, is a documented member of both groups, with the latter being instrumental in his electoral success in 2014.26 This election marked a turning point in the state’s relationship with Islam, as ever since Hindu nationalists have been more frequent in their attacks on the Muslim community, with the lack of intervention from the state acting as a sign to Indian Muslims that it views them as de facto foreign nationals within India.
The relationship between Islam and the state of Pakistan remains complex as the divide between various denominations is so vast and has become increasingly violent. Sectarian violence was rare before partition, but it was promoted during Zia ul Haq’s reign as a way of controlling Iranian influence on Shia groups, as Sunni conservatives such as him were concerned that they would be inspired to carry out their own version of the Iranian Revolution of 1979.27 Post-Zia governments have not moved away from this tactic. Political parties continue to compromise with sectarian groups (such as Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan, a paramilitary organisation) and manipulate sectarian conflicts for short-term political gains.28 Nawaz Sharif has been the only Prime Minister to address the issue of fundamentalist Islamism arising from the Deobandi school that had links with the Taliban and al-Qaeda. In 1997, he enacted the Anti-Terrorism Act which gave added powers to the army and police to combat sectarian violence. The practical implementation of this is difficult to measure as Pakistan is a vast country with many mountainous regions where Islamist
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24 25 26
27 28
303, 304. 301.
128, 134.
Lal, “Islam in India,”
Lal, “Islam in India,”
Mandakini Gahlot, “India's Hindu Fundamentalists,” Al Jazeera English, October 8 2015,
http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/peopleandpower/2015/10/indias-hindu-fundamentalists-
151008073418225.html.
Grare, “The Evolution of Sectarian Conflicts in Pakistan and the Ever-Changing Face of
Islamic Violence,”
Magnus Marsden, Living Islam: Muslim Religious Experience in Pakistan’s North-West
Frontier (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005),
210.
6
madrasas can hide in isolation and carry on relatively undisturbed by national politics.29
On the other side of the border, the increase in activity by peripheral fundamentalist Islamist groups such as Taliban has soured relations between Islam and the state of India as it has been used by Hindu nationalist groups as a justification for attacks on Muslim communities. On an administrative level, local Hindu councils have opposed grants to build mosques in recent years. The houses of one Indian Muslim village were burned down by mobs after they began construction anyway, with women and young girls being attacked in the process.30 They do so because the high population growth of Indian Muslims is used by nationalist groups as a point of communal concern, conflating this community that has co-existed with Hindus in India since the 8th century CE with organised terrorists.31 One could argue that the Modi-supported RSS better display the hallmarks of such a group given their tactics. They commonly refer to India as ‘Hindustan’ and their movement has been accused by international reporters of seeking the ‘saffronisation’ of the state — after the saffron robes worn by Hindu religious leaders. It appears antithetical to Zia’s ‘Islamisation’ of Pakistan but it holds the same purpose – the creation of a theocratic state.32 The BJP and the RSS have consciously pushed the image of Islamic madrasas in particular as having the primary function of promoting Islamist thought as it suited the wider aim of portraying Indian Muslims as the belligerent 'other' when in reality they are largely regular schools that are often a child’s only chance of education.33 34 Fundamentalist groups have historically had a relatively small following in India in comparison to it’s neighbouring countries, and the current population of Indian Muslims appear relatively passive, wanting to maintain a stable and healthy relationship between
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29
30 31 32 33
34
135.
Grare, “The Evolution of Sectarian Conflicts in Pakistan and the Ever-Changing Face of
Islamic Violence,”
Gahlot, “India's Hindu Fundamentalists.”
Mistry, “Muslims in India: A Demographic and Socio-Economic Profile,”
Gahlot, “India's Hindu Fundamentalists.”
Arshad Alam, “The Enemy within: Madrasa and Muslim Identity in North India,” Modern
Asian Studies 42, no. 2,(March-May, 2008),
Shubh Mathur, “Mapping the Enemy: Images of Islam,” Economic and Political Weekly
38, no. 37, (Sep. 13-19, 2003),
606. 3875.
404.
7
their faith and the state.35 Even though the Deobandi school of thought is the progenitor of the Taliban and is increasingly popular amongst Sunni Indian Muslims, this faction is content in the Indian state so long as it remains secular and they are allowed to use shari’a law on a personal level – they also do not support their fraternal movement in Pakistan.36
The threat of fundamentalist Islamism has negatively affected India’s relationship with Islam, and a possible increase of interest in fundamentalism and separatism in response to escalating Hindu nationalist violence could worsen this situation if secularism in India is not restored on an equal basis for all classes and creeds.
The relationship between states and religion are largely governed by the legislatures of the state, as they decide what, or who, is a priority to protect, and what, or who, is a priority to prohibit. The constitutions and subsequent legislation of both India and Pakistan are deeply rooted in the histories and struggles that they share both with each other and external colonising groups. Following the mass exodus of Muslims from India to Pakistan following destructive measures by a dying British Empire, the dynamics between both states and Islam were destined to be fraught. Seventy years later, the conflict between the state of India and Islam is ongoing and does not appear to be quietening down, and Pakistan’s future is looking increasingly unstable as the Sunni/Shi’a divide continues. In a sense, this uncertainty is why a comparative analysis of the relationship between Islam and the states of India and Pakistan is possible.
Ultimately they are both becoming more destructive as peripheral fundamentalist Islamist groups become more active, with the state of Pakistan failing to address the leniencies it has given to more orthodox groups, and the state of India actively discriminating against Muslims and inciting distrust of the state amongst its Muslim population.