In a nuclear age, North-Korea is an ongoing case-study in the field of negotiations. The purpose of this essay, therefore, is to provide a historical background of the involved powers: Japan, China, South and North-Korea, with the “West” defined exclusively as The United States of America. (For explanations on European exclusion, see Annex A) Since systematic solutions require access to classified US policy, information on internal North-Korean politics, and knowledge of back-channel negotiations with Japan, China, the analysis of the negotiating process shall be limited to how a constructive negotiation could be approached. As explained later, “amicable” is defined as negotiations not occurring during wartime.
The Korean situation involves all the above-mentioned powers. However, the historical roots of the conflict begin with the Japanese Empire’s colonization, and subsequent decolonization of Korea from 1910 – 1945. Undivided Korea was ruled by the Joseon Dynasty, an “agrarian society, with a strong class structure” (Cumings, 1981), where “landed aristocracies used their privileges to dominate the peasantry”. (Palais, 1991) In 1910, a newly industrialized Japan, “spurred on by the lack of resources in its homeland” (Cumings, 1981), invaded and colonized the peninsula. The Empire was a demonstrably hated ruler. The figures are indicative of this– It took the French “2920 administrators and 10,776 French troops to rule 17 million Vietnamese, yet Japan required 246,000 indigenous Japanese to administer 21 million Koreans.” (Grajdanzev, 2012) Significantly, while “French withdrawal from Vietnam resulted in a bloody war” (Kissinger, 1994), it was proportionally easier for France to rule Vietnam, than for Japan to rule Korea. “Koreans maintained that their nation was something that Japan snatched away – in league with Korean traitors.” (Cumings, 1981) And justifiably so, since Japan used tried-and-tested methods of “rewarding local elites (yangban) who cooperated.” (Juhn, 1977) The landed-aristocracy was close to Japan: Korean industrialists were financed and run by “either the Japanese zaibatsu houses, or by the Industrial Bank or the SMRC”, (Schumpeter, 1940) and these ties were not purely commercial, for “the zaibatsu occupied an esteemed place in Japanese political society as well.” (Benedict, 1946)
The systemic problem this created was that “entrepreneurs and post-colonial figures such as Hyon Chun-ho, Kim Pyong-no, Yun Sang-un, and Kim Song-Su were all landed aristocrats,” (Cumings, 1981) and the result after decolonization was a peasant society, “with 30,000 political prisoners in colonial jails and a deep, lasting hatred of Japan, and landlords, whose behavior was stated as being parasitical.” (Migunsa, 1988) The struggle between these classes ultimately sowed the seeds of Korea’s division.
In 1945, Japan was defeated in the Second Great War. To “peacefully withdrawing the Japanese population from Korea” (Chun-yõn, 1947), the immediate post-colonial Koreans were segmented into two categories: The hardliners and moderates, not Communists and Capitalists. “While those opposed to Japan did turn communist,” (Kang-Kuk, 1946) the primary gap between North and South was of attitudes towards Japan. It was no coincidence that Kim-Il Sung, the founder of the DPRK was a hardliner first “emerging in the Northeast Anti-Japanese United Army (NEAJUA), fighting in Japanese-occupied Manchuria” (Suh, 1967), while “the South-Korean nationalists, mostly honam landlords such as Kim Song-su, had been weakened by the collaboration of many leaders with the Japanese.” (Cumings, 1981) The left, therefore, denounced the right as “traitors and Japanese dogs.” (Hyõk, 1946) Effectively, the Japanese, who packed up and left quickly, left behind different North-South politics with opposing viewpoints on Korea’s future, with the North being, and remaining, highly antagonistic towards Japan. The past foreshadows current events, which is the focus of the essay, but it not be surprising that “nuclear missiles were launched into the Sea of Japan” (BBC, 2017) and Japan’s security concerns today are therefore very real.
The above describes the past with Japan; however, China is far more integral today for negotiations. With it supplying “95% of North-Korean foreign trade, and every barrel of oil into North-Korea” (Chatham House, 2017), it is easy to say that a solution requires China to pressurize North-Korea. History, again, proves complex. China’s concern is about its borders – Especially the extremely sensitive Yalu Border. “For 3000 years, China viewed itself as the Middle-Kingdom, and everyone outside of its territory as barbarians, who occasionally visited to pay tribute to All-Under-Heaven.” (Kissinger, 2011) It did not even have a Foreign Ministry until 1894, “with all foreigners handled through the Ministry of Rituals” (Kissinger, 2011), where “they were wined, dined and courteously treated – Then sent back, or set-off against other barbarians.” (Ying-Shih, 1967)
Indeed, “British Ambassador Macartney, who came for trade, was handed a message saying that China possessed everything, and that the Queen should pay homage to Chien L’ung”. (Toynbee, 1960) The Opium-Wars shattered this dignity. 1839-1949 was “their century of humiliation, with their population addicted to opium, their Summer Palace burned down, and their territories taken away in the Unequal Treaties, including the 1848 Aigun and 1850 Beijing treaties.” (Kissinger, 2011) The greatest humiliation came when Japan invaded– through the Yalu border. In Japan’s occupation of Nanking, “an estimated 40,000-300,000 Chinese civilians and disarmed combatants were murdered.” (Levene & Penny, 1999) Rabe stated “that all he could see was murder and rape – It is known today as the Rape of Nanking.” (Woods, 1998) China did not forget it’s humiliation.
Mao waged “a war against India in 1962, engineered the Zhenbao incident against the Soviets in 1969, and when General Macarthur pushed the North-Koreans up to the Yalu River in the Korean War, Mao, at tremendous risk to himself”, (Kissinger, 2011) fought against a nuclear-armed America – all to protect a non-nuclear, chaotic, and poor China’s territorial integrity. “China not want a bordering nuclear-power”, but it is a completely non-negotiable foreign policy that will not tolerate foreign troops at the entrance to its greatest humiliation – The Yalu. North-Korea is a historic inconvenience for China – “Kim’s invasion of the South drew China into an American war, something that Mao did not desire”. (Kissinger, 2011) But “pressurizing Kim may result in regime collapse, with millions seeking refuge into China” (Belfer Centre, 2017), or hypothetically, a war on the Yalu, and these options are unacceptable – As Kim Jong-Un knows.
Having described the threats to and interests of Japan and China respectively, the final participant’s description is of the United States, and how it relates to the situation. The US maintains troops in South-Korea (USFIK) since “the Korean-War, to protect the South, and threats to Japan are a direct US-geostrategic challenge, since the US guarantees Japanese security through the US-Japan Security Treaty”. (Brzezinski, 1997) The problem is that “peninsular involvement was due to George Kennan’s Soviet containment doctrine” (Kissinger, 1994), and China “sees the US-presence as a continuation of containment, now directed against China.” (Brzezinski, 1997) The US-Pacific presence, and the division of Korea is a hangover from the Second World War and the Cold-War, and while it does maintain a certain peace, it is ultimately illegitimate – “A legitimate order is one which all powers consider just enough not to completely overthrow it, but to negotiate within its bounds”. (Kissinger, 1964) If “the North goes operationally nuclear, Japan and South-Korea will go nuclear, with or without the US.” (Rose, 2017) China will certainly not want an escalating nuclear-race with neighbors, and a nuclear or non-pacific Japan, ceteris-paribus, is a much greater problem for China than any other: Economically larger than Korea, geographically closer than the US, and with the most painful history of all. The US also has significant “interests in maintaining a peaceful, non-militarized Japan”. (Brzezinski, 1997) One observes that neither China nor South-Korea want a nuclear Korea on their border, and the US will oppose a nuclear Korea – For security, as described below, and regional nonproliferation. The situation is therefore that “everyone wants peace. But it’s attainment is not as easy as the desire for it” (Kissinger, 1964) – Again, as Kim Jong-Un knows.
Before describing the (inferred) North-Korean policy-plan, it must be commented on why the situation has escalated beyond 1950, when an actual war broke out. The role of Nuclear weapons in policy is essential to understand this, “even though it is unknown to all parties, including the North-Koreans, whether their weapons are operational.” (Rose, 2017) “Geopolitical balances-of-power do not change significantly from conventional-arms acquisition, but nuclear weapons are not conventional. “The development of a nuclear weapon within a nation’s territory is enough to change the balance-of-power, without ever crossing borders.” (Kissinger, 1969) It is true that the disproportionality between all US and North-Korean military capacities is great; the US retains “1411 warheads” (Arms Control Organisation, 2017), while North-Korean warheads are estimated at “30-60.” (Council on Foreign Relations, 2017) With this disparity, the “second-strike capability of the US is enough to win a nuclear war with North-Korea.” But the essence of nuclear policy is that a first strike from North-Korea is enough to wage damage unacceptable to the US, regardless of who wins a declared nuclear-war. The reason why the Cold-War was cold, “while in any other situation it would have been a hot-war was because both sides knew that Mutually Assured Destruction was too costly, and outweighed any benefits.” (Kissinger, 1969) In the hands of an irresponsible power, or a revolutionary power not subscribing to the Westphalian System, nuclear weapons are incremental blackmail. (See Annex B for Nuclear Blackmail and Westphalia).
The final participant is North-Korea itself. It has an armistice-existence since 1953, an aberration in a historically united peninsula. It is “not a country with a functioning economy”. The Kim family, described as a crime family, survives because it derives legitimacy from anti-Japanese sentiment, hostility to South-Korea, and propaganda against the US”, (Rose, 2017) based on “the devastation of the North during the Korean-War.” (Millett, 2010) “But the dictator’s power is as absolute as it is illusory. It shatters, as stated by Clemens von Metternich, on his first defeat.” (Kissinger, 1964) Open rapprochement with the US or Japan is “likely to collapse the regime, as is rapid cut-offs of Chinese aid.” (Rose, 2017) Kim seeks the security of nuclear weapons, because “he saw what happened to Gaddafi after he gave up his nuclear program.” Kim Jong-Un’s “school records display intellectual rationality” (Rose, 2017), and assuming this rationality, his “rapid nuclear acceleration” (Yuen, 2017), is a bargaining chip before negotiation, unlike Gaddafi. Kim Jong-Un, inferentially, is playing realpolitik. A nuclear strike on the US or Japan is enough to result in nuclear annihilation of North-Korea. Kim Jong-Un is a rational man who wants a deal – without being assassinated or removed.
It is observable, therefore, that all parties disagreed on what to do about the situation, thereby, it has proceeded so far. To negotiate, therefore, is to construct a Peninsular order considered legitimate- an order that “all powers consider fair enough that they will not overthrow it. In Kissinger-ian terms, “the revolutionary is the power that nothing can reassure, except for total security for itself, but total security for a power means total insecurity for others”. (Kissinger, 1964) When contrasted with Europe in 1813 (See Annex C for parallels with Europe after Napoleon), North-Korea is a caricature of legitimate Austria more than revolutionary France: “A historical relic, desperately seeking security like Austria– but through revolutionary policies, like France.” (Kissinger, 1964) The US is the mirror of revolutionary France– “for it views the Far-Eastern order of a pacific Japan, non-nuclear Korea, and troops in the South from a unilateral perception of its security”. (Brzezinski, 1997) The proposal, then, is to look at the situation, not in American terms, that “of the natural state being utopian-peace, but in Chinese terms, that there are no final solutions in a legitimate order, and a problem solved is a gateway to another problem”. (Kissinger, 2011) If nothing reassures the USA other than obliterating North-Korea, and nothing reassures North-Korea other than nuclear-weapons, there is no point in negotiating, “for in a revolutionary order, diplomats meet but no longer speak the same language.” (Kissinger, 1964) Outlandish though it may seem, North-Korea’s development of Nuclear weapons is the best thing to happen to this negotiation, for revolutionary unilateral invasion or bombing “will not work with Seoul 35 miles from the DMZ” (Millett, 2010), and China’s objections. Now that war is impossible, the maxim: “Diplomacy is the art of reconciliation, of living in relative insecurity rather than total security” (Kissinger, 1964), must be followed. Now that the North has ambiguously operational nuclear weapons, it must be a part of negotiations, perhaps through back-channel open embassies such as India or Russia. It must be recognized that Kim will not openly denuclearize- it is suicidal for him. The method, then, is for the US to convert from unilateral revolutionary France to Austria –in engaging Kim Jong-Un, it must isolate the balance against him, as his legitimacy also demands his renunciation of his absolute, nuclear-security. Of course, “it must also be understood that force is always hanging over every negotiation, and since realpolitik dictates that threatening force without credibility destroys the whole bargaining position”, (Kissinger, 1964) the US must display readiness to use force and use this pressure against North-Korea – THAAD deployments for ally-defense provide openings for threats of force – the US President’s fire and fury declarations help.
Simultaneously, through back-channels, the US should pressurize Japan to reach a Sino-Japanese détente, which is happening as “the Prime Ministers meet to declare an understanding for better relations”, (Reuters, 2017) and prepare to move USFIK to Japan. The US must recognize that “legitimate orders require relative-insecurity” (Kissinger, 1964), and propose to secretly withdraw from the South after “partitioning North-Korea along the narrow neck of the peninsula, as suggested after the Korean-War” (Kissinger, 1994). “Diplomacy is the art of nuance” (Kissinger, 1964), and if these proposals reach Kim through back-channel countries while President Trump continues to publicly threaten force and “conduct intensified exercises with the South” (Neuman, 2017), while back-channels simultaneously conduct negotiations with Kim Jong-Un to get him to denuclearize with his security arranged for in a Belgium-esque agreement – That is, the neutrality of the country secretly guaranteed by all powers; they have a possibility of working. A possible partition along the narrow neck of the peninsula, followed by voluntary US-withdrawal, while “leaving behind THAAD radar-systems that can peer into Chinese aerospace”, (Swaine, 2017) is an achievable compromise for both Chinese and US interests. Although unlikely to be implemented, a real diplomatic isolation is not conducive to Kim Jong-Un’s survival, which is his ultimate self-interest. Following the maxim, “that as completely as the revolutionary seeks to destroy an existing system, he must equally put something to replace it” (Kissinger, 2011), North-Korea, although it entered the arena with nuclear threats, has no power to revolutionize the system – It has already “made it known through Russia that they want to negotiate” (Borger, 2017) – The US, one can infer, is perhaps following this pattern of diplomacy.
This policy resembles juggling five balls in the air, but it is necessary- “Leo Caprivi once said that he could not juggle five balls simultaneously, unlike his predecessor Bismarck. His preference for a final Schlieffen plan, the total victory instead of nuanced treaties, contributed to the Great War that Bismarck tried to prevent” (Clark, 2012) – and perhaps erraticism is effective in this case, since three contradictory courses are to be pursued with equal sincerity. is a task of US policy, then, to implement its values legitimately and to do so with nuance – for Kim faces a sensitive situation domestically, and if he denuclearizes in the face of open humiliation, it is presumable that some insurgency will occur. “The ultimate test of a statesman’s policies is their longevity, and the above, displays the principle of legitimate negotiations – they are not defined by rigid demands from any side, but by spontaneity and flexibility”. (Kissinger, 1964)
In conclusion, therefore, it is recommended that the US understand that the Far-East today is unsustainable, and for it to use its power to reconcile to a legitimate order, which will entail making sacrifices of troop withdrawals from the South, and to use this readiness to make sacrifices to isolating Kim, while simultaneously, and unilaterally, pressurizing Kim to substantially reduce his program – at a minimum. In due course, Kim’s goal of security should be encouraged by secretly supplying him with economic aid if he engages in a very gradual reconciliation with the South, perhaps in the shape of a Korean Confederation.