Political expediency was a major factor behind political parties extending, or supporting the extension of the franchise, the theory being founded upon the assumption that the newly enfranchised would in return, in the next election vote for the party which had introduced this extension. Due to mounting social pressure, political parties saw the extension of the franchise as inevitable, but were aware that reforms could be structured in ways that were advantageous to themselves, and thus were willing to support the extension of the franchise despite not personally endorsing it, for the sake of political expediency. Thus the real intention of the 1832 reform bills can be hypothesized to be not necessarily to increase the franchise but more specifically to redraw constituency boundaries, and hopefully maximize their own returns. The reasoning behind this was that as most newly enfranchised would vote the way their superiors advised, it would be valuable to ensure that these ‘superiors’ represented clearly defined, separate interests as opposed to mixed ones. Urban interests which had spilled over into many county seats could now be confined to an appropriately limited sphere, and the landed interest would thus exercise an unchallenged sway in an expanded rural electorate.
The development of two-party politics, and subsequent competition between the Whigs and the Conservatives was an additional motivation in the push for electoral reform, as each party sought to increase their own support by increasing the electorate. This is evidenced by the events leading up to the implementation of the 1867 Reform Act, which was introduced by Lord Derby’s newly formed coalition government, despite his Conservatives having defeated Lord Russell’s Liberal government’s proposal in the previous year to relax voting property qualifications. Thus the origins of the bill lay in the struggle for supremacy at Westminster, and in particular the rivalry between William Gladstone and Benjamin Disraeli, who would both go on to become Prime Ministers. This paralleled the way in which the reform bills that were introduced, but never passed, in the 1850s and 1860s were a means for the two major parties to secure precarious majorities, this time the result of the contest between Viscount Palmerston and Lord Russell as well as the breakdown in party alignment after 1846. The role of the competition between parties in encouraging the extension of the franchise is thus significant, especially when considering that political parties had the ability to structure parliamentary reform to be more expedient, as depending on who was enfranchised and where, reform could, for example turn a rural constituency into an industrial one, etc. and thus alter the balance between town and country, possibly swinging a constituency from one party to the other. Political party members themselves were aware of this, for Liberals complained that the Tory bill of 1859 would place representation of the boroughs in Tory hands, whereas the 1866 bill introduced by the Liberals was expected by Lord Derby to virtually extinguish the Conservative party.
What became informally known as the Second Reform Act was actually more radical than the one originally proposed by Lord Russell as Derby and Disraeli who was Chancellor of the Exchequer at the time, aimed to use this extension to encourage voters to vote Conservative. Disraeli in particular, was ambitious and throughout his political career which culminated in the position of Prime Minister and leader of the Conservative party, he justified his many shifts in policy by various practical problems at the time. For example, earlier in his career he had sought stability in a compromise alliance between the landed interest and the bourgeoisie, whereas in the late 1860s through to the 1870s he made a direct appeal to the lower classes with what came to be known as ‘Tory democracy.’ Although he was primarily responsible for the final bill that granted the franchise to virtually all of the urban working class, for the rest of his career he would consistently oppose any forms of extension of democracy such as lowering the county franchise, affirming that he acted from expediency and not conviction, with regards to the Second Reform Act. The theory of political expediency also extended to politicians taking the position of opposition to parliamentary reform when there was little internal or external pressure to do so, and additionally little to gain from doing so. This is exemplified by the time period from 1822 to 1830 during which popular support for reform was for the most part non-existent, and so the Whig leader Earl Grey advised his son, the then Viscount Howick not to press for reform in the House of Commons, for fear he would be deserted by public opinion.
Additionally, political parties were subject to pressure for electoral from within the parties themselves, and sought to address these issues in attempts to maintain party order and unity, in order to expedite themselves. 1848 was a turning point, when following the February revolution in France that year there was a substantial group of MPs in the House of Commons who advocated fundamental electoral reforms – some who had earlier on supported Chartists’ petitions in 1839 and 1842, and others who were newly elected in the general election of 1847. This increase in support for electoral reform posed a problem for the Whig Prime Minister at the time, Lord Russell who had been one of the principal architects of the 1832 Reform Act, but now regarded it as a permanent settlement, declaring his opposition to any further parliamentary reform. Lord Russell would eventually however, be convinced that further reform was necessary, due to both pressure within the establishment, and events in Europe which meant that at the time Britain was the only major European power (with the exception of Russia) which had not yet accepted the principle of manhood suffrage, raising questions if Britain could indefinitely maintain her status quo. Russell’s abandonment of finality and move to support reform was an expedient action not only in terms of Russell’s position within parliament, but also Britain’s position, and having been endorsed by both Peelite and Protectionist Conservatives, paved the way for reform to play a significant role in strategic programmes of parties in the 1850s.
A further theory to explain the votes of MPs with regards to reform bills is the role of self interest and personal political expedience, which can be categorized into the roles of patronage politics and individual occupations. In the case of both Whig and Tory patrons, if driven by social and economic interests, the MPs under their influence could be expected to oppose reform, which generally went against patrons’ social and economic interests. Alternatively, assuming individual MPs vote decisions were influenced by their occupations, a more systematic divide can be seen amongst MPs, as illustrated in Table 1, which lists the both the occupation and family circumstances of individual MPs in relation to the probability that they supported the Reform bills in 1832. The data indicates that MPs with a relative(s) in parliament systematically opposed reform, as could be expected whereas those with a military background were more likely to support it, most likely having been influenced by the risks of social unrest – this is further supported by evidence that such MPs changed their allegiance from opposition to support between March and July, the period during which the threat of unrest escalated. The votes of MPs with backgrounds in finance, commerce or industry, who might have been sympathetic to demands for the redistribution of seats to expanding industrial cities, but simultaneously concerned that a wider franchise might lead to increase pro-labour legislation or higher taxes tended to vary. Those in finance were more likely to support reform but those in industry inclined to oppose it, most likely because of the fear that this would give workers the power to demand new economic rights.
Consistent with the aim of advancing each party’s individual interests, was the aim of curbing any threat of political revolution. Apart from the party in opposition, the largest threat to any party in government was that of revolution, as the French Revolution had shown the capability of a sizable working class to overthrow an existing government. The effects of the French Revolution had spread across the channel to England, with Corresponding Societies being established across the country in 1791 and 1792. These societies were a cause for concern for the political elite not only for the messages of support that were being sent to the French National Convention, but also for the fact that most members were working class men, who now represented a new challenge to the existing political system. The threat of revolution played a prominent role in the events leading up to the first major extension of the franchise in 1832, from as early as the 1817-1819 when the reform movement, and specifically the Peterloo massacre, based in Manchester was a cause for concern for the Tory Sir Robert Peel. The Swing riots of 1830 by poorly paid agricultural labourers were one of the causes of the fall of Duke of Wellington’s government, although it is significant that despite having suffered through the winter of 1929-1930, economic conditions for the labourers had improved by then, and they were roused to action by the revolutions in France, thus affirming the ease at which popular protest could spread. These disturbances which peaked just after Wellington’s resignation, quickly declined when Earl Grey took office on 22 November on a platform clearly committed to reform. The significance of the threat of revolution can be clearly seen when studying the circumstances under which the 1832 Reform Act was eventually passed. Having been defeated the first two times it was introduced (at the committee stage, and in the house of lords, respectively), it was only under the volatile political environment of country-wide riots and a rise in political militancy that the act was finally passed in December 1931. This is perhaps most strongly evidenced by the statistics of less than 50 contentious gatherings held collectively in the months of June, July and August of 1831, but more than 300 in October. The threat of revolution should not, however, be mistaken for having a universal impact on politicians, as voting on reform bills of 1832 indicate that the threat of revolution in the previous year (riots, talks of armed uprising, and petitions to parliament) had an asymmetric impact on voting behaviour – while the threat of revolution had convinced reluctant Whig MPs to support the reform bills, it simply enforced Tory resistance to reform.
Source A is a valuable source in support of this argument. With regards to its provenance, as a statement by the Prime Minister and leader of a major political party it provides valuable indication of the party’s justification for introducing the Reform Act. It is in terms of the content, however, that the source is most valuable particularly when studying factors behind the extension of the franchise, as Earl Grey explicitly states that the reform is being implemented strictly to ‘prevent the necessity of revolution.’ The source also serves to eliminate the possibility of other motivations for extending the franchise, such as a change in social attitudes of the political elite, as Earl Grey describes that this reform is a means to prevent future universal suffrage as opposed to endorsing it. His claims regarding the threat of revolution are further supported when considering the extent of political unrest that occurred in the years leading up to the implementation of the 1832 Reform Act, from as early as 1811 when the Luddite Riots began, up until the Swing Riots of 1830. Further evaluation of historical context shows that attempts at electoral reform were often preceded by a measure of unrest, a significant example being the next key legislation, the Representation of the People Act of 1867. Escalating violence as a consequence of the economic downturn experienced during the financial panic of 1866 was a major factor behind the pace at which the act was passed.
Historians Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson however, contend that political reforms to extend the franchise were undertaken as strategic decisions by the party in power with the single objective prevent widespread social unrest and revolt, superseding any expediency-related motivations. This was done in the face of the working class and poor having the numbers to overthrow the government, despite being excluded from representation. In the face of this threat, extending the franchise would act as a commitment to future redistribution of wealth as well as preventing future unrest. In contrast to this, promising future redistribution whilst power remained concentrated amongst the political elite, would not be credible. Although this argument is valid, as it is dependent on the existence of a threat to order, and considering that democratization in England generally was in the form of gradual extensions of suffrage accompanied by little outright violence, it does not apply to the entirety of the period in question. An alternative theory put forth by historians Alessandro Lizzeri and Nicola Persico theorizes in the absence of a threat from the disenfranchised, the political elite willingly extended the franchise because elections with a wider electorate gave better incentives to politicians, for two main reasons. Firstly, increasing the electorate reduces the relative proportion of voters that can be wooed by ad hominem promises, and secondly, assuming parliamentary reform favours swing voters, the political party in power could expect newly enfranchised votes to swing their way. This argument is however less convincing due to the speculative nature of the reasoning.
Prior to the implementation of the 1832 Reform Act, the votes of Whig and Tory MPs with regards to reform bills were as a rule, very dissimilar and thus countervailing ideologies about the extension of the franchise can be proxied by parties themselves. Inherent, party-based attitudes to reform were initiated as early 1790, when Burke’s Reflections on the Revolution in France, in attacking the revolution’s philosophical basis, laid down the principles which would later be identified as central to modern Conservative ideology. Under his assertions that governments did not derive their authority from the explicit consent of the governed, as advocated by the revolution, but instead from custom and experience; and that a government’s prime duty was the preservation of social order the Conservative party developed as the party of order which placed social stability, the preservation of the constitution and the defence of religion above individual liberties and reform. Thus this could explain the reasons for Tory opposition to Reform across the period in question, the exception being in situations where it was politically expedient. This ideology was shared by individual politicians themselves, in particular the propertied men who after 1792 would rally to the defence of the existing system, in which property was urged as the basis for the wealth and security of the country, and those with could be trust to use their votes wisely.
An alternative view is that social attitudes of politicians had changed over time, as the enlightenment movement made it harder for members of the political elite to view a system in which the majority lacked representation, as right and just. Since the end of the 18th century which coincided with the French Revolution, contemporaries felt the growing need to address the perceived failures of political institutions at both a local and national level – this view held by ‘philosophical’ radicals such as Jeremy Bentham and James Mill would go on to influence the politics of key centrist Whigs namely Lord Russell, and Earl Grey. In fact, a major part of Lord Russell’s later arguments in support of electoral reform would be based on its desirability for enhancing the efficiency of the political system. Changes in social attitudes would continue to happen throughout this time period, leading to politicians moving to support the extension of the franchise. William Gladstone’s opposing stance to reform in 1832, but later becoming convinced of its social and moral benefits are a key example of this. *GLADSTONE SOURCE*
Additionally, the new democratic constitution being implemented in France through the middle of the period in question would also have influenced the views of politicians. Primarily, the enlightenment view theorizes that in light of the changes across the Channel, as politicians adopted the more liberal ideas being endorsed, more of them moved to support the extension of the franchise. Additionally, the new French democracy made the English electoral system in contrast, seem restricted and archaic. Internal events in Britain also influenced politicians’ changes in stances on reform, for example when speaking in the House of Commons on the debate of Hume’s Four Points Resolution in 1848, Lord Russell stated clearly that his attitude to reform had been altered by the ‘temper, moderation and good sense (…) shown by people of this country’, which demonstrated those yet to be enfranchised were fit to have the vote, despite the archaic view that the non-propertied classes were too easily swayed by emotional appeals, and the poor insufficiently educated. However, while individual politicians may have had this view, there is little evidence that supports the change in social attitudes as a collective political party’s justification for extending the franchise. Furthermore, Paine’s and Rousseau’s writings had been largely disseminated by the British political elite by the early 1800s.