One of the most interesting aspects of the Soviet Union is how peacefully it fell. Arguably, this can be attributed to the Soviet Union’s attitude and behaviour towards the changes in Eastern Europe. It is in stark contrast to the behaviour seen in the past in which Soviet policy towards Eastern Europe was rigid and intolerant. This was exemplified in Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968 in which Soviet troops intervened to maintain Communism under the ‘Brezhnev Doctrine.’ Thus, due to this extreme change in thinking it is interesting to analyse the reasons that precipitated these decisions and allowed the Soviet Union to fall without any major violence (despite the Romanian case) (Kramer, 2004). Rather than solely focusing on the protests, this study will examine the reasons why the Soviet Union chose not to use force during the protests in 1989 and the effect this had on Eastern Europe, especially how it facilitated the fall of the Soviet Union.
Mikhail Gorbachev’s reforms glasnost and perestroika had a great impact on the politics and society within individual East European states (Wilton, 2010). In this study the term ‘East European’ will refer to the states of the former Warsaw Pact other than the Soviet Union- Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Poland, Hungary and Romania. Beginning with Poland and Hungary, the fragility of the Soviet regime began to show when Mikhail Gorbachev allowed the East European states to ‘go their own way’ without the threat of Soviet intervention. This fragility had been evident long before 1989, in Czechoslovakia and East Germany in 1953, Poland and Hungary in 1956, Poland and Czechoslovakia and in 1968 and Poland in 1970, 1976, and 1980-81, what made these crises different to what happened in 1989 is that previous crises had been quelled by Communist authorities or the Soviet army (Kramer, 2003). In 1989, Mikhail Gorbachev was clear that under no circumstances would the Soviet Union use force against Eastern Europe, this study will look at the reasons behind this and the consequences of the 1989 protests.
ay It can be argued that moral reasons prevented the USSR from intervening in the 1989 protests in Central and Eastern Europe. Bennett (2005) argues that Gorbachev had a ‘deep personal almost physical aversion to spilling blood’ this could be a result of the lasting influence of formative experiences. Gorbachev, Shevardnadze and other ‘new thinkers’ had experiences as children or young adults that made them ‘sceptical of the efficacy and morality of using force’ (Bennett, 2005). Both Gorbachev and Shevardnadze had family members who had fallen victim to Stalinist repressions and as young adults witnessed Soviet military interventions in Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968. The continued costly failure of Soviet backed military operations in Afghanistan, Angola and Cambodia in the 1980’s only strengthened Gorbachev’s inclination against using force. The strong reaction to the Soviet army’s killing and wounding of unarmed demonstrators in Tbilisi in April 1989 and the world outrage to the violent suppression of demonstrators in Tiananmen Square in June 1989 further convinced Gorbachev and other ‘new thinkers’ that the use of force was ‘morally illegitimate’ and ‘ineffective at solving political problems’ (Bennett, 2005).
This view differed largely from ‘Old thinkers’ such as Igor Ligachev who emphasized the likelihood of ‘bandwagoning’ or ‘domino’ dynamics, who believed that ‘popular unrest in one country, if successful would inspire uprisings elsewhere and would eventually, jeopardise the unity of the Soviet Union itself’ (Bennett, 2005). However, whilst this view did end up being correct the use of force was likely to stimulate greater opposition rather than cowing the opposition into submission (Bennett, 2005).
Vladimir Kryuchkov, the Head of the KGB in the late 1980’s and early 1990’s acknowledges the change in opinion towards using force, in an interview in 1998:
‘In both Soviet society and the East European countries a deep change had taken place, and it played out through the 1980’s producing a negative attitude toward such means of resolving conflicts’
In a report written by the CSPU International Department on the situation in Eastern Europe they state that ‘authoritarian measures and direct pressure are clearly obsolete… It is very unlikely that we would be able employ the methods of 1956 and 1968 both as a matter of principle, but also because of unacceptable consequences’ (ID document, 1989 – in Levesque, 1997).
‘We cannot and will not resort to force’ (Gorbachev, Meeting of the Politburo, Discussion of Memorandum of Six Politburo Members on the Situation in the Baltic Republics, 11th May 1989). Military and KGB leaders were less keen on ruling out the use of force, but after setbacks in Afghanistan were hesitant to resort to force (Bennett, 2005).
Thus, Gorbachev’s personal views influenced the reluctance to use force in Central and Eastern Europe; Bennett (2005) argues that ‘Andropov would never have permitted the political ferment in Eastern Europe that Gorbachev not only allowed but actively encouraged.’ However, it is likely that the use of force would have only created greater opposition to the Soviet regime. Whilst, morality did play a role in the reluctance to use force in Eastern Europe, it must be said that Gorbachev did not completely disagree with the use of force as seen in his interventions in Azerbaijan in 1990 and the Baltic Republics in 1991; it is more likely that using force in Eastern Europe would have undermined Gorbachev’s domestic reform agenda (Bennett, 2005).
Economic Reasons
‘The Socialist model has entered into an obvious contradiction with the requirements of the development of society, has become a brake on the path of socio-economic and scientific-technical progress, and has created a real threat of a growing gap between the socialist world and the West’- Soviet Ministry of International Affairs (1989).
There has been some suggestion that the USSR failed to intervene in Central and Eastern Europe because they no longer could afford to maintain their ‘satellite states’ and could not afford another costly military intervention. Soviet economic growth had been declining slowly but constantly for twenty years, at this point the Soviet Union had lost any hope of catching up with the West, as it had always promised and was falling ever further behind (Levesque, 1994). Soviet economy was failing due to the inefficiency of central planning; the increasing globalisation of product and investment meant that the Soviet Union was paying a high price for their economic isolation from the West (Bennett, 2005).
Furthermore, ‘new thinkers’ viewed Soviet allies in Eastern Europe as an economic burden, whilst ‘old thinkers’ stressed the strategic, economic and security benefits of allies in Eastern Europe. Bennett (2005) argues that the Soviet Union would have benefited from shedding its East European empire at the beginning of the 1970’s due to the attainment of nuclear parity and the increase in world oil prices in 1973, he also suggests that Gorbachev could have continued with limited changes to foreign policy and simply reformed the market economy in much the same way that China did.
Gorbachev’s efforts in 1985 and 1986 to improve the Soviet economy failed thus Soviet leaders had to make greater concessions to both the West and opposition leaders in Central and Eastern Europe. The use of force in the region would have resulted in unacceptable levels of military casualties, large direct and indirect economic costs due to the international debt obligations of Eastern Europe and the threat of economic sanctions from the West (Bennett, 2005). Despite, the Soviet Union’s economic decline, its large nuclear arsenal offered some security benefits and greater risk taking in foreign policy.
Furthermore, Bennett (2005) argues that whilst financial constraints were important it is unlikely that they were the primary factor in Gorbachev’s thinking in Eastern Europe. Withdrawal from Eastern Europe was not planned, and was a result of the failure to revitalise the Soviet economy and politically and economically reform Eastern Europe.
Political Reasons
Gorbachev’s predecessors relied on military force to ‘defend socialism’ in Eastern Europe this was emphasized in the ‘Brezhnev Doctrine’ that justified intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968:
‘The sovereignty of individual socialist countries cannot be set against the interests of world socialism and the world revolutionary movement…. Each Communist party is free to apply the principles of Marxism-Leninism and socialism in its own country, but it is not free to deviate from these principles if it is to remain a Communist party’ – (Brezhnev Doctrine, 1968 in Bennett, 2005).
The Brezhnev Doctrine exemplifies the view from the 1940’s until the 1980’s that Eastern Europe was an extension of the Soviet Union, threats to Eastern Europe were threats to Soviet security as well (Kramer, 2004).
This differed largely to Gorbachev’s so-called ‘Sinatra Doctrine’:
‘The social and political orders of certain countries [in Europe] changed in the past, and may change again in the future. However, this is exclusively a matter for the peoples themselves to decide; it is their choice. Any interference in internal affairs, or any attempts to limit the sovereignty of states—including friends and allies, or anyone else—are impermissible’ ("Rech' M. S. Gorbacheva," Izvestiya (Moscow), 7 July 1989, p.2 in Kramer, 2003)
Furthermore, improvements in East- West relations meant that Gorbachev had less fear that Western countries would exploit changes in Eastern Europe to Moscow’s disadvantage (Kramer, 2003). Gorbachev aimed to show the West that ‘new political thinking’ was more than just words thus in 1988 in a speech to the United Nations, he announced that the Soviet Union would be reducing its military forces in Eastern Europe by 50,000 troops, 5,300 tanks and 24 tactical nuclear weapons. Hungary and Poland were quick to exploit the greater latitude for political and economic change, and the policies of perestroika and glasnost allowed for grievances and social discontent to be brought to the surface. Despite the fact that Romania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia and East Germany clung onto orthodox Communism at this stage, it was clear that Gorbachev was willing to permit far reaching changes in Eastern Europe that would have been suppressed under the Brezhnev Doctrine (Kramer, 2003).
Moreover, Gorbachev did not intend to undermine the Communist regime by introducing political reforms and did not foresee the changes that would take place as a result of his reforms. He had hoped to preserve the integrity of the Warsaw Pact by creating favourable conditions ‘socialism with a human face’ that would hopefully stop the instability of the past. However, he maintained his stance on avoiding the use of force and when the process of change took a revolutionary momentum of its own, he declined to interrupt it or slow it down (Kramer, 2003).
Furthermore, Gorbachev declined to use force as it would result in ‘anti-Sovietism’ and ‘undermine the Soviet Union in the foreign policy field’ as well as ultimately leading to the ‘isolation of the Soviet Union in the International arena’ (Soviet Ministry of International Affairs, 1989).
The Role of Central and Eastern Europe
What is most interesting about the protests in 1989 is how remarkably peaceful they were, other than in the special case of Romania. The lack of any major violence can be attributed to the East European Communist regimes, Kramer (2003) argues that if it had been left to the East German, Bulgarian or Czechoslovak authorities violent repression would have resulted. Whilst the restraint of the East European people is of great importance, it is also in part to the policies adopted by Moscow. The Soviet Union aimed to forestall violence and promote liberalisation in the Warsaw Pact countries. Gorbachev continually stated that the Soviet Union ‘would respect the absolute right of every nation to choose its own socialist system as it sees fit’ (Address to European Parliament, 1989).
Despite in the case of Romania, the Soviet Union managed to deprive hardline Communist leaders the option of violent repression. Soviet influence had always been much weaker in Romania than elsewhere in Eastern Europe and it exemplified the lengths Gorbachev was willing to go to avoid direct military involvement in Eastern Europe. Even when major Western governments stated they would welcome Soviet intervention, Soviet leaders continued to refrain from sending troops (Kramer, 2003).
Bennett (2005) argues that if Gorbachev had been willing to use or threaten force to maintain the Warsaw Pact or even giving his consent for East European governments to use force themselves, the citizens of Eastern Europe would not have tried to overthrow the existing regime.
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