For the brief amount of time that humanity has reflected upon the abstract concepts of the universe, there have been too few that have contemplated the idea of personal identity. While some have interpreted this notion in their unique style, two of the most renowned philosophers, René Descartes and John Locke, established the views on “self” that most present scholars study. While both examinations have some similarities between the explanation of what personal identity is, they are separated by various, and yet considerable, distinctions. Therefore, it is reasonable to analyze both perceptions of this concept in order to understand why philosophers should be in agreement with Locke’s assessment on personal identity and why Descartes’ theory should be disputed.
In “Meditations in First Philosophy”, René Descartes explains his perspective on the concept of personal identity. The foundation for his beliefs on “self” can be best expressed as his doubt in regard to his senses. For example, Descartes persists that what he had previously considered to be accurate could be challenged because of his senses, which he concludes to have deceived him (Descartes, 1). Eventually, he assumes that “if God’s goodness would stop him from letting me be deceived all the time, you would expect it to stop him from allowing me to be deceived even occasionally; yet clearly I sometimes am deceived” (Descartes, 2). Of course, the logic behind the philosopher’s theory is that because he can be deceived, then it is also because God permits it. Furthermore, he asserts that “some malicious, powerful, cunning demon has done all he can to deceive” him, which is his reasoning that if God was as supremely virtuous as he was portrayed, then the only way for him to be misled is by a demon (Descartes, 3). Therefore, Descartes concludes that since his human instincts could not be trusted in part to manipulation by either himself or by some other force, then he must question everything. Eventually, he discovers that the senses from his body can be misinterpreted in his mind, and he later claims that the body and mind must be separate (which is now considered mind-body dualism). The rationalization for this theory is that “every body is by its nature divisible, but the mind can’t be divided” (Descartes, 32). By this reasoning, he claims that whenever he reflects upon his mind, it is a single, simple component as compared to the structure of the body. Ultimately, he finds that the mind and body are separate because “I have a vivid and clear idea of myself as something that thinks and isn’t extended, and one of body as something that is extended and does not think” (Descartes, 29). He believes that his “self” is purely his thinking self and that it is “distinct from my [Descartes] body and can exist without it” (Descartes, 29). Concisely, Descartes meditated upon his thoughts and his “self” and found that his senses could be deceived by a multitude of entities, and that the mind, as a thinking mechanism, is his “self” rather than his body, further providing an extension of himself.
In “An Essay Concerning Human Understanding”, John Locke illuminates his understanding of personal identity. From what he can comprehend of an individual, the “self” consists of “…a thinking intelligent being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider itself as itself… in different times and places; which it does only by that consciousness which is inseparable from thinking…” (Locke, II.xxvii.9). With this comprehension, Locke theorizes that the simple undertaking of thinking is actually what constructs consciousness, and that consciousness is what permits us to distinguish our personal identity. Additionally, he contends that corporeal matter, or the body, does not have any influence on what he considers to be the “self” of humans or animals, as he claims that “…(animal) identity is preserved in identity of life, and not of substance” (Locke, II.xxvii.12). Likewise, Locke also insists that personal identity is not affected by the soul, as he affirms that “…the soul alone, in the change of bodies, would scarce to any one but to him that makes the soul the man, be enough to make the same man” (Locke, II.xxvii.15). The reasoning for this claim is that an individual may have a copious amount of personalities over their duration on Earth, so they cannot be the same “self” over time if personal identity is based on the soul. However, Locke stipulates that “self” is principally one’s consciousness, as he declares that “…it is that which makes every one to be what he calls self, and thereby distinguishes himself from all other thinking things…” (Locke, II.xxvii.9). A peculiar notion that is associated with Locke’s perception of self is that “…as far as this consciousness can be extended backwards to any past action or thought, so far reaches the identity of that person; it is the same self now it was then…” (Locke, II.xxvii.9). To put this concept in a more abridged fashion, Locke believes that the “self” is tied to memories in such a way that if you remember your beliefs, ideas, and personality from when you were a child, you are still the same person today. Moreover, he also assumed that if two individuals were to possess the same memories, then they would be considered the same individual. In summary, Locke believes that “self” is not comprised of the soul or body, but of a constant consciousness that strings together memories over time.
Between both philosopher’s mindsets of what personal identity is, there are many connections as well as discrepancies. In regards to the relationship between the body and “self”; both Locke and Descartes establish that since the body is constantly changing, it cannot be what distinguishes personal identity. Descartes supports this within his Sixth Meditation as he states that “If a foot or arm or any other part of the body is cut off, nothing is thereby taken away from the mind” (Descartes, 32). Locke sustains this stance within his work by revealing “But if one of these atoms be taken away, or one new one added, it is no longer the same body… their identity depends not on a mass of the same particles, but on something else” (Locke, II.xxvii.3). Furthermore, Locke and Descartes similarly concur that the “self” is a “thing that thinks”, in which Descartes details “I know that I exist and that … I am a thinking thing… my essence consists solely in my being a thinking thing” (Descartes, 29) and Locke agrees that “we must consider what person stands for… a thinking intelligent being” (Locke, II.xxvii.9). However, the major distinction between their views is obvious when they consider what “self” is truly compiled of. As formerly mentioned, Descartes believes that “self” is fashioned by the fact that he is a “thinking thing” (Descartes, 29). On the other hand, Locke disputes against Descartes’ assertion by affirming that “… consciousness always accompanies thinking… in this alone consists personal identity” (Locke, II, xxvii, 9). So while Descartes deems that the essence of personal identity lies within the fact that he is a “thinking thing”, Locke ascertains that the essence of “self” is actually the consciousness of an individual. One imperative peculiarity to detect here is that with Descartes logic, we are the same “thinking thing” throughout our lives. Since we must be conscious to think by Descartes’ standards, then that means we are continually thinking as long as we are conscious. Furthermore, because the “thinking self” is the essence of personal identity in regards to Descartes’ theory, then we must be the same individual for as long as we are conscious. However, Locke presumes that because consciousness is the essence of “self”, then we are only the same person as how much we remember to be, “as far as this consciousness can be extended backwards to any past action or thought, so far reaches the identity of that person” (Locke, II.xxvii.9). To put it briefly, while Locke’s and Descartes’ views on personal identity have similar aspects, their theories ultimately do not compare at the core of their arguments.
In regards to my preference on the concept of personal identity, I would have to agree with John Locke’s interpretation of personal identity. With his assessment, there is more lucidity with concerns to questions such as “am I the same person as I was 10 years ago?”. For example, if I were to ask myself “am I the same person as I was when I started high school?”, the answer would depend on what I remember from my freshman year. If I were to respond to that query in a truthful manner, I would have to say that I have an almost perfect recollection of what my beliefs, ideas, and memories were in that time because they have not changed in the present. Therefore, I am the same person as I was when I started high school, by Locke’s standards. However, I cannot remember the same issues that are formerly listed from when I started middle school, as I, in my mind, have changed. Consequently, I am not the same person as when I started middle school as I have no remembrance of the memories from that period of life. From this example, Locke’s perspective of “self” is sensible in regards to how it relates to my life and can relate to others.
By favoring Locke’s perspective, I must therefore reject Descartes’. One major criticism I have with Descartes’ concept is that he has the wrong ideology when it comes to distinguishing that the body and mind are separate. He believes that because two distinct objects have different attributes, then they must be separate. However, I do not believe that this is a rational presumption. For instance, one popular argument against Descartes’ theory of dualism is the “Superman Argument”, in which Lois Lane believes that Superman can fly, but Clark Kent cannot, so therefore they are two separate people (Jubien, The Superman Argument). However, we know that this argument is unsound, as the conclusion is false because Clark Kent is Superman. By using this exact reasoning, the conclusion would be that Descartes’ theory concerning mind-body dualism is also unsound. All-in-all, it can be presumed that the properties of what Descartes theorized are simply properties of what he can perceive, and not of the objects that he is studying.
Both of the theories concerning personal identity are as distinguished as they are disputed in the field of philosophy. While both philosophers agree that the mind and body are separate, their theories diverge upon the clarification of what the essence of “self” is. On one hand, Descartes advocates that the crux of “self” is that each individual consists of a “thinking self.” On the contrary, Locke promotes that consciousness, and by relation, memories, are the root of personal identity. While each theory encompasses many enthusiasts as well as critics, I am in agreement with the more rational and relatable approach of Locke’s concept of personal identity in contrast to the outdated and nonsensical direction of Descartes’ ideology. All-in-all, the consciousness and memories of an individual are key components of the “self” rather than solely the “thinking thing.”