Trump and The Wall: Business as Usual on the U.S.-Mexico Border?
The images and rhetoric surrounding Donald Trump’s wall along the U.S. Mexico border played a pivotal role in both his presidential campaign and now during his presidency. The first of many mentions of Trumps’ plan to build was wall was the campaign trail on June 16, 2015, stating “I will build a great wall ― and nobody builds walls better than me, believe me ―and I’ll build them very inexpensively. I will build a great, great wall on our southern border, and I will make Mexico pay for that wall. Mark my words.” The insistence that some form of physical barrier would be built, that security of the U.S.-Mexico border was an critical issue that needed a solution, and the insistence that Mexico will pay for it continued throughout the campaign and has become more of a reality today. On January 25, 2017, President Trump signed an executive order which seeks to increase the security at the southern border of the United States, to paved the way for increased deportations of “illegal immigrants,” and outlines his plan to start the megaproject that is “the wall.”
This paper seeks to move past some of the noise and examine the facts surrounding the proposal contained in the January 25 Executive Order, including the cost, size, timeline, and stated purpose. It will then investigate some of the challenges to reaching the goals outlined in the proposal, and address some of the lingering questions about the project. It will then investigate the necessity of such a project by examining trends in border security since the 1980s and trends in migration on the southern United States border. Finally, this paper will examine the long history of escalation of border security through the lens of Peter Andreas’s theoretical framework to seek to understand whether Trump’s proposal and rhetoric is anything new, or is just a logical step in line with a history of escalated border policing.
An “Impenetrable, Physical, Tall, Powerful, Beautiful, Southern Border Wall”
The January 25, 2017 executive order lays forth the plans for the project of an expansive wall along the southern border of the United States. Through examining the language of the executive order and examining subsequent announcements by the Department of Homeland Security, we can understand the details of the project and what completing such an undertaking would entail. The executive order also provides insight into the stated purpose of the barrier, which will be examined further in this analysis.
Section one defines the administration’s motive for expanding border security, while sections two and four explicitly lay out the next steps for the commencement of the wall. Section one states that,
“border security is critically important to the national security of the United States. Aliens who illegally enter the United States without inspection or admission present a significant threat to national security and public safety… The recent surge of illegal immigration at the southern border with Mexico has placed a significant strain on Federal resources and overwhelmed agencies charged with border security and immigration enforcement, as well as the local communities into which many of the aliens are placed.”
The section further sites increased criminal activity along the border, including human and drug smuggling, attributing increased levels of violence along the border and in the United States. It states that, “Among those who illegally enter are those who seek to harm Americans through acts of terror or criminal conduct.” From this we can see the purpose of expanded border security is for national security purposes, as illegal immigration is a threat to public safety and that we have experienced a recent surge of undocumented migrants which has put a strain on resources. An increase in illegal immigration is also seen to have increased crime, especially violent crime, in the United States.
Section 2 defines the administration’s policy and it’s dedication to building a physical barrier to deter the security threat of illegal migration. It states that,
“It is the policy of the executive branch to secure the southern border of the United States through the immediate construction of a physical wall on the southern border, monitored and supported by adequate personnel so as to prevent illegal immigration, drug and human trafficking, and acts of terrorism.”
This section clarifies that Trump’s wall will be an actual physical wall at the border, rather than a virtual border or simply an increase of technology, as some analysts predicted. This wall will act as a physical deterrent to illegal immigrants, drugs, and human smuggling and will serve as a security measure for the protection of the nation.
The plan for how to proceed with the project follows in Section 4. Section 4 is essentially a set of instructions for the Department of Homeland Security(DHS.) It instructs the Secretary of Homeland Security to “take all appropriate steps to immediately plan, design, and construct a physical wall along the southern border…,” to investigate the effectiveness of border security measures currently in place, including the already constructed physical barriers, within 180 days of the order, to identify funding and secure said funding from Federal funds, to “project and develop long-term funding requirements for the wall, including preparing Congressional budget requests for the current and upcoming fiscal years.” From this section of the order, we see a step-by-step process of developing a plan for full border security, or as it is called time and time again within the order “complete operational control” of the border.
DHS released a private report to Reuters on February 9, 2017 with further details and next steps for the project. Throughout Trump’s campaign, and leading up to this announcement, he touted a cheap price tag for his wall, quoting $8 to $12 billion. DHS, it’s report, estimates the wall would cost “as much as $21.6 billion,” significantly higher than Trump’s estimate. The wall would span 1,250 miles. The report further states that the wall would take 3.5 years to build, would be compelted by 2020, and would be completed in three phases. The first of which would start in September, contingent upon budget approval by Congress in April, and would target “…26 miles… near San Diego, California; El Paso, Texas; and in Texas’s Rio Grande Valley.”
Challenges and Questions
The executive order and the Department of Homeland Security’s report have resulted in more questions and challenges than they have answers. From questions of cost, both financial and otherwise, to project management challenges, to the challenges presented by the terrain of the southern border, to questions of the necessity of a wall based on Trump’s claims that the purpose of the wall is to secure a border which is a critical security threat, the plan for the wall brings with it many questions and challenges.
First are the challenges to the estimated timeline, which cite project management experts and the tendency of infrastructure mega-projects to consistently fail to meet deadlines and budgets. Completing the project by 2020 In order to begin the project, the government needs to secure a large amount of cash. The first phase of the project is estimated to cost around $360 million, a smaller ask than the full project total of $21.6 billion, but as the Lafrance (2017) states,
“even if lawmakers approved that kind of cash this week, the wall almost certainly wouldn’t be complete by the end of Trump’s first term—or even a potential second term. The “iron law” of infrastructural megaprojects, according to a paper by Bent Flyvbjerg published in the Project Management Journal in 2014, is that they will go “over budget, over time, over and over again.”
Sourcing the funds is just the first challenge, and with a majority Republican legislature that may prove to be less of a barrier. Even though budget approvals that create a deficit may rile constituents, it is less likely to do so in majority Republican states with constituents who see undocumented workers and immigrants as an economic and security threat. After securing funds, the challenge of private property and land for the wall will arise. Large areas where a wall would need to be built are privately held. While the government can seize this land through eminent domain, landowners could take these seizures to court, pushing out the timeline further.. Ainsley reports that,
“In addition to seeking eminent domain and environmental waivers, the U.S. government would also have to meet the requirements of the International Boundary and Water Commission, a U.S.-Mexico pact over shared waters. The report estimated that agreement alone could bring the cost from $11 million per mile to $15 million per mile in one area.”
The issue of land ownership will be accompanied by the challenges of the terrain itself. The wall will need to scale mountains, pass through huge swathes of desert, requiring construction in over 100 degree heat during half of the year, and take into account the Rio Grande River, it’s flood plains, erosion, etc., which runs along a large portion of the border.
The next major challenge to the Trump administration’s proposal comes in challenging the cost of the wall and how the government will raise or reallocate funds in order to do so. From Trump’s first mention of the wall he insisted that it would be paid for by Mexico and this insistence has run though his campaign and into his presidency. However, after signing the executive order, Trump changed the strategy. The Economist reports that
“Before signing the executive orders, he told journalists from ABC News…that the construct of the wall would start within months and that, initially, the American taxpayer would pay for it. But ultimately, Mexico would cover 100% of the cost, he claimed.”
Trump and his administration has reported various ways in which Mexico would pay for the wall, though most are riddled with issues and many ultimately would cost the American people rather than the state of Mexico. Additionally, many of the proposed measures would have some unintended consequence, including actually increasing illegal channels of migration in the long term.
The administration has proposed the wall be funded by a 20% tax on imports to Mexico. A 20% import tax would likely be challenged by the World Trade Organization (WTO) and would violate the terms of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA.) However, while this method would send a clear message to Mexico, and the ultimate way Mexico would “pay” would be more in a more symbolic meaning of the term, as it could cause a decrease in the purchase of Mexican goods by American citizens. This strategy could have the unintended consequence of increase need for economic opportunity for Mexican citizens if exporting industries declined, which could actually lead to an increase in the need for migration the United States. It could also have the consequence of Mexico, “…removing tax benefits for U.S. foreign investment.” In response to the large negative public response to this proposal, Press Secretary Sean Spicer retracted (or perhaps, corrected) the statement made during a press conference with cited this strategy and rather redefined the strategy as a border adjustment tax. “Border-adjustment would change the way firms calculate their profits for tax purposes. Revenue made from exports would no longer count. Neither would costs incurred by importing goods. In short, exports would be [subsidized], and imports taxed,” reported the Economist. Considering the trade deficit the U.S. has with Mexico, this method has the potential to raise a good about of funds, a reported $10 billion a year. However, this method comes with its own set of challenges and inadvertent drawbacks. A border adjustment tax would apply to all trade partners, not just to Mexico, so inevitably Mexico would not be singled out and all trade partners would be affected. The Economist reports that in order for this measure to be beneficial, the dollar would need to rise in value significantly for this to benefit the U.S., it would “inflate the value of dollar-denominated debts in emerging markets” which would mean negative consequences for all developing countries who deal with the United States or have received loans from International Financial Institutions in dollar denominations, and it would “transfer wealth to those with dollar assets…[and] this would greatly benefit China, which would see the value of its $3trn Treasury portfolio go up by a quarter.”
Another way which the Trump administration has proposed to “make Mexico pay” is to block money transfers for those who cannot prove legal documentation status and/or to tax those remittances sent from the United States to Mexico. Citizens of Mexico rely on money sent from friends and family in the United States, totaling around $25 billion a year. Trump proposed to “[prohibit] immigrants who couldn’t prove legal residence from wiring money abroad. Under the threat of losing these resources [he argued]…the Mexican government would soon cave and offer to pay for the wall.” Another route that the administration could take, rather than blocking remittances, would be taxing them – either a flat tax or a tax for those who could not prove legal residency. This would no doubt have implementation issues, as money transfers are handled by private companies who may not want to risk losing customers due to an increase in cost. This would also likely just push remittances to be sent through other, undetected channels. This method could also have the consequence, in cutting off access to finances for Mexican citizens and therefore economic opportunity, of increasing the need to migrate to the United States for economic opportunity.
Various other means have been cited as ways to pay for the wall, including higher charges on border cards and visas or cutting aid to Mexico. Regarding visa cards, the cost for visas is already considerably high, ranging from $160 to over $200 for nonpermanent, nonimmigrant visas for Mexican citizens. An increase in fees to travel to the United States legally could have the unintended effect of increasing non-legal means of entering the country as the need to visit family or seek temporary work visas will not decrease. Additionally, fees for visa are “dedicated by statutes to finance U.S. consular activities around the world.” Cutting aid to Mexico, which in reality is just moving funds from one basket to another, wouldn’t raise much money, would actually have a negative effect on Mexican development and therefore could trigger a rise in the need to migrate, and is problematic in that “[the] little aid Mexico gets from Washington is mostly destined to help finance Mexico’s efforts to stop migrants from El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras from traveling across Mexico and into the United States.”
Challenges and problems abound, but perhaps the greatest challenge and the largest cost of the wall has been the cost on the relationship between the United States and Mexico. Historically a friendly neighbor, the constant insistence that Mexico pay for the infrastructure project of another nation which negatively targets it’s citizens has undoubtedly had a very negative effect. Guajardo explains that,
“With the possible exception of Canada, there is no other country with as many areas and levels of cooperation with the U.S. as Mexico. Issues of trade, transportation, national security, organized crime, water, the environment, health, and immigration that affect both countries rely on extensive bilateral cooperation and goodwill.”
Furthermore, the negative relationship between the two countries has already begun to foster anti-American sentiments and it is predicted that this will have the effect of a nationalist candidate securing the Mexican presidency in 2018. With an insistence the Mexico pay for the wall, and the negative consequences any of the aforementioned proposals to fund the wall, Trump continues to negatively effect the relationship between historic allies. Guajardo further argues that, “he is undoing year of patient diplomacy and riling up a long-dormant Mexican nationalism. He is telling us that our old suspicions were right and that the U.S. is a foe, a bully not to be trusted.”
Playing the Border Game
The Trump Administration, through the January 25 executive order, has painted a picture of a serious security threat on the southern border of the United States. Trump cites an “recent surge of illegal immigration at the southern border with Mexico,” an increase in violence, and human and drug trafficking as the need to build such an extensive, impenetrable barrier. But how immediate and overwhelming is this threat?
In regards to the “security emergency” at the border, Isacson reports that,
“migration down to levels not seen since the early 1970s, other indicators are also going the right way. Seizures of the illegal drug most trafficked between the ports of entry, marijuana, are down significantly. Violent crime is remarkably low on the U.S. side of the border: FBI data show that, of 23 cities over 100,000 population within 100 miles of the border, only 3 had homicide rates above the national average. And Border Patrol has seen a notable decrease in use of lethal force.”
Additionally, Pew Research Center reports that “more Mexican immigrants have returned to Mexico from American than have migrated to America since the end of the recession. The actual observed trends in migration do not fall in line with the Trump administration’s rhetoric of securing the border. In fact, violence is lower than it would seem if you just listened to Trump’s policy, drug seizures have decreased, and immigration from Mexico on the southern border of the United States is on the decline, having peaked in most areas around 2005 (see Figure 1.)
What’s more, according to the Migration Policy Institute, “about 60 percent of the unauthorized population has been here for at least a decade” and that “…each year from 2007 to 2014, more people joined the ranks of the illegal by remaining in the United States after their temporary visitor permits expired than by creeping across the Mexican border (see Figure 2.)
We can also examine the executive order’s claim that, “among those who illegally enter are those who seek to harm Americans through acts of terror or criminal conduct.” While criminals exist in populations of various backgrounds, The Migration Policy Institute reports of unauthorized immigrants in the United States, “820,000 of the 11 million unauthorized have been convicted of a crime. About 300,000, or less than 3 percent of the 11 million undocumented, have committed felonies. (The proportion of felonies in the overall population was an estimated 6 percent in 2010, according to a paper presented to the Population Association of America.)”
Through an examination of data on immigration trends and numbers, and through looking at the criminal records of an estimated 11 million undocumented immigrants in the United States, half of which are here “illegally” due to overstaying their visas and not from crossing the border, we have to question the validity of Trump’s state reason for the necessity of a wall. In fact, almost 700 miles of border fence have been constructed since the passing of the Secure Fence Act of 2006, and even the areas without border fencing have not seen increases in border arrests. So this leads us to ask, what is the true purpose of a 1,250 solid, 40 foot wall which would cost over 20 billion dollars and have a considerable negative effect on U.S.-Mexico Relations?
Andreas outlines a theory in which escalations in border security are more of a performance to display state power than they are necessarily about creating an actual, secure border. He argues that the state creates an image where they have lost control of the border and can then increase hardline strategies of an increasingly militarized border to address the problem they have marketed. “The basic story line,” says Andreas,
“is that border defenses are under siege or entirely bypassed by clandestine transnational actors. Although the focus is on lack of state control rather than the increase in control efforts, embedded in the story is an implicit explanation for the escalation of force: increasing policing can be understood as natural policy response to an increase in illegal cross-border flows… In other words, the state is viewed as simply reactive, responding to a growing clandestine transnational challenge…”
Essentially, by painting the problem in the “loss-of-control narrative” the state can prescribe solutions that meet the solutions they are willing to provide and pushing other solutions to the proverbial back burner. These solutions could include address the demand for cheap immigrant labor domestically, or the historical neo-colonialist policies that have led to underdevelopment in other countries, creating the need for them to immigrate in the first place. The solution comes in the form of increased investment in high-tech cameras and motion sensors, policies and framing which criminalize immigrants and turn them into “the other.” As stated by Andreas,
“On both sides of the U.S.-Mexico borderline, escalation has translated into tougher laws, rising budgets and agency growth, the deployment of more sophisticated equipment and surveillance technologies, and a growing fusion between law enforcement and national security institutions and missions. Of course, the most visible – and certainly most symbolic – sign of escalation has been the construction of more and bigger physical barriers.”
Through this lens we can understand the true purpose of Trump’s ongoing demonization of Mexican immigrants, his rhetoric of the wall and forcing Mexico to pay, and the January 25 executive order. The ever-expanding border wall and increasing investment in border security and technology is not about truly securing the United States’ border, but further reinforces the ongoing narrative of an insecure border as a way for the state to display control. Trumps’ wall is not a new concept. He is following in the footsteps of the politicians who have gone before him in villainizing the other of the “illegal immigrant” and sourcing an “illegal invasion” as a need for an increase in militarization.