I
Introduction
Indian philosophical thought has centred around various themes including epistemological, metaphysical, linguistic, ethical and ontological concerns. Discussions on knowledge and its sources, nature and existence of God, ethical values, causation, liberation, reality, and creation can easily be found. But as far as problem of freewill or freedom to act is concerned, one doesn’t find a comprehensive and detailed discussion being done to explore this problem of freewill. Often scholars have raised their concerns with regard to this problem but no constructive elaborate studies have been produced. Fragmented discussions pertaining to this problem do exist and may be during the classical period in Indian philosophy people were not bothered with this sort of problem as their major concern was to find out ways by which one can transcend the cycle of birth and death to attain eternal bliss or realise God. So they were interested in ‘freedom from’ not so much with ‘freedom to’.
But this very attainment of freedom required effort in the sense of ethically desirable actions being done by the doer or the agent. One can find the issues pertaining to actions and their rewards and punishments being highlighted by different systems, which thereby raise the concerns over agency of an agent. Classical Indian philosophical thought has put in considerable effort to construct and elaborate the doctrine of action (karma) to set a background for the critical importance and significance of one’s being an agent of actions. Some schools like NyÈya and MimÈmsÈ have further gone into precise details of essentials of agency with a motive to capture the very essence of the mechanism of reward and punishment. Also, Indian philosophical systems have been keen to understand action because for most of them final release or freedom in soteriological sense can be attained only but having an absolute, conscious and informed control over one’s actions. And this is the reason why an action in Indian context is not merely or purely an act but it is always tied with the intention of its performance as well the result that ensues from it. This is the reason why action theory in Indian context is known in the name of karma theory and is unanimously accepted in schools of Indian philosophical thought, though they might differ amongst each other with regard to the nuances of the theory of karma. Some people call it a doctrine and is generally defined as ‘what you soweth, that shall you reapth’. Actions done by you in the past and present life hold the key to your future in terms of your birth, life span, status, experience of pleasure and pain, psychological, physiological and genetic makeup. Now, the question is: if one is determined in so many different ways, does it really make sense to hold that a person is responsible for actions as well as its results. To put it in other words, if a person is so programmed that he/she will do according to the information fed without fail, then how do we make sense of responsibility because it is said that one is not responsible unless one was free to act otherwise. Is there any sort of freedom for action available to the agent in the background of karma theory? Indeed when we talk about the agent, the concept of selfhood has to be looked into from Indian perspective to understand who the agent is?
Aim of the Research
The proposed study will focus on the nature and the function of the agent in the classical Indian tradition i.e. intentions, volitions and desires have to be ascribed to whom? And, whether freedom of the will can be ascribed to this agent in the background of the karma theory. If this is so, how this freedom is interpreted and what is its scope in Indian classical thought.
Since action is the very basis of human existence as well as experience, there has been a relentless debate about the nature of the doer of actions. Understanding of actions done by the agent on the one hand and the implications of the results brought about by the performance of these actions on the other hand play a vital role in drawing the soteriological framework of any classical school of Indian philosophical thought. An agent’s or a person’s whole existence is explained by way of the actions done by him/her, intentionally or unintentionally throughout one’s life time. Actions done by an agent creates vibrational as well as potential futuristic tendencies which determine one’s present life existence as well as future existences. So, an extreme insistence is placed on doing those sort of actions which bring good results or no results at all. Good or bad actions bring merit and demerit which bind one to the cycle of birth and death whereas those actions which do not bring about any results are favoured and looked upto, for they pave the way for one’s release/ liberation.
Thus, action and its agent have a significant role for any school of Indian philosophical thought giving it a teleological/purposive character. Any agent is defined in terms of a person/ individual (jÏva) or something that performs an action or actions. So, the agency is the faculty or potentiality to do actions. This can be clarified with the help of an example- if a rock rolls down a hill and falls into the river and splashes water then settles down on the river bed. Thus, many causal relations are formulated which produce various effects. But such an action of rock cannot be said to be a true manifestation of agency proper as no conscious effort is made on the part of the rock to splash the water. Now, compare this to someone taking a dip in the river or throws a stone into the water. This can be called an action with an agent proper who brought it about. Thus, there is a difference in the agency of the insentient and the sentient beings. This research work aims to deal with agency only with regard to human beings as they alone are capable of willing, volition, desiring and translating them into performance of actions or controlling not to turn their desires into action. The term which is most commonly used by Indian philosophical system to express agency is ‘kartṛtva’. This work also has been an attempt to explore the nature of agent and agency along with the sense of freedom available to the agent to perform actions.
Though we do not find the freewill debate in Indian philosophical tradition the way we find it in western philosophical thought, still we can say that Indian thinkers might not have explored this problem from the intellectual point of view but they do have explored it from the practical point of view. They have been concerned about the problems of life where man is seeking some sort of connection between what he gets with what he does not expect. The whole endeavour to rationally make sense of what sort of conditions bring about what effect, in the wake of transcending the cycle of birth and death, lead to the finding that human beings are responsible for what they do. If they are responsible, are there any conditions which determine their responsibility? It has been accepted generally that the freedom to act on the part of the doer is a necessary condition for holding one responsible. But what sort of freedom is needed to satisfy that demand, humongous literature has gone into it catering to this question. Classical Indian thinkers have also been keenly engrossed to answer this question but they have adopted a different way to talk about it. They have taken the path of the doctrine of karma to enunciate about responsibility and henceforth explain if any form of freedom is available to man for accountability to his deeds.
Literature
This work undertakes an indepth study of the concept of the agent and freedom of action in some select schools of classical Indian philosophy. It will be an expository analysis of the above said issues. This research work is grounded on both the original texts of the concerned schools as well as the relevant secondary sources. In the chapter on Jainism, TattvÈrthasÊtra of UmÈsvÈtÏ translated by Nathmal Tantia, ĀchÈrȇga Sūtra translated by Herman Jacobi and SamayasÈra of KundakundÈchÈrya translated by Vijay Kumar Jain have been referred. In the chapter on Early Buddhism, only Sutta Pi—aka which is comprising of all the NikÈyas have been referred. The chapter on NyÈya, has focussed on VÈtsayÈyana’s commentary on Gautama’s NyÈya Sūtra translated by Ganganath Jha. For the examination of the willing process of an agent, I also referred to Vi„vanÈtha’s BhÈ–Èpariccheda translated by Swami Madhavananda. In SÈ£khya-Yoga chapter, the primary text used for the study is I„vara kṛ–na’s SÈ£khya KÈrikÈ given in Larson’s book on Classical SÈ£khya. Along with that the investigation of agency is based on Aniruddha’s commentary on SÈ£khya SÊtra. Apart from this Yoga SÊtras of Pata¤jali translated by J.H. Woods have been referred to understand the freedom of the agent. Lastly, for the chapter on Advaita VedÈnta, ƒa£kara’s commentary on BrahmasÊtras, translated by both Thibaut and Swami Gambirananda have been consulted.
Literature Review
The question of freedom to act on the part of the doer when one is determined by one’s past karmas has caught the attention of many scholars. They have tried to bring an understanding of the freedom not in the sense of one being absolutely free from any sort of determinants like dispositions and psycho-physical tendencies, but with these as the determinants can we talk about freedom to action? In this regard, I want to cite views held by various scholars to explain the sense of freedom available to the doer of actions.
In The survey of Modern Writings on Classical Indian Ethics: Methodological Hints for Appraising as Ethics, P.K.Mahapatra writes that the doctrine of karma is ‘individualistic and usually backward looking in respect of securing appropriate consequences which everyone is entitled to by virtue of his (past) actions. Actions of individuals have the causal efficiency of producing consequences, which the respective individuals have to enjoy or suffer. This is because the individual, who is endowed with the power of freedom of will, does all his actions by choice, so it is supposed and therefore responsible for the consequences they produce.’ He seems to have taken freedom of the will as a given without any need to explore what that freedom consists in. Just because it is necessary to make sense of responsibility therefore it is an unproved assumption which paves the way to rationalize what one gets as reward and punishment. Whether one is really free and if free then in what way? are questions which cannot be settled with mere common sense explanation. We need to analyse it in depth to make any statement about the matter.
Radhakrishnan in An Idealsit View of Life, writes that ‘karma is not so much a principle of retribution as one of continuity…..all things in the world are at once causes and effects. They embody the energy of the past and extent energy on the future. Karma or connection with the past is not inconsistent with creative freedom. On the other hand it is implied by it. The law that links us with the past also asserts that it can be subjugated by our free action. Though the past may present obstacles, they must all yield to the creative power in man proportion to its sincerity and insistence…. The principle of karma has thus two aspects, a retrospective and a prospective continuity with the past and creative freedom of the self.’ He explains life with the help of a game of bridge. Cards are given to the player and they don’t select them. One is more free when the game starts and later on when the game has developed his choices become restricted. But till the very end there is always a choice.
For him the ‘self is not free from the bonds of determination, it can subjugate the past to a certain extent and turn it into new course. Choice is the assertion of freedom over necessity by which it converts necessity to its own use and thus frees itself from it…..’ he quotes Pȇini that ‘ the human agent is free’(A–—ÈdhyÈyÏ 1.4.54) and declares that ‘if there is no indetermination, then human consciousness is an unnecessary luxury’. So, Radhakrishnan clearly denies predestination and complete determinism in nature. He accepts that human beings have creative freedom by the use of which they can break the determinateness in the natural order and create possibilities. Human beings are capable of choices and will is nothing over and above or separate from the self but only its active side. Freedom of the will is freedom of the self when whole of the nature of self is active rather than the fragmented self i.e the more a person is aware and in realization of the power of the self, the more one can be said to be free.
Thus, Radhakrishnan accepts freedom in compatibilist sense but doesn’t construct an elaborate argument to prove how it is. It seems that he takes a hasty approach to his conception of creative freedom without giving enough explanation about the nature of the agent, his agency and freedom to act.
Another scholar S.N. Mahajan has tried to study freedom from an Indian perspective. He explores in Freedom: An Indian Perspective an idea of what constitutes freedom to ascribe responsibility, and claims that it is not merely freedom in negative sense of absence of external constraints which is generally believed to constitute only a necessary condition for freedom. For him, this condition is not a sufficient one and one must look towards the absence of or presence of internal constraints, inner compulsions to supply the full conditions of freedom. He says ‘ in fact in so far as the internal compulsions are more subtle and elusive but forge a formidable vice-like grip on man, any analysis of freedom which leaves out an understanding of these factors will necessarily remain superficial.’
To argue for the same he brings in the theories of psycho-analysis and psycho-therapy to talk about inward reflection and attainment of freedom in the sense of overcoming one’s attachments and disentangling the roots of the ego based life with its worry, anxiety and dualities. The energies of the psyche having been liberated from the clamping, constraining hold of the ego, there is a natural flow of free, spontaneous activity. He quotes psychologist, Hans Jacobsk and Jung, who have emphasized the importance of taming the mind to unlock its natural powers by concentration and observing one’s own thoughts. Whatever lies dormant deep in the conscious should be dug out and released. This enhances one’s real freedom. Mahajan concludes with the idea that real freedom consists in the realization of one’s identity with the self which is the pure subject, the witness and substratum of all states of consciousness. The more one’s activity becomes spontaneous and less coerced from external factors and the choices are made by himself. Thus, he also tries to carve space for freedom in the background of psychic determinants where there is a possibility to transcend the so called negative tendencies or ego generated vices to see one’s real self. This very reflection brings real freedom and spontaneity in one’s activity where one not only have transcended external constraints but also inner constraints.
Another somewhat close view to Mahajan’s is Kalidas Bhattacharya’s article ‘The Status of the Individual in Indian Philosophy, he writes ‘law of karma as understood to be against freedom of action is not so.’ According to it only jÈti i.e. birth, Èyuh i.e. age and bhoga i.e. experience of pleasure and pain for an individual are determined. Actions at the moral and spiritual levels are not. He cites three reasons for that:
Merit and demerit accrued in the previous life gets exhausted in the present life by fructifying the results of actions in the form of reward and punishment. If the results as experiences in the present life in their turn yield further results with hedonistic tones, it would amount to rewarding and punishing an individual for all eternity. This would go against the accepted theory that merit and demerit of actions get exhausted in their results. It would also speak against all possibility of betterment of the individual, and equally against all conscious effort for liberation. Also, it would follow that an individual once good in one life is good in all lives and similarly with individuals who are bad, in turn, would mean that bad individuals can never become good and the good never bad ³ a thesis which no Indian system would ever allow. If the law of karma is understood as a theory of complete determination this would go against the very spirit of scriptural or for the matter of fact, any prescription and prohibitions.
Thus, spiritual actions which proceed from detachment have maximum freedom because there is no submission to rÈga and dve–a. Moral actions channelizing, according to prescription and prohibitions, normal biological activities are free in the sense that in their case there is no blind submission; and actions which proceed consciously through rÈga and dve–a and are consequently accompanied by an I-feeling are free only in the sense that in their case there is always a possibility of not having submitted to them. So, there is always scope of free action according to Kalidas Bhattacharya at the level of spiritual and moral actions for there is one important condition of freedom which gets satisfied that the doer could have chosen otherwise had he so decided. This implies that he also gets into the discussion of necessity of freedom by way of which he establishes that there is freedom to act.
Karl Potter has tried to approach this problem from a different perspective. In The Karmic: Apriori in Indian Philosophy, he experiments with the idea of apriori, if that is applicable in Indian philosophy or not like the Kantian apriori. He presents C.I. Lewis conception of pragmatic apriori to widen the scope of availability of conceptual schemes to an individual whereby one can reject one set of that and replace it with another which is not the case with Kant. By apriori is meant ‘a statement or a proposition embedded in an interpretative scheme the structure of which is internally necessary, such that the relations among its constituents are fixed in advance of its application.’ Potter explains that though we cannot have an apriori in Indian philosophy the way Kant and Lewis talk about it but yes some general features can be noticed to see the apriori in Indian philosophy. He says that the karmic apriori is ‘the general assumption governing the Indian account is that our concepts are generated by our karmic inheritance, and that within the limits of the theory of karma it can be manipulated, revised or exchanged for something else.’ He develops a very sophisticated understanding of determination of one’s present conceptual construction and interpretative scheme by one’s past karmas. Thus according to Potter ‘karmic apriori it is not the limitations of human reason which determine the categories of interpretation that we use, it is rather those habits of mind that have been generated from the past lives.’ These habits are an outcome of two kinds of conditioning factors; vÈsanas or dispositions and sa£skÈras or traces from past lives also called karmic residue. Each time one is born, a certain position of one’s karmic residues are tabbed to be ‘activated’ and thus ‘burned off’ during the coming life time. This sort of karmic apriori is both fixed and revisable. It is fixed in the sense of fructification of prÈrabdha karma without any variations and it is revisable in the sense that one can attempt and try to condition one’s future disposition so that future lives or even the future part of the present life will be different than otherwise. With difficulty one can repress, though not to the point of excluding one’s inherited vÈsanÈs or dispositions and replace them with others deemed preferable. Thus, one can improve one’s interpretations morally and spiritually and attain a better place in next life and a truly wise man should curb all his interpretations altogether.
So, it can be summed up that scholars have affirmed the determination of one’s present state of existence by previous karmas. They also unanimously accept that this determination is not endless and have looked for scope of improvement to one’s present as well as future state of existence. They have constructed different measures to clarify that power lies within the individual with the help of which one strives to attain the ultimate goal of life. But one doesn’t find any attempt where constructive analysis of agency is done from the point of Indian philosophical thought which paves the way to discuss freedom to act and relate the issues of responsibility.
Doctrine of Karma: An Overview
What is the cause of the inequality that exists in the world? Why should one person be brought up in the lap of luxury, endowed with intellectual, moral and physical qualities and another in absolute poverty steeped in misery? Why should one person be a prodigy and another an idiot? Why should some be born with saintly characteristics and another with criminal tendencies? Why should some people be born good at some art? Why should some be congenitally blind, deaf or deformed?
Either this inequality amongst mankind has a cause or it is purely accidental. No sensible person would think of attributing this unevenness, inequality and this diversity to blind chance or pure accident. Calling it a chance occurrence doesn’t have intellectual appeal. Man of intellect bedazzled with this phenomenon tries to explain it as ‘nothing in the world happens to a person that he doesn’t for some reason or the other deserve’. This brings out the essence of the doctrine of karma that whatever is done must bear fruit i.e. there is no loss of the effect of the work done till its effects are exhausted and secondly, no consequences accrue to a person except as a result of his own actions. Thus, the word ‘karma’ is often used with an ease to explain the pleasure and pain one suffers in one’s life time. Since there is lack of rational explanations with regard to one’s life situations, ups and downs in one’s life, diseases, suffering, it is verily substituted with the word ‘karma’. Potter says šthere is an irritating tendency to treat karma as a well-known matter which needs little explanation and sometimes none at all›. Not merely this, doctrine of karma is one of the various pre-suppositions accepted by different schools of Indian philosophy and its prominence can be seen by the way these schools whether orthodox or heterodox have employed it to build not only there ethical doctrines but also as one of the factors leading to the successive running of the world order. Bina Gupta, writes šin the language of R.G. Collingwood we may call them šabsolute presuppositions› and the rest of the philosophy may be regarded as rational and critical elaboration of these presuppositions. The resulting philosophies do not justify these presuppositions; they rather draw out what follows from them. It is almost universally admitted that a common presupposition of pan-Indic thought is encapsulated in the words škarma/rebirth›.
Before trying to know what this doctrine of karma is, how it is conceived and employed, it is important to understand the meaning of the word ‘karma’ The word karman or karma is derived from the Sanskrit root word ‘kṛ’ which means to do, to act, to bring about etc. Its literal meaning consists only in bringing about of an action by an agent. But the curious mind has looked for deeper meaning of this word. Thus, the word ‘karma’ is supplied with multiple meanings catering to the requirement of building explanations for the past conditions for the action as well as future course of events to be brought about by an action. Apte has given various meanings ascribed to karma as (i) an action, work, deed (ii) execution and performance (iii) religious rite (iv) a specific action or a moral duty (v) product, result (vi) fate, the certain consequence of acts done in former life (vii) the object of an action (in grammar) (viii) in Vai„esika philosophy- motion considered as one of the seven categories of things etc.
Earliest or the Vedic conception of karma referred to correct performance of ritualistic activity with a view to receiving the desired results. It was believed that if a ritual or a rite was rightly performed, then it would lead to desired results without any obstacle and any mistake in the performance of the rite can lead to undesired results. Thus, a correct action was rite performed rightly and no moral value was attached to such an action. Eventually karma acquired larger meaning and came to signify any correct action having ethical implications. All classical Indian schools of thought believe in the doctrine of karma except CÈrvaka. It is invariably held in the religious, ethical, cultural and philosophical thoughts of the Hindus, Jainas and Buddhists. They all use this doctrine in order to explain and justify different occurrences or happenings found in both anthropocentric and non-anthropocentric worlds. According to them, the root cause of bondage is karma and ignorance. Sufferings do not come to us without the antecedent condition, for as the man sow, so shall he reaps. This has been the most general and simple way of defining the doctrine of karma. But this small definition is a covering on the different and myriad meanings given to the doctrine of karma. When we go into the historical accounts of the doctrine of karma, we find that the version of the doctrine of karma differs from system to system in both the orthodox and heterodox schools of classical Indian philosophy. Even the indologists and scholars- Indian as well as western- do not seem to hold the same line of interpretation of the doctrine of karma. Their analysis and characterisation of the doctrine of karma differ from one another. The views of the different scholars and writers who have tried to present the doctrine of karma as some law which is justified in itself can be touched upon here.
According to S.N. Dasgupta šall the Indian systems agree in believing that whatever action is done by an individual leaves behind it some sort of potency which has the power to ordain for him joy or sorrow in the future according as it is good or bad›. S. Radhakrishnan while explaining karma from Upani–adic point of view writes škarma has a cosmic as well as psychological aspect. Every deed must produce its natural effect in the world, at the same time it leaves an impression on or forms a tendency in the minds of men. It is this tendency or saṃskÈra or vÈsanÈ that inclines us to repeat the deed we have once done. So, all the deeds done will have their fruits in the world and effects on the mind. As far as former are concerned, we cannot escape them, however much we may try. But in regard to mental tendencies we can control them. Our future conduct holds all possibilities. By self-discipline we can strengthen the good impulses and weaken the bad ones.› Paul Deussen explains the concept of karma as šthe idea…….. that life, in quality as well as quantity, is the accurately meted and altogether fitting expiation of the deeds of previous existence›. S.C. Chatterjee, in his Fundamentals of Hinduism defines karma as šin the simplest form the law of karma means that all actions, good or bad, produce their proper consequence in the life of an individual who acts›. Some have interpreted it as an extension of the law of šcausation to the sphere of human conduct and teaches that, every event in the physical world is determined by its antecedents, so everything that happens in the moral realm is preordained›. Further, šit signifies not merely that events of our life are determined by their antecedent causes but also that there is an absolute justice in the rewards and punishments that fall to our lot›. Sometimes the law of karma is interpreted as ‘the law of the conservation of moral energy’. It is the law of conservation of moral values, merits and demerits of actions. This law of conservation means that there is no loss of the effect of the work done (kṛtapra‡È„a) and that there is no happening of events to a person except as the result of his own actions (akṛtÈbhyÈgama). The function of the law of karma is: što equip the individual with the body and the environment which his past career entitles him to. Nature and the events of nature, good or bad, which form the common background of the people of an age or a country, are just what are deserved by all of them according to their common moral worth.› Thus karma sets forth the relation between one’s action as a jÏva and one’s state of being. Sometimes the law of karma is understood not merely in terms of a moral causation rather it is identified with a universal principle of causation which applies to all existent entities, human and non- human, in an inviolable manner. It is said that one can become an animal, plant, rock etc. according to one’s actions. Purȇas and Upani–ads are full of such stories.
Though the law of karma is interpreted by the indologists in both the sense, moral and non -moral, the moral version of the doctrine of karma seems to have been given more prominence than non- moral. Hiriyanna, e.g., claims that the law of karma is not a blind mechanical law. It is essentially ethical. For him the law is immutable, but it is not mechanical. Scholars claim that immutability or inviolability of the law does not make it mechanical. As Aurobindo states škarma is not quite the same thing as a material or substantial law of cause and effect-the antecedent and its mechanical consequence›. Humphreys also presents his point of view indicating that our knowledge or understanding of the law of karma is insufficient. He says šthe trouble with several interpretations of the karma concept has been that the idea has been more or less understood in mechanical manner, but to do so is to drain it of all its force, for it could only be properly understood from spiritual point of view.› Many have traced the origin of the doctrine of karma in the ÿg Vedic concepts of ÿta and sacrifice. In their view the ideas of ÿta and sacrifice contain in them the germs of the law of karma. According to Radhakrishnan šÿta is the anticipation of the law of karma…it is the law which pervades the whole world, which all gods and men must obey. If there is law in the world, it must work itself out. If by any chance its effects are not revealed here on earth, they must be brought to fruition elsewhere. Where law is, disorder and injustice are only provisional and partial. The triumph of the wicked is not absolute…. ÿta is the satya or the truth of things.› S. N. Dasgupta observed šwhen the sacrifice is performed, the action leaves an unseen magical virtue, called adṛ–—a (the unseen) or the apūrva (new), that by it the desired object will be achieved in a mysterious manner, for the modus operandi of the apūrva is unknown. There is also the notion prevalent in the Saṃhitas….that he who commits wicked deeds suffers in another world, where as he who performs good deeds enjoys the highest material pleasures. These were probably associated with the conception of Ŗta, the inviolable order of things. Thus these are probably the elements which built up the karma theory which we find pretty well established but not emphasized in the Upani–ads where it is said that according to good or bad actions men will have good or bad birth›. It is said that the ÿgvedic term ‘ish—apūrta’ indicates nothing but the fund of merit and demerit earned by making offerings to God and gifts to the priests. Sacrifice is taken to mean karma and consequence of sacrifice is taken in the sense of phala.
Gananath Obeyesekere suggested that the origin of the idea of karma in ancient Indian tribal religions can be traced in the Gangetic region where Buddhism and Jainism, as well as the religion of the ĀjÏvikas flourished. He argues that it is reasonable to suppose that a simple theory of rebirth, not unlike those which occur in other parts of the world, underwent certain changes in order to develop into the specifically Indian theory of karma; that ethicization transformed rebirth into Buddhist and Jaina theories of karma. Similarly, the transactions implicit in the vedic ritual of „rÈddha, when applied to the equally amoral Vedic concept of entry into heaven, resulted in the Hindu theory of karma. It has been made clear by Gananath that the karma theory is not a linear development from Vedic and Upani–adic religion only rather it is a composite structure. It has come from both Vedic as well as non-Vedic sources. Whether the doctrine of karma had its root in the ÿgveda or it is an extension of beliefs present in early Vedic times or was a new addition to Upani–adic, Jaina, Buddhist thought or not, is a matter of historical significance. But the way this doctrine of karma is understood as a concept has raised the hopes of philosophers to conduct deeper inquiries into the issues that surround the karma doctrine. The general features of the doctrine of karma can be summed up in the words of Flaherty – šwe mustered our courage to attempt the definition (of karma) again, and came up with several possible formulations. The general consensus that we were dealing with a theory of rebirth based on the moral quality of previous lives was further refined by A.K.Ramanujan (A) and Charles Keyes (B). The essential constituents of a karma theory are: (A) (i) causality (ethical or non ethical, involving one life or several lives). (ii) ethicization (the belief that good and bad acts lead to certain results in our life or several lives). (iii) rebirth. (B) (i) explanation of the present circumstances with reference to previous actions, including (possibly) actions prior to birth; (ii) orientation of present actions towards future ends, including (possibly) those occurring after death. (iii) moral basis on which action past and present is predicated.›
Moving on to the conception of the doctrine of karma in different schools of classical Indian philosophy it can be said that all the schools except CÈrvÈka accept and enforce it in full vigour. Not merely orthodox schools accept it, heterodox schools have made it the very purpose purpose of human life to attain release from the clutches of karma. Jainism is said to have till date the most copious literature on the doctrine of karma. None the less there has been a tendency in all the schools to accept it as a law which is inviolable and inexorable.
Buddhism believes in and advocates strict doctrine of impermanency, momentariness and anÈtmavÈda/no soul theory. They maintain that everything in the world is subject to production, destruction and change, no matter whether it is a thing or organism, agent or action, result of action. They do not believe in any permanent being or soul which is said and accepted as eternal by other systems of Indian philosophy. For them everything in the universe is conditional, dependent and relative thus subject to birth and death. The Buddhists do not hold the view that karma is governed by a moral administrator of the world i.e. God who takes care of the operation of the law karma granting rewards and punishments according one’s deeds and actions. For them, karma is possible without the involvement of any permanent conscious agency, i.e. atman. Karma works by itself; it is an impersonal law which works without the guidance of any external agency. Actions are related to their results without the need of a mediator. Buddhists believe in the transmigration of samskÈras (dispositions or tendencies), not in the transmigration of the soul. Being of man is not a combination of a soul and body rather this being is a bundle of five fittings or skandhas namely rūpa or matter, vedanÈ or feeling, sanj¤È or perception, sa£skÈra or disposition and vij¤Èna or consciousness. Due to their belief in the doctrine of momentariness Buddhists do not believe in the identity of the doer of an action and the experiencer of the fruits of that action. In the background of the theory of dependent origination, they try to explain how an action done by a person will bring results to its performer who has not perished but is a continuous chain of conditioned arising. Unlike, Jainism and Hinduism, it might seem that Buddhism believes that man may not get the fruits of his actions because he is perishable and he may perish before the emergence of the fruits of his actions. It is also possible according to Buddhists that even if man doesn’t perish but it might be the case that the fruits of his actions might perish before their being experienced by the doer. Not only this, it is also claimed that an individual may be led to some result which is not the result of any of his actions. It is because of all this that fixing of responsibility in Buddhism seems impossible as it is in other schools of Indian philosophy which believe in the identity of the doer and the experiencer of the fruits of the actions. All theses implications of the doctrine of momentariness to the doctrine of karma in Buddhism do not capture the essence and novelty of Buddhist thought, rather it distorts it. In Buddhism, ignorance is the root cause of bondage. And this ignorance gives rise to karma which perpetuates the cycle of birth and death. True Knowledge is the only way or source to get out of this cycle of birth and death. It is said that karma is birth, karma is death, karma is pleasure and karma is pain. So, as long as the karma operates no one can claim to be free from all these afflictions.