Essentially, it should be noted that when a fresh information in laid as it relates to a similar offence cannot support a plea of autrefois as shown in R. v. Manchester. Likewise, for a claim abuse of process, one must address all questions of a fair trial for the defendant or if a stay of proceedings should be granted if the prosecution is seen as oppressive. Additionally, if the any promise is express or implied by the prosecution to the defendant so prosecution does not occur and then reneges the court can in fact see this as an abuse of process as shown in the case of R v Croydon. That is to say only if the accused person was induced an acted not to his or her benefit. Furthermore, R v Townsend states “it is not every breach of promise that gives rise to an abuse of process. A point to note is in Trinidad and Tobago Interpretation Act inflicts a time period of six months relative to a summary matter being laid. As such the limitation do not include when the offence occurred and Autrefois cannot be birthed as a result two charges cannot consistent to one another as the court will decide one.
Thus, concerning the Connelly v DPP (1964), Lord Devlin made a further pronouncement that tried to bring clarity by narrowing the topic of ‘Autrefois’ by stating: “For the doctrine of autrefois to apply it is necessary that the accused should have been put in peril of conviction for the same offence as that with which he is then charged. The word ‘offence’ embraces both the facts, which constitute the crime, and the legal characteristics, which make it an offence. For the doctrine to apply it must be the same offence both in fact and in law.” Ideally, Lord Delvin summarized Lord Morris of Borth-y-Grest pronouncement on the said case to show that there was not a nexus between two cases. For this reason, the offence of manslaughter or murder is not similar to the offence of robbery in law and indeed cannot be applicable to the said case in Connelly. Even though the practise in earlier times were for every court to exercise its power to stay criminal proceedings on the notion that the matter was abusive and was tantamount an abuse of its process.
The courts therefore seek to protect itself by refusing certain rules if it is oppressive or abusive. Nevertheless, it wasn’t until Connelly v DPP (1964) that the decision to judicial stay was totally allowed as the House of Lords identified the ingredients for a plea of Autrefois to be accepted. When a defendant makes a plea of Autrefois Convict or Autrefois Acquit, that defendant is literally challenging the process of the court and saying it is abusive or oppressive. Indeed, throughout the course of time several matters challenging this process have arisen in the court of law. For instance, when a plea of autrefois becomes present concerning a different crime committed by an accused person may have on a previous hearing been punished you must look at the following cases. For example, Mohammed v R where a plea supposed to been maintained, as conviction of the lesser offence was permissible by statute and was a bar to prosecution for the greater, there being no new evidence, which resulted in the manslaughter charge.
Incidentally, because of a plea of autrefois convict by the accused that he was already convicted for a minor offence arising out of the same facts; it would be unfair for him to endure a double whammy seeing he received punishment already. No doubt, that in the case of Joseph v Mohammed same could not be said as the court indicated they don’t have authorization to convict an accused for a minor offence if by statute he is already on a charge for a bigger offence.
Similarly a sentence was giving in the case of Richards (Lloydell) v R (1992) resulting in a sentence from a guilty verdict as the sitting magistrate might be ‘functus officio’ in deliberating and finding guilt. The charge with murder, the appellant made a plea of guilty to manslaughter, which was accepted by the prosecution. As a result, the matter was postponed for character evidence and at the next hearing, the DPP of Jamaica entered a ‘nolle prosequi’ and re charged the defendant for murder. As such, he was convicted and appealed via a plea of autrefois convict to the Privy Council, who overruled the older authority because it stated that a plea of autrefois convict would only be permitted on the basis that the accused had a thorough adjudication on the subject of a prior charge, resulting in a conviction. In fact, such decision must contain the verdict creating guilt and the ultimate passing sentence of the case. Due to this fact, the murder conviction was upheld as the plea was not valid. On the other hand, it could be said based on the facts that there was an abuse of process by the prosecution. But, the Privy Council stated that despite what was presented, it would be entirely unfortunate if the death sentence wasn’t applied. By this token the council itself had some apprehensions as to the impartiality of justices as it pertains to the prosecution.
Consequently, when a no case submission is made before a court, it is known that no conviction will be recorded, however this wasn’t the case with R v Midhurst JJ ex p Thomson (1973). Of course, when the court realize a mistake was made it sort to fix it. Nevertheless, the statement, coming when it did, before the defence was heard, was not an effective order of conviction and was a nullity. Also, if an accused person is charged for a similar offence according to different law, stops the other one from proceeding when a result of a conviction or acquittal is given.
As well as, Lewis v Irish speaks about a sentence on another charge, which is available via statute, the courts can quash it, if there lingers a previous conviction on the initial charge. At this point, D charged for an unlawful possession however, in the summary trial, the court allowed a conviction for another crime and eventually acquitted, due to the fact though the second charge went in as evidence, it was not the same as it came after an indictment was laid for the initial crime. Anyhow, in Lewis v Irish, the Court of Appeal in Trinidad and Tobago Court of Appeal held that where statutes allow for a sentence to stand on an alternative offence, this rule of thumb does not indemnifies all cases of prosecution for an alternative offence, barring conviction on a certain charge.
Above all, the authority of the court to cease prosecution because of oppression or an abuse of process derives in two situations. Namely, when the trial has influenced or tainted the practice of the court depriving the accused person of their prosecution or operated unlawfully to the defendant. However, like most process, when a stay of proceedings application is made in most Commonwealth countries it is met with delay and there numerous cases to highlight this resistance. The case of the DPP v Tokai states that the best forum to stake a claim of abuse of process is the initial trial or preliminary stage. In particular, Bell v DPP acknowledged that a delay could result in a stay of proceeding with regard to an abuse of process. However, a major question asked in relation to this was the case of Tan v Cameron; where an assessment to decide if the prosecution should stay is whether the accused person can in fact get a fair trial. As a result, in Flower v R the Privy Council laid the foundation in determining arguments of a delay resulting from an abuse of process.
Notwithstanding, that in Charles, Cater and Carter v The State showed an effective argument when making a case for abuse of process on the basis of a delay. Additionally, there is a lot of mitigating factors the court is clear on its principles and guideline concerning Autrefois and an abuse of process. In light of all these factors, in this essay I will dissect the crucial principles governing autrefois, as I address the existing statutes concerning authorization for a retrial after the matter concluded resulting in a verdict of acquittal or conviction due to certain requirements in the said case. Also, I will do a holistic analysis of the plea of autrefois acquit and autrefois convict, analysing various cases in detail and I show the nexus between a plea of Autrefois and Abuse of Process, the importance of preventing a double jeopardy and various doctrines governing an abuse of process and Autrefois. It is my intention to show how the law applies in Autrefois Acquit and Autrefois Convict as well as the true meaning behind the statement made by Lord Devlin in the matter of Connelly v DPP (1964).