Reflection 1
In essence, the cognitive behaviours of every social agent would be influenced by a variable number of dominant beliefs (Gramsci 1971); these beliefs or ideologies therefore govern decision-makings of hers/his in interpersonal dynamics. Underpinning these ideological practices – moreover – would be the perceived empirical truth of them; otherwise, an agent reasonably would neither be governed by nor exercise them. Furthermore, materialising these beliefs could as well constitute the life purposes and life meaning of that person.
Following are the two paragraphs dedicated to elaborating on the ideologies of my life that fulfil the entire array of aforementioned functions; these two paragraphs would thus answer questions one to four of the task.
In particular, I value my recently attained Christianity the most. Upon the religious change, firmly underlying my social behaviours are moral values from the Bible. Having conformed to God’s teachings, my humanitarian and egalitarian beliefs have also progressively surfaced. Though seemingly complacent, I believe that I have become morally enhanced upon the acceptance of Christianity. The second to my Christianity is vegetarianism; despite relinquishing the consumption of meat, I feel ethically correct and physiologically unchanged to help promote animal equality. Other than that, I am also a feminist who aims to help achieve gender equality in society. Another belief I ironically adopt is a mild form of individualism: I refrain from intervening issues not personally pertinent; and except God, I prioritise myself – which would to a large degree seem selfish.
To be frank, a paradox has emerged vis-à-vis my morality; but it nevertheless justifies the belief that I have the freedom of choice. Despite my self-proclaimed moral enhancement due to Christianity, my individualism predisposes me to prioritising myself in life. I could provide two instances of my individualism, which concurrently substantiate my freedom of choice: first, the change of religion was without a parental agreement; second, balancing social gatherings against independent studying, I often prefer the latter to the former. In brief, my religious values and my individualistic beliefs are often contradictory; and I admit to having that intrinsic paradox, which it is probably the cornerstone of my intrapersonal philosophy – a problematic one that requires gradual rectification. Yet, it could also be argued that no philosophy is inherently wrong. In brief, despite the ethical contradiction, it illustrates my human agency as well as my being responsible for its possible implications.
Finally, this reflection leads me to my contemplation of and search for truth. In essence, whilst I could perceive truth from the array of (religious and social) ideologies, I strongly believe that there are uncertainties in life that could neither be explained nor summarised with academic theories. One example is the uncertainty that whether romance is ‘indispensable’ at the current stage of my life, or even at any stage of a human life. However, this truth-seeking conundrum is an adequate opportunity for me to reiterate my initial proposition: my daily routines to a major extent revolve around Christian doctrines. Hence, prior to painstakingly examining pre-existing details of a controversy in search for the precise truth, God will be the first of whom I enquire.
(514 words)
References
Gramsci, A. (1971). Selections from The Prison Notebooks [Translated by Q. Hoare and G. Nowell-Smith]. New York: Lawrence and Wishart.
Reflection 2
From Socrates’ relentless questioning in ancient Greece, to the development of Cartesian scepticism and Meditations (Descartes 1641), to the Marxist (1848) postulation of social conflicts between bourgeoisie and proletarian, these philosophical frameworks exist for a fundamentally critical reason: collectively as a discipline – Philosophy, it attempts to define – and beyond that, preserve – human morality (Thom 2011). Upon this theoretical basis, I arbitrarily mediate the dichotomy between absolutism and relativism; arbitrarily as well, I assume a universal consensus on the definition of ‘morality’.
Relativism invalidates the presence of absolute truth (Baghramian and Carter 2016), while absolutism is the direct opposite; but they nonetheless similarly describe the essence of truth. Despite their philosophical relevance, neither one deserves universal establishment because both concepts fail to fulfil the purpose (as discussed earlier) of philosophy to construct and preserve empirical morality. Relativism is morally incomplete because incontestable ethical values – such as loving our parents – do exist; identically, absolutism is invalid because certain controversies in life – such as the theory of ‘absolutism’ – have no absolute correctness.
I do not recognise myself as an individual relativist because relativism challenges the truism of certain humanitarian values. In essence, many facets of life take different shapes and forms. For instance, the method of food consumption in Malaysia – encompassing bare hands, forks and spoons, chopsticks – depends upon cultural conventions; none is superior. Nevertheless, in relation to food consumption, the axiom that should never be challenged by relativists is the virtue of not wasting food. If relativism intervenes, it will lead to the ideologically inevitable tolerance of food-wasting. The outcomes of such practice would be detrimental, especially to the environment. In short, even if certain values are indeed relative, relativism could not be universally applied because it may relinquish moral values in favour of ‘inclusivity’.
Cultural relativism – with identical regard to the fundamental purpose of philosophy – does not promise peace. Cultural relativists believe that they could lead to the utopia of cultural inclusivity as they argue that every cultural sect has the right to preserve a preferred way of thought. However, such relativist orthodoxy does not guarantee peace. The rise of German and Italian nationalists in the 1930s was validated by the inclusive principles of relativism; and consequently, European hostility elevated to a global war. This historical example demonstrates that despite the moral imperative of ‘open-mindedness’ or cultural inclusivity, certain cultural materialisations could not be justified by relativism. Overall, I strongly argue that modern civilians should never tolerate behaviours, practices or principles that are explicitly immoral.
Although I endorse neither absolutism nor relativism, I seek truth. As mentioned in the previous reflection, God is my primary source of truth-seeking; but this paragraph delves into physical mechanisms. Despite society dominantly inculcating me with the significance of Mathematics or Physics, I am in the Arts, for instance. The main reason is that, upon contemplating the traditionalist assertion, I perceived that natural sciences are not all-encompassing (Redfield 1950); had humans been without the theoretical development of Humanities alongside scientific advancement, modern civilisation could not have been configured. From deconstructing a dominant ideology, to conceptualising the interrelationship between social and natural sciences, this exemplar illustrates that truth could certainly be discovered with time, intellectual effort and patience – largely regardless of relativism and absolutism.
(537 words)
References
Baghramian, M. and Carter, J. (2015) ‘Relativism’. Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy. [Online] 11th September. Available from <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2016/entries/relativism/#WhaRel> [19th February 2017]
Descartes, R. (1641) Meditations on First Philosophy.
Marx, K. and Engels, F. (1848) The Manifesto of the Communist Party. Moscow: Progress Publishers
Redfield, R. (1950) ‘Social Science in Our Society’, in Phylon (1940-1955). Clark Atlanta University, page 31-41
Thom, B. (2011) Ethics and Moral Philosophy. Boston: Brill
Reflection 4
The co-existence of God and moral delinquency constitutes a theological contradiction, which is generally described as ‘the problem of evil’ by critical theologians as well as sceptical atheists (Holmen 2015). In response to such assertions, I – with theodicy – argue that the dismissal of God is the outcome of human greed and arrogance (Stump 2008: 9) due to three reasons.
Firstly, ‘the problem of evil’ reinforces the commercialisation of the relationship between God and disciples, which subsequently leads to religious hypocrisy. Religious commercialisation happens when disciples devote commitment to God in pure pursuit of benefits. The primary repercussion of it, nonetheless, would be religious hypocrisy. As ungrounded discourse has dominantly synonymised the ‘omniscience, impeccable morality and omnipotence’ of God to a ‘constant source of happiness’, it is predictable that many would be tempted to ‘accept’ the ‘grace’ of God. It could be perceived that such religiosity is profit-driven: for the hypocrites, a post-acceptance encounter of adversities would naturally serve as a convenient excuse to denounce and dismiss the existence of God. Thus, ‘the problem of evil’ epitomises human greed.
Secondly, ‘the problem of evil’ denies the importance of moral enhancement through ethical and religious perseverance, on which God’s indoctrination (the Bible) has put an emphasis. Adam and Eve were deceived by the infamous serpent; and the consumption of the fruit of wisdom created human evil. While some may contend that God failed to scrutinise His creations, I argue that God’s temporary absence was a testimony (Stump 2008:9) of their devotion – both of them failed the examination. Fast forward to contemporary civilisation, constant examinations of commitment to God during moments of difficulties are vital because God could verify the eligibility of each disciple for Heaven. If the path to Heaven was as convenient as pledging verbal commitment to Christianity, everyone could acquire an instantaneous permit to the holy ground without devoted conformity to God’s teachings: it all takes a de-contextualised enunciation of ‘Amen’. Having proven the misinterpretation of God by some ‘followers’, ‘the problem of evil’ again exemplifies benefit-orientated Christians.
Thirdly, ‘the problem of evil’ indirectly overlooks God’s goodness. In essence, this theological concept has failed to appreciate all the positive aspects of life – encompassing the impossibilities and miracles – that God has granted to humans. In fact, it is almost undeniable that many have encountered certain instances of positivity, and following is my anecdotal evidence. My (former) three-year romantic relationship had encountered an ominous situation; however, despite the three weeks of weeping and agony, I allowed God to decide the outcome: I experienced an unexpected sense of relief in the immediate aftermath of the ‘ending’. Not only that, my academic capabilities afterwards accomplished an exponential progression in the second semester of my Foundation studies. From the total absence of post-break-up sadness, to the subsequent academic advancement, not only does this individual experience illustrate my appreciation for God’s blessings, it instantiates the existence of God.
In brief, ‘the problem of evil’ instantiates human greed and arrogance. Several unfathomable situations in life should not be exploited with the disappointment of anyone to dismiss God. Instead, God’s purposes and intentions must be acknowledged: we owe God for our current existence, achievements and even momentary difficulties.
(530 words)
References
Holmen, H. (2015) ‘Action and the Problem of Evil’, in International Journal of Philosophy and Theology. Page 335 – 351
Stump, E. (2008) ‘The Problem of Evil and the Desires of the Heart.’ in Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion. Ed. by Kvanvig, J, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Page 196 – 215
Reflection 5
The question of freewill could be recognised as a philosophical framework upon a religious foundation. Fundamentally, God configured elementary features of the mortal world (Rogers 2015), including the inborn intelligence of humans. Although philosophers such as Anselm of Canterbury (McClusky n.d.) conclude that God is therefore logically and essentially the epitome of determinism, such notion overlooks God’s intention to create a world containing autonomy and creativity; for instance, God did not prevent Adam and Eve from consuming the fruit of wisdom. In conclusion and expansion of this philosophical basis, God induced human freedom, and the freedom engendered the current form of society which indeed has a debatable degree of determinism; above all, determinism and freewill justifiably co-exist.
(This essay rejects the theoretical intervention of authoritarian regimes – or absolute determinism – because any dictatorial doctrine of total conformity defies the religious fundamentals as examined in the first paragraph.)
I adopt an interdisciplinary approach to addressing crime by intertwining philosophy and politics (Michael 2012): the coexistence of human agency and determinism means that there is no absolute structural constraint. Even if socio-economic structures of a geopolitical entity may trigger individual delinquencies, they do not determine behaviours of societal members.
Crime is essentially a personal choice, even though it indeed depends largely on socio-economic predicaments. Following are multiple instances of human freedom. Although robbery may be widespread, beggars (who are also desperate for monetary resources) exist. While murderers kill to express anger and/or fulfil vengeance, some instead choose to commit suicide, and others transform vengeance into optimistic energies. Albeit rapists could not have maintained ‘impulsive’ sexual temptations, others would address libido by masturbation, pre-marital sexual intercourse and/or focussing on other issues – such as academic obligations. In brief, these examples illustrate that although socio-economic forces of society may be powerful, individual choices and/or behaviours are not completely determined by them.
In recognition of that interrelatedness (hence, coexistence) of liberty and determinism, I believe that to a large degree I have control of my individual development. The following anecdotal evidence has no arrogance intended. Upon joining the university, despite my A+ in English for the Malaysian Certificate of Education (SPM), my language proficiency was inferior to most course-mates. Nevertheless, in addition to the motivations from my new teachers, I took initiatives: from the 66% in Writing for Academic Purposes, to the 81% in Written Communication and Study Skills, it justifies that ‘hard work pays off’. In response to potential scepticism that it could have been that deterministic ‘inferiority’ that motivated me to be industrious, I humbly say: not all academically inferior students work hard for improvement. Personal control of individual development therefore is possible, and embodies liberty.
Nonetheless, one prerequisite of personal freedom is individual responsibility; if I intend to act, I must be responsible for the outcome (Nichols 2015). Consequential responsibility exemplifies the mutual agreement between deterministic structures and inalienable freedom: as far as repercussions are addressed, an agency could express freewill without institutional oppression. Social discourse and situations urged me to further my studies in natural sciences, for instance, but I would soon be in politics; and regardless of my future finance, I would accept the consequences because I rejoice over what I have been – and will be – in.
(535 words)
References
McClusky, C. (n.d.) ‘Medieval Theories of Free Will.’ Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy: A Peer-Reviewed Academic Resourse. [Online] Available from <http://www.iep.utm.edu/freewi-m/#SH2b> [19th March 2017]
Michael, W. J. (2012) Political Philosophy: A Historical Introduction. New York: Oxford University Press
Nichols, S. (2015) Bound: Essays on Freewill and Responsibility. Oxford: Oxford University Press.