The introduction suggests the purpose of the book, which “is a reflection on both Buddhism and modern psychology that uses each as a mirror to examine the other’s assumptions to make the ongoing dialogue between Buddhism and modern psychology a more conscientious and fruitful one” (Jiang, 6). In the contemporary world (especially western culture), many intellectuals accept Buddhism as a psychotherapeutic religion, which insightfully explores the human`s mind. In other words, Buddhism is conveyed to westerners through the vehicle of psychology. This psychological approach is sub-divided into three views: meditation as a regressive “oceanic” feeling, difference in phase between meditation and psychoanalysis, parallels between the two. Although the second and third views are recent and dominant, the careless comparison between Buddhism and psychology can be dangerous. Because, according to Jiang, it can lead to an oversimplification of distinct vocabularies and structure of Buddhism (4). To put it differently, western scholars tend to interpret concepts of Buddhism through the eyes of psychology, which does not consider the cultural difference between the past and now. Therefore, rather than integrating Buddhism and psychology, it is important to understand each concept in each social norm and then examine each other in a new setting. Keeping this in mind, the author, due to the complexity of Buddhism and modern psychology, carefully chooses Yogacara Buddhist notion of alayavijñana and the concept of the unconscious in modern psychoanalysis for comparison. Alayavijnana or storehouse consciousness, normally regarded as the unconscious in Buddhism, “is a subliminal reservoir of memories, habits, tendencies, and future possibilities” (Jiang, 8). Although there are many other similar concepts to the unconscious, such as bhavanga, anusaya, and asava, alayavijnana is the most appropriate, for Yogacarins developed it structurally and systematically. The western understanding of alayavajnana has progressed through three questions: What is the Buddhist notion of the unconscious? What issues are raised within the Buddhist tradition that give alayavijñana its current shape? Is the notion of alayavijñana adequate in addressing the challenges that it is formulated to answer? The problem is, however, scholars are still exploring alayavijnana in psychological perspectives. To avoid this, the author raises a different question: What do the differences between alayavijñana and the unconscious tell us about the presuppositions of the modern psychological notion of the unconscious and the Yogac ara notion of alayavijñana? And these differences will be analyzed into the questions of what, why, and how.
In the first chapter, the author deeply examines the concept of alayavijnana, by showing certain tension in Buddhist teaching. Specifically, he presents Abhidharma Buddhists` effort to solve the tension between Buddhist doctrines, which facilitates the understanding of Yogacara Buddhism and alayavijnana. When founders of religions establish their doctrines, a doctrine cannot be constant. For the founder has to explain the doctrine to various people and in many contexts. Such differences confuse disciples who want to study the doctrine. In case of Buddhism, Abhidharma school, the foundation of the teaching of Buddha, strived to solve this inconsistency, and Yogacara school in the fourth century succeeded this endeavor. Jiang argues “The tension in question is between identity and change, reflected in the difficulty in conceptualizing continuity” (22). If the change continues, the change would have an changing identity, but when identity exists, change would be impossible or have unchanging identity. This tension exists between many Buddhist teaching. For example, Karma and anatman. Then, each concept and its tension with another concept is explained thoroughly. At first, anatman, normally translated as no-self, has vague points since the Buddha, in the early texts, did not explicitly deny the existence of the self. So, Peter Harvey suggests that Buddha did not reject the empirical self in daily experience and that Buddha put aside the metaphysical self, due to incomprehensibility. In other words, there is a possibility of the existence of empirical sense of the self. When this concept is combined with karma, which is interpreted as volition and willed action, there exists inconsistency in that karma continues over many lives without atman. Genjun Sasaki represents the nature of karma and anatman is the same but merely a different perspective because separating those can lead to reification of an unchanging identity. However, whether these concepts can pacify the tension between momentariness and continuity is a different problem. Thus, the author cites two Theravada schools, Sarvastivada and Sautrantika, which contributed to the progress of Yogacara school. As mentioned above, the dilemma is to explain continuity without relying on inherent existence. So continuity was interpreted in three ways. Firstly, “change is predicated upon a substance. The second scenario…is to ‘formulate a theory of immediate contiguity and grant causal efficiency to the immediate preceding dhamma’ (Kalupahana 1975, 72–73). Lastly, continuity is conceived in such a way that it rejects the idea that time consists of a series of instantaneous moments” (Jiang, 33). Sarvastivada accepted the first view, and Sautrantika accepted the second. Yogacara modified the all three views and then adopted. At first, Sarvastivada maintained things in the past, present, and future. And things in each stage of time causes the conscious. The boundary between each stage of time is the efficacy of the causal power. For example, dharma in the past no longer operates in the present. Moreover, a dharma is efficacious only when the dharma owns a possession. However, this complexity revealed unchanging essence of things due to the separation of attributes from the substance and is condemned as a heresy by other Buddhists. As a result of the criticism, Sautrantika brought a new stance that the attributes and essence are the same. Specifically, it rejected the unchanging moment of dharma and admitted only two stages: nascent and cessant. The dharma cease to exist immediately after each moment, and this continuous change is linked by the notion of seed (bija). The seeds are not an efficacy or essence but a capacity or potential. Sautrantika even furthered the concept of subtle and elusive seeds, from which yogacara Buddhists flowered their structured and systemized concept of a subliminal mind, alayavijnana.
As has been noted in Chapter 1, people often misunderstand continuity as an identity or essence, so the Buddhists` goal is to solve this “Problem of Continuity”. And alayavijnana is one of the schools, which wanted to resolve this dilemma. The author chooses Xuan Zang, who was a “Chinese Buddhist pilgrim and translator” in the seventh century. Especially, Cheng Weishi Lun (CWSL), which is an “extended commentary on Vasubandhu’s Thirty Verses” by Xuan Zang, will be used to examine alayavijnana (Jiang, 48). Xuan Zang addressed his argument in three steps. Firstly, he employed the concept of emptiness of Madyamaka school so that he can state the absence of metaphysical identity and the existence of a “continuum of momentary entities”. Secondly, “he attempts to reduce the continuity of external objects to the continuity of conscious activities”. And, finally, he theorized the continuous process of enlightenment from delusion to enlightenment (Jiang, 49). As the second step is the pivotal point, the author especially focuses on the second step, by raising a question: “Does alayavijñana as presented in the CWSL eventually solve the problematic of continuity within Buddhist discourse, and if so, how? (Jiang, 50).