Matthew John Fritschen
April 24, 2017
International Relations
Andrew Bennett
The Consequences Diplomatic Disengagement with States with Interstate Terrorist Regimes
Since September 9, 2001, efforts to eliminate terrorism have increased in the United States, and it still isn't clear what the best methods are for eliminating this problem. In the past, the United States has diplomatically and economically severed ties with many of these states in the hopes that by doing so, the state's economy and political atmosphere would decline, leaving the state with no choice but to withdraw sponsorship from the terrorist regime(s). While this strategy may seem effective, Tara Maller, a researcher from MIT, makes the argument that leaving states in diplomatic isolation has more consequences than benefits. Maller’s paper contains several valid arguments but fails to make an argument that accommodates the classical-realist perspective, fails to provide alternate solutions, and makes a faulty assumption that state sponsorship is what determines the success of terrorist regimes.
Maller’s article opens by stating that the United States has used diplomatic sanctions as a way of coercing states sponsors of terrorism to defund terrorist regimes (1). These sanctions were implied when Vice President, Dick Cheney said, “We don’t negotiate with evil, we defeat it (Kessler)” after the terrorist attacks on September 9, 2001. Cheney meant that if state sponsoring terrorist regimes do not cooperate, the United States will not compromise and will sever ties from the target country. Tara Maller calls this form of severance “diplomatic disengagement.” Diplomatic disengagement is a strategic tactic used by the United States that leaves the target country in diplomatic and sometimes economic isolation. The idea is that the states will no longer be able to afford to sponsor inner-state terrorist regimes. In Tara Maller's article, she goes into depth about two cases where the United States used this tactic as a means of counterterrorism, but in both argues that it failed. These failures support her argument that the United States should maintain diplomatic engagement and use diplomacy as a method of counterterrorism. She analyzes times when the United States diplomatically disengaged in the past, and presents evidence that this form of severance has had “blowback” consequences such as “loss of valuable intelligence, a decreased public diplomacy capability and an increased threat of radicalization in the target country (Maller 1).” Maller uses examples of diplomatic disengagement with Afghanistan and Sudan to highlight these”blowback” consequences.
Tara Maller analyzes counterterrorism method of diplomatic engagement through a hybrid of liberalist and constructivist perspectives. Her argument is constructivist because she examines historical failures of diplomatic disengagement, and indicates that leaving terrorist sponsoring states in isolation has created an anti-west norm, which has ironically this has led to rise in terrorism.
In fact, if one looks at the states that remain on the severed states list into the late 1990s until today, all of these states are currently on or have recently been on the U.S. State Department State Sponsors of Terrorism (Carter 135).
This presents an undeniable positive correlation between diplomatic isolation and the rise of state-sponsored terrorism. In other words, diplomatic isolation has created an anti-west norm in these countries, which has caused an increase in terrorist organizations.
Her liberalist argument is seen through her proposal for diplomatic engagement, which advocates for cooperation between states to eliminate terrorist regimes. However, Maller fails to acknowledge the correlation between diplomatic disengagement and classical realism.
Tara Maller emphasizes the failures of diplomatic disengagement, but fails to acknowledge other reasons why it was used as a form of counterterrorism in the past
The terrorist attacks on the twin towers on September 9, 2001 resparked a sense of American nationalism across the United States. American citizens gathered around their TV’s waiting to hear how George W. Bush would take action. This put tremendous pressure on the president. George W. Bush and Dick Cheney stated that the United States would not negotiate with terrorists. While, cooperating with state sponsors of Al Qaeda could have been a potential solution, this would have been seen as a weak move by the president. Knowingly or unknowingly, this could have threatened his reelection because the audience costs were high. This is not an argument that Bush made this decision to sever ties in his best interest, but it is a possibility that should be noted when historically analyzing why isolation was used as a form of counterterrorism. Politicians the United States have to be careful when making decisions, especially if they are seeking reelection due to the democratic structure of the United States government. Because Maller only analyzes effective ways of counterterrorism from a liberalist and constructivist perspective, she entirely ignores the classical realist argument: that United States President’s may opt to diplomatically disengage with a state if it heightens the chances of their reelection.
Maller also fails to acknowledge that state sponsorship doesn’t guarantee terrorist regime success. In her argument she assumes that finding a way to eliminate state sponsorship will eradicate terrorist organizations, but this is not always the case. In “A Blessing or a Curse, State Support for Terrorist Groups” David B. Carter names several situations where state sponsorship is more likely to lead to failure of the terrorist group. One of this findings was that if a state provides a terrorist group with a safe haven (a form of sponsorship), the probability that the group will fail increases. “All else equal, if a group receives safe haven from its state sponsor, this increases the probability a group fails (Carter 135).” This means that Carter’s finding that state sponsorship isn’t doesn’t determine whether a terrorist group survives undermines Maller’s assumption that eliminating state sponsorship (through diplomatic engagement) will eliminate terrorist organizations. If Maller would have included scenarios for when cutting state sponsorship is and isn’t effective, it would have contributed to her proposal that diplomatic engagement should be used.
Maller does not acknowledge that diplomatic engagement will not eradicate terrorism on its own. Her proposal does not include other counterrorism methods to use in conjunction with diplomacy. Terrorist groups can still rise and fall without the support of their government, so other methods are necessary for eradicating these groups, especially in cases where diplomacy fails. Bjorn Lomborg proposes another possible method to assist in eliminating terrorism.
This [reducing terrorism] could be achieved in part by reallocating or increasing foreign assistance. Currently, the United States gives only 0.17 per cent of gross net income as official development assistance – the second-smallest share among OECD countries. Aid is frequently skewed to countries that support the United States’ foreign policy agenda (Lomborg).
Providing foreign assistance to countries with terrorist organizations could greatly reduce terror risks. Foreign aid would put the United States under a positive light. Assisting countries economically will reduce anti-west norms in these countries, which would ultimately assist in reducing terrorist group membership. Unfortunately, According to Lombard, countries that support the foreign policy agenda of the United States will receive the most aid, meaning that countries that do not support the foreign policy of the United States will receive the least aid. But what if the reason that these countries do not support United States foreign policy is due to a lack of economic support? THe United States providing aid to these countries could change their perception of United States foreign policy, and also aid in eliminating the anti-west perspective. If the United States were to try and provide aid through organizations such as the World Bank and IMF, it would be reasonable to assume that the inhabitants’ views of the United States would change over time.
While there are problems in Maller’s argument, she makes some valid points. Maller wrote this article years ago before the Syrian refugee crisis. Syria is one of the countries that the United States left in diplomatic isolation. Looking back, if the United States had maintained engagement with Syria with on ground forms of communication, the outcome of the civil war within Syria could have been different. Engagement also would have also provided the United States with valuable information on how to take action during the crisis. While ceasing diplomatic engagement might have seen like a good idea at the time, the United States has experienced “blowback” consequences from leaving Syria in diplomatic isolation. Syria is one of many examples of the shortcomings of using diplomatic disengagement as a counterterrorism method. This supports Maller’s argument that maintaining diplomatic relations could be a better plan of action. However, reestablishing/maintaining diplomatic ties is not a solution on its own, especially according to new evidence that eliminating state sponsorship of terrorist regimes is does not guarantee their demise. Other methods must be employed in cases where diplomacy fails. Lomborg's method of creating foreign aid programs might help reduce the number of terrorist organizations in middle-eastern countries by changing the creating a positive perception of the west.