Introduction
The purpose of this essay is to discuss the problems and merits of this view regarding Karl R. Popper’s Hypothetico-deductive method (HPM). This view is adapted from Alan Chalmer’s book ‘What is this thing called science?’ (1976), he quoted it as society’s popular conception of scientific knowledge which can be inferred as an inductivist’s account (Chalmers, 1982). The essay will essentially focus on two methods of acquiring scientific knowledge: Induction and Popperian Hypothetico-deductive method, and explore the conflict between the two. Induction can be defined as a process of using observation and experience of natural phenomena to derive logical principles and sometimes, generalizing an existential statement to becoming a universal statement. Popper’s HPM brings forth testability and falsifiability, identifying problems, producing hypotheses and subjecting them through experimentation and observation. The hypothesis should be testable and realistic, when the hypothesis fails the testing, it is rejected. New solutions are proposed and goes through the same process. This cycle will help remove the inherent weakness of each of the hypotheses in the form of a new problem. Ultimately, after the solution satisfies and withstands the testing, the theory becomes acceptable although not legitimized, due to its high measure of corroboration, it is presented as the best available until further information or observation can falsify it or another testable hypothesis can supersede it (SCIE1000 Lecture Notes, 2016).
Popperian Objection: Hypothetico-Deduction method
‘Proven knowledge’ may suggest a sense of absolute truth which has been verified and cannot be falsified, suggesting that that specific scientific statement has already been justified and no longer requires the need for further investigation or exploration which directly clashes with the concept of HPM. Popper claimed that ‘the empirical basis of objective science has thus nothing ‘absolute’ about it’ (Popper, 1968). There lies a contradiction in the view as scientific knowledge is acquired by observation and is objective which creates a great degree of reliability but observation statements can also be fallible, making them sometimes unreliable and useless, which shows that the importance of filtering different observation experiences by its relevance.
Regarding the extent of objectivity pertaining to science, Popper would reject the idea of science being only objective and that subjectivity will inevitably play a role in the production and testing of theories. Objectivity may refer to the ability to justify the information without influence of external factors that may produce a bias. To apply objective reasoning through observation and experimentation, personal qualities such as emotions, opinions or expectations cannot shadow the process, producing a public character of these observations with the absence of a subjective judgment of the observer. But according to Popper, separating the psychological programming of our logical observations through our senses cannot be achieved too simply. He firmly states that ‘the objectivity of scientific statements lies in the fact that they can be inter-subjectively tested’ (Popper, 1968). Popper believed that objective knowledge itself does not contain absolute certainty but tentative hypotheses, when they are highly probable and has yet been susceptible to doubt (Popper, 1968). However, a Popperian can agree with the statement ‘Science is based on what we can see and hear and touch, etc.’ as these observations we are making can be seen as problems when related to a specific theory. For example, if I am holding onto the theory of plants being green due to the green chlorophyll pigment, why do red foliage plants exist? The observation of red foliage plants existing poses a problem as it does not align with the theory of plants being green in colour. Also, the style of rigor used to approach experimentation and observation shows some parallels between the two methods.
My views
My stand largely aligns with the HPM though I do find various fundamental discrepancies within it. I believe that both subjectivity and objectivity partake in this scientific inquiry process though objectivity arguably holds the upper hand. Subjective qualities such as imagination, emotion, intuition and faith are inherent in human nature which makes it difficult to separate them from our sense perception and reasoning. Referring to Popper’s method, gathering problems and formulating hypotheses establishes the scientific inquiry, this step requires the ability to be able to brainstorm for possible solutions, incorporating creativity and imagination to expand one’s cognitive complexity, involving a subjective experience. Although subjective experiences cannot be used to justify the scientific knowledge, it can aid in the rational and logical thought process, growing the capacity to observe and understand.
I agree with the idea that theories cannot be verified even with a high degree of corroboration, leaving a sense of tentativeness due to the evolving nature of science. As a result, there is a possibility that the scientific knowledge can be influenced to change. The universe is constantly transforming, the changes that occur in our environment are the natural phenomena that we aim to investigate (such as carbon dioxide concentration affecting global warming). Due to the impermanent quality of nature, we must adapt by advancing and creating new theories that can align with the changes. The use of new theories may provide updated data that can falsify the existing theories, allowing us to make more informed predictions and expectations of the phenomena. Conversely, falsificationism can fail with various scientific statements. Scientific principles or laws should be unfalsifiable as they explain a general regularity and are scientifically testable.
Personally, I believe that the abandonment of theories that initially fail the testing, may instead narrow the direction and impede progress of scientific advancement as failed theories could be retained for future use. Popper stated that theories that survived the testing were corroborated to overcome the invalidity associated with induction, insisting on his criterion that acceptable hypotheses should not be verified and failed theories should be abandoned. However, he also did not deny the need of dogmatism in testing theories (ideologies that are ascertained based on potentially inconsistent premises) to a certain extent(Popper,1968), condoning the duality of a critical and dogmatic attitude despite the clash that dogmatism presents to his theory.
Conclusion
The main issues that arose between the inductivist account and the HPM would be the validity of scientific knowledge and the extent of objectivity in acquiring it. A Popperian would strongly argue that scientific knowledge, in terms of theories, can never be legitimized or ‘proven’ on the basis that it should be falsified and the strongest contender is the best available theory. Additionally, scientific inquiries would ultimately use the combination of an objective and subjective experience during observation and experiment. Though I support the HPM, it does retain some limitations regarding its criteria that are fundamental to the progress of science.