Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) or more widely known as drones, have been gaining attention in recent years. For governments, militaries, and to an extent the public perspective, the use of drones provides conveniences such as: reducing the number of troops needed on the ground, the cost of sending troops to dangerous environments, and the time and preparation needed for tactical training. The increased use of drones in military operations and warfare has been acknowledged by governments and media outlets as evolutionary and effective. However, with all technology advancements, there have been drawbacks. The drawbacks in this context are framed around ethical implications of drone use in warfare. More specifically, the scope of drone warfare and these ethical concerns will be examined through the influence of technology, theoretical frameworks such as democratic peace theory and the just war doctrine, the concept of dehumanizing war, and other catalysts such as language and discourse. Thus, as the world progresses in innovation, furthers technological evolution, and engages in conflict, these advancements blur the moral and ethical lines of conflict and warfare.
In simple terms, the use of drones by democratic states has been aimed at reducing human suffering and death in times of war. When looking at the bigger picture, the use of drones has military and political benefits such as reduced costs of military equipment, improved surveillance of target areas, and (for the most part) the public’s support. However, in light of the many benefits drone warfare has to offer, the ethical implications cannot be ignored. In ‘Killer drones: The ‘silver bullet’ of democratic warfare’, authors Frank Sauer and Niklas Schörnig discuss the use of drones by democratic states and the ethical concerns drones impose through democratic peace theory.
Sauer and Schörnig first make reference to the principles that guide democratic states through democratic peace theory. In this theory, democratic states generally peaceful and do not go to war with each other (Kaufman, 2013, p. 124-5). Non-violent approaches are used in instances of conflict and military force is used as a last resort. An important point made by Sauer and Schörnig in this regard is that democratic states operating through democratic peace theory may engage in conflicts that are asymmetrical, or engage in ‘wars of choice’. This translates to a democratic state engaging in a conflict or war with a non-democratic state, whether there was a direct cause or state interest or concern led to involvement. These situations can potentially result in the principles binding this theory to be misinterpreted or blurred by the democratic state. The democratic state may act aggressively towards the non-democratic state, which would offset the principles of the theory, but not hold the state entirely accountable. When considering the use of drones, this becomes more of an issue:
…assuming democracies to be distinctively set up in terms of institutions and their subscription to specific liberal norms and values seems generally valid. Yet this does not necessarily render them immune to aggressive behavior- and unmanned systems play a very problematic role in this regard. (Sauer, Schörnig, 2012, p. 369)
The appeal of democracies to use drones warrants beneficial short-term goals, or what Sauer and Schörnig would consider the ‘silver bullet’, but drone usage in conflicts and war over the long-term transform this ‘silver bullet’ into a ‘boomerang’ with ethical implications.
The ‘silver bullet’ for the use of drones are the obvious benefits drones provide by being less expensive than current military machinery and training practices, preventing civilian and troop casualties, and operating within war laws and norms. More specifically, for reduced military expenditure, drones: limit the need for life- support systems, saves money from training a fighter pilot to a drone pilot, and a less expensive budget for drone maintenance (Sauer, Schörnig, 2012, p. 370). These benefits contribute to the savings drones secure and would satisfy the military, the government, and the public. The military saves time and money with training and maintenance and the government also saves money and appeases the public’s approval by not over-spending on the military. Civilian and troop casualties are factors that democratic states when engaged in conflict hope to keep at a low level. Drones can eliminate the need for troops on the ground (or nearby) and provide close and clear imagery of potential targets while avoiding detection (Sauer, Schörnig, 2012, p. 370). This supports the notion of human suffering if drones can pinpoint enemy targets instead of innocent civilians. The advanced technology of drones such as real-time intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance and precision-guided missiles offer a minimal amount of force that can be used and be executed within war laws and norms. This is supported, ‘By replacing firepower with precision and the capability to wait hours for the optimal moment to engage, so the argument goes, the least force necessary in accordance with the law of armed conflict’s norms of discrimination and proportionality can be applied’. (Sauer, Schörnig, 2012, p. 370) Lastly, two other concepts are introduced to drone warfare, weaponization and autonomy. For weaponization, Sauer and Schörnig suggest that drones have transformed from an observational or recreational function, to a machine of weapon yielding missiles. Drones can carry out communications and perform targeted hits, which forms a two-in-one operation, rather than separate operations. For autonomy, drones can operate without external control, which places it on the path towards ‘independent, intelligent, decision-making’ (Sauer, Schörnig, 2012, p. 370). Internally operated drones and potential independently functioning drones also contribute to the changes in warfare environment, and eliminates the need for ground troops or able-bodied soldiers altogether. It is benefits such as these that appear to be in favor of less military spending, reduced need for ground troops, and avoiding civilian and solider casualties. However, when more closely examined, moral and ethical implications arise and cannot be ignored. This leads to the ‘boomerang’.
The ethical obligations posed by Sauer and Schörnig regarding drones are considered for the long-term. These concerns include costs in relation to the ‘proliferation of technology’, casualties, and moral and legal frameworks threatened by drone warfare. For technology, the moral dilemma is aimed at the innovation and replication of drone technology. Technology in general evolves at very fast rates. In relation to drones, aside from the militaristic components of the drone (weapons and sensors) it can be manufactured and built in the civilian consumer industry (Sauer, Schörnig, 2012, p. 371). As the leading innovators and those that follow develop more advanced technology, states will be inclined to spend more in order to maintain the latest drone technology. This borders the line of over-spending on military, which is not a hallmark of democratic peace theory. Another important factor to consider is the malfunction of drones and risking the potential for a wrecked drone’s technology to be recovered and sold on the black market (Sauer and Schörnig, 2012, p. 371). While this is issue is more of a security risk, ethical implications over casualties take precedence.
The ethical concerns regarding casualties from drone warfare are threefold. Democratic states must take into account the asymmetry of the conflict or war. If drones were used, how would it be received by the opposing state and other state or political actors? Sauer and Schörnig suggest that drone warfare could provoke retaliation in the form of guerilla warfare or terrorist activity in asymmetrical conflicts, or wars of choice (Sauer, Schörnig, 2012, p. 372). This would jeopardize the troops stationed in that country, and could lead to casualties if a successful terrorist attack or guerilla warfare was waged. Another implication that is caused is when considering the risk to soldiers and the political and military decisions that are made on behalf of drone warfare: ‘However, implementing this option also leads to the antinomic effect of political decision makers supporting military missions they would not have supported under different, more costly circumstances. The growing numbers of weaponized drones and robots only makes this slope more slippery’. (Sauer, Schörnig, 2012, p. 373) The risk to soldiers and cost factors of drone maintenance and operations, given this condition must be examined, especially for the long-term. Lastly, there are fears that the hype around drone technology may lead to an arms race where states could put international relationships at jeopardy or potentially increase military conflicts (Sauer, Schörnig, 2012, p. 373). This concern also navigates away from peaceful and non-violent approaches to conflict.
The norms and laws of war become distorted when drone warfare is waged. In regards to the law of mutual risk, where combating parties assume risk in the fight, drones eliminate the risk on one side (Sauer, Schörnig, 2012, p. 373). This presents a few moral issues from a military perspective and the concepts of war. In terms of mutual risk, using drones as weapons would create a riskless environment for one state; and create a riskier environment for the other. This would not make this a ‘fair’ fight (depending on the standards of ‘fair’). From a military perspective, concrete values such as honor and bravery that uphold and motivate soldiers are devalued when a drone pilot carries out an attack from a desk on the other side of the world. Weaponized drones can potentially dehumanize the foundation of the military and the conditions for conventional warfare and fighting combative style. For international law, the problem with drones and ethical concerns stems from the autonomy of the drone. If technology were to advance to an independently functioning weaponized drone, would it be able to distinguish between a civilian from a soldier? The risk of a lethal mistake by a drone would cause implications in determining the responsibility of the action (the supervisor of the drone or the drone itself) and violates the conditions of proportionality through drone-on-soldier combat rather than soldier-to-soldier combat, for example. While such technology does make significant contributions to the political and military realms, it also causes challenges within applicability, morality, and legality.
This article encompassed the large scope of drone warfare, it highlighted the benefits of drones (even though it was presented as short-term goals) and it also provided the issues drone warfare may cause in the future. The contribution made by this narrative did place the focus on ethics, but through a military and political perspective and the adverse effects a democratic state may face if engaging in drone warfare. Another important aspect of this argument is how the authors’ crafted the short-term benefits of drone warfare by creating loopholes through democratic peace theory- through costs, sparing casualties, maintaining public support, and obliging to war norms and standards. However, prolonged drone warfare demonstrates that the loopholes used to obtain the short-term goals create complex problems in the long-term. The problems are framed around ethical issues such as the advancement of technology and dehumanizing longstanding constructs like the military and traditional combat, which would lead to violations of responsibility and proportionality. It is ethical implications like these that give rise to other concerns of drone warfare and its impact on the conditions of the Just War Doctrine.
Just War Doctrine can be simply described as a set of conditions and criteria for waging war. Broadly stated, the Just War doctrine: ‘…pertains to moral criteria that states should use when justifying armed aggression or war against another state’. (Kaufman, 2013, p. 100) The doctrine is divided into three criterion, jus ad bellum, jus in bellum, and jus post bellum. These translate to the decision to go to war, how war is conducted, and the ending of the war. In relation to drones, the focus will be on the jus ad bellum and jus in bellum criterions and relevant principles. The Just War doctrine can and should be used as a guideline when considering the use of drones. In ‘Remote Killing and the Ethics of Drone Warfare’ James DeShaw Rae outlines ethical implications of drones in regards to the Just War doctrine amongst other concerns. According to DeShaw Rae, using drones in warfare does not coincide with the just war framework:
‘The just war framework customarily includes the following: just cause, legitimate authority, last resort, proportional means, and reasonable chance of success. When drones are viewed as a weapon system, just war doctrine is ill-fitting; otherwise one must insert drones into this formula and evaluate each interstate conflict specifically…’ (DeShaw Rae, 2014, p. 81)
Within that narrative, DeShaw Rae mentions five key principles of jus ad bellum and jus in bellum that are effected by drone warfare (just cause, legitimate authority, last resort, proportional means, and reasonable chance of success). Out of the five principles mentioned, Last resort, proportional means, and reasonable chance of success will be the focus of the ethical discussion on drone warfare.
In just war theory, the last resort condition as the term implies, means that all other options to remedy the conflict must have been exhausted before resorting to war. Wars have a reputation of being bloody, violent, and disastrous, so it really must be the only option left for parties to pursue. For the last resort to have an ethical implication, DeShaw Rae frames this argument through the advancement of technology. If drones are being used as weapons, they can exhibit force prior to reaching the last resort (DeShaw Rae, 2014, p. 81). If a state did make this decision to use a drone as weapon before reaching the last resort, it could potentially exacerbate the conflict by inflicting unnecessary damage on property or even injuring or killing civilians or troops. This would potentially receive criticism from the international community as well as not waiting to exhaust all other options before using the drones as weapons. This also reflects on the proportionality of the attack.
Proportionality in just war theory reflects the amount of force and or cost used for the appropriate (or proportional) reasons. In jus in bello, proportionality and discrimination ethically shape military violence, ‘…violent military action has to discriminate between combatants and noncombatants. Second, the costs of the particular military action have to be proportional to the objectives sought’. (Hallgarth, 2013, p. 31) For ethical implications, especially in drone warfare, being able to decipher combatant and noncombatant is crucial. Also, DeShaw Rae’s second argument in light of just war theory regards the clandestine activity of drones: ‘Certainly, any aerial bombing essentially runs the risk of forfeiting discrimination. Drone strikes are stealth attacks on unsuspecting individuals that sometimes include innocent civilians’. (DeShaw Rae, 2014, p. 81) The element of surprise is an old-time war tactic, but the advanced technology used to administer the drone attack undetected to unsuspecting targets with the risk of civilians in close proximity crosses the ethical line. A prime example is the ‘signature’ attacks administered by United States in Pakistan in recent years. These attacks were controversial for a number of reasons, but especially for the amount of innocent civilians that died as a result from a ‘signature’ drone attack. As suggested by the inaccuracy of hitting the ‘signature’ targets, the chance of success now becomes an ethical concern.
The chance of success condition in just war theory depicts that the outcome of the war must be successful. In other words, ‘This criterion is meant to avoid fruitless, pointless, self-indulgent wars, even if a just cause can be articulated’. (Hallgarth, 2013, p. 31) This condition poses a challenge in compliance of the parties involved. Depending on the perspective, there may be conflicting interpretations of what constitutes as “fruitless, pointless, and self-indulgent”. In DeShaw Rae’s argument for the chance of success, technology is used as the catalyst: ‘Faith in the technology also impacts whether a reasonable expectation of success can be ascertained…’ (DeShaw Rae, 2014, p. 82) The use of drones demonstrate a high confidence level within militaries and governments, given the reliance and abundance of attacks, surveillance and reconnaissance missions. Furthermore, ‘Currently, drones provide a relatively risk free means to deliver lethal results and on the surface one could expect a successful outcome tactically…’. (DeShaw Rae, 2014, p. 82) In an effort to spare troops on the ground and out of danger, drones can deliver risk-free lethal attacks. However, the risk-free factor is not necessarily determined for innocent civilians (or personal property), who do not voluntarily take the risk of being caught in the line of fire, like soldiers do. This disregard not only reflects fruitless, pointless, or self-indulgent, and carelessness but also circles back into the issue of proportionality and discrimination.
In addition to ethical implications outside of the Just War doctrine and its principles, DeShaw Rae discussed other key ethical issues regarding the use of drones. First, covert drone programs and operations ensue public debate over the morality, effectiveness, and legality of organized political violence and war (DeShaw Rae, 2014, p. 83). Again, Pakistan is an example. This clouds the transparency of the government and military, and could lead to public distrust. Second, the technology wave that propels the innovation and demand for drones to be used in warfare encourages impunity (DeShaw Rae, 2014, p. 83). This provides a range of factors that can blur ethical lines- the reduced costs, number of grounded soldiers, casualties, and drone operator detachment from the battlefield can twist drone warfare to be ‘justifiable’. However, given these reductions in addition to advanced drone technology in weaponry, it would be easier for a state to prolong the war until its goals or incentives are satisfied.
Lastly, the focus is directed to the ethical concerns surrounding the language and discourse contributing to the fascination of drone warfare and its lethal reputation. This begins with the names of drone models: ‘The martial naming techniques of drones reflect their almost supernatural powers. General Atomics built and named the two most well-known drones: the Predator and the Reaper’. (DeShaw Rae, 2014, p. 86) This is a symbolic ethical concern, a machine that bears a name like ‘predator’ is suggestive of a dehumanizing nature where the predator drone is going to track and hunt down its human prey. Also, the commentary surrounding drone warfare can be described as ‘hyper-masculinization’ in terms of how drone warfare is conducted. For example, the United States military and the Central Intelligence Agency refer to areas of target impact as ‘bug splatter’ and to ‘squirters’ as those fleeing the scene amidst the chaos (Rae, 2014, p. 87). This superior and dehumanizing attitude towards lethal drone attacks is another serious ethical implication. This was also reiterated in the article ‘Virtuous Drones’. In a discussion on favoring human life in conflict, the disregard for life is evident in the language used to conduct drone warfare:
‘The very crass (and one is afraid to say, all too predictable) use of the terms ‘bug splat’ or ‘whack-a-mole’ to denote the killing of a ‘terrorist’ by drone strike obviously dehumanises those killed, and is clearly meant to achieve the idea that the enemy needs and deserves eradication without trial or observance of the rule of law’. (Kennedy, Rogers, 2015, p. 212)
The top brass and intelligence agencies by exhibiting this hyper-masculine and inhumane approach to drone warfare set a poor example of morality for the lesser ranks of the military and intelligence agents involved in these operations. This could also develop into a ‘widely accepted notion’ within militaries shaping tactical behaviors. While this critique is viewed from the point of the state utilizing and administering in the use of drones, the perspective of the adversary and the effects of drone warfare should also be highlighted.
As a majority of the focus has been placed on a state engaging in drone warfare, the perspective of the adversary, especially one that may not have access to advanced drone technology should be discussed. In terms of adversary and conflict, this approach would be an asymmetrical conflict, and a case where a country’s sovereignty had been breached by drone attacks (as in Pakistan or Yemen). Although ‘Virtuous Drones’ discusses drones in relation to peacekeeping methods, the article gives mention to how the meaning of life is devalued in targeted areas, making it easier to kill without remorse (Kennedy, Rogers, 2015, p. 222). Drawing off this point, an ethical concern in this context would be for the people that live in these targeted areas. Killing innocent civilians in drone attacks obviously crosses the ethical line; but an ethical concern must be given to the people that survive these attacks and live in constant fear or paranoia of being caught in future crossfire. The traumatic psychological effects that drones have on adversary populations, especially in frequently targeted areas such as Pakistan or Yemen must be staggering and a burden to bear whilst living in an already hostile and conflicted environment.
Conversely, much of the discussion thus far has been in the context of drone warfare and lethal attacks. In brief, it would be beneficial to include contrasting and alternative viewpoints to drone warfare and ethics before concluding. In ‘Just War Theory and Remote Military Technology: A Primer’ by Matthew Hallgarth, advocates that drone warfare does fit into the Just War doctrine on the premise that it is not the weapons that make war unethical, it is the people that control them that break the ethics threshold. Therefore, in light of evolving technology, the Just War doctrine remains as is and still acts to guide states during war:
The tradition has been flexible, with technological innovations in the past, has evolved to meet the moral complexities entailed by these technological changes, and has retained a core set of principles grounded in the irony of war as a fact of life with moral statuses associated with innocent humans’ rights to life and property. So while unmanned military vehicles can and does changes the situational variables used to make particular moral decisions with regard to military conflicts and operations within them, these weapons do not render the just war tradition obsolete’. (Hallgarth, 2013, p. 40)
The argument that Hallgarth is making supports the direction that warfare is heading with drones and other robotic technology. If as he suggests, just war theory has supported military technology and the moral concerns of these advancements in the past, there should not be any reason that it would reject the use of drones in warfare and its moral complications if it has proven to be flexible in the past. However, the moral argument presented is black and white. It is strictly the ‘…use of these unmanned vehicles is only as good or as evil as the moral agents controlling them’. (Hallgarth, 2013, p. 38) If technology is so pervasive, apparent, and dependent in forms of everyday life (schools, homes, communication, business, etc.), the use of drone technology and warfare should not be scrutinized to such a high ethical standard.
An alternative point worth mentioning includes the influence of technology and drone warfare. In reviewing the sources for this discussion, it was apparent in all that technology advancement has shaped drone warfare in terms of performance and operations and created a moral and ethical platform for academic and wartime critics to discuss. However, given the technological implications, there was lack of discussion on the potential for a drone to be hacked and hijacked. This is more of a security issue than an ethical issue. In a world where hijackings and hacking into secured networks and databases are feasible, a hijacked armed drone used against a democratic state, its ground troops, or innocent civilians could fuel terrorism, human rights abuses, and other retaliatory actions within adversary states. This would also prolong the war while violating the criterion of just war theory (proportionality and discrimination).
To end, the there are many ethical implications surrounding drone warfare to consider and to bring awareness to outside of academic and geopolitical realms. Many of these ethical concerns are attributable to the advancements and dependency of technology (especially by governments and militaries), loopholes within democratic governance and peace theory, and interpretations and application of just war theory. Other concerns raised by drone warfare stem other factors such as a drones arm race, societal influences on language, the psychological well-being, and the concept of dehumanizing war. Given the trajectory of drone warfare, ethics and morality will need to conform with this path or risk diverging and losing influence and meaning within a vulnerable world.