Existence of Moral Responsibility
In this paper I will defend the position that true moral responsibility does not exist. My argument is based on the existence of moral luck. It may be objected by rejecting the influence of moral luck on morality or rejecting the control condition. I will give a fair representation of these arguments and then show how my position still holds.
A good place to start is will Kant’s work on the subject. Kant make the argument that our actions are not made good by their consequences or results. They are made good or bad by the will itself. That is to say an action is made good or bad by its intent. The ordinary condition of moral judgment is that we cannot be held morally responsible for factors that are outside control. (322)
Although the control condition is highly intuitive and widely accepted, a deeper look into it reveals that it is not practiced in real life. There are many examples that prove this point to be true. Take, for example, the case of a drunk driver that hits and kills a pedestrian. This pedestrian just stumbled out into the street and the driver’s slowed reaction time caused him to hit the pedestrian. Then another drunk driver does not hit a pedestrian and makes it home safely. Both these drivers did the same thing, but we will judge the one that killed the pedestrian more harshly. The pedestrian’s presence was outside both drivers’ control, thus contradicting the ordinary condition. To some degree the driver is being held responsible for a factor outside his control.
Now this is a very specific case and much more needs to be said to show that moral responsibility does not exist. To do this we will take the focus off of the action and move it the agent. If one is to held morally responsible for their actions they must, at least to some degree, be responsible for the way they are. We do not get to decide the genes we get or where we are born. Nor do we get to decide the people that are around us or how we were raised. This mean we really aren’t in control of the way we are. So how could you say that we can be held truly responsible for our actions. I hold that we cannot.
“Where a significant aspect of what someone does depends on factors beyond his control, yet we continue to treat him in that respect as an object of moral judgment, it can be called moral luck (323).”
Thomas Nagel identifies four different categories of luck we can encounter. The first is circumstantial luck. This is the idea that two of the same character and other traits could have different outcomes based on their circumstances that are not determined by them. The second is constitutive luck. This is simply the kind of person you are. What you are capable of, what are you good at, and your disposition. Third is antecedent luck. This is luck is like a long chain of events. And the last one is resultant luck. This is like the pedestrian jumping in the road in the drunk driver example. (324)
At this point I have showed what moral luck is and given an example. I also broke it down into categories. This is useful, because These categories allow you to imagine how moral luck can play into every decision we make.
Now that I have laid out my position let’s consider the first objection. In this case we accept moral luck, but reject that is influences moral judgment. The basic argument is that moral luck is not enough to escape judgment. For this argument we will assume that we have ‘moral laws’. So each time an agent breaks a law, whether or not luck was a factor, the he or she did it. Luck can still be involved in every moral situation, but it does not change the fact that the law was broken. This point of view almost puts a distance between the moral agent and the the action. So when we make a moral judgment we are referring to the action and not the agent responsible.
I have a couple problems with this objection. One it does nothing to eradicate or even slightly reduce the pervasiveness of moral luck. It is just as relevant as in Nagel’s work. This is important, because the luck involved is bringing on the action will still be tied the the action itself.
The distance put in between the agent and the act brings up another issue. When we say someone acted wrongly, we are more or less saying he or she could have avoided acting wrong. Think back to the example of the drunk drivers. The reason why we come to different judgments is we are not concerned with the degree of control the agents had. We are just concerned with the fact that they could have chose otherwise. Our judgments are toward the agent and not the list of moral laws they break.
The next objection I will consider is the rejection of the control condition. If we accept that the control condition is false than Nagel’s moral luck would fail to undermine moral responsibility. This way of looking at it would accept that we just live in a complex world where many factors are at play (including moral luck) and moral agents should be aware of this. This looks at morality with more a virtuous lens. A capable moral agent would be able to “rise” recognize the complexities and predict outcomes with accuracy.
I can argue this a couple of ways. For one I can simple dispute that is is feasibly possible for someone to predict with any certainty outcomes. There are so many things going on in each moment that it is unrealistic to take all of them in.
Another one is that if you eliminate the control condition what are the limitations for what one is responsible for. Are we all responsible for every morally right and wrong thing that happens? That seems very questionable.
Imagine for a moment, that you are sitting at your desk reading philosophy papers and at the same moment someone punches the Queen of England. Now you are thousands of miles away and a moral agent of the highest regard, are you morally responsible? You had no control over this situation, but it seems as though you are based on this. Something morally wrong happened that you didn’t stop. This is an extreme point, but it illustrates that control has to play some role in morality.
Let’s now consider one more potential objection. I have shown the existence moral luck and the requirement of the the control condition. I think there may still be and objection that accepts both of these conditions. It goes to say that we don’t have to have complete control to be held responsible. We just have to be capable of avoiding acting wrongly. They would conclude that as long as someone is capable of doing the right thing, they can be held accountable for their actions. Is also us to factor in luck and the control condition. Whether or not an agent is responsible would rely on the degree of control they have.
I can counter this argument in a couple ways. One way would be too control is even a thing. It relies on the existence of free will, for which we can’t even prove exist. One of the most heated debates in philosophy today is over free will. We may feel like we are making decisions all time, but choice could just be an illusion in our heads. But, this is an argument for another day.
Let’s assume that control is a thing. Even then I would still be able to hold my position, by arguing that moral luck is so pervasive that it reduces our relative control. Luck has a compounding affect that started long ago. Even if there is the tiniest bit of luck in every event leading to a moral action, it would have a profound impact that can’t be overlooked. Think of the butterfly affect.