As a central issue of “What We Owe to Each Other”, Scanlon deals with two problems, namely, moral motivation and the justification of moral norms and he offers a compherensive theory of practical reason.
Scanlon’s discussions are deep and convincing; he has produced a compelling explanation of the moral thinking by offering us a moral theory of right and wrong through our obligations to one another. At the central claim of his theory that is called contractualism, morality relies on principles it would not be reasonable for people to reject.
It is an approach from different angles, integrating earlier written pieces on practical reason and well-being, value and responsibility into an own moral and – how he calls it – contractualist theory.
Being especially conscious of utilitarian protests on the one side and of neo-Aristotelian ones on the other, he seeks after a response to one of the most key inquries in moral philosophy: What is it for an act to be wrong?
His answer, at first sight, is simply Kantian, which can be summed up in the already well-known and at some degree complicated definition. “An action is wrong if it is not allowed by any principle that no one could reasonably reject.” This simply helps us to remember Kant’s categorical imperative, despite the fact that Kant himself did not tend to favor maxims with double negation.
And, in fact, the conceptualision with double negation is confusing.Why not just say: ‘A principle is valid if everyone could resonably agree to it’? The double negation initially was acquainted as a concession with altruistic approaches / methodologies. An altruistic person could agree to principles that others could not accept because of the unbearable burdens which these would bring about. In his book Scanlon concedes that in fact, logically speaking, it does not make any difference whether a principle is not valid because not everybody who might be affected by it has agreed to it or whether a principle is not valid because it has been rejected for good reasons. He nonetheless keeps up with the negative formulation because, as he says, it ‘expresses the basic contractualist idea more directly’ (390, note 8).
The principle of justification is the center of his form of what he calls contractualism. This, however, is a somewhat deceptive signification. Most of the time, contractualists such as Locke or Gauthier – the theory of the latter is usually called ‘contractarianism’ – emphasize the idea of coming to an agreement by coordinating the interests of individuals. Scanlon’s hypothetical agreement conversely depends on the concept of reason and the related thought of taking the interests of all the other representatives into account. What we owe to each other is not the result of a fixed set of moral norms that are inalterable across different contexts. In contrast, it turns out through a mutual justification of moral norms, a procedure where those norms pass ‘the test’ which cannot be denied by good reasons.
Rather than Rawls, Sclanlon does not apply a theoretical construction, for example, the original position and the veil of ignorance to make sure that the decision procedure of rational agents / representatives can be called reasonable and justifiable. To recall, Rawl’s thought is that if we are devoid of knowledge about our position in society during the process of decision-making, we ‘consequently’ make judgments about a moral norm considering the perspective of every participating party. It is therefore part of a rational calculation that one tries to find norms which are aggreable, because we cannot preclude that it is we who might wind up in such a position. As Scanlon does not apply to any ‘ideal state’, he is not exposed to some of the objections Rawls has been confronted with. So, for instance, he need not explain why rationally arguing individuals, who are willing to take the risk of winding up in a terrible position, nonetheless should find it rational to agree to the difference principle. Neither has he to protect himself against the criticism of expertocracy since it was the philosopher who worked out what information within the original position was still available for the parties and what lay hidden behind the veil. Having this in mind, the question that takes place is how does one come to reasonable principles if not with the help of the original position? Why should one take the perspectives of all others to come to an agreement on moral norms?
Scanlon gives an answer to these questions by connecting his notion of moral justification with the issue of moral motivation. His approach depends on the idea that all of us want to justify our actions to others. We have a master-reason, namely, a reason to give reasons for our actions. This master reason cannot be rejected by any good reason at all. At the same time, the reciprocal justification of our action offers expression to the idea that the relationship with others is to be one of mutual recognition. Achieving this ‘positive value’ (162) is what he calls the contractualist ideal.
Most of the time –and that is what Scanlon has to presuppose- we all tend to justifying our actions to others. But what about a person who does not have the insight into being moral, who is not oriented by moral considerations? This does not imply that such a person can be called irrational, at least not in the sense that by ignoring acting according to moral norms he acts against his interests. Rather the amoralist, similar to someone who is not moved by the beauty of nature or by splendid art, does miss something. What the amoralist is missing is an important feature of being a person. We perceive another as a person in a proper way only if we justify our actions reciprocally.
By mentioning to the idea of reciprocal justification of actions, Scanlon hopes to prevail over a problem in moral philosophy which is known as ‘Prichard’s dilemma’. As indicated by H. A. Prichard, the sole answer we can get to the question ‘Why be moral?’ is inadequate. If our response is in itself moral, we are criticized for presupposing what we actually want to justify. In the event that we give a non-moral response, we are faced up with the objection that we have misunderstood the question since what was under discussion was not the question why it is judicius to be moral. Yet it is not absolutely clear whether Scanlon finds a way to defeat Prichard’s dilemma. Regardless of whether he does as such, relies on his ability to give a persuading response why we are to be moved by the contractualist ideal to act morally.
At this point the reader might feel somehow puzzled because it seems as if Scanlon offered four different answers throughout his book. And all four raise further problems that leave some doubt about their persuasive power. It may be helpful to look at the answers in more detail.
First, we can be motivated to act morally because the ideal of justifiability to others is part of our good life. In this manner, we want to consider ourselves as persons who appreciate this type of master-value and we intend to realize it as a feature of our life plan. Yet, an ‘ethical’ justification of being moral leaves it to each individual as to whether this value turns out to be the part of one’s good life or not. It lacks the compel that makes acting in harmony with this ideal an obligation to all.
Second, there are some signs that Scanlon’s answer is to be concluded analytically from the concept of reasonableness. Considering this interpretation we are motivated to be moral because this concurs with our notion of being reasonable and acting reasonably, which intends to justify our actions to others. But if so, this would only transpose the problem of preventing a moral answer to a notion of reason which also presupposes not yet justified normative assumptions.
A third possibility of understanding moral motivation is seeing our interest in reaching consensus with others about what is right or wrong as an anthropological precondition. The entire idea then depends upon the notion of basic interests or human capacities and whether one may say that this is something we share with all other individuals; this assumption is somewhat controversial.
Fourth, interpretation bases on the empirical assumption that this ideal meets best our moral experience and is phenomenologically reasonable.This clarification is very persuading, despite the fact that it also quite ‘thin’.
One may protest that this is a too cognitivistic approach which belittles the emotional segments of moral motivation, so that, for instance, being moral itself leans on the decision that one wants to be moral. However, in the event that the source of moral motivation is an act of volition, one would pay a high cost. We had to acknowledge that all persons can claim with justification to have a right to give good reasons against a principle. For all that, some of them, the ‘volitioners’, ignore the good reasons of others and do not feel obliged to submit to principles they, for any reason, do not like and care for. Obviously, this is not what we all think of. Scanlon, however, guarding a ‘thin’ hypothesis of moral motivation, cannot yield any explanation other than that we want to be moral in the sense marked out by him, because the ideal of justifiability has turned into a widespread practice in daily life.
The ideal of justifiability also involves ideal conditions, yet they are restricted to aspects of universal participation, the will to discover a consensus. Particularly, the test of hypothetical agreement needs initially to be done from a specific ‘viewpoint’: we are required to consider every single possible reasons of all those who may be influenced by the principle. Moreover, we need to appraise the outcomes for those influenced and whether the possible burden can be reasonably anticipated to be borne. Lastly, it is presupposed that we all share the goal to find principles that others could not reasonably reject. In spite of the fact that Scanlon does not states certain rules for the argumentation procedure, he, in any case, indicates what requirements reasons need to meet in order to be called ‘good’ reasons. However, these requirements are formal in nature without ordering the scope of moral principles.
Scanlon’s elucidation of what criteria a reason has to meet in order to be reasonable is a significiant step in procedural theories on moral justification. According to him, reasons first of all need to be general in the sense that they mirror a judgment that not only a single individual would agree to, but that would be acceptable for every other individual in a similar sort of situation.
This contains that they are to be general in their moral content, i.e. they have to cover angles which are familiar from experience, for instance, keeping away from bodily damage and being able to count on promises that were given. Also, general reasons are in fact personal and allude to the results an action may have for an individual, to certain values such as friendship and family, to the well-being of a person and to the moral status.
The second fundamental standard for being a good reason to reject a principle is as to whether the principle would lay an intolerable burden upon someobody. Both standards, generality and intolerable burdens, are presented with extreme conceptual accuracy and are elucidated with the assistance of the discussion of varied dilemmatic situations. Beyond the shadow of a doubt, this is what makes the argumentation so powerful.
Scanlon, goes into a detailed specification of what may be the determinative factor in rejecting a principle reasonably.
He as a result of that comes very close to utilitarian methodologies. Scanlon’s contractualism wishes for offering a theoretical structure that ensures that the ground for good reasons is not narrowed to one comprehensive idea, for instance, well-being; however incorporates a plurality of moral theories. From the of perspective of varied moral theories, the contractualist procedure can be agreeable because the arguments of different moral theories are considered when choosing whether a principle is reasonable or not.
Scanlon’s pluralist approach may be a justification why he gives certain forms of aggregation in the procedure of measuring outcomes which appear to step outside Kantian moral judgments. This presumption itself, needs further clarification.
In a few circumstances one has to chose which of two burdens is the heavier and which may be considered as a reason to reject a principle. After that, the number of individuals and their well-being comes into play. It is in some degree easy to make a decision in a case where the costs all individuals face are the same. For instance, if one has to choose whether to save one person from let’s say any disaster or a group of two, one has good reasons to save the group according to him. Scanlon, nonetheless, does not contend to maximise an overall value such as well-being or human life, but keeps to the idea that each individual’s claim counts equally.
“If one takes seriously not only the claim of P1 (who is alone) and P2 (who belongs to the group of two), but also the claim of P3, then this means that there are two claims on one side that ask to be respected equally in contrast to one claim on the other side. Scanlon’s main argument here is that if one is not in favor of the greater group this would mean to disrespect either P2 or P3. But Scanlon goes even a step further.” Çevir.
There are some situations where the number counts, even if the burdens that different groups may face not equal. If, for instance, a great number of people face rather overhelming costs (to lose their arms) as a result of an action, where on the other side a less number of people significantly face much heavier costs (to lose their lifes), it is reasonable to argue for a principle that permits the saving of the greater number of people.
Here again, Scanlon argues, one of the claims of the individuals in the group with the greater number of people functions as a ‘tie-breaking’ argument which tips the balance in favor of that greater group. Since the aggregation is one that is carried out ‘intrapersonally’ (237) and not ‘across’ lives, taking into account the burden for one specific individual rather than summing up the costs or benefits for different people, Scanlon claims this process differs from utilitarian approaches.
This last type of aggregation, in any case, leaves from the individualist tradition and opens the door for utilitarians. Since the costs for the one individual (who is about to face with death) are higher than for any other individual of the second group, it is clear that not only does the number of people count but also the aggregation of their burdens. What has to be decided is at what case the burdens of the one side outweigh the heavier than the other. This is not just a question of what number of people claim to recognize their voices but also a question of how extensive the burdens must be before the heavier burden of a fewer people on the other side.
This process is not possible without including all costs and benefits on both sides. One pertinent question in this connection is whether it is for sure meets our moral experience that it is right to sacrifice the life of a person in order to hinder a huge number of people from being blinded değiştir bunu yukarıdaki örn ile uymuyor orada losing arm dedin.
If one considers individualist point of view, from the point of view of the person that may be one who will die, one would definetely reject a principle that endorses of the death of a person for the sake of the injury of others. Assuming, if one agrees this utilitarian component it turns out to be much more difficult not to apply this type of aggregation on different circumstances where most probably the costs for one person are much more higher than for a huge number of people.
Why then, to refer another of his examples, should one reject a principle that allows a person injured in a TV-transmitting station, to suffer for one hour, instead of interrupting the transmission of a football world cup match which millions of football fans enjoy? – Why then, to refer to another of Scanlon's illustrations, would it be advisable for one to dismiss a rule that permits a man harmed in a TV-transmitting station, to languish over 60 minutes, rather than intruding on the transmission of a football world glass coordinate which a large number of football fans appreciate?- The relatively insignificant benefit to each viewer is no longer main measure. Perhaps the billionth viewer will outweigh the pain of one man.
Additionally, taking a closer look at Scanlon’s approach at applying utilitarian arguments, it is worth focusing on another feature which is of great interest to him in his book. It is the matter whether judgments of an action and the related reasons can be stated to be universal in a pluralistic world. Scanlon argues for what one could call a ‘context-sensitive universalism’. As for him, not all moral principles consist universal validity, however they may be satisfactorily justified and not reasonably rejected within a certain society. His moral theory consists of three different cores / areas/domain. The fist one covers judgments of right and wrong that can be accepted by everyone.
Principles, let’s say that it is wrong to murder people just for fun is one of the examples of universal moral standards. Second one also covers judgments, yet in contrast to previous one, these judgments are not universal due depending on social conventions. That is the reason why moral principles sometimes perform in different aspects according to different contexts and they are supported or rejected for different reasons.
The protection of the private sphere, for instance, depends on what we consider as the sense of shame, but also on the stage of the technical development of a society, such as the possibilities of financial transactions via credit cards or ordering via the internet. So there are different, well-justified moral principles that are valid according to varying contexts. They may contradict each other, however deal with the same moral aspect. These two domains are related to ‘morality in the narrower sense’ (174, 343), a formulation which points out that there is a ‘morality in the broader sense’ (171, 342).
The third domain, which Scanlon marks out, is about values. He indicates that some of the ideals we have are surely belong to the moral central idea but that they require more. For instance, our friends demand that we treat them in a fair way. We also owe them respect in a certain way which more than we would do for any other persons. For instance, as a close friend he or she is expected to care unselfish about the other’s health and spend time with. What this type of treatment involves does not relate to the ‘core morality’, but rather consists social value. We do know that it is not something we can expect from everyone and in this instance, our related expectations and also social practices are rather bound to a certain community. Those social practices based on values which violate the ‘core morality’ – for example, treating one’s wife as a slave – are not permitted. Distinction in these three domains, however, brings about one question. What we owe to each other can change according to different contexts. So, what if the convictions that are valid in one society turn out to be more widespread in another? For instance, by immigration processes? At that point we may face with two well-justified principles excluding each other. Then how can we decide which is the more proper and reasonable?
Scanlon could answer that the widely accepted principle first should, according to what he calls the ‘Principle of Established Practice’ (339), remain the dominant one. Scanlon could reply that the widely agreed principle first should remain the dominant one according to ‘Principle of Established Practice’ (339 What ‘Principle of Established Practice’ indicates is that if there is more than one norm or standard that have an equivalence in governing a specific activity, then the one that is already agreed by a majority of people wins. But there are some problems with this.
First, presenting a moral structure that is not able to figure out changes in the moral convictions and is not open for critical re-asessments of previous judgments; second, it is also problematic that the recently presented principle has already been widely agreed and accepted in the other society and has been turned out to be successful.
A similar problem happens in the third domain. What if in different context certain practices that did not break norms of the ‘core morality’, however they were not obliged by it, are mismatched with the accepted principles? For instance, arranged marriages are considered to be an important part of family solidarity in some societies and also a reasonable practice. Does this then imply that people have to separate from their values, or has the moral norm to be altered?
And how could it be decided which are the norms that cannot be reasonably rejected if within society A and B, respectively, norms are valid which exclude each other? Yet, in a circumstance where at least two reasonable justified moral norms contrast to each other, or where the battle against different values goes on, we all perhaps have not sought hard enough for an alternative principle that could not be rejected by anybody. However, it may take quite a long time before this principle were accepted by good reasons.
Despite of the questions marked here, Scanlon’s book is a landmark in moral philosophy, which is sure to keep philosophers in suspense for longer than the author needed for writing it. By connecting the question of moral motivation with the ideal of mutual justification he copes with issues that contractualist theories usually confront. And with his idea of a ‘context-sensitive universalism’ he has found a way between the Scylla of a too abstract formal proceduralism and the Charybdis of a utilitarian way of justifying moral norms.