The concept of a social identity is one which many sociologists have attempted to define for a number of years, with varying degrees of success. The main sociologists of our time have had vastly different ideas of what constitutes as the social self, with many different perspectives of the discipline. Some sociologists believe that our social identity is built by the influence of those around us, where as others believe that it is rather due to our perception of how others view us. Our social identities are often the cause of many of the largest social issues we face in modern sociology, from war to loneliness. There has been a rising importance of our social identity in recent years, arguably due to the rise in technology. This essay will discuss three of the most widely accepted definitions: Social Identity Theory (Ellemers, N. et al., 1999), one provided by Goffman which compares the self to the masks used by actors (1990), and the idea of the ‘I’ and ‘Me’ (Mead, G. H. 1934).
Social Identity Theory theorises that individuals will form perceptions of others in relation to where they stand with themselves:
…social comparisons between groups which are relevant to an evaluation of one’s social identity produce pressures for intergroup differentiation to achieve a positive self-evaluation in terms of that identity (Turner, 1999 p. 8)
This is done in three main steps: categorisation, identification and comparison. Firstly, the individual will develop a social identity aside from their personal identity. They will then internalise this social identity and begin to filter each person they encounter as being part of the in-group or out-group. Comparison will then begin, where the individual will perceive the members of the in-group as being more favourable or generally superior. For instance, the social identity ‘goth’ relies on the idea that the individual will distinguish between ‘goths’ and ‘non-goths’. These people will then attempt to make themselves appear to coincide with the ‘goth’ appearance, such as wearing black clothing. They will then show in-group favouritism, by which they imagine their own group to be superior to all others.
If this theory was to be correct, social identity is an interesting topic for sociologists to study; in-group favouritism could be the cause of many major social issues we face today. For instance, the alarming rise in islamophobia in western countries such as the USA and UK could be pinned down to the categorisation, identification and comparison of the self to others; an individual will see themselves as part of a group, either muslim or non-muslim. They will then automatically filter every person they see into being muslim or non-muslim. They will view their own group as superior, and so prejudice will occur.
This theory, however, is deterministic, meaning it fails to account for the free will of the individual, instead choosing to assume everyone is a slave to their identity. This is not the case as, using the example above, not every non-muslim is Islamophobic, nor is every muslim hateful towards other religions. The world Tajfel describes is open to much more conflict than we actually experience, as we have the ability to be tolerant and open to others. Furthermore, Social Identity Theory focuses too much on the role of others in developing a social identity, implying that we only form our identity based on existing qualities in others. However, we are able to build an entirely new identity based instead on our evaluation of what we see around us, in the sense that “…identity hinges on the apparently paradoxical combination of sameness and difference” (Lawler, 2008). This means that we view our surroundings and see which aspects of individuals we like and do not, and see ourselves in relation to others. Furthermore, it sees our social identity as being completely separate to our individual identity, which is not always the case. An example of this is how we see our gender identity; this can be seen as being both individual and social in essence.
Goffman, however, draws a metaphor between our social identities and the work of an actor on a stage, taking inspiration from Shakespeare’s words in As You Like It: “All the world’s a stage, And all the men and women merely players; They have their exits and their entrances, And one man in his time plays many parts” (2015 2.7:1-4). He theorised that we act out our identities like actors do on a stage, and have many different masks; which one we use depends on who we are with and the situation we are in. For instance, the identity we express to our boss at work is vastly different to the one we use around our close friends, which in turn is different to the one we express to strangers. Behind these masks, Goffman explains, “each performer tends to wear a single look, a naked unsocialised look, a look of concentration, a look of one who is privately engaged in a difficult, treacherous task.” (1956 p. 151). The treacherous task he references is, of course, the balancing of his or her various masks in any situation. He goes on to explain how, if we are faced with a situation where we are with two people, with whom we ordinarily use a different mask, we feel a contradiction, and try to balance out our behaviour to what each person would expect of us, often times appearing flustered.
If this model is correct, it is extremely important to investigate social identity, as some individuals may gain entrance to positions of power using a legitimate mask, but then use that power in negative and sometimes horrifying ways. We can look toward the huge issue being faced by the Football Association at the minute with the large influx of child sex abuse claims. According to the BBC News, “155 potential suspects have now been identified” (BBC Sport, 2016). These abusers used their professional sport-loving mask to gain the trust of the FA and secure a job training children. This issue with having different masks is in using one we are hiding the characteristics of another; in this case the offenders hid their sexually abusive tendencies.
Goffman himself acknowledges some of the major issues with his dramaturgical model:
The stage presents things that are make-believe ; presumably life presents things that are real and sometimes not well rehearsed. More important, perhaps, on the stage one player presents himself in the guise of a character to characters projected by other players; the audience constitutes a third party to the interaction— one that is essential and yet, if the stage performance were real, one that would not be there. (Goffman, 1956)
This points to largest issue this theory has; it is too loosely based on reality. The theatre is exclusively fictional, and actors rehearse frequently in order to achieve the perfect mask. However, this theory suggests that the act of using masks of identity comes naturally to the individual and requires no effort to execute, which does not correlate to the dramaturgical model Goffman puts forth.
Furthermore, Goffman’s theory does not account for impulsive or unthinking action, and can be said to be too simplistic in the ideology. For instance, it can be assumed that we are unable to put on a mask first thing in the morning when we are awoken, nor do we when we are vulnerable such as when injured. Goffman’s theory is implicative of a quick and subconscious change into the mask needed for each situation we are in, which seems overly-simplified and extravagant. It is unlikely that Goffman’s dramaturgical model can sufficiently explain social identity, as our identities are vast, rich and complex entities which can not be reduced down to the activities taking place on a stage. Anthony Elliot summarises this idea by saying “Goffman’s theory of self says surprisingly little about the emotional or psychosexual dynamics of personal life and social relations”(2014, p.43).
Mead, on the other hand, takes a slightly similar view to Goffman; he sees the social identity of an individual as being split into two parts: the ‘I’ and the ‘Me’. “The "I" is the response of the organism to the attitudes of the others;, the "me" is the organized set of attitudes of others which one himself assumes.”(Mead, 1934). In simpler terms, the ‘Me’ is the generalised other’s perception of ourself, where as the ‘I’ is our internal evaluation of what the ‘Me’ is suggesting. For instance, in preparation for a job interview the ‘Me’ would expect a man to wear a suit in order to appear a serious candidate. However, the ‘I’ would weigh in that the individual may be too hot in a suit and so should wear less clothing (Woodward, 2014 p. 12). It is the balance of both of these concepts which form our social self.
Table 1.1 (Woodward, 2004 p. 18) shows the similarity between this theory and that of Goffman well; particularly in structure, in the sense that we must use what is already present and are unable to create new structures. This is a major drawback of both theories, as it seems impossible to be true in such a modern age of technology; every day new social identities are being formed in response to rising fan groups online. For instance, in 2007 two brothers decided to end all textual communication and instead exchange video blogs each day for a year (Vlogbrothers, 2007). From this a large, wide community of fans emerged, named Nerdfighteria. This has become integral to the identity and often self-worth of an individual who belongs to the Nerdfighteria group. This is evidence of new scripts and structures occurring, and the lack of hard reliance on past lines or labels.
If this explanation of the social identity is correct, it is important to study because of the immense impact others can have on a person’s perception of themselves. For example, if a person thinks that wider society views them as being bad or undesirable, they are very likely to feel this way themselves; the ‘I’ works with the ‘Me’ in that the ‘Me’ provides material for the ‘I’ to evaluate. If the ‘Me’ gives exclusively negative self-image, the likelihood is that the individual will have a negative identity.
Regardless, Mead faces criticism, mainly surrounding his ignorance of the individual’s perception of themselves aside from that given by others: “The behaviourist and structure-driven nature of Mead’s thought led him to ignore the relevance of individual identity construction in the processes of the self.” (Abbott, 2015 p.1). Mead fails to acknowledge the importance of our internal perceptions of ourselves based on unique personal experiences, rather than our interpretation of how others view us.
In conclusion, there are many different ideas of what constitutes a social identity; some of these fit together, where as some stand as their own theory. However, the one thing every theory has in common is the fact they are not perfect; each has their own shortcomings. Perhaps considered together they can be viewed as more holistic, but one alone can not stand true. As discussed previously, it is vastly important to study social identity. We as a society have great strength in numbers, and if left uninvestigated this power can be used for gaining prestige, which could ultimately lead to oppression and negative social change. It is only through the studying of social identity that we can enact defences against this abuse of power.