An ‘Imperial Coalition’: British Foreign Policies in China, 1925 – 1928
A city that only exists in historical documentaries and old maps, Hankou, now an important part of the Wuhan city, seems never forgets its British occupation scar and its Northern Expedition stories, back to when it read ‘Hankow’ in British diplomat files and old imperial maps. The Western style buildings, mainly built by British residents, has been standing there since the early 20th century. Accompanied with them are state owned pavilions, visiting attractions and ‘Patriotic Education Centers’, narrating a tale of the victorious side: the great Expedition by great Chinese people overthrew the evil imperialism. The history has been concluded and oversimplified as the history of strike and nationalist revolutions, spotted by the party ‘purge’ by Kuomintang (Chinese pronunciation of the Chinese Nationalist Party) against the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), as official history textbook goes. For many, the war had ended long before and the story has been settled as well.
However, the story is never a clear and conclusive one, as historical research always goes. For example, while historians could reach consciousness on what those British ‘imperialists’ did from their first day of landing upon Hankou soil and other Chinese locations, they cannot agree on what the British government did when they were faced with nationalist challenges during the late 1920s, especially during the nationalist Northern Expedition. Many would argue that British government relinquished its treaty rights and evacuated their concessions, and began its retreat from China. In their narratives, British government, under the lead of the Prime Minister Sir Stanley Baldwin and the Foreign Secretary Sir Austen Chamberlain, gave up British privileges and treaty rights back to the rising Chinese Kuomintang (KMT) government – a government with nationalist motive and, after the late 1927, devoid of its previous Bolshevik effect.
In both of their insightful works, Phoebe Chow and Edmund S. K. Fung describe the British movement in China during the Northern Expedition as ‘the imperial retreat’. To Phoebe Chow, the British government’s policy in that late 1920s was a combination of partisan opinion, public views and diplomatic thoughts, all of which brew during the Sino-British interaction during the early 20th century. The outcome, as to Phoebe Chow, was the beginning of a movement that ‘eschews force for friendship’ and carry on ‘the path of retreat’ despite strong and vocal voice of opposition. Edmund S. K. Fung, on a different but equally potent perspective, identifies the informal British Empire’s nature as ‘a nation of shopkeepers’. For Edmund Fung, the final aim of the British Empire in China in the late 1920s was to build a pacific atmosphere and to preserve its trade interests.
Other researchers, though, hold different interpretations. For example, Cain and Hopkins interpreted the British activities as ‘gentlemanly order’. In their argument, what Britain was trying to achieve during the Northern Expedition was the implementation of a new Imperial order. Also in Austen Chamberlain’s biography, David Dutton gives the Chinese unrest in the 1920s and the Egypt problem the similar weight. Using the imperial context as the background, he suggests that the British government did not actively retreat from China during the late 1920s. In Dutton’s concise narrative, Chamberlain, who held and relatively independent position apart from the Stanley Baldwin government, secured his governmental support towards a more conciliatory policy towards Chinese unrest during the late 1920s. But when the unrest became more violent and pervading and it finally threatened Shanghai, the Cabinet opinion became divided. It seems to Dutton that, after all, the British government passively accepted the result of the Expedition, and the Imperial view in Joseph Chamberlain’s time had gone long before.
Again, it seems that many of those arguments concentrate on one question: did Britain retreat or not? In fact, both sides have their weak points. Those who are convinced there was not an ‘imperial retreat’, like Cain and Hopkins, have put too much concentration on the Empire’s financial side. The business had indeed moved on, but their argument is not conclusive enough to explain the relinquishment of imperial treaty rights and the restraining attitude when it at first faced with the Nationalist government’s high tariff issues in early 1927 when British government merely protested the Nanking government’s unreasonable actions. Those who advocate an ‘imperial retreat’ might be right when they argue that the British interests were not only financial, but they were still at a loss when they are faced with the sole fact that the British colony of Hong Kong still stood until 1997. All in all, they have come into a wrestle about the British Empire’s nature, as well a question that might be hard to answer – to what degree could the British actions during the 1920s be identified as ‘retreat’ or not.
Akira Iriye’s approach to the British government’s action might borrow us some new light. In his narrative where Britain, Japan, American and Soviet were all active, the British government tried to preserve its commercial interest through the abandonment of some concessions and treaty rights. Then after 1927, British officials were cautious of contacting with Chinese political factions for the British government would receive resentment from every other Chinese political faction, for ‘having negotiated with the one with which you have made an agreement’ would almost certainly agitate other factions. Akira Iriye did not interpret the question with the single ‘retreat or non-retreat’ dichotomy. Instead, he put the British actions in a new, international framework, though he argument were sometimes suspicious because of his over-interpretation of the Japanese-led East Asia co-prosperity in the later part of his book.
While quoting different arguments where necessarily, this dissertation builds its argument with a different concept. By building its own historical narrative, it argues that, though in fact the British government might take maneuver that could be interpreted as retreat or advance, researchers do not necessarily need to identify whether there was a retreat or not. In fact, British government’s actions contained both factors related with retreat and non-retreat, and the sheer debate about the ‘debate’ might have lost the point because it does not contain a reexamination of the event’s nature at all. Thus, the history should be reevaluated from a different light. British foreign policy at least began to take its form as early as 1925, and during the Northern Expedition, the British government was trying to achieve an ‘Imperial Conciliation’ which aimed to achieve some balance between British interests, foreign powers and the Chinese government. Though encountered with drawbacks and obstacles and threatened by the Soviet presence, the British government successfully implemented a ‘conciliation’ in Sino-British foreign relations. It successfully, at least temporarily, pacified the intense situation brewing in the Northern Expedition. During the process, the British interests were threatened, but not fundamentally impaired.
First of all, it is necessary for this dissertation to illustrate the background of the policy making. The year 1925 was, for British residents in China, not quite a promising year. Though till August their trades and businesses was still in the leading position, taking approximately 38 percent of foreign and costal trade, they had faced challenges from both foreign powers and Chinese local businesses. From the statistics, historians could identify that Japan was in the second position, following British trade in China with a 24 percent of Sino-Japanese trade. Furthermore, Japan covered 31.43 percent of tonnage dues and cargo duties, which was only 5.6 percent less than British share. Chinese businesses took the lead in shipping tonnage by a share of 50 percent, and in other aspects such as duties in cargoes, they also showed strong existence. In short, the British commercial predominance was in no way an overwhelming one.
This lack of overwhelming predominance was further severed by a series of anti-British protest and strikes after the May 30th incident. It served as the trigger of a series of violence and boycott. After the British shooting of Chinese students’ delegate, situation deteriorated rapidly. Reports of Chinese unrest began to spread through multiple foreign concessions and trade ports from June, including Shanghai, one of the most important cities for international settlements. Strikes and protests were then strengthened by Chinese merchants and workers, who were ignited by a sweeping sense of nationalist. Britain’s share of China imports dropped from 12.4 percent in 1924 to 9.8 percent in 1925 while imports from Britain to China fell from 126 million Haiguan taels to 93.1 million taels in 1925.
The British trade and residents in China were at stake, and people at home knew it. On 21st Aug 1925, Chamberlain was enquired by the King of the United Kingdom, George V. In the letter drafted by Baron Stamfordham, the Private Secretary to the Sovereign, King was worried about ‘240, 000 pounds a day loss of trade’ in China, and asked Chamberlain to explain the ‘complicated problem’. Chamberlain did not respond immediately for the sudden strike of lumbago; yet, the situation, as he described in an early letter to the Archbishop of Canterbury, was something that caused him ‘no little anxiety’.
More worryingly, the shadow of Bolshevism, controlled by Soviet Russia, was behind those unrests and ‘anti-Imperialist’ movements. The Zinoviev Paper Affairs in 1924 had made British officials anxious enough against a possible Bolshevik infiltration or intervention, although its authenticity had not been carefully examined at that time. However, in this time, Britain had directly bumped into Soviet influence in the Far East. By early 1926, Soviet Russia and the Comintern had been financed Chinese revolutionary movement, and attempted intervene Chinese political affairs. A telegram from the British agent and the general manager of Chinese Engineering and Mining Co., Ltd, Major W. S. Nathan, confirmed the Bolshevik existence. In his telegram, he summarized the Chinese situation as ‘a vague spirit of nationalism’ had been ‘seized on by the Bolshevists as fertile ground for disruptive forces’.
It was obvious that the situation was urgent. Yet, Chamberlain and Foreign Office did not respond speedily. In 14 July 1925, the Foreign Office rejected a proposal of blocking Canton, an precautious countermeasure that could be used as threat against further anti – British actions, urging that this action would raise nothing but more anti – British propaganda. Also, Chamberlain did not respond to the business sector’s pledge as to replace Sir Ronald Macleay who they thought was incompetent in Sino – British affairs. It seemed as if Chamberlain and his foreign office was unwilling to act toward an emergency. The gunboat and large scale troops relocation was missing in the picture, much to many Briton’s surprise.
A letter from Chamberlain to Charles Eliot, the British ambassador to Japan, might help explaining his underlying intention. By responding to Eliot’s distrust against Chinese people and the urge for tight control among Chinese, Chamberlain wrote, ‘In regard to China the aims of our policy are three-fold: to restore good relations with that country, to work in community with the other Powers, particularly with Japan and the United States, and lastly, to use the tariff Conference… (and) to lay the foundations for a permanent improvement.’
It could be argued that Chamberlain was, at that point, thinking of a new foundation and ‘a permanent improvement’ by means of international cooperation and a good relationship with China, thus the old ‘gunboat’ policy, though effective for a short period of time, was no longer applicable. As Chamberlain confessed in his later correspondence with Sir Miles Lampson, the British Minister to China after Ronald Macleay, ‘to trade in peace and amity’ was the Britons’ main purpose. The war and unrest from July was not in their favor. The unrest triggered by the May 30th incident was in progress everywhere, forcing British companies to halt their business and evacuate their people when situation turned urgent. The British residents, many of whom were involved into the business, must leave hastily and lost their properties in other alien strangers’ hands.
Though aiming at the peaceful trade, Chamberlain also pointed out that the Britain was ‘a nation of shopkeeper’ and the main aim for him was to keep those shops opened. In otherwise, he intended to maintain the British economic influence. In the late 1920s, the British ‘shops’ in China were not just small, individual shops. Many of them, such as Shanghai and Hong Kong Bank of China (HSBC), Swire & Butterfield, Jardine & Matheson, Asian Petroleum Company and other companies, were all influential business groups who held substantial investments in China. It went without doubt that their business was heavily depended on Chinese political situation. When the Chinese unrest began to affect their business, they kept a cautious eye on both Chinese and British political decision making progress, and made petitions and protests when they were forced to give up interests. Also, the unrest would play into Bolshevik’s hands, and if Britain played passively and did not resist, the Bolshevism might defeat Britain in the Far East.
Britain, then, must think of something else. What Chamberlain came up with later would serve as British’s future foundation of the Chinese policy. The trait of a new Sino policy appeared as early as 1925 in his correspondence with Eliot. The policy, as this dissertation will show next, could be concluded as an ‘Imperial Conciliation’. Its aim was to maintain British prestige in China and to pacify Chinese nationalist sentiment at the same time. It tried to reach a balance between three factors: British interest in China, Chinese people’s acceptance and other powers’ cooperation. On a basis of a good Sino – Anglo relationship, Britain must not retreat in order to protect its economic interests and stand against Bolshevik presence, and must not abstain herself from using force, for it would cause nothing more than unrest. The power cooperation and the renunciation of war, under the diplomatic atmosphere supported by Austen Chamberlain in Locarno, would also be important.
Early 1926: The Beginning of Conciliation Policy
The situation did not improve as Chamberlain and his colleagues might expect with the coming of the new year 1926. A strike originated from the Southern part of China, the Canton – Hong Kong strike, did not stop since its first outburst in June 1925. Though the Governor of Hong Kong, Cecil Clementi, behaved strongly against the strike, the situation in Canton was still far away from his control, and with Foreign Office, under the lead of Austen Chamberlain, still behaved unsatisfactorily in both British people and businessmen’s eyes. Criticisms came from big companies like the Asian Petroleum Company and politicians like Winston Churchill who, as usual, showed the willingness to take firm action.
However, it would be unfair to conclude that Austen Chamberlain and his Foreign Office did not make any effort. Though Chamberlain personally did not talk too much in his personal papers and correspondences, the Foreign Office under his administration had put much energy into the coming Peking Tariff Conference and pushed forward a series of additional political initiatives to form its new conciliatory attitude towards Chinese. If succeed, it would constitute as one of the most important political pillars as Chamberlain’s letter to Eliot had suggested. A new, conciliatory policy, which contained both the abstaining of old treaties and the insistency of interests would be implemented.
During the last months of 1925, Chamberlain was convinced that Britain should neither interfere with Chinese political affairs nor should she abandon its interest whatsoever. To doing this, he started a series of political initiatives that aimed at a ‘healthy relationship’, which could lead to a conciliation. The Washington Naval Conference in 1921 and the confirmation of the ‘Open Door Policy’ had settled down the basis for power cooperation. Using this as a diplomatic background, Britain used the Peking Tariff Conference from October 1925 acted as a main place for its forming of the new conciliatory attitude towards China. In December 9, two months after the inception of the Tariff Conference, he instructed Peking Legation: ‘… our policy should be to cultivate friendly relations with such a government from the outset and show our sympathy with its nationalistic aspiration by taking the lead both at Tariff conference and in respect of Extraterritoriality in making liberal concession along every reasonable line which leads towards China’s status as a sovereign state.’ Here, Chamberlain managed to get a conciliation with a Chinese government who could act as a sovereign state (if there was any). He was neither willing to agitate Chinese nor try to retreat from Tariff Conference or China. Through the ‘cultivation’, Chamberlain hoped to take the lead.
When his new plan was repeatedly rejected by Ronald Macleay, the British Minister to China, he accused Macleay directly. In a telegram in response to Macleay’s objection of distributing Chinese debt among Provincial agencies, Chamberlain wrote, ‘You see great dangers in our policy, we had thought ours might promote healthy developments perhaps in distant future.’ Compared with Macleay’s vision, it would not be hard to assume that the ‘health’ must contain a relationship that required no use or threat of using force, and the protection of interest. Thus, the danger of more conflict and violence could be stopped, and a conciliatory policy could find its ground.
However, the progress of the implement was not a smooth one, and the outcome was unsatisfactory at first. To achieve this conciliation, the British government must at least guarantee three key factors: the British initiative, Chinese response and the coalition of powers. But in fact, it was hard for the British government to find a good Chinese political faction to cooperate with. As the Tariff Conference showed, the Peking government was not politically strong enough to represent the China, as the nationalist Northern Expedition and other regional unrests ha firmly showed. Furthermore, much to the Foreign Office’s alarm, other powers such as Japan and the United States did not address political affairs during the Tariff Conference. In short, the conciliation lacked of two most important factors. Chamberlain and his colleagues needed a new ground with good cause to carry on their plan.
It was at that time, as Edmund Fung has argued, the British government turned from Peking Government to Canton side. The Nationalist government had begun its Expedition from Canton, a province located in the South side of China, on early July. It was a new government with nationalist initiative who attracted both educated and uneducated Chinese to fight under its banner. After the Peking Tariff Conference broke down in April, the Nationalist Northern Expedition began from Canton and obtained significant military success in less than three months. It could be possible that in Chamberlain and other key decision makers’ mind, the Nationalist Revolution and its unifying campaign could serve as the prelude of the new Chinese government.
However, there were still hard tasks ahead for Britain to obtain international cooperation and correctly evaluate Chinese political situation at the same time. The Canton government was still pushing its battlefront towards the north, where experienced and formidable Chinese warlords and Peking government were still in good shape. Furthermore, the war between several Chinese warlords, including Wu Peifu and Sun Chuanfang, was still in progress, and Japanese interest in China was severely affected. It would then be hard for Japanese to adopt a conciliatory attitude, not to mention the diversion of political interest from the North to the South. To make things more complicated, Soviet Russia was still howling about the struggle between Chinese workers and ‘British Imperialism’, and urged the British government to ‘hands off China’.
In an observer’s eyes, the Britain in the early 1926 was still experiencing the same difficulty in 1925, and with the Peking Tariff Conference’s failure and China’s internal turmoil, it would be even more harder for Britain to achieve its conciliation. However, the Nationalist Expedition had brought Chamberlain hope. As this dissertation will show in the next chapter, although severely challenged by nationalist unrests and regional conflicts, several key factors were changing in Britain’s favor after diplomatic and economic efforts.
Conciliation Challenged and Tested: The Northern Expedition: Late 1926 – early 1927
From late 1926 on, the British government made a significant change of its foreign policy. Still balancing the political situation and carefully cultivating the relationship with China, the Foreign Office contacted with the Kuomintang (KMT) government, and compromised in certain times in order to push forward it conciliation.
The First promising sign of a possible conciliation between British and Kuomintang officials could be traced back to July 1926 when the British Consul – General in Canton J. F. Brenan met with Eugene Chen (Chen Youren), the acting negotiator for Kuomintang. In this meeting, Eugene Chen used the usual revolutionary words, but also expressed the possibility between Britain and China to trade on an equal basis.
Britain had a long history using trade as the preset for the normalization of international relationship. The Anglo – Soviet trade agreement in 1921, for example, acted as the basis for the later development of Anglo – Soviet relations. Although Soviet Russia did pose a threat to capitalist countries for its extreme propaganda of ‘world revolution’ and supported the nationalist revolution in China, this did not necessarily indicate that Britain would refuse to make a good deal with another government with different ideology. Besides, the Canton Kuomintang administration was the ‘only really good government’ in China. Many of its municipal officials and important figures even received western education; T. V. Soong, who later became the Financial Minister, received his Bachelor degree in Harvard and the postgraduate degree in Columbia. Thus, in Macleay, Lampson (who later replaced Macleay as the Minister to China) and Chamberlain’s eyes, the Canton government could be easier than those Chinese warlords to reason with.
The British initiative towards a conciliatory gesture was reiterated with commitment and detail in the December Memorandum. This Memorandum was first formed during the British Cabinet meeting in November and was at first a direction to Sir Miles Lampson, who succeeded Ronald Macleay as the British Minister to China in Peking. In this memorandum, the British willingness of ‘(to) promote her political and economic development and the rehabilitation of her finances’ was officially expressed. This memorandum showed the Britain’s conciliatory attitude, which the British government had confirmed verbally and politically in the past years: to keep distance from Chinese political affairs, to grant Chinese people enough autonomy, to abstain from using force excepet when vital interests are at stake, and to consolidate the debt as to rebuild China’s credit as an international trader.
Opinions of the British government’s nature of activities separates from here. For some researchers, the December Memorandum suggests the completion of a blueprint for retreat, for, as it clearly stated, the British government would ‘safeguard the integrity and independence of China’, and when a central government emerged from China, would ‘pursue a constructive policy in harmony with the spirit of the Washington Conference’. It is thus reasonable to conclude that the British government adopted a brand-new attitude towards China. The old gunboat diplomacy that based on the overwhelming technological superiority and cultural ascendency as Bertrand Russell had identified, disappeared from this official declaration. In their eyes, a new age was finally coming.
However, this argument responded only half of the truth and failed to examine the deeper assumptions of the memorandum. True enough, when an empire that was at its peak of power suddenly abandoned its supposed privilege, it surely looks like that there was a ‘retreat’. But first, there was nothing in the ‘December Memorandum’ that clearly stated the supposed ‘retreat’ from China. On the contrary, it merely supposed an adjustment of the attitude, a change of the policy, and most importantly, it called for the powers’ agreement of the principles of the policy. Second, as readers will see, the British government was considering the retain of British prestige in China, mainly trading interests. It intended to protect its trade not only by making concessions in places of secondary importance, but also by protecting key areas and if necessary, with force. Third, the content of this memorandum was not something new; it was just a summarization of the Foreign Office’s past policies and attitudes. As this dissertation has illustrated, the conciliatory attitude and policy had been applied from 1925 when May 30th Incident arose multiple nationalist unrest and boycotts.
The importance of the December Memorandum is that it officially and publicly confirmed the British government’s policy. by circulating the memorandum to other powers in China and publishing in public, it formally declared Britain’s change of Chinese policy. Austen Chamberlain and his Foreign Office had done enough to make others realize the change in Britain’s foreign policy. Officials in the Foreign Office hoped that, if published, it could gain positive opinions from Kuomintang and took the lead in the coming nationalist upsurge.
Kuomintang’s reaction was less satisfactory to British government. On 29 December 1926, Kuomintang’s Propaganda Department prepared a policy that questioned the sincerity of British policies, for it restated the British hope to cooperate with a central government before China sought for international equality. Furthermore, on 22 February 1927, Grant Jones, a British diplomat, reported back to Peking with the words ‘recent overtures of H. M. government are ignored’. March 1927, Chiang Kai-Shek, the military leader of Kuomintang, accused British policies in an interview that ‘exactly as if she were dealing with her own Colonies’, and threatened ‘so long as Great Britain does not amend this colonial policy we shall oppose her’.
The situation soon became more questionable when Kuomintang marched towards other Chinese cities. Would the Kuomintang show conciliation? Would the unrest and riot be bolstered by them and used against British settlements? After all, what Britain did in the past months was largely diplomatic effort, and it had never experienced a test after the publish of December Memorandum. As Chamberlain pointed out in his telegram, it was ‘a test’.
The first test case was Shanghai. As the biggest city in the Far East and a major concentration of British interests, Shanghai International Settlement was controlled by multiple powers such as Britain and United States. As a result, the defence of Shanghai required cooperation between powers. When Nationalist Revolutionary Army pushed to Shanghai, British residents in the International Settlement were concerned. Chamberlain himself also expected this. In an telegram to Peking Legation, he expressed his concern: ‘…sooner or later a clash at Shanghai with consequences which you (Miles Lampson) foresaw may be inevitable.’ However, his order remained: the British government should pursue the previous policy as always.
In Shanghai test case, Chamberlain’s conciliatory policy showed its tough aspect. By requesting a British expedition, most of which was formed by Indian troops, Chamberlain sent the Shanghai Defense Force to protect possible threat. Meanwhile, in another telegram to Lampson, Chamberlain instructed him that the use of the Defense Force should be purely defensive. His action also included warning the leader of the Liberal Party, Lloyd George, ‘not to write anything that could affect British position in Shanghai’. Furthermore, Chamberlain made efforts to obtain military supports from Japanese and diplomatic supports from Americans, thus form a solid ground of international cooperation. However, the interests of powers seemed too divided. At the end of the day, Chamberlain would have to act largely on his own. At last, after the Revolutionary Army went into Shanghai in January, the British government made a proposal to Kuomintang government, which was received by Eugene Chen.
In Shanghai, the British government showed firmness of staying in Shanghai with other powers, which could easily be interpreted by historians as not retreating. However, this argument is considerably biased. In a personal letter to Lampson, Chamberlain talked more about his initiatives in Shanghai: ‘only by making clear to everyone how earnestly we were seeking a peaceful solution and how liberal our policy was and continued to be, have I kept an almost unbroken public opinion…when it became necessary to send troops to defend Shanghai.’ Chamberlain’s task to obtain support was a hard one. Even though Cabinets and other colleagues were keen to send troops to Shanghai, there were still public voices against the defense. It could be argued that the defense of Shanghai was not a consensus after all. In Chamberlain’s mind, the retreat was indeed not preferable, but the ‘Imperial Stay’ was also not viable due to strong domestic pressures.
The second major test took place in Hankow, where Miles Lampson argued with Chamberlain was there necessity to send troops and took immediate action. When Hankow British settlements were gradually evacuated, Kuomintang took over the control of Hankow concession. An agreement was made soon afterwards, marking the Kuomintang’s takeover. However, few days after the signing of the agreement, Lampson raised the issue of countering Chinese by force. The first place, in his perception, could be Shanghai. In the following minutes, supported the idea as to take ‘a concentration of military and naval forces such as we have not had since 1900 and are not likely ever to have again’ as strategic advantage, and to perform a blockade on one key port or city. In Lampson’s mind, the signing of Hankow agreement was a mistake, for it handed over British residents to those unstable ‘Chinaman’, and their ambition might not stop.
In his reply in 22 February, Chamberlain dismissed this idea. He admitted that Kuomintang and Eugene Chen’s sincerity of negotiation was problematic and that the British prestige could be harmed, but he also considered the blockade plan as impracticable, because ‘such measures would be more harmful to foreign trading interests than to Chinese’. The use of force would not gain consent among powers, could also have brought the Soviet Russia deeper into the picture. All in all, the blockade was harmful to the conciliation, for it would harm British trade and blur the international situation in China. By repeating this telegram to Hong Kong, where the Governor of Hong Kong, Sir Cecil Clementi was hard on Chinese offensive, he also reminded Clementi that the British government would protect its key interests, not abandoning them.
During Shanghai and Hankow cases, Chinese officials such as Eugene Chen was impressed. Before the Nationalist army contacted with Britain on field, the British attitude remained a mystery to Kuomintang. Without the action as supportive cases, the December Memorandum was more like a diplomatic maneuver than a demonstration of conciliation. However, in Shanghai and Hankow, the British government showed conciliation through its restraining attitude. Though the agreement in Hankow was not important as Shanghai, it was strong enough to satisfy Chinese people’s high nationalist spirit in an age where foreign powers used to use gunboat and troops to make deals with Chinese governments. That was perhaps the reason why in a meeting with Arthur Ransome, a famous British writer, Eugene Chen expressed the idea that the anti-imperialist was not anti-Britain. The conciliation was finally paying off.
From Nanking Incident and the Party Purge: Conciliation Went into Deep Water
Hankow and Shanghai cases might prove that the conciliation policy was paying off, but the situation was still far from satisfaction. Although British interests and residents in Shanghai and Hankow was not threatened, the Nationalist Expedition was still in progress. Furthermore, Communist influences inside the Expedition force was still strong enough, and the British government could not directly act against the Soviet Russia, for it was invited and welcomed by Sun Yat-Sen, the late Kuomintang leader, thus any action against the Soviet lacked a justified reason. Also, a direct anti-Soviet action could break the tie between Kuomintang and Britain, for it would violate the nationalist sentiment by interfering with Chinese affairs. During this time, Chamberlain did not instruct British legation in Peking to act. Although intelligence showed a possibility of Russian’s being thrown out of the picture, the situation was still not a clear one.
In 1927, two major crises tested Britain’s conciliatory policies intensely. In Nanking Incident, foreign lives were lost, and the trigger of the incident was not clear. In the new Nanking taxation plan, the challenge came not only from military aspect but also from financial side. In both crises, Britain did not refer to enforcement, and restricted the use of it at the first place. The situation development in Britain’s favor proved the victory of ‘wait and see’ tactic, which further proved Britain’s conciliatory plicy finally paid off.
When facing with Nanking incident, the British government was still committed that the policy should continue. After Nanking’s fell into Nationalist hands, more boycotts and strikes led by Communist Party took place. Later on, six foreigners were killed. British and American ships then shelled the city, causing an emergency which could cripple the weak consensus formed between British government and Kuomintang. For a time, the weak conciliation was likely to break apart. British government began to consider a drastic action. However, Chamberlain still instructed Lampson to adhere to the previous policy.
Situation then made a sharp and unexpected turn. On April 6, Chang Kai-Shek occupied the Communist Party’s Shanghai branch of the Political Department while Chang Tso-Lin, the ruler in Peking, raided the Soviet Embassy at Peking. The British government reacted rapidly. By admitting Chang Tso-Lin’s proposed raid, it indirectly involved the elimination of Soviet influence in China. An anti- Communist clash inside the Revolutionary faction soon endowed Britain ‘accidental’ advantage against Soviet.Later, voluminous Soviet intelligent files and reports were sent to British hands and translated into English, which confirmed Britain’s long time suspicion: that the Soviet Russia was behind the Nationalist revolution, and that it was acting against Britain by strikes and other means.
For Britain, the Nanking incident was a more complicated test of the conciliation policy. Accompanied by party division and internal conflict, the British action took a sharp turn from conciliation to indirect interference. By restraining from direct military confrontation with Kuomintang, the Britain successfully maintained the appearance of the conciliation policy. Then, the aiding of the Soviet Embassy raid in an indirect manner gave a kick start of the anti – Bolshevism action in China. The coming year witnessed a continue British action against Soviet remnants, boycotts and espionages, which strengthened the British interests in China by suppressing the boycotts and strikes with a legitimate cause.
At this time, Britain had clearly showed a framework through which the dispute should be settled down. In the face of an emergency, the conflict of interests should be solved with negotiation and reasonable concessions without impairing both sides’ core interest. The use of force must be halted at the first place. If the situation was urgent, the nature of force should be defensive. It was through demonstrations in Hankow, Shanghai and Nanking, Chamberlain hope, that Britain could constitute a conciliation without retreating Britain residents and interests, and that the disputes could be solved peacefully. Still, the road to conciliation would not be a smooth one.
The next challenge came from the new, incumbent Nanking Nationalist government when it suddenly raised a new taxation schedule at June 1927. Till 1927, the Nationalist Expedition had successfully unified the Southern part of China, and guaranteed the establishment of a government in Nanking. In this taxation plan, the Chinese custom would call for a 50 percent tax on cigarettes, luxury taxes on various commodities, a 2 2/1 Washington surtax (which had been agreed) and the same rate of export taxes. The British government was caught by surprise, because the Nanking administration did not inform them in advance and the official notification only came days after they had acknowledged the truth in June 27. Then, in July 24, Nanking informed the British Legation of new tax plan.
In face of the new situation, Chamberlain decided to take cautious steps. He first ordered Lampson to join other powers to make a protest. Then, faced with strong pressure from both Nanking who demanded the tax plan should be enforced by no later than 1st September and Legation who suggested the use of force, he instructed Lampson not to use force individually. Still, Lampson still thought that the tax plan was intolerable, and with the British government unwilling to act strong to protect their interests, ‘the Chinese now take what they want unless prevented from doing so’.
As the 1st September’s deadline approaching, opinions inside the British government divided. Some had received reports claiming that Chinese custom officials were carrying weapons and used it as a threat, and feared that the new Chinese custom would carry on their policy with force, and warned the Foreign Office to send armed forces to protect British merchants and ships. Some would suggest that they should pay for the tax in exchange for trade in peace. However, Chamberlain decided otherwise; he did not agree the deployment of force, cause it would agitate further aggression, and did not show a tendency that the British merchants should pay for the tax. In his picture, the fragile Nanking government could be again crashed if they use force.
The conflict between British merchants and Nanking Government seemed inevitable, while the situation changed suddenly in 27 August when Brenan was informed by the Chinese Commissioner of Customs that the new taxes are postponed indefinitely. Further reports came from Shanghai that the taxes would not be collected. Although one month later, Nanking informed Peking Legation that the surtax was raised to one tenth, but the dispute had been a less violent one.
During the taxation crisis, Chamberlain and the Foreign Office adopted even more conciliatory tactic with flexible use of its overwhelming advantage against Nanking. As Chamberlain instructed Peking Legation in 24 November 1927, the Chinese government would get their tariff autonomy, but they should grasp through peace negotiation and no fast steps should be taken. In the crisis, Britain took advantage of its economic and political advantage to a certain as only weights for negotiation, and did not rely on force in order to ‘cultivate’ the situation which was good for both British interests and the Chinese government.
Finally, after years of political maneuver, negotiation and compromise, the ‘Imperial Conciliation’ seemed finally succeeded. A Chinese central government finally took into shape. Although the warfare was still in progress I the Northern China, the British commercial activities returned to normal in the south which was far away from Northern China, and life of British residents was calm again. Lampson reported back to Chamberlain in April 1928 that The Chinese finally got on real terms with the British governments, and situation was improving in Foochow, Amoy and Swatow, and more specifically, Canton. In Hong Kong, the trade was almost back to normal, and ‘everyone delighted at the prospect