In Robert T. Lehe’s journal article, he explains the topic of Peter Byrne’s take on religious pluralism, and makes several critiques on its ideals. In general, pluralism acknowledges that any religion could lead to the truth, even though the evidence presently cannot deduce the most favorable religious belief. Lehe acknowledges that most religions have contradicting beliefs, and it would be very difficult to explain all the differences falling into one single truth about the divine (Lehe, p. 505). Although Byrne had taken a step for religious pluralism in the sense realism, it still contained flaws.
According to Byrne, religious pluralism mainly follows three theses: “All major religious traditions are equal in respect of making common reference to a single transcendent, sacred reality,” (all religions are in fact referring to the same divine truth) “All major religious traditions are likewise equal in respect of off erring some means or other to human salvation,” (any of the religions is a viable path to the truth) and “All traditions are to be seen as containing revisable, limited, accounts of the nature of the sacred; none is certain enough in its particular dogmatic formulations to provide the norm for interpreting the others” (the religions have revisable anecdotes of the divine, though none can be set as an example for it) (Lehe, p. 506). His concept of pluralism mainly uses the idea of agnosticism, or the idea that there is not possible way to determine the actual truth, given some evidence. Byrne also refuses to believe that all religions share a central core of religious essentialism, nor does he claim that all religions agree on a set of beliefs (Lehe, p. 506).
However, Lehe found that the first and third statements were at ends with contradiction. Unlike Hick, Byrne had tried to avoid any conflict coming from religious differences. The accounts of seeing the sacred may have been revisable, but this is detrimental to the idea of pluralism itself, because revision could result in “improving” one religion and therefore no longer making equal to others. Therefore, the idea that accounts can be revised over time conflicts with his own definition of pluralism (Lehe, p. 512). Honestly, the act of revision seems to be for the sake of religion changing over time, and not for them to be updated and therefore leaving other religions “out of date”.
Additionally, the second statement has problems stemming from its reasoning. As stated by Lehe, the agnosticism brought on by Byrne suggests that people would rather react in disbelief when introduced to other religions’ topics, rather than accept them (Lehe, p. 518). While the concept may mean that anything is possible when concerning the sacred origins of God, it also means that nothing can ever be truly ruled out. Primarily, he made an example of this with a follower of Christ; if he could not legitimately rule out the possibility that nobody could reach the standards for salvation, then it could damage his personal connection to Christ (Lehe, p. 519).
As a result, Lehe concluded that Byrne’s view on religious pluralism is not rationally defensible, as agnosticism composes much of his ideals. Without any knowledge about the truths of other religions, he claims that future religious progress will slow as nobody will answer the question about the parity of religions on salvation (Lehe, p. 519). It seemed rather surprising how flawed pluralism could become if all of its concepts were agnostic in nature, since the ideas of John Hick outright state that not all answers about conflicting views needed to be answered to reach salvation. It would be helpful, however, for Lehe to mention any other issues that religious pluralism could hold, aside from the agnostic views. Certainly, there is much of it in the view on religious diversity, but it is likely due to it being the most accepting that it is so.
In Robert C. Gordon’s review of the book Buddhist Inclusivism: Attitudes Towards Religious Others, he discusses the idea of promoting inclusivism to the religion of Buddhism. As stated, Buddhism has not paid much attention to the concept in its history. Although the author, Kristin Beise Kiblinger, has stated that “there is a romanticized perception of Buddhism as an exceptionally tolerant and inclusivistic religion”, it has contributed little to the topic. The scholars from outside religions, however, can make an effort to contribute to a discussion of religious inclusivism with others, and encourage the Buddhists to make a response to the religious diversity (Gordon, p. 238). When considering the geographical spread of Buddhism, it doesn’t seem surprising that conflicts with other religions seems small, because of the importance of the monk community in Theravada Buddhism and the nomadic lifestyle of other monks.
After summarizing the ideas of exclusivism, inclusivism, and pluralism, the author described religious inclusivism as somewhere in the middle of exclusivism and pluralism, with the acceptance of other religions while valuing his own religious beliefs. Interestingly, the author had described exclusivism as “dismissive” of other religions (Gordon, p. 329), as though the other religions were not even worth examination. In the book, there is an emphasis on the idea that others may be right with their own unique beliefs, as she mentions how Buddhists could learn from others. She further explained that there are in fact fourteen kinds of inclusivism, such as three kinds described by Johann Figl, one by Paul Hacker, and ten others of various origin (Gordon, p. 329).
Gordon mentions that Buddhists tend to respond to other religions with “subordination, reinterpretation, and new application” (Gordon, p. 329), which is quite reminiscent of the previous use of the term “contented exclusivism” (Gellman, p. 407); this may suggest that Buddhism may be a religion with followers more likely to follow contented exclusivism instead. The three steps mentioned prior likely mean that Buddhists would deem the other religious beliefs as inferior to their own, rephrase the ideas as to be relevant to Buddhism, and use them accordingly as an enhancement. At this point Buddhism seems to straddle the line between exclusivism and inclusivism.
The author also brings up dialogue from philosophers such as Alvin Plantinga, George Lindbeck, Paul Griffiths, Nicholas Rescher, and Alasdair MacIntyre, while giving praise or criticism to each. She also brings religious commentary from Buddhist leaders and scholars, such as that of Thích Nhất Hạnh, a Vietnamese monk who found appreciation in Christianity from French colonization. One of the criticisms by Gordon is that the author explains the topics of inclusivism like a written thesis; this seems to be somewhat of a weak complain, as much text about the debate of religion may delve well into such prose. Regardless, he pushes to claim that inclusivism is vital for “peaceful and respectful relations” with outside religions; when it comes to that goal however, it seems a bit contradictory, as pluralism can also lead to such results as believers of the philosophy would avoid comparing religions at all.