Rousseau’s “Discourse on the Origin and Foundations of Inequality among Men” (Discourse) is a mordant lampoon, comparable to Don Quixote in its character; they both caricature their intellectual opponent’s view in nearly satirical manner. For Cervantes, it is chivalry, and for Rousseau, it is social contractarian philosophy. It is interesting to note that the Discourse, much like other contractarian works, is the foundation for Rousseau’s political theories by means of a hypothetical, namely the state of nature. By means of this hypothetical, social contractarians diagnose the ills of human civilization and justify their own proposals for political obligation. In true Rousseauian fashion, he becomes part of the contractarian club by refuting everything it establishes. In fact, to compare the Discourse and The Leviathan is to see that Rousseau directly imitates Hobbes’ own state of nature and eviscerates it. This essay will demonstrate the Discourse nearly directly transcribes Hobbes’ “condition of mere nature” (which is equivalent to amour propre) with the purpose of refuting Hobbes’ political philosophy. It will be elucidated, first, through a discussion Rousseau’s proposal of man in the state of nature, followed by a direct comparison of Rousseau’s “civilized” society with Hobbes’ own “condition of mere nature,” concluded by an analysis of its significance, briefly looking at the theory of political obligation each philosopher proposes.
To encapsulate the three basic components of the “noble savage,” have a prolegomenous look at this excerpt:
“Let us conclude that wandering in the forests, without industry, without speech, […] with no need of [their] fellow men, likewise with no desire to harm them, […] savage man, subject to few passions and self sufficient, had only the sentiments and intellect suited to that state […].”
In the latter, it can be observed that man in the state of nature is (1) amoral, (2) self sufficient and (3) underdeveloped relative to our current faculties. Regarding the first, it is not meant that savage man is morally backwards. It merely means that their actions are not informed by complex moral considerations, which would certainly require the foresight and language that Rousseau deprives the noble savage of. Nonetheless, man in this state is characterized by amour de soi. In essence, man’s foremost preoccupation is their self preservation by whatever means possible, but not to the intentional detriment of another. That is, “man’s own preservation is not prejudicial to the self preservation of others.” This is enabled by the one “proto-moral” instinct: pity.
By pity, Rousseau is referring to the most basic element of reciprocation, “do onto others what you would have them do unto you.” This is, in Rousseau’s state of nature, the most valuable teaching of the noble savage, which has been lost over time. Their pity is in turn established by their second and third characteristic. Because man is completely self sufficient for their food and protection (which are their only desires), they lack the need to depend on others. The third characteristic, their intellectual and social underdevelopment, stems from the latter. Because the noble savage has no language or complex set of intellectual faculties, “[their] modest needs are easily satisfied, and [they] is far from the degree of knowledge necessary to desire greater ones that [they] can neither have foresight nor curiosity.” Therefore, it follows that they find no use in confederacy to fulfill superior passions, which makes conflict a near impossibility.
These three characteristics considered, savage man would be as different to our current state as any other animal. However, what Rousseau describes as the most fatal characteristic of man is precisely what gives them their advantage over other animals: their perfectibility. By this, Rousseau is describing an ability to learn to use tools to “overcome natural obstacles”. Perfectibility in it of itself is not particularly noxious, but Rousseau proposes is that it is the driving force for man’s exit from the state of nature.
As human beings multiply and disperse, their ability to gather food becomes more difficult. Harsh climates, great heights and competition with other beings forces man to acquire tools, such as fishing rods, fire and spears. Most importantly, man’s perfectibility allows them to recognize the possible benefits of collaboration with others of their kind, and therefore leads them to assemble into groups. These first took the shape of families, but as they continue to coexist with other human beings, man becomes settled and their shelters assemble in townships. This is where culture and vices begin. First, human beings begin to notice they are superior to other animals and can dominate them (which leads to pride). Second, quarrel breaks as any voluntary wrong is seen as a direct threat to one’s preservation and therefore causes outrage against the perpetrator.
In essence, this first revolution established new desires. With pride, a new language of description rose, where men compares themself with one another based on their strength, size or possessions. Therefore, as humanity progresses, perfectibility leads to the expansion of desires.
Agriculture and metallurgy are the second revolution and establish the familiar definition of property and, in turn, institute natural inequality in two ways. First, the land that previously was held in common is divided; the first inequality is those that own land and those that don’t. Secondly, those that are ingenious or strong work with metals; metallurgy and agriculture depend on each other (the blacksmith needs food and the farmer needs tools), but the metal worker would have abundance while the farmer works tirelessly to keep themselves afloat. Therefore, natural inequality is established between all of society based on wealth of resources and occupation (otherwise defined as worker versus owner). Hence, the poor, “having lost everything, because everything changed around them, […] were obliged to receive or steal their subsistence from the rich;” they were forced to make a choice between servitude and plunder.
Development, therefore, leads to a new set of passions. Amongst them, the desire to dominate others, to acquire property and to have control of resources. This is the phase that Rousseau baptizes as amour propre. It is, in essence, an artificial and cancerous form of self-esteem that is based on one’s comparison with others. A positive view of oneself is contingent on another’s misery, and the humble desires that (if fulfilled) make savage man happy would make “civilized” man miserable.
What Rousseau describes as amour propre is able to be directly translated into what Hobbes defines as universal private judgement, which makes man’s life in his conception of the “condition of mere nature” one that is “[…] solitary, brutish, nasty and short.” Universal private judgement is the sole purpose for all human action outside of society and has a set of three conditions. (1) All men are roughly equal. Though one man may be smarter or stronger than another, the inferior man may kill the superior by means of mechanization or confederation. Therefore, one cannot assume that natural superiority will ensure their survival. (2) Every person has a Right of Nature, which “is the Liberty each man hath, to use [their] own power, as he will himself, for the preservation […] of [their] own Life; and consequently, of doing any thing, which in [their] own Judgement, and Reason, hee shall conceive to be the aptest means thereunto.” Because anything can be determined to be necessary to one’s survival (qua Right of Nature) then every person has (3) a Right of All to All. This universal private judgement leads to the three “causes of quarrel and religion” (competition, diffidence and glory) that, invariably, makes the state of nature a state of war.
There are three reasons to believe that Hobbes’ condition of mere nature is directly transported into amour propre. (1) The conflict that erupts between the rich and the poor is, in essence, a war (ostensibly) driven by the poor’s belief that the resources of the land must continue to remain in common. This is equal to the Right of Nature, and leads to diffidence because the rich fear an attack on the resources of their own preservation. (2) The desire to be superior to all around them is analogous to the third cause of quarrel, the search for glory. (3) One objection is that Rousseau explicitly says that man is unequal, which would therefore void the first necessary requirement of Hobbes’ condition of mere nature. This objection is true, but only superficially. Rousseau does indeed establish the introduction of natural inequality, dividing people into rich and poor depending on ownership (or lack thereof). However, what creates conflict is precisely the fact that the poor recognize their condition of poverty to be artificial and attack the land of the rich. It is precisely what Hobbes describes: though they have land, they remain vulnerable to usurpation and therefore remain equal. Therefore, this would constitute the the first cause of quarrel, competition.
Having established that these conditions are all identical to Hobbes’ state of nature, what follows is that man, in both conceptions, establish a state to circumnavigate the inconveniences of their condition. In both, men enter the state by means of covenant. However, what is their motivation to do so? Hobbes proposes that man in the state of nature voluntarily agrees to enter this covenant because they want to make their agency effective. Man, Hobbes says, is a rational agent, and necessary condition for rationality is the desire for one’s actions to have a certain effect. In the state of nature, one is not able to exercise their agency for fear of others attempting to kill them. Therefore, all and one must give up their right of nature in order to be secure and to acquire effective agency. This is similar to what Rousseau says, with one proviso. The covenant is a trick by the rich over the poor in order to exercise control over them.
The rich, in essence, promise the poor their freedom and liberty (which, in this context, is analogous to effective agency) in order to convince them to enter under their control. The rich create the covenant to enter the civil society not to ensure all of their liberty, but to protect their own property from the poor through oppression by means of what is later defined as moral inequality: the institution that formalizes inequality by affording the rich political power over the poor.
Taken in isolation, the fact that Rousseau includes Hobbes as part of his theory of cultural evolution is nothing but a witty rhetorical strategy to refute Hobbes’ view. However, it is important to remind oneself that these hypotheticals serve a specific purpose in the social contractarian school: they justified each philosopher’s own theory of political obligation and function of government. When one sees it in this light, then it can be seen that what Rousseau is undermining Hobbes’ political theory in its totality. Therefore, it is necessary to briefly contrast the two’s political theories.
Hobbes establishes that the function of the sovereign is to maintain a sense of order, to take away every person’s right of nature to ensure their common security and effective agency. This leads to two overarching conclusions that would be completely justified under Hobbes’ state of nature: (1) that government is to channel human nature and (2) that absolute monarchy is the only legitimate form of government. It is perhaps difficult to see how the simple refutation of the fairness of the social contract could make these two conclusions crumble?
To support the latter claim, it is important to note that while Hobbes saw the function of government as channeling human nature (namely, their effective agency), Rousseau envisioned that his state would change human nature “by substituting justice for instinct in [man’s] conduct, endowing [their] actions with the morality that they lacked.” Therefore, because the poor were coerced into entering the state, then it follows that absolute government is always illegitimate, as it represents that rich’s domination over the indigent. It then begs the question, what is the aim of government? Rousseau asserts that it ought to act as a moral and spiritual guide, holding what he calls the “General Will” (which remains partially, if not completely, vague) is the only sovereign power over the people. It is only through government guided by the General Will, Rousseau declares, that man can be returned to the first stage of its existence; it is the only way in which man can be forced to be free.