The Cotonou Partnership Agreement (CPA) is the oldest and most comprehensive European Union (EU) development cooperation policy (Salama & Dearden, n.d.). The agreement was concluded in 2000 and is signed by the EU and 79 African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) states (European Commission, n.d.). The prime goal of the cooperation is the reduction and eventual eradication of poverty in the participating countries (Babarinde & Faber, 2003). Other aims of the agreement are integration of the ACP countries into the world economy and sustainable development (Salama & Dearden, n.d.).
The partnership rests on three pillars: development cooperation, political cooperation and economic and trade cooperation (European Commission, n.d.), resulting in the shaping of the EU-ACP relations in four main categories: aid, trade, regionalisation within the ACP group and the role of non-state actors and the local government (Hurt, 2003). Within the CPA framework, Economic Partnerships Agreements (EPAs) with the different countries are signed to regulate trade between the EU and the specific country (Banthia, 2007). Examples of development cooperation are financial and technical assistance programmes, which usually follow a five-year cycle (Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, n.d.). An important subject on the political cooperation agenda is good governance (Moltke, 2004).
Since the conclusion of the agreement, it has been revised in 2005 and in 2010 to adapt it to changing circumstances and to allow for new priorities (European Commission, 2016). The agreement entered into force into 2003 and lasts until 2020, after which it can be reinforced every five years (Hurt, 2003). For the period of 2014-2020, the partnership was allocated 30.5 billion euros through the European Development Fund (EDF) (European Parliament, n.d.). This is slightly higher than the budget for the 2008-2013 period, which was 22.7 million euros (Schaik & Maes, 2008). In contrast to the EU’s relations with other developing countries, EU-ACP relations are not covered by the DG External Relations but by the DG Development (Schaik & Maes, 2008).
History of EU-ACP relations
A long history of relations between the two groups of states preceded the signing of the Cotonou Agreement. The basis for cooperation between the EU and the ACP states can be found in Part IV of the 1957 Treaty of Rome, which contained provisions on the Association of Overseas Countries and Territories (Babarinde & Faber, 2003). It created the European Development Fund, which provided assistance to colonies and overseas territories (European Commission, 2014).
After the start of decolonisation in the early 1960s, the member states of the European Economic Community (EEC) agreed to support their former colonies on their route to independence through continuation of benefits such as financial assistance and preferential access of their commodities on the European market (European Commission, 2014; European Commission, n.d.). This led to the Yaoundé Convention, a partnership agreement between the EEC and 18 newly established Francophone African countries (Bindi, 2010; European Commission, n.d.). The agreement was based on equality, it allowed both parties free access to each other’s markets, and development aid was provided by the EEC (Banthia, 2007). After being renewed once, Yaoundé was substituted by the Lomé Convention In 1975. This convention included the former British colonies in Africa as well as Caribbean and Pacific states and differed from the Yaoundé Convention with respect to free market access. With the Lomé Convention, the principle of non-reciprocal market access was introduced, meaning that the ACP countries had free access to the European market, but European products were only granted preferred, not free, access to the ACP markets (Banthia, 2007). The Lomé Convention was extended four times; however, results of the successive Lomé Conventions lacked success (Banthia, 2007; Moltke, 2004). Critics said the agreement was not helping development, and developing countries were dissatisfied with the outcomes of the agreement (de Vree, Coffey, Jansen & Lauwaars, 1987). A new agreement was not only desired, but also necessary to confirm with the new requirements of the World Trade Organization (WTO), which no longer allowed non-reciprocal trade preferences (Moltke, 2004). In 2000, the Lomé Convention was succeeded by the Cotonou Agreement. Moving from the Lomé agreements to the Cotonou Agreement meant a substantial shift in focus on trade to focus on development cooperation and stronger political conditionality (Banthia, 2007; Bindi, 2010). Moreover, the CPA differentiates the ACP between least-developed countries (LDCs) and non-LDCs with matching differentiated trade and economic cooperation. The new WTO requirements complicated trade relations with the ACP countries since it forced the EU to conclude different EPA’s within the CPA framework, rather than regulating trade through one agreement (Lodge, 2008).
The legal foundation of the Cotonou Agreement was already laid in the Treaty of Rome, however the introduction of Treaty of the European Union (TEU) in 1992 created a single EU structure for development cooperation, in parallel with member states’ own national development policies (Steingass, 2015). Moreover, the Lisbon Treaty stated poverty reduction and the eventual eradication of poverty as primary objectives of the EU development cooperation policy, thereby strengthening the legal basis for development cooperation (European Commission, 2014).
Diverging positions within the EU
When negotiating the Cotonou Agreement, both the EU as well as the ACP countries were in favour of a clearer and more flexible agreement. They agreed on development strategies, poverty eradication and on the enhancement of political dialogue. However, trade cooperation and good governance appeared to be more difficult to agree on (Salama & Dearden, n.d.)
According to Laporte (2012), the positions of the different EU member states on the Cotonou Agreement are mixed. This is partly due to the enlargement of the EU, since mainly the Eastern European member states would prefer to see EU resources being used for development in the EU neighbourhood rather than the South. Laporte’s finding of mixed positions of the member states corresponds to the earlier finding that member states in general have different attitudes towards development cooperation (de Vree et al., 1987). Furthermore, Laporte (2012) points out that the ACP-EU partnership may have lost political relevance since major issues relating to peace and security are dealt with outside of the EU-ACP relations, leading to European disengagement. Indeed, in the EU’s Global Strategy, which was published in 2016, there is no information on the ACP states nor the Cotonou agreement. Merely, there is one sentence on a “post-Cotonou partnership” (Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe, 2016, p. 40).
While EU member states can engage in their own development cooperation, the European Commission plays a key role in formulating EU level assistance policies and regulations. These are decided upon by the Council of Foreign Affairs Ministers and the European Parliament (European Commission, 2016). Agreements such as the Cotonou Agreement are decided upon by unanimity in the Council. The Commission expressed the wish to tailor the CPA to the needs of the different regions (European Parliament, n.d.) The European Parliament has been critical about the agreement, saying it does fully represent European values and it should pay more attention to human rights, in specific to non-discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation (European Parliament, 2017). Also, it criticised the EPA’s the Commission concluded with the different ACP states, arguing these agreements were only driven by a free-trade agenda and did not pay attention to historical relations (Hoebink, 2010).
Position ACP states and civil society
The other parties to the agreement, the ACP countries, also show some signs of dissatisfaction with the current state of affairs. Laporte (2012) writes that the ACP countries are less involved with their own group than before, which is the result of other regional organisations gaining influence and legitimacy, such as the African Union. This puts pressure on the ACP grouping. Also, the ACP countries have not always been happy with the way EU-ACP relations were conducted. Some countries are suspicious towards the EU’s intentions and its attitude towards the states has done harm to its reputation. Nonetheless, the EU is a major aid provider and the ACP states realise they are heavily reliant on both the EU’s aid and its markets (Hurt, 2003).
The CPA aims to actively involve civil society in development of the ACP states, however, Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) have been hesitant towards the agreement (Max van der Stoel Foundation, 2016). This counts for both CSOs from the EU and CSOs from the ACP group and the hesitation likely to be rooted in either their position towards the agreement or possible limited knowledge of it.
Pro and cons: eradication of poverty and practical difficulties
One thing that stands out when analysing the EU’s current approach towards the ACP countries, is the fact that the countries are handled with within one agreement, even though they not nearly a homogenous bloc (Flint, 2008). The countries are merely divided in LDCs and non-LDCs (Banthia, 2007). Another practical, extensively discussed, disadvantage of the existing policy is the funding of aid through the Cotonou agreement. The main budgetary instrument, the EDF, falls outside of the general EU budget and it thus not streamlined with other financial processes. This makes the process more complex (Dearden, 2008).
In 2006, the European Commission conducted a qualitative assessment of the ACP projects. Whereas other development cooperation policies of the EU showed positive results, the outcomes of the CPA were less positive, and the results concerning sustainability, effectiveness and impact worsened between the years of 2001 and 2004 (Dearden, 2008). However, in a 2016 assessment of the policy, the Commission is more optimistic. With regard to effectiveness, it reports mixed results, with positive notes on the eradication of poverty and the support for trade and economic development (European Commission, 2016). Areas that the agreement has been less effective in are good governance, human rights and gender equality (idem). With regard to efficiency, the Commission states that the tools available within the CPA have been used extensively and allowed for an efficient and significant contribution to achieving the objectives of the agreement. On the other hand, the agreement has to deal with delays, inefficiencies and apprehension towards institutional practice (idem).
Critics: unequal relations
Even though the agreement is an ambitious effort to link trade to development cooperation (Moltke, 2004), it has to deal with some practical difficulties. Moreover, there has been criticism regarding the core of the agreement. One of those critics concerns the unequal relationship between the EU and the ACP countries. Even the European Commission admits that the agreement has not been successful in “bringing the EU and the ACP Group together as joint partners on the international scene” (European Commission, 2015, p. 4). Hurt (2003) titles the agreement to be of a political nature, in contrast to the economical nature the EU it claims to be of. Likewise, he accuses the EU of using some sort of coercion by leaving the ACP countries no other alternative but to enter into an EPA with the EU and by attaching certain conditions to the provision of aid. Banthia (2007) discusses the dependence of ACP countries on EU development aid that is created through the current relations. This dependence in turn further increases the inequality between the two partners. In addition to that, she finds that the ACP states have not been able to successfully develop themselves economically. The dependence on EU aid and few other alternatives makes that the APC countries have a lot to lose, which allows the EU to set the terms of any new agreement between the two parties.
A theoretical explanation for this dependence can be found in the work of Knack (2001). He finds that “higher aid levels erode the quality of governance, as measured by indices of bureaucratic quality, corruption and rule of law” (2001, p. 310). One could thus say that the dependence of ACP countries on the EU and the inability of the CPA to achieve good governance, is a circular relationship (see figure 1). The EU provides development aid, but is unable to ensure good governance in the recipient countries. Since the aid provided will lower the quality of governance, the recipient countries remain dependent on the EU aid. This pattern provides an explanation for the development of the EU policies towards the ACP countries. At the time of conclusion of the Yaoundé Agreement, there was already an unequal relationship between the EEC and the African countries that were part to the agreement, since they were highly dependent on the EEC for both trade and aid (Banthia, 2007). Due to this unequal relationship, the EEC was partly able to dictate the terms of the agreement. Since the African, and later the Caribbean and Pacific countries remained dependent on the EU over time, the EU continued to be in the position to shape the new agreements to its advantage, since the ACP countries had no reasonable other option than to agree to the EU and participate in the partnership.
The claim that the EU concluded the CPA for political rather than economic reasons, would fit the realist explanation that states pursue international economic policies to achieve geopolitical goals (Hix & Høyland, 2011). The trade component combined with political conditionality of the CPA is an example of the EU exerting influence through trade, as discussed by Meunier and Nicolaïdis (2005). Also, in the EU’s Global Strategy it is states that the EU development policy should be aligned with strategic priorities (Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe, 2016). On the other hand, since the EU is not a state, Hix and Høyland assume that the EU does not “have a clear and indivisible national interest” (2011, p. 305). This lack of indivisible national interest would explain why the EU member states are internally divided about the policy. The policy pursued could also be explained from a liberalist point of view. Namely, the EU used the Cotonou Agreement to create international institutions, and because the preferences of states are defined in terms of economics, states are likely to create institutions in this field (Hix & Høyland, 2011). This explanation would view the agreement as an economical agreement. The fact that the Yaoundé agreement was first concluded with former colonies, could be an example of a decision guided historical trajectory rather than a rational choice, which fits the constructivist approach. The EU provides more development aid to former colonies than to other developing countries (Banthia, 2007; Bueno de Mesquita & Smith, 2009; Chiba & Heinrich, 2016). Additionally, research shows that development aid is not always provided to the countries that are most needy for this aid, but that sometimes historical, colonial ties play a role in the allocation of this aid (Chiba & Heinrich, 2016; Maxwell & Engel, 2003).
To conclude: a critical, realist, note
A critical last note should be made regarding the efficiency of the Cotonou Partnership Agreement. Following the discussion of the goal of the CPA, a discussion concerning the efficiency of the agreement arises. As mentioned before, the European Commission conducted research to evaluate the effectiveness and efficiency of the policy based on outcomes in the APC countries. However, if the underlying goal of the agreement does not only include poverty eradication and economic development, but also includes a political component on the EU side, one would also want to take a possible increase of European influence into consideration. In September of this year, negotiations on the post-Cotonou relations will take off (European Parliament, n.d.). The new EU-ACP may take a different form than the current agreement with, for example, a new geographical scope and different tools in order to address new priorities (European Commission, 2015). One could maybe say that the agreement has not been very efficient with regard to economic outcomes in the ACP countries, but it does allow the EU to exercise influence in the field of trade, development and political cooperation in the nearly 80 countries that are part to the agreement.