Outline the key features of ‘classical theism’ and evaluate the alternatives to classical theism proposed by John Macquarie in In Search of Deity.
Introduction
In his contribution to The Gifford Lectures, In Search of Deity, John Macquarrie sets out to critique what he terms as classical theism in favour of a panentheistic alternative; a concept that he labels dialectical theism. His general thesis responds to Aquinas, whom he sees as a representative of this classical theism. The thesis is as follows: ‘unfortunately, no matter how carefully classical theism is formulated, it still tends to present a distinctly “monarchical” view of God, that is to say, God as one-sidedly transcendent, separate from and over or above the world.’ This essay will first explore the features of classical theism and examine the problematic elements that Macquarrie finds in it, before evaluating the alternatives he proposes, namely atheism, pantheism and dialectical theism.
Characteristics of classical theism
Macquarrie bases his understanding of classical theism on the theism represented by Thomas Aquinas; a position that may be generally understood as traditional theism but is reframed in Macquarrie’s work as classical theism. Let us outline its key features, remaining cognisant of the fact that it is these characteristics inherent in classical theism that Macquarrie perceives as being defective.
The first feature is its heavy emphasis on the question ‘Does God exist?’, a question Macquarrie terms as misleading since, ‘when we talk something ‘existing’, we normally mean that occurs somewhere in space and time or that it belongs to the real world, and it seems clear that God does not exist in that sense.’ However, Aquinas’ answer characterises classical theism; God is viewed as Qui est, ‘He who is.’
The second feature that shapes Aquinas’ classical theism is his five ways by which he seeks to answer the question of whether God exists.’ The majority of the arguments, – the arguments from motion, causation, contingency and degree – are all understood by Macquarrie as leading to a [consideration of God] as ‘one other item among the things that exist.’
The final major markers of classical theism are its doctrine of creation and its understanding of God’s action in the world. According to its teachings, God created the world from ‘nothing by a free act of his sovereign will.’ However, this creation out of nothing seems to place the world outside of God, giving it its own reality and a certain amount of independence, and above all implies a distinct separation between God and the world. In keeping with Aquinas as being the basis for Macquarrie's understanding of classical theism, let us look to his view of God’s action in the world. Macquarrie summaries Aquinas’ view by saying, ‘the universe goes along for the most part according to the laws of nature… though ultimately originating from… God’ and God will ‘occasionally intervene by a supernatural act to overrule the ordinary processes of the universe in order to attain some desired end.’ Yet does this idea not create a perhaps paradoxical concept of a God who is all at the same time transcendent, eternal and interventional?
The issues that Macquarrie see in the above features of classical theism lie in the fact that he sees it to have overemphasised certain attributes of God and has led to a substandard concept of the divine from not only a religious but also a philosophical point of view. It places a one-sided emphasis on qualities of God such as transcendence, eternity, and independence and presents a distinctly ‘monarchial’ view of God who is removed and aloof from creation. He pinpoints the most serious difficulty that one could have with classical theism; ‘the idea of a God, external to and transcendent of the universe but nevertheless intervening in it from time to time to achieve some particular purpose’, is an idea that has become seemingly alien for the modern person. The main difficulty here appears to be the one-sidedness of classical theism, especially its one-sided stress on the transcendence of God. Macquarrie illustrates the crux of issue in the following equation: ‘The world minus God = 0; God minus the world = God?’ He states that in classical theism, God impacts the world, but this is unrequited. In Macquarrie’s words, ‘God is not in any way increased by the world, nor would he be diminished by the world’s disappearance,’ which, he claims, is a one-sided and undialectical representation of his relationship with the world.
Macquarrie’s alternatives
In light of the issue he takes with classical theism, Macquarrie considers some possible alternatives, one of which he puts forward as his own interpretation of a panentheistic understanding which he names ‘dialectical theism’. Let us first explore his initial rejections of atheism and pantheism as alternatives before discussing Macquarrie’s own dialectical theism.
It is worth noting the extent to which Macquarrie rejects atheism and pantheism, both of which he claims to be ‘even less persuasive than classical theism.’ He illustrates that modern atheism, whether it be theoretical, moral or emotional, ‘presents itself to contemporary society as the major rival to [classical] theism,’ yet the case for it is in fact weaker than it is often considered to be. For a start, theoretical atheism easily becomes subject to grave objections: the more it places emphasis on reductionism and materialism, the less credible it becomes, since ‘inert formless matter cannot evolve into such a universe as we know.’ however, the more it ‘imports into matter in the way of form, creativity, [and] direction,’ it likens itself to pantheism and an ‘immanent quasi-God.’ Likewise, atheisms with motivations that are moral, intellectual or emotional, appear to rise from a place of discontent, in which the ‘negative features of existence tell against the existence of a divine and … benevolent creator.’ Macquarrie acknowledges Patrick Masterton’s analysis, in order to express that any atheism grounded in human emotion is no more successful than what he labels theoretical atheism. According to Masterton’s analysis, ‘the attempt to overcome alienation by abolishing God has resulted… in an increased alienation and frustration.’
Like atheism, pantheism is an alternative that Macquarrie sees as unsatisfactory. With the view that ‘God is all things or God is in all things’, and its usually religious and/or mystical affiliations, it can be likened more to theism than atheism. In theory, a pantheistic view of the world sees God as equally present in every part of it, yet in practise the presence of God is not always manifested proportionately, and as a result, an ‘instability [is introduced] into pantheism.’ Where God begins to be seen as a proxy name for the world, ‘pantheism seems to collapse into atheism.’ Firmly rejecting both these alternatives, Macquarrie sees the need to ‘find a meaning for divine action in the world… on other lines than the view of classical theism, that is to say, belief in a God external to the world, but nevertheless able to intervene in its affairs.’
In light of his evaluation of these traditional arguments, Macquarrie attempts to demonstrate that a dialectical concept of God would overcome the implicit problems he sees in them. He claims that his ‘examination of classical theism reinforced our distrust of one-sidedness, which can be justly blamed for some of the incoherences and implausibilities attaching to the classical idea of God.’ Therefore, Macquarrie sees a plausible concept of God as one that holds seemingly opposing attributes in a dialectical tension, as opposed to placing more emphasis on one than others in a one-sided manner.
In his review of Macquarrie’s work, D. W. D. Shaw succinctly explains the dialectical concept that Macquarrie proposes as follows; it ‘arises out of a series of contrasts: being and nothing; the one and the many; knowability and incomprehensibility; transcendence and immanence; impassibility and passibility; eternity and temporality. These contrasting terms are not equally weighed in their application to God, rather, the ‘thesis is fundamental, and though it needs to be qualified by the antithesis, the final synthesis will be closer to the original thesis than to the antithesis’. Macquarrie’s alternative tradition aims to express ‘the kinship between God and the world by grounding it in a different model of transcendence derived from human being, and safeguard the ontological difference in the capacity to let be.’ The fact that the attributes of God are seen in a dialectical manner overcomes the initial problems faces, since they neither contradict nor create paradoxes with each other.
Conclusion
From the outset, Macquarie seeks to find an alternative to classical theism, since ‘although the conception of God in classical theism is at some points questionable, this certainly does not mean the end of God.’ It is not the conception of God as a whole that he distrusts, but the one-sided nature of the discourse offered by classical theism that he considers responsible for the incoherences that come with a classical understanding of God. After settling on the fact that his two initial alternatives, atheism and pantheism, are even less convincing than classical theism, Macquarrie turns to dialectical theism, through which he attempts to provide a concept of God that could advance our theological understanding. However, in light of this essay we must ask ourselves whether, whilst it is a strong alternative, dialectical theism is the only alternative to its classical counterpart.
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Bibliography
Bradshaw, Timothy. "Macquarrie's Doctrine of God," Tyndale Bulletin 44, no.1 (1993): 1-32.
Macquarrie, John. In Search of Deity: An Essay in Dialectical Theism, 1984; London: XPRESS Reprints, 1993.
Morley, Georgina. John Macquarrie’s Natural Theology The Grace of Being. Milton: Taylor and Francis, 2017.
Shaw, D. W. D. Religious Studies 21, no. 4 (1985): 589-90. http://www.jstor.org/stable/20006230.