Literature review
Many political scientists have sought to find an explanation to why people become radicalized and attracted to violent extremist organizations, especially those with roots in islamism, as it is a contemporary issue. After 9/11, the prevailing view among policymakers was that poverty causes terrorism (Kahn and Weiner 2002, Mitra 2008). This view was widely held due to research into the economics of conflict, but later studies have found that poor economic conditions do not have a causal relationship with generating terrorism or violent extremism. One study found causes of islamist radicalization in Central Asia to be associated with repressive governments, but still mentioned poverty in the list of causes as well (Azizian 2006). One year later, findings showed that at the country level repression plays a larger role in the sources of international terrorism than does poverty (Kreuger 2007). It seemed that, for a period of time, researchers could not let go of the links between conflicts and poverty and applying them to terrorism or radicalization. In studies analyzing countries’ economic indicators, researchers found no link between poor economic conditions and ISIS foreign fighters (Piazza 2007, Benmelech and Klor 2016).
Currently many researchers are continuing to delve into the causes of terrorism related to jihad, ISIS and similar organizations, and foreign fighters. The concept of foreign fighters and their recruitment appears to be a new phenomenon. However, it has been shown that foreign fighters are not a new phenomenon, and are not uniquely Islamic; there has just been a lack of the term to describe this concept (Malet 2010). Malet gives the Spanish Civil War, the Afghanistan War, and other smaller-scale incidents as examples of foreign fighter recruitment throughout the years before the current concern with foreign fighters of islamic extremism. Malet’s work delves deeper toward the causes of radicalization and why some leave their homes to become foreign fighters by exploring the recruitment efforts. In doing this, Malet finds the weaknesses that certain organizations target in order to sway potential foreign fighters in their favor. Within his four-step model of recruitment efforts, Malet explains that the most receptive audiences to these recruitment efforts are those who are active in their particular community’s institutions, identify with the community, but who also are marginalized as a minority group in the society (Malet 2010).
This finding is backed up by a different study which analyzes whether the intensity of anti-Muslim sentiments at a neighborhood or municipal level is linked to pro-ISIS radicalization on Twitter (Mitts 2017). Mitts’ research expands on Azizian and Keuger’s findings of repression as a variable in vulnerability to recruitment or radicalization efforts by examining social isolation of Muslims in Western countries. Mitts showed that Twitter users in areas with more votes for far-right and anti-Muslim parties were more likely to show signs of radicalization than users in areas that had less votes for far-right and anti-Muslim parties. This finding is related to issues of ideology and difficulty assimilating into homogenous Western countries, a cause of foreign fighters suggested by the results of Benmelech and Klor’s study, which also quickly notes that other research shows isolation as another cause for radicalization of potential foreign fighters (Benmelech and Klor 2016). Lack of belonging, a feeling closely associated with isolation, is cited as the reason behind the effectiveness of radicalization efforts of Dutch jihadist foreign fighters (Weggemans et al 2014).
Another perception after 9/11 was that tougher immigration policies would prove to be an effective counterterrorism strategy, since it seemed that all major terrorist attacks at that time were perpetrated by migrants. Academic literature on this issue gives arguments against the implementation of immigration policies to counter terrorism, and shows that these policies alienate the community, reinforce the perception of immigrants as potential threats/terrorists, and in turn further alienates that community (Spencer 2007). Although the literature on the reasons people join violent extremist organizations has been quite well researched, in the discussion of Central Asian foreign fighters, there has not been much written on why most of the Central Asian foreign fighters have been of Uzbek or Tajik ethnicity and not of Kyrgyz, Kazakh, or Turkmen ethnicity (Azizian 2006). Some studies look at why Central Asians join violent extremist organizations, but don’t focus on why this disparity exists; why Kazakhs, for example, are less likely to join violent extremist organizations and/or commit acts of terror than Uzbeks are. They may note that a large number of Uzbeks and Tajiks are fighting for a certain violent extremist organization, but they do not look at why this is the case for these ethnic groups, and not others in the region (Karmon 2017).
Theory
My independent variable is the relocation and isolation of young labor migrants away from their homes in Central Asia. My dependent variable is the amount of Central Asians who join violent extremist organizations. I assume that the relocation of young, Central Asian migrants away from their homes in Central Asia is not recreational travel, but travel to find employment. I assume that the Central Asian migrants already hold at least some level of belief in Islam. I assume that travel to Syria or Iraq by these Central Asian migrants implies joining the ranks of a violent extremist organization. I assume the country a Central Asian migrant is moving to for work is one outside of Central Asia for higher pay. I assume that this non-Central Asian country does not have an ethnic majority of the migrant worker’s ethnicity. I assume many or most of the ethnic-majority members of the country to which the migrant worker moves do not have particularly warm sentiments towards the migrant worker’s ethnicity or towards immigrants in general.
If a person from Central Asia moves to a different country he or she may experience some discrimination and alienation from the majority population of that country. The extent of this discrimination can vary based on the country travelled to. Feeling alienated and discriminated against, one may want to isolate themselves even more from anyone in society to try to find somewhere where they feel they belong. Additionally the discrimination and alienation that the migrant worker experiences may also lead to feelings of resentment and anger towards the people or society from which the discrimination is coming. If the migrant worker increases isolation, separating his or herself more from anyone who doesn’t share his or her opinions and feelings, and if he or she continues to have negative experiences with and feelings towards the society he or she is now in, then the migrant worker is more likely to be swayed by violent extremist propaganda. Therefore he or she will be more likely to give in to the propaganda to join the extremist organization. I will test the hypothesis that as the relocation and isolation of young labor migrants away from their homes in Central Asia increases, we should expect an increase in the amount of Central Asians who join violent extremist organizations or engage in violent extremist acts.