“Discuss the key elements of Deep Ecology, and critically explore the strengths and weaknesses of Deep Ecology as an environmental ethic”
Student number: s1877555
Naess, A. (1973). The shallow and the deep, long‐range ecology movement. A summary∗. Inquiry, 16(1-4), pp.95-100.
In this piece, Arne Naess coins the idea of deep ecology. He contrasts the 'shallow' ecological movement of the time which is concerned primarily with the fight against pollution and resource depletion alone with his own proposed idea of a 'deeper' ecological movement. Naess characterises the seven principles that form the base of the deep ecology movement. The first is the rejection of the man-in-environment image in favour of the relational, total-field image. The second principle of biospherical egalitarianism builds on this idea by adding that all lives are equal. The third principle of diversity and symbiosis goes hand in hand with the principle of egalitarianism since by maintaining diversity every living thing will have a better chance of living and blossoming. Furthermore, Naess argues against classes in the fourth principle, suggesting that no one group should exploit another group. The fifth principle is in agreement with the shallow ecology movement insofar as it tries to fight against pollution and resource depletion. Finally, the remaining two principles call for a recognition of the complexity of ecological systems and the fact that we do not entirely understand the interconnected of the components, as well as highlighting that ecologically stable systems are vulnerable to outsiders and that to maintain their integrity we need to protect local autonomy.
Matthews, F. 2007. Deep Ecology. In: A companion to Environmental Philosophy. Malden (Mass.): Blackwell, pp.218-232.
Matthews elaboration of Naess’ principles here provides a useful explanation of the rather bare ideas that Naess puts forward in his 1973 article. By linking the various principles, Matthews presents a more cohesive view of deep ecology.
Matthews continues by identifying the differences between Naess’ original proposed principles of deep ecology in 1973 and the new principles written in collaboration with Sessions in 1984. In the new set of principles described as the platform of the deep ecology movement, the idea of biocentric egalitarianism is absent and instead replaced by a statement about the intrinsic value of the non-human world. Matthews highlights a clear issue with this new deep ecology platform which is that it is questionable whether or not it can still be labelled as ecological considering that all reference to ecological principles are absent from the new platform. Furthermore, there are various other critiques of the deep ecology movement originating from other philosophic groups, including ecofeminist and social ecologists, including that deep ecologists don’t fully understand the political roots of the human/nature divide and the criticisms of the emphasis on the idea of ‘wilderness’ in deep ecology, for example.
Salleh, A. (1984). Deeper than Deep Ecology. Environmental Ethics, 6(4), pp.339-345.
Salleh offers a thoughtful critique of the deep ecology movement from an ecofeminist perspective in this piece. One of the most interesting ideas offered by Salleh here is that ‘pollution’ is thought of by Naess in entirely material terms, he doesn’t consider the ideological pollution that ecofeminists are concerned with in terms of the patriarchal conditioning that people have had to endure for centuries.
On the whole, Salleh seems to push the ecofeminist perspective shared by the movement overall that the environmental injustice that deep ecology concerns itself with can only be tackled after human injustice to other humans is overcome. Some of the ideas presented by Salleh may be considered as somewhat unsettling, however. While radical for its time considering this piece was written in the 1980s, the ideas may not all be valuable in modern society. For example, transwomen who don’t have the connection to nature that Salleh speaks of in terms of their fertility cycle and pregnancy would be excluded in this idea. It seems that in trying to push for the equality of men and women Salleh Is inadvertently pushing the image of a woman in society as someone who can carry children and who is naturally caring and nurturing which is comes across as demeaning and sexist.
Fox, W. (1984). Deep Ecology: A New Philosophy for our Time? The Ecologist, 14, pp.194-200.
Fox illustrates the basic principles of deep ecology in this piece and reiterates the distinctions between shallow and deep ecology. In particular, Fox elaborates on the connection between deep ecology and religious mystical tradition as well as ‘new physics’, all of which he suggests subscribe to a similar structure of reality. All of these serve to create ecological awareness, but through different means. For example, meditation as a mystical tradition claims that by freeing yourself of your own self-centred thoughts you come to realise that “the other is none other than yourself”. Similarly, deep ecology strives for an awareness of the fundamental interrelatedness of all living things. While some critiques of deep ecology such as William Godfrey, and notably, Matthews (2001) argue that deep ecology is somewhat undefinable and tends to try to “discuss everything at once”, Fox asserts that there in in fact a coherent, central institution of deep ecology, and the other fields that it relates to including mythical traditions and new physics can serve to strengthen our understanding of this institution, which is essentially deep ecological awareness.
Bookchin, M. (1987). Social Ecology versus Deep Ecology. [online] Dwardmac.pitzer.edu. Available at: http://dwardmac.pitzer.edu/Anarchist_Archives/bookchin/socecovdeepeco.html [Accessed 16 Oct. 2018].
Like Matthews, Bookchin suggests in this piece that the so-called ‘principles’ of deep ecology are vague and often self-contradictory. This is in direct contrast with social ecology, which he states is a long-standing coherent body of ideas. The social ecology movement has criticised deep ecology for subscribing to ideas such as that of the Malthusian concept of a population, in which only the fit survive. The fit are generally the rich and white people while the poor, black people are those who are left to die, according to Bookchin. Social ecologists argue that population ‘issues’ aren’t simply a numbers game, and that reproductive behaviour is rooted in social ideas such as the status of women, cultural values and socio-political conflicts.
One interesting point raised by Bookchin that is also reflected by Fox, an apparent supporter of deep ecology, is that there are serious issues with the proposal by deep ecologists that all creatures are equal down to the “tiniest microbes in the soil”. This issue opens itself up to wide criticism, such as Fox arguing that if this is true, then humans should feel as bad about eating a plant compared to an animal, and that it is unclear where to stop when we’re treating all beings equally, as Fox raises the question of whether or not we should also treat equally the microbes that give us disease, for example.
Sylvan, R. (1985). A Critique of Deep Ecology. Radical Philsophy, 40, pp.2-12.
Sylvan offers new criticism of deep ecology in this piece along with some that have been mentioned previously. Like a number of the other papers reviewed, Sylvan has an issue with how the ideas in Naess’ two accounts of deep ecology are not consistent. He also appears to be in agreement with the widespread critique of deep ecology as a rather murky concept, though it is suggested that there is some substance in the notion of deep ecology. According to Sylvan, the self-professed prophets of deep ecology are sometimes more shallow in their treatment of environmental issues, which contributes to the apparent vagueness of deep ecology as a whole. One particularly interesting criticism of deep ecology that hasn’t appeared in the other papers as of yet is an issue with the biospheric egalitarian principle. Sylvan argues that even if every living thing has intrinsic value, it doesn’t follow that they have it equally. For example, according to this principle, a forest and a tree within a forest would have the same value, which simply makes no sense. Overall, while Sylvan offers a number of harsh critiques of deep ecology, he concludes by suggesting that suitable modifications to this philosophical system could make it work.
Guha, R. (1989). Radical American Environmentalism and Wilderness Preservation. Environmental Ethics, 11(1), pp.71-83.
In this piece, Guha argues that deep ecology is firmly rooted in American environmental history and it is not appropriate in a Third World context. Guha’s first argument is that its anthropocentrism/biocentrism dichotomy is not useful. Deep ecology takes issue with environmental degradation but the dichotomy that it proposes is not useful when dealing with this issue. The main global ecological problems are overconsumption by the industrialised world and growing militarization, Guha suggests, which have no connection to the anthropocentric-biocentric dichotomy. The causes of the ecologically wasteful tendencies of an industrial society and one with increased militarization are actually economic and political structures and lifestyle choices of individuals.
Guha also suggests that the emphasis on wilderness in deep ecology is harmful when applied to the third world. The transplantation of the American system of national parks to Indian territory is extremely destructive to society, and the needs of local people are not considered in these decisions. For example, while Project Tiger aims to protect tigers in India, it takes no interest in the peasants living in these areas who are physically displaced by the project.
Another issue with deep ecology is how it appropriates Eastern traditions in an effort to promote itself as a universalistic philosophy. Deep ecology lumps together complex and differentiated religious traditions as being biocentric, which is clearly over-simplistic.
Total word count: 1553 words.