Briefing Document
Topic: How should the administration re-orientate its policy towards North Korean nuclear proliferation?
Since the dawn of the Korean war, US – North Korean relations have been defined by insecurity. Recent years have seen this already strenuous relationship pushed to its brink, largely due to the DPRK’s insistence on conducting nuclear weapon tests, beginning in 2006. This document will provide an outline of the current situation and review the prospects for a re-orientation of the current administration’s policy towards the DPRK. This document largely proposes a liberal approach to dealing with the crisis, proposing a continuation of economic sanctions on the DPRK that focus on limiting its military/technological capacity to develop nuclear weapons. The document will also provide an analysis of the risks involved in adopting a neo-conservative policy, denouncing the viability of preventative military action.
Current Context:
Recent nuclear tests suggest that the DPRK may now have developed intercontinental ballistic missiles (IMB’S) capable of striking US mainland (CNN 2017). These pose a direct threat to US security, and therefore the administration must take action to ensure denuclearization. To do this, a number of sanctions have been imposed on the DPRK, largely lead by the US. These range from general trade restrictions to those directly limiting its technological and military capacity. Recent diplomatic breakthroughs would suggest that these are working and that the crisis is now somewhat under control, with both sides engaging in dialogue. The Singapore summit demonstrated this, creating “a context of peaceful engagement” where it did not exists before (Grunstein 2018). Although the details of the agreement are somewhat vague, it was agreed both countries would establish peaceful relations to work towards denuclearization. Despite this, we cannot expect it to be a straightforward process, and is likely to take years. The US must continue to put pressure on the regime.
Key Considerations
We can confidently say that the North Korean nuclear weapons programme is a response to their perceived insecurity in the international system, especially in relations to the United States. Specifically, it was a response to George W. Bush’s rhetoric, describing the DPRK as part of the “axis of evil”, and announcing the administration’s “new doctrine of pre-emptive defence” (Laney and Shaplen 2003). Thus, in our anarchic system, developing nuclear weapons are the only way the DPRK can protect themselves from their perceived existential threat. Donald Trump’s threats of “fire and fury” (NYT 2018) do little but reinforce this insecurity. The DPRK’s willingness to suffer great economic pressures and international condemnation demonstrates how “they believe their national interests requires (the) development of a nuclear capability” (Goldstein 2000). This determination to preserve their sovereignty must be appreciated when considering what action should be taken.
Liberals in the administration would argue that the recent diplomatic breakthroughs are a result of the economic sanctions imposed. The 2018 Singapore summit can be considered a milestone in US-North Korean relations as Kim Jong Un, in Trump’s words, promised his commitment to the “complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula” (Al Jazeera 2018). Part of the recent success of the sanctions can be attributed to China’s increased willingness in imposing its share of the sanctions, cutting off “key trade in coal and other minerals” (Foreign Affairs 2018). Therefore, it is vital Chinese diplomatic support is maintained. In dealing with the current crisis, it is in both the United States and China’s interests for denuclearization to be achieved peacefully.
These sanctions should continue, but we must also adopt a ‘smart sanctions’ policy (Mastanduno 2016) that directly targets the regimes capacity to finance and develop their nuclear programmes. The technology needed for the development of nuclear weapons is inherently advanced, and by limiting the DPRK’s access to these technologies we’d be putting severe stress on the programme. Similarly, the sanctions effects on the general population must be minimal. Other than the moral concerns of purposely causing food/energy shortages, sanctions of this kind may also strengthen the regimes domestic support. Negative sanctions targeting the civilian populations are likely to “inspire resistance and resentment” among them, provoking a “rally around the flag” effect (Mastanduno 2016).
Neither should we limit our means of economic statecraft to negative sanctions alone. We should also incentivise North Korean denuclearization through promises of access to world markets and monetary institutions. These positive economic incentives would create some mutual trust, fostering a notion of “cooperation and goodwill” between the two states (Cortright 1997). The hermit kingdom has a lot it could gain from such agreements, as its economy in 2017 saw its largest decline in 20 years (The Guardian 2018). Liberal economic theory poses that the more involved the DPRK becomes in world markets, the more likely it is to follow a peaceful foreign policy. In discussions with South Korea’s President Moon Jae-in, it was said that Kim Jong-un was open to joining the IMF, the World Bank and other similar agencies (BBC 2018). Offering such incentives for denuclearization would greatly reduce the DPRK’s fear of annihilation in the future while also promoting a lasting peace. Dorussen was right to claim that the political benefit of such a policy greatly outweighs any economic cost for the US (Dorussen 2011). The costs of such programmes would be relatively small for the US and its allies, but it would greatly increase US security and cement its policy of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.
However, these positive economic incentives should only be materialised when the North Korean promises of denuclearization are validated, as in the past the regime has often made promises it probably had no intention of upholding. Reasonable timeframes should be given to complete every step of the process. The better these incentives are, the less likely it is the DPRK will be willing to sacrifice them to continue with their nuclear proliferation programme.
I’m sure that many of the realists in the room may believe that preventative military action is the most suitable course of action in dealing with the escalating nuclear threat. Under the current circumstances, military action is simply not a viable option. This is due to the humanitarian implications of such actions, as well as its likelihood to cause a severe deterioration in Sino-American relations. Any military intervention in North Korea by US forces, either by conventional or nuclear means, is likely to cost many Korean and American lives and severely de-stabilize the region. If this intervention were to be successful, in that it removed Kim Jong Un from power and secured the country’s nuclear capabilities, it is highly unlikely that the regime change would be a harmonious process. Intervention could lead to the need for a “large-scale counterinsurgency or peacekeeping operation” that would pose a large burden to the US’s military and economic resources (Metz 2017). We must learn from our experience in Iraq that although military involvement may remove the immediate threat, it is likely to lead to dragged out intervention.
If military action failed to immediately secure the country’s nuclear development sites, the consequences could be disastrous. Rational deterrence theory states three conditions where nuclear proliferation may occur without the likelihood of nuclear war increasing. The third of these conditions states “the nuclear arsenals (of a given state) must not be prone to accidental or unauthorized use” (Sagan 1994). If these weapons were to fall into local or international anti-US insurgent or terrorist groups, it is unlikely they would show much restraint in using them. These groups would pose a much larger threat to US security if they acquired the regimes WMD in the aftermath of intervention.
Preventative military action is also not viable due to its likely negative effects on US-Sino relations. China has a vested intertest in the crisis being ended peacefully, primarily for two reasons. Firstly, any military action would likely cause millions of people to be displaced, causing a regional refugee crisis. Most of this burden would fall on China, and its leaders have expressed concern that tens of thousands of refugees may need to be supported (Benner and Lind 2011). Secondly, China is unlikely to tolerate US military presence so close to its border, be it during or after the initial action. Currently North Korea serves as a buffer between the US military bases and Chinas land-borders, and losing this would provoke serious security concerns for China. Instability in the region may escalate into conflict between these two superpowers (Beal 2011). As a result, it is unlikely China would support any preventative military action in the peninsula in the UNSC, meaning the operation would lose any legal or international legitimacy. More importantly, any military action in North Korea risks escalation into conflict with China.
Conclusion and Recommendations
To conclude, I propose a liberal approach to dealing with the North Korean nuclear crisis. While I would recommend that the administration continues to enforce economic sanctions on the DPRK, it is also important we provide positive economic incentives for denuclearization. Economic coercion simply deepens North Korean insecurity, and diplomatic assurance is important to demonstrate a cooperative relationship could flourish in future. Due to the US’s historically uneasy relationship with the DPRK, I would also recommend that the administration would take a step back in its role in the crisis and allow China to take the lead as a mediator. As discussed, China has a vested interest in the crisis being ended peacefully, and it is certain that the DPRK’s leaders will be more willing to cooperate with them given their special relationship. The administration must also refrain on the use of aggressive rhetoric for the same reasons. Again, pre-emptive military action is simply not a viable course of action, and it risks leading to drawn out involvement or even conflict with China, which would drain the US’s military and economic might.