1. Introduction
Since 2016 there have been more than eighteen armed conflicts worldwide in which children have actively participated as either part of a state military or a non-state armed group (Child Soldiers International, 2018). Even though various attempts in international law have been made to stop the participation of children in armed conflict, it remains a continuous problem prevalent in many conflicts. One of these conflicts is the Syrian war, in which since 2011 many (international) state and non-state armed groups have been fighting one another. According to the Annual Report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations on children in armed conflict, the number of verified recruits of children in Syria over 2017 was 961 (2018). One of the non-state actors operating in Syria that is estimated to have doubled its recruits of children over the last year, is Islamic State (IS), (Annual Report GASC, 2018). IS is an extremist Jihadi militant group with territory in both Iraq and Syria. IS is not a regular rebel group, but an ‘aspiring state’ that aims to reassure the continued existence of its caliphate (Benotman and Malik, 2016). Where within academic debates, motives of the widespread use of children as soldiers have been mainly applied to rebel groups striving for territorial power or political support, the aspirations of IS are more complex.
This paper aims to shed light on why and how IS uses children as soldiers to strengthen and extend its caliphate. It uses the definition of a child soldier as defined by the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), that include all children associated with an armed force below 18 years old (UN Children’s Fund, 2007). By analyzing existing literature applicable to other rebel groups and research specifically on child soldiering within IS, it shows the deep aspirations of IS on which the use of child soldiers is based. Through the comprehensive, integrated process of indoctrination prior to the selection of its members, IS intends to create children that are the embodiment of its ideology and hence will carry on its caliphate in the future.
This paper is of scientific relevance, since it contributes to the academic debates on general child soldiering by applying the existing literature on the case of IS. Therefore, it seeks to form a bridge between this literature and the prevalence of the phenomenon within IS in Syria. Moreover, by shedding light on how and why IS uses children, this paper can offer relevant information to NGOs and other humanitarian organizations that cope with the rehabilitation and reintegration of former IS child soldiers.
The paper starts with a theoretical chapter in which the international legal framework of child soldiers is summarized, the relevant theories on the motives of the use of child soldiers is pointed out and the transformation from a child into a soldier is explained. Hereafter, there is given a short context of the subject of this paper, namely the conflict in Syria and the organization of Islamic State. The analysis consists of case literature on child soldiering by IS that is compared to the literature as used in the theoretical framework. Finally, some concluding remarks are made after which the discussion gives some recommendations for future research.
2. Theoretical Framework
2.1. Child soldiers: Legal framework and Definition
Even though child soldiering is not a new phenomenon (Rosen, 2007; Horgan et al, 2017) some scholars argue the trend has recently increased to a scope and nature that cannot be compared to historical occurrence (Fox, 2005). Hence, to criminalize the use of child soldiers, various efforts within international law have been made over the last few decades. This paragraph addresses these developments within international law and focuses on the definition of the term child soldier.
The international law on the use of child soldiers has its roots in the two additional Protocols of the Geneva Conventions in 1977, that criminalized the participation of children in non-international armed conflicts under the age of fifteen (Druba, 2002; Rosen, 2007). Despite the implementation of the prohibition of child soldiers in international humanitarian law, these Protocols left ambiguities to the international legal system; e.g. leaving out intrastate conflict and a definition of a ‘child’ (Druba, 2002). In response, the Convention of the Rights of the Child in 1989 gave the first universal definition of a child as “every human being below the age of eighteen years…” (United Nations Human Rights, article 1). Remarkably, the article in this Convention that concerns children in armed conflict, follows up the Geneva Conventions by using the age of fifteen as the threshold of criminalization (United Nations Human Rights, article 38). Moreover, the article did not solve the gap of intrastate conflicts. It only refers to States as potential recruiters of child soldiers, leaving out the many who participate in civil wars (Rosen, 2007). The most comprising effort in international law to criminalise the use of children in armed conflict, is the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (Rosen, 2007). Under war crimes, article 8, the Statute criminalises “the conscripting and enlisting of children under the age of fifteen years in armed forces or using them to participate actively in hostilities” (ICC Statute, article 8, xxvi, vii). Although the ICC did not increase the age of children in combat to eighteen years old, its definition takes into account both interstate and intrastate conflicts and state and non-state groups.
During the 2007 Paris Principles on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict, the United Nations Children’s Fund defined children participating in armed conflict as follows (2007, p. 7):
“A child associated with an armed force or armed group refers to any person below 18 years of age who is, or who has been, recruited or used by an armed force or armed group in any capacity, including but not limited to children, boys and girls, used as fighters, cooks, porters, spies or for sexual purposes.”
This definition complies to the international lobby of international human rights organizations to include a straight-18 position to define child soldiers (Druba, 2002). Moreover, it not only includes those who fight, but also those who fulfil other positions within the armed groups. This definition of child soldiers will be used in this paper.
2.2. Why Children become Soldiers
The recruitment of child soldiers is a deliberate choice that is made for different, often strategic, reasons (Singer, 2001). Although there has been a predominant focus on the abduction of children into armed forces within past research, Rosen argues the majority of child soldiers is not forcibly recruited (2007). To ensure a thorough understanding of the reasons for child soldiering from both the perspective of the armed group and the child itself, this paper therefore distinguishes between two different levels of analysis: the meso-level, that concerns the motives of the armed groups, and the micro-level that sheds light on the child’s perspective.
2.2.1. Meso-level Explanations
On a meso level, the use of child soldiers can be explained by three strategic motives. To start with, the use of child soldiers can be financially beneficial to armed forces. According to Benotman and Malik, children are significantly cheaper to retain than adults, because they consume less goods and receive less or no compensation (2016). Moreover, the growing market in cheap, light arms make it easier to transform children into soldiers who are effectively able to carry and use these weapons (Singer, 2001; Webster, 2007; Lasly and Thyne, 2015). Therefore, child soldiers form a relatively cheap option to expand the armed groups. However, the argument that it is equally as easy and effective to make children use these arms can be criticized. It might enable children to carry these light arms, yet it keeps being difficult for them to effectively use them (Achvarina and Reich, 2006; Beber and Blattman, 2013).
Second, Beber and Blattman argue “children are easier to mislead and indoctrinate and more responsive to coercive methods” (2013, p.68). In line with this argument, Kimmel and Roby argue, once indoctrinated, children become dependent on the armed group for both survival and psychological identification (2007). This positively influences their level of obedience towards their commanders.
Third, another explanation of the use child soldiers is that child soldiers can be used as a mean to fear among local communities (Benotman and Malik, 2016). This fear originates from shared believes, that relates child soldiers to, for example, witchcraft, or from the fact that children are often the ones carrying out the atrocities against civilians (Singer, 2001; Beber and Blattman, 2013). The despair they inflict on the community, can therefore be perceived to be a strategy to create social disruption.
2.2.2. Micro-level Explanations
On a micro level, a plausible explanation of child soldiering is the vulnerable positions many children in conflict-affected societies find themselves in that often go hand in hand with weak social ties and poverty (Singer, 2001). Joining armed forces, offers children a way to obtain goods for their families and/or themselves. Moreover, Zack-Williams argue life in armed forces provides children a ‘surrogate family relationship’; something which is enticing for children with weak social ties, such as orphans (2001, p. 78; Kimmel and Roby, 2007). However, Achvarina and Reich claim this vulnerable position as a predictor of child soldiering, lacks validity in its explanation (2006). This because it would not explain why the majority of children growing up in these positions does not end up child soldiering (Achvarina and Reich, 2006). In addition, Achvarina and Reich claim there is no evidence for a strong relationship between the number of orphans and child soldiers. Nonetheless, this latter finding is very straightforward and insufficient, since the number of orphans in comparison to the total number of potential employable children is so little (Andvig and Gates, 2010). Hence, where being orphan forms a possible push-factor for children to join an armed group, this relationship is almost unobservable on a large scale, due to its small number.
To conclude, this paragraph summarized efforts in existing literature to explain the use of child soldiers on a meso- and micro-level. To avoid an exclusive explanation of the child soldier phenomenon, this paper interprets these factors as possible contributors to the explanation and not as distinct explanations as such. By putting these factors in context and by taking into account cultural, societal and political aspects, they can, however not exclusively, provide a way to the understanding of the phenomenon of child soldiering.
2.3. The Road from Child to Soldier
The road from child to soldier entails much more than merely the recruitment. According to Singer, the ultimate goal is to make the child dependent on the armed force with the aim of bonding them strongly to the organization (2001). In this paragraph, the different stages that follow the recruitment of a child will be elaborated on, starting with the recruitment itself.
There are mixed arguments on the type of recruitment in existing literature. Where some claim abduction is one of the main methods for recruiting children (Singer, 2001; Maclur and Denov, 2006) , others argue the majority of child soldiers voluntarily join armed groups (Rosen, 2007; Da Silva, Hobbs and Hanks, 2001). In the case of abduction, armed groups generally show horrendous levels of violence when facing their potential recruits. By doing so, the determination with which they use violence and the power they have is immediately evident. This will make children feel they do not have any choice apart from complying to their recruiters (Singer, 2001; Maclur and Denov, 2006).
The second and third phase that can be distinguished is a congregation of indoctrination and military training. This concerns the transformation from child to relentless fighters who act in accordance to the armed groups’ motivations (Singer, 2001; Maclur and Denov, 2006). Military training aims to give children the very bare minimum of skills they need to own during the conflict; e.g. the ability to kill (Singer, 2001). Moreover, the indoctrination aims to make children fully dependent on their recruiters. Separated from former social ties, their survival lays in the hands of the armed groups (Maclur and Denov, 2006). By emphasizing this, children tend to increasingly attach themselves to the armed groups. Once children are prepared enough to fight, the obedience that results from the indoctrination phase, makes them willing to commit the most hideous deeds. The great exposure of brutal violence towards the children, enforces the process of normalization of this violence (Maclur and Denov, 2006). After the indoctrination and the military training, children feel a strong solidarity towards their armed groups (Singer, 2001; Malcure and Denov, 2006). According to Singer, at this point, children’s self-identification is strongly intertwined with their armed group to which they feel a strong sense of loyalty (2001). However, Andvig and Gates argue this loyalty can also originate from the fear children experience to escape and the fact that they do not have much to lose apart from their own lives (2010). Singer argues children are indeed scared for the consequences if they would flee, nonetheless this does not prevent them from doing so (2001).
To conclude, within existing literature three different phases are distinguished within the process that transforms a child into a soldier; recruitment or selection, the indoctrination and finally the training. Important to keep in mind here, is the fact that these are theoretical descriptions of phases that in practice, vary within and across armed groups.
3. Context: Islamic State and the war in Syria
3.1. The History of Islamic State (IS) and its ‘Caliphate’
Islamic State originates back to 2003, when Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, a Jordanian radicalized Islamist and leader of the militant group Jamaat al-Tawhid wal-Jihad, started a jihadi ‘umbrella’ consisting of Sunni groups in Iraq (JWJ), (Hashim 2014; Lister, 2014). Together, they tried to defeat the current occupiers and targeted the Shia population and its militia forces with the ultimate aim of creating an Islamic State under the sharia, in which there would not be space for dissidents. The JTJ distinguished itself from other groups by making use of suicide bombers and other forms horrendous violence, causing many civilian deaths (Hashim, 2014).
In the end of 2004, Zarqawi started fighting under the name of Osama bin Laden’s Al-Qaeda (Hashim, 2014). When Zarqawi was killed by the United States in 2006, Al-Qaeda in Iraq announced the founding of the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI), led by Abu Omar al-Baghdadi. Even though ISI needed to deteriorate due to counterinsurgencies supported by the United States in 2010, it managed to recover and restructure itself (Lister, 2014). According to Hashim, there have been four major factors that explain this re-emergence of ISI (2014). First, ISI reorganized its structure and enforced its military. Second, the instability in Iraq after the United States pulled back, left space for the empowerment of ISI (Lister, 2014). Third, al-Qaeda started to become less present which gave al-Baghdadi the chance to take a more prominent position. Lastly, the civil war in Syria broke out. The latter gave ISI the opportunity to seek more territorial power within Syrian borders.
Over the years, the goals of ISI have become well-defined: the overtaking of weak governments and the creation of an Islamic State; its own Caliphate (Hashim, 2014; ). Al-Baghdadi changed the name to Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) which is nowadays, referred to as Islamic State (IS). IS claims to represent the only and true protector of the Sunni, Islamic ideology (Lister, 2014). Its brutal violence and terrorist attacks directed towards civilians has made IS the infamous, feared group it is today.
3.2. The Syrian War and the Involvement of IS
When the uprisings of the Arab Spring reached Syria in 2011, the Syrian population started protesting with the aim of changing the repressive regime of al-Assad (Bhardwaj, 2012). However, these protests were violently suppressed by al-Assad’s military with a counterreaction of even greater disapproval among the local population (Lynch, Freelon and Aday, 2014). The ethnic-religiously divided society of Syria, with a strict distinction between the powerful Shia on one hand and the Sunni Muslims on the other hand, increased the level of friction within the State (Anshumali Shukla, 2017).
The abusive and violent attitude of al-Assad’s regime and the rising death toll, caught the eye of the international community (Bhardwaj, 2012). Where regional powers Saudi Arabia, supporting the Sunni opposition and Iran, backing the Assad regime started to intervene, it did not take long before international superpowers started to appear. Communistic Russia and China are supporting the Syrian government, whereas the United States wants to overthrow Assad’s government; justifying their motive by Assad’s use of chemical weapons (Anshumali Shukla, 2017).
Apart from the regional and international powers that are fighting each other, the conflict is even more complex, because these powers at the same time share one common goal: the defeat of IS. Due to its earlier successes, IS attracted many Sunni fighters in their fight against the Assad regime (Laub and Masters, 2016). Nowadays, IS has claimed territory in northern Syria, with as its capital Raqqa (Laub and Masters, 2016). In here, they have built different supportive institutions, such as schools and hospitals, to win the hearts and minds of the people and exercise its power over the population (Laub and Masters, 2016).
Since the Syrian war has started in 2011, approximately 1100 Syrian children under the age of sixteen have joined IS (Vale, 2018). According to Horgan et al., these children originate from five different categories, namely: internally displaced children or foreign children, children who have been supported by fighting civilians, orphan children, abducted children or runaways who voluntarily join IS (2017; Anderson, 2016). Within IS, they fulfil different tasks, ranging from positions in which they do not engage directly in violence, such as cooks or sex slaves, to that of suicide bomber or frontline fighter (Benotman and Malik, 2016). In the following analysis, the use of children by IS will be further explained.
4. Analysis: the Children of the Caliphate
“Islamic State, is not just a rebel group. But an aspiring state, and it needs societies, not just soldiers.” (Benotman and Malik, 2016, p. 35)
IS distinguishes itself from other rebel groups in the sense that it strives to more than territorial power and political support. IS ultimately aims to expand and strengthen its own caliphate (Vale, 2018; Benotman and Malik, 2016). To thoroughly understand the use of children by IS in its pursue to this goal, this paragraph first analyses why IS uses children by determining the different explanatory motives for child soldiering. Thereafter, it will focus on how they transform children into soldiers.
4.1. Explanations of the Use of Children by IS
The focus on children by IS stems from different meso and micro explanations. These meso and micro explanations are both relevant because it shows on one side of the spectrum, the reasons why IS recruits children and on the other side of the spectrum, how IS responds to the micro-level push or pull factors that attract children to IS.
To start with, one of the most prominent reasons for the use of children by IS lays in the desire to pass on their ideology from generation to generation (Benotman and Malik, 2016; Vale, 2018; Horgan et al., 2017; Anderson, 2016). By investing as early as possible in children, the extremist ideology of IS gets normalized within their minds (Anderson, 2016). Apart from the fact that indoctrination makes children obedient to their commanders and with this, tactically, fulfilling the daily tasks of the caliphate, it therefore also functions as a way to ensure the long-term existence of it (Benotman and Malik, 2016; Mahmood, 2016). This method of indoctrination to ensure obedience and assure loyalty towards the IS ideology, is therefore in agreement with the argument of Beber and Blattman that this makes children of particular interests to armed groups (2013). Another strategic motive for the use of children by IS, is the public awareness and social destruction they create. (Benotman and Malik, 2016). By publishing footage of the children committing horrendous atrocities, they create a flow of worldwide critiques and fear. Even though on a bigger, international scale, this is in line with the argument of Benotman and Malik, that children can be used as ‘the embodiment of chaos’ (2016, p. 28). Moreover, children are financially cheaper to retain and therefore tactically profitable to the group (Anderson, 2016). Although this argument takes a less prominent place within case study literature, it does confirm to the conventional literature that states child soldiers can be of financial benefit to armed groups (Benotman and Malik, 2016; Singer, 2001).
On a micro-level, the motivations of the children to ‘voluntarily’ join IS, can be traced back to the vulnerable positions they sometimes find themselves in (Horgan et al., 2017; Almohammad, 2018 ). Even though Achvarina and Reich (2006) claim this motive lacked explanatory power, orphans and IDPs do seem to form a significant part of the children recruited by IS (Horgan et al., 2017; Anderson, 2016). According to Anderson, IS is appealing to children because of two different reasons. First, it gives them material support. Since IS functions as an aspiring ‘state’, they offer health care, education and welfare to their ‘population’. Second, in accordance to the argument of Singer (2001) and Zack-Williams (2001), being part of IS gives children a sense of belonging and structure; something which is often absent in the war-torn lives of these individuals (Anderson, 2016). As will be further explained in the next paragraph, IS makes smart use of these push- and pull-factors that increase the attachment of the children to IS.
4.2. Transformation from a Child to Soldier: the Six Pathways
As was mentioned previously, conventional literature on child soldiering distinguished three different phases after the recruitment: selection, indoctrination and military training. However, in the case of IS this seem to be more extensive. Horgan et al. propose a six-staged process in which children are formed into soldiers (2017).
The first phase of this model is the seduction phase. In this phase, children are exposed to the IS’s ideology through public events and pro-IS propaganda (Benotman and Malik, 2016; Horgan et al, 2017; Mahmood, 2016). IS predominantly invests in children of whom they know it is easy to get access to, such as orphans (Almohammad, 2018). In this way, it responds pertinently to the micro-factors that push children into IS’s direction. By spreading out IS values and attract children through for example toys, IS encourages the engagement with its organization and it becomes inevitable for the children not to be exposed to IS ideology. In contrast with other literature on child soldiering (Singer, 2001; Maclur and Denoy, 2006), IS therefore not exclusively starts with the selection of the children but instead aims to increase the attachment to the group prior to the selection. Hence, it distinguishes itself from other rebel groups, in that it devotes much effort to the gaining of trust before the enlisting takes place (Almohammad, 2018).
The second phase is that of schooling. It is during this phase that most of the indoctrination takes place. IS strategically responses to the vulnerability of children within the destroyed Syrian society where education is in some parts to be considered a rarity nowadays (Benotman and Malik, 2016). By the schooling of children and the exposure to other IS members, IS manages to control the information children receive and with this, direct their believes (Horgan et al, 2017; Benotman and Malik, 2016). Where other rebel groups mainly focus on the indoctrination through the experience of dependence on the recruiter (Maclur and Denov, 2006), IS therefore differentiates itself by the intense indoctrination through education. According to Benotman and Malik, education is the perfect tool for IS to shape the ‘hearts and minds’ of the children (2016).
The third phase is the selection phase, in which other IS members determine what child will be used for what purpose (Horgan et al., 2017). Strikingly, as mentioned before, this phase in which children are selected and assigned to certain positions is usually referred to as being the first phase of turning a child into a soldier (Vale, 2018). According to Vale, it is essential for IS to build trust and strong, emotional commitment among its members before enlisting, since this will reduce the chance of treason and desertion. Therefore, the aspiring state IS is, it needs to ensure the indoctrination of IS’s ideology preceding to the actual selection to secure life-long, loyal members.
The fourth face entails the subjugation, in which children receive intensive physical and psychological training with the aim of increasing loyalty (Vale, 2018). According to Horgen et al. (2017), the brutalization of violence children experience in this phase, will create a strong sense of solidarity. Where existing literature on child soldiering claims part of this loyalty comes from children’s weak social ties and fear to escape (Singer, 2001; Andvig and Gates, 2010), IS reduced this risk by focusing first on the indoctrination prior to the selection. Herewith, IS aims to create child soldiers that are the embodiment of their extremist ideology. This increased loyalty as part of the subjugation phase, lays therefore much deeper than merely fear or the lack of other chances.
The fifth phase, deepens children’s expertise through specialized training (Horgan et al., 2017). Eventually, the sixth is that of stationing. This last phase assigns children to a certain role after which they will actively participate in IS’s battle for its caliphate. Moreover, this phase makes children recruit more children (Vale, 2018). Horgan et al. argue, this is particularly effective, since children have more faith in peers than in adults (2017).
To conclude, to create loyal members out of children, IS has a very extensive socialization strategy. Where other rebel groups start with a brutal level of violence from the very first beginning of the transformation process, IS slowly normalizes violence. It starts with a somewhat soft approach that attaches children to its group. Through seduction and the offering of education in war-torn Syria, IS manages to indoctrinate children to its extremist jihadi ideology prior to the enlistment. This minimalizes the betrayal and escape of children and therefore both functions as a tactic on the short-term but mainly as a way to fulfil its strategy of a strong, grand caliphate on the long-term.
5. Conclusion
As any other rebel group, Islamic State chooses deliberately to make use of child soldiers. However, the explanatory factors of why and how IS uses child soldiers deviates from that of other rebel groups. This difference has its roots in the ideological structure of IS as such. Where other rebel groups use child soldiers for political gain or territorial power, IS has deeper aspirations than this. This paper aims to answer the question of why and how IS uses child soldiers to strengthen and expand its caliphate.
The answer to the question of why IS uses child soldiers to expand and strengthen its caliphate, can partly be found in conventional literature on child soldiering as applicable to other rebel groups. Children are cheap to maintain and therefore tactically beneficial for the fulfilment of daily duties within IS. Moreover, they are easy to commit to the organization, especially those who find themselves in vulnerable positions. These vulnerable positions form a push-factor towards armed group. IS deliberately uses this vulnerability as a way to attract its new members. By offering exactly those structures that are missing in a war-torn Syria, such as education and healthcare, it forms a relatively safe ground for children. This is not any different from rebel groups, that are attracting children as a mode of survival. What does differ is the fact that IS purposely recruits young children to create life-long, loyal members who fully comply to its extremist ideology. Since IS wants to reassure the continued existence of its caliphate, it needs members that carry on the ideology from generation to generation. The reason why IS deliberately recruit children, has therefore deep roots and is because the future of its organization and ideology, lays in the hand of these children.
How IS uses children to strengthen and expand its caliphate cannot be compared to the three phases model that is often referred to in existing literature; recruitment, indoctrination and training. Instead, IS follows a more comprehensive approach, that follows six stages; seduction, schooling, selection, subjugation, specialization and stationing. When comparing these two models, the biggest difference is the seduction and indoctrination of its members prior to the selection of its recruits. Where existing literature on other rebel groups emphasizes the often violent recruitment of children after which they are indoctrinated into the armed groups, IS adopts a softer approach that first focuses on the attachment of the children to its organization. By first ‘investing’ in the indoctrination of children prior to the selection, IS secures a selection of highly loyal, dedicated members with a reduced chance of betrayal. Moreover, by investing heavily on education, children are only exposed to the IS ideology, something which is absent in most other rebel groups.
To conclude, the use of children by IS cannot be compared to any other rebel group. Since its organizational motives and aspirations differ, the reason why and how they use children does so too. By using child soldiers, IS attempts to expand its caliphate through new members and strengthen its future by creating young, loyal members that will carry on IS in the future. They do so, by deeply integrated modes of indoctrination and selection through which children become the embodiment of the IS ideology.
6. Discussion
This paper shows how IS uses children as the embodiment of their ideology with the strategic aspiration of strengthening and expanding its caliphate. By acknowledging the limitations of this paper, there can hopefully be taken further steps in the future to understand the use of child soldiers by IS.
Firstly, the findings of this paper are solely based on existing literature. Even though this is of analytical significance to the academic debate on child soldiering both within IS and in other rebel groups, it does not offer new empirical insights. Since the empirical research in this field of study is relatively limited, this is therefore a recommendation for future research. Acknowledging the difficult nature of these types of researches, this paper recommends empirical research among former child soldiers within IS.
Second, this paper is limited by solely taking into account the recruitment of children by IS. As Vale emphasized in her research, “the Islamic State is a whole-family project” (2018, p.29). Hence, by merely focusing on child soldiers, this extended family approach has been left out. For future research, it is therefore recommended to also investigate the processes of social relationships that are of interest to the recruitment of children or families as a whole. Moreover, macro-level explanations should be pointed out to get a fully comprehensive understanding of child soldering within IS.