Critically assess Peter Singer’s view regarding our moral obligations to the global poor.
Peter Singer is a world renown Australian moral philosopher who has a plethora of publications on the topic of animal rights and global poverty. Amongst his many papers, “Famine, Affluence and Morality”, written in 1971, lays out his arguments for why those that are more fortunate should give to those that are less. In this essay, Singer’s fundamental assertion is that affluent societies cannot justify the lack of support they give to those that are in a state of poverty, starvation, or general suffering and thus that there is a fatal flaw in our current societies’ “moral conceptual scheme”. Singer structures this essay into roughly 5 parts: “the problem”, objections to the nature of the problem, a solution, possible objections to the solution and finally the practical applications of the solution. The main thrust of Singer’s argument that individuals in affluent organisations do not give enough is correct, but the way in which he proposes we apply his principles to affect change is inherently reductive and thus unsatisfactory. In short, he is right in identifying the problem, but incorrect in how he attempts to provide a solution.
The main problem that Singer wishes to address is essentially ‘how little we give to those in need’. The crux of the issue lies in the lack of philanthropy that members of affluent societies and governments undertake. Singer quite critically notes that there is neither individual action, nor any kind of dynamic protest or movement to convince governments to address the glaringly obvious problem of widespread global famine and poverty. The example of the United Kingdom (UK) and its multi-million-dollar Concorde project is used to lambast the UK government for being more concerned with transport than the death and starvation of millions in East Bengal (Bangladesh). This was a timely issue in the context of 1971 where a civil war erupted in Bangladesh resulting in over 3 million direct deaths from the war alone and millions more from starvation, poverty and disease. Although Singer heavily utilises the Bangladeshi famine example to illustrate his point, it should be emphasised that he was talking about humanitarian crises in general. In this respect Singer is correct in criticizing affluent societies and governments for failing to take effective and significant action in terms of humanitarian action when they were more than capable of doing so, both financially and logistically. He presents the problem in such a way that it is difficult to refute, from any ethical and moral thought system, that helping those that are in a state of poverty and starvation is morally wrong.
Singer argues that the reason behind this lack of action and empathy lies in people and the moral standards that modern society has placed on them. He proposes that our current “moral conceptual scheme” needs to be re-evaluated in such a way that we give more to those in need. Firstly, a core argument in the way the system should be changed is as follows: “If it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening without thereby sacrificing anything of moral significance, we should do it”. He further extends his argument by claiming that by loosely following the principle of impartiality, as a fundamental principle in Utilitarianism, we should prioritise assistance for those in greater need regardless of their proximity. In a globalised world where transport and communications are highly developed and accessible, Singer sees arguments of ignorance or action being bound by distance as moot. Another issue within the same scope of ‘correct action’ is the quantity of aid being provided. Although the way in which he structures his argument in this regard was rather convoluted and difficult to understand, in essence one can surmise this: regardless of how much we think others are giving and the aggregate amount of what is being given; we should still give as much as we are able to give. Theoretically, if all members of affluent society lived by this rule, it would produce a better world with less overall suffering. This is an inherently idealistic perspective on the hypothetical good that donating to those that suffering could do but it fails to consider, the practical concerns of executing this rule.
The primary problem with Singer’s views on alleviating suffering on a global level is that his argument attempts to apply logical equivalence. In an attempt to provide a universal solution to an extremely complex problem, he has fallen to reductivism and thus fails the test of practical application. In this instance, Singer takes the example of the drowning child and applies it to the starving masses in Bangladesh. A fundamental issue with this is that the two situations are inherently different. As much as Singer tries to propose the universal applicability of his ideas, one cannot treat the two examples as equal; both from the perspective of the spill over effects of a potential action, and the ultimate good that will result from the particular act. In essence, Professor Susan Blackmore’s criticisms on Singer’s way of equating the two situations are as follows. Firstly, Singer assumes that the aid given by affluent societies and the members of those societies will easily and effectively reach the suffering person in Bangladesh. A myriad of issues in how the donation is handled and whether the donation even reaches the person immediately presents itself. These range from, corruption both on the part of the organization and the local government administering the donation, the possibility of limited local resources that are insufficient to help all suffering individuals regardless of how much is donated, and finally the presence of deep structural problems in respective local governments that will continually prolong suffering to the people they govern. Singer attempts to excuse these practical issues altogether firstly by claiming that “Expert observers and supervisors, sent out by famine relief organizations or permanently stationed in famine-prone areas, can direct our aid to a refugee in Bengal almost as effectively as we could get it to someone in our own block” Furthermore, Singer only addresses overpopulation as one of the systemic issues that cause issues such as famine and poverty. It is important to note that, the argument of donations never reaching their intended recipient is applicable not only to the Bangladeshi crisis of 1971, but to all humanitarian crises and donation initiatives that manifest as a result. Therefore, due to Singer’s use of logical equivalence in equating a drowning child to the Bangladeshi crisis and by extension all humanitarian crises as well as his idealistic view on the logistics of humanitarian donation, there are critical flaws in the practical application of this rule.
Even though Singer does not explicitly state that there may be other ways that members of more affluent societies can alleviate poverty starvation and suffering, his proposal for changing the “moral conceptual scheme” in these affluent societies may be applied differently. In Mill’s “Utilitarianism”, he proposes that it is the duty of education and those that are ‘intellectually superior’ to raise the overall level of moral goodness. Indeed, Singer does indeed touch on the topic simply by stating that the “moral conceptual scheme” needs to change and immediately assumes this will have a widespread impact on alleviating the suffering of those that are in a state of poverty, starvation or suffering, but does not discuss how this can be done. Utilising Singer’s rule and applying Mill’s proposal of educating those that are not morally up to par, we may achieve better results both in quality and quantity. By educating members of more affluent societies, most critically those that hold the power to affect change, far more can be done to alleviate the suffering of individuals in less fortunate societies. Governments and institutions within more affluent societies and nation-states can implement policies that go beyond the simple act of providing direct donations. Fair economic partnerships, guidance in resource and population management, and sharing expertise in the fields of sustainable development are just a few of the many ways in which more affluent societies and nation states can reduce the suffering experienced by their less fortunate counterparts. For humanitarian and natural disasters in particular, the governments of more affluent societies can provide expertise in the domain of building more stable and robust infrastructure as well as in developing disaster response protocols in areas prone to them.
In this way, the problem of the lack of philanthropy that members of affluent societies and governments undertake is acknowledged and appropriately dealt with by applying Singer’s rule of “If it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening without thereby sacrificing anything of moral significance, we should do it” in a pragmatic, practical and effective manner.
Word Count: 1553
Works Cited
Blackmore, Susan. 2009. Sue Blackmore: Giving money to help save lives abroad is fraught with complexities and unintended side-effects. Edited by Alan Rusbridger. The Guardian. London: The Guardian, April.
Mill, John Stuart, and George Sher. 2002. "What Utilitarianism Is." In Utilitarianism, by John Stuart Mill, 7-31. Hackett Publishing Co.
Singer, Peter. 1972. "Famine, Affluence, and Morality." Philosophy and Public Affairs (John Wiley & Sons) 1 (1): 229-243.
Totten, Samuel, and Paul Robert Barthrop. 2008. Dictionary of Genocide. Vol. I. Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press.