What should be the United States’ policy towards Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula?
Historical Background
Al Qaeda taken from the Arabic root qaf- ayn- dal holds the meaning of the term “base” as in home or camp. Created in the 1980’s by Osama bid laden and Abdullah Azzam in response of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan , Al Qaeda then became known to be a terrorist organization primarily based in the Middle East. After the invasion of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan there was a call to the younger generation of Muslims to volunteer to what was called a “holy war” or as “jihad” to fight against the Soviet Union. When the Soviet Union exited Afghanistan in 1989 Osama Bid-Laden and Abdullah Azzam sought the opportunity to continue their activism and that is when the declaration of Al-Qaeda had commenced.
Later the organization has been found responsible for the attack of U.S. troops in Aden in December 1992, and claim to have shot down U.S. helicopters and killed U.S. servicemen in Somalia in 1993 . Al Qaeda also carried out the August 1998 bombings of the U.S. Embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam, killing up to 300 individuals and injuring more than 5,000 . In October 2000, Al Qaeda conducted a suicide attack on the USS Cole in the port of Aden, Yemen, with an explosive-laden boat, killing 17 U.S. Navy sailors and injuring 39 . On September 11, 2001, 19 AQ members hijacked and crashed four U.S. commercial jets – two into the World Trade Center in New York City, one into the Pentagon near Washington, DC; and the last into a field in Shanksville, Pennsylvania – leaving over 3,000 individuals dead or missing.
As time progressed the expansion of Al Qaeda had grown exponentially. Breaking off into multiple branches, one particular branch that has made major impact is Al Qaeda in the Arab Peninsula. Most active in Saudi Arabia and Yemen it is considered to be the most active branch. In January 2009, the leader of al-Qa’ida in Yemen (AQY), Nasir al-Wahishi, publicly announced that Yemeni and Saudi al-Qa’ida (AQ) operatives were working together under the banner of AQAP. This announcement signaled the rebirth of an AQ franchise that previously carried out attacks in Saudi Arabia.
Later a Muslim convert Abdulhakim Mujahid Muhammad, formerly known as Carlos Leon Bledsoe stated he had been affiliated and sent from Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula to open fire in a drive-by on the United States Military Recruiting office in Little Rock, Arkansas as well as when the organization took responsibility for an attempted and failed bombing on a Northwest Airlines flight from Amsterdam to Detroit on December 25th, 2009. here it helps tribal militias seize territory from al Houthi-Saleh forces. The U.S. Department of Treasury listed the governor of al Bayda, Nayif Salih Salim al Qaysi, as a specially designated global terrorist in 2016 for facilitating the expansion and settlement of AQAP in al Bayda
Policies
Under the Obama administration a threefold strategy for Yemen was implemented: combating Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula in the short, increasing development assistance in the long term, and organizing international support for stabilization efforts. The main goal of the United States in relation to Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula is to simply contain and stop all terrorist activity.
Significance to US National Interest
In 2015, Saudi Arabia began bombing Houthi held territory across Yemen causing mass civilian casualties. Saudi Arabia destroyed targets ranging from market places to hospitals from schools and they even targeted a funeral that held one hundred and forty people and were all killed in a single strike. Saudis bomb a vital part of al-Hudayah, severely damaging a main source of Yemen’s food and any humanitarian shipments and increasing the chances of mass starvation and what is already an impoverished country. The indiscriminate bombing has promoted investigations by the United Nations for possible war crimes, but while Saudi Arabia are the ones who are taking the main source of action, it is also important to look at the great powers whose support those actions that happens to be the United States.
The United States has supported Saudi Arabia military since World War two, selling arms, providing military aid, and training the Saudi Military on how to use United States manufactured planes, tanks, and other weapons. In recent years, Saudi Arabia has bought more weapons from the United States than any other country in the world.
In March of 2015, the United States authorized twenty two billion dollars worth of weapon sales to Saudi Arabia. A recent deal includes twenty Abrams tanks listed as battle damage replacements; the battle of course is Yemen. The weapons the United States sells also include cluster bombs, banned by most of the international community and f-15 fighter planes, which makes up the vast bulk of what the Saudi air force is currently using as it bombs Yemen. But Americas aid to Saudi Arabia goes way beyond weapon sales and is directly contributing to the current fight. That is because the United States is helping refuel the Saudi planes while they strike targets across Yemen. When the Saudis ask the United States to refuel one of their planes, large American tankers deploy from Turkey or the Arabian Sea to link up Saudis and give Saudi Arabia airborne refuels that give Saudi planes a much longer range and allow Saudi air campaign to become more lethal, by allowing planes to stay in the air longer and target more frequently.
The question to ask now is why is the United States so supportive to the Saudi Arabian government? The most important reason is the Iran nuclear deal. In 2015 the Obama administration offered to drop its crippling economic sanctions on Iran in exchange for Iran limiting it nuclear program, without those sanctions Iran’s political and economic power has significantly increased, making Saudi Arabia nervous that their enemy will gain new influence in the region in countries from Iraq to Lebanon and from Syria to Yemen.
Now that Iran influences in Saudi Arabia’s backyard the Saudis fear that Houthi rebels loyal to Iran will then be footsteps away from Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia wants the Unites States help beating them back. Secondly, the intervention Yemen is also a part of the United States is broader counterterrorist strategy for the Middle East. Because Yemen is home to the most active and dangerous branch of Al Qaeda, the United States has a major interest in preventing this terror group from taking advantage of the power vacuum in Yemen to plot new attacks. U.S. counterterrorism operations also inadvertently tilt momentum in favor of al Houthi-Saleh forces in places like al Bayda governorate where AQAP is the main force supporting the anti-al Houthi fight. Civilians frequently protest against Emirati-backed security forces arbitrarily detaining, torturing, and disappearing young men accused of terrorism.
The United States is honoring its longstanding most important allies. Since World War two Saudi Arabia has been a vital partner against communism and now terror. The Yemen campaign is a high priority for Saudi Arabia and that makes it a priority for the United States. U.S. Director of National Intelligence Daniel Coats testified in May 2017 that AQAP has “preserved the resources, manpower, safe haven, local influence, and operational capabilities to continue to pose a threat.”
As the war continues into a bloody stalemate the administration is increasingly worried about being complicit in potential war crimes. State department documents show that the United States has been trying to limit exposure to LOAC (law of armed conflict) concerns . In efforts to avoid this United States issued a no strike list to the Saudis to try and mitigate civilian casualties including areas such as hospitals, universities, schools, and cemeteries, but the Saudis appear to be ignoring it. The United Nations estimates that nearly 10,000 people have died in the fight. Additionally, U.S. intelligence officials reported that AQAP transferred the capability to conceal explosives in electronic devices to al Qaeda affiliates in Somalia and Syria.
Alternative Course of Action
Talks of peace of agreements have been evident but many have seemed to falter. Law makers in congress have talked about stopping weapon sales to Saudi Arabia until there is more to keep the air war in Yemen from causing massive human rights abuses. Although others think that it’s very important to keep the sell up from Saudi Arabia despite the carnage in Yemen. Though the Obama administration has urged Saudi Arabia to avoid areas such as schools and hospitals, the white house also condemned individual attacks. The reality is that the Unites States increasing complicit with the action of a coalition led by Saudi Arabia. Lead efforts to broker a political resolution to the civil war and resolutions to the local conflicts that would otherwise collapse a national-level settlement and that fuel insurgencies. Support the establishment of forums to air and begin to address local grievances. Support a resolution to the civil war that preserves the al Houthis’ role in a future Yemeni government and that promises to begin to address popular grievances against the central government. Remove requirements under UNSCR 2216 as preconditions for peace talks.
Another course of action when dealing with Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula is for the United States to threaten the removal of aid to Saudi Arabia if Saudi Arabia does not agree to help end the legacy of Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. Their close encounter to the headquarters of Al Qaeda can give the United States leverage into Yemen if the idea of an invasion would come about in similarity to the attack on Osama Bin-Laden. The problem resulting here is if the United States does in fact stop aiding and selling weapons to Saudi Arabia, the United States then loses out on a very large amount of profit, as Saudi Arabia is the United States most buying country when it comes to military defense selling.
Expand operations against AQAP by focusing on the group’s critical vulnerability: its relationship with the Sunni population. Maintain or increase support for the Emirati forces combating AQAP. Establish or support partners in establishing an alternative line of support for local militias in order to break their relationship with AQAP. Support local administrations and governance efforts to secure populations against AQAP’s influence. The increasingly sectarian nature of the war drives support toward AQAP and strengthens the group’s narrative that it is the defender of the Sunni in Yemen. The conflict is largely about local power struggles, and most Yemenis are not fighting for sectarian causes. The Zaydi Shi’a al Houthis, Hadi allied forces, and AQAP have cast it in sectarian terms, however.
Lastly, another course of action is no course of action. Due to the United States providing aid to Saudi Arabia, the United States can allow for Saudi Arabia to continue its course in war with Yemen in the hopes that in time Al Qaeda and its members will slowly dissipate. The only issue that remains concerning to this course of action are the notions of the United Nations finding causation to believe that the United States is or will be found responsible for war crimes as well as for the many casualties that will result of this matter. Along with the decision of wanting to let go of an idealist perspective of doing what more so morally acceptable or to uphold a realist point of view and allow for the weak to suffer what they may. Along with American and Emirati counterterrorism tactics may create a backlash within certain Yemeni populations. Tribes view U.S. counterterrorism operations as overly costly for their communities and frequently express frustration for the lack of support they receive to combat AQAP. AQAP then frames its attacks on Emirati-backed forces as reprisals for these human rights violations in order to galvanize support for its cause. Considering AQAP emir Qasim al Raymi encouraged supporters in the West to rise up as part of a global Muslim army in a late May 2017 statement.
Proposed Course of Action
Support and shape the Saudi-led coalition’s operations in Yemen in order to pressure the al Houthi-Saleh faction militarily, prevent resources from flowing to AQAP, and limit the effects of the war on the population. Reorient the Saudi-led coalition on achieving strategic effects through limited military operations in place of campaigns that are equally punitive for the population. Condition assistance on a more restricted air campaign against specific military targets and on adherence to guidelines that will better regulate the recipients of military and financial resources.
The U.S. must orient on changing the conditions set by the civil war that AQAP exploits in order to put the group on course to permanent defeat. AQAP will expand its support zones as long as the Yemeni civil war persists. The U.S. must take the lead in shaping the Saudi-led coalition’s policy in order to reach a political settlement to the civil war and focus the coalition on countering AQAP.[26] A lasting political settlement will enable Yemeni actors to concentrate on providing governance and combating AQAP. A political solution to the civil war will also limit the need for the Hadi government and Saudi-led coalition to depend upon AQAP-affiliated militias, to which they currently turn a blind eye. An inclusive political resolution will advance U.S. national security objectives in the region by removing some of the conditions that AQAP exploits in order to expand its support zones and safe havens.