This essay will investigate why India adopted its ‘Act East’ policy and how effectively India has implemented that policy.
In 2014 at the East Asia Summit in Myanmar, the Prime Minister of India and leader of the National Democratic Alliance (NDA), Narendra Modi, launched the governments Act East Policy (AEP). The government of India has prioritised its foreign policies towards the East for several reasons which this essay will discuss.
Firstly, the AEP has been described as a regeneration of the Look East Policy which was initiated during the government of Prime Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao in 1992. The Look East Policy was set up to strengthen economic ties with its eastern neighbours and was later successfully implemented to catalysing cooperation in security and economic terms with its fellow states in the region. Prior to the announcement of the AEP in November 2014 the Minister of External Affairs of India, Sushma Swaraj, described the need for an AEP to replace the outdated Look East Policy in an attempt to reassert India’s role in the region and increase its proactive role in the region. Swaraj insisted that India must Act East and not just Look East. The AEP lacks an official vision statement which leads us to speculate the ‘official’ motive and goals of the policy. However, the words and promises of Prime Minister Modi to ‘Act East’ on several occasions, including at the ASEAN summit, highlights the new action-oriented approach suggesting the reason for the policy is to announce that India is looking to take on a bigger role in the region and prioritise the pursual of strategic and security cooperation to deepen relationships with its neighbours. Perhaps also to revive ‘historic cultural and ideological links with countries to its east, especially Japan and Southeast Asia’. Furthermore, unlike the objective of the LEP, the AEP is looking to expand the domain of the ‘East’ to include China, South Korea, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, and the Pacific Islands. This implies India is working to engage in the broader Asia-Pacific region and to construct a strategic vision for the broader Asia-Pacific. In this regard, the AEP’ could be an attempt to correct India's historical neglect and lack of a strategic vision for the Asia-Pacific’. Therefore it is clear India wants to take a more proactive role in the region and perhaps engage in deeper complex interdependence in the region.
It is important to consider the current context that India is situated in currently to further contribute to the assessment of why India adopted its AEP and what triggered the regeneration of the LEP for a more hands-on approach. The announcement of the policy was made during a time where the region is facing major geopolitical shifts. Firstly, and most obviously, the rise of China.
The rise of China has had profounding effects both globally and regionally. Regionally the rise has produced fundamental changes in the economic and politico-security structure of Asia. These effects have created a phase of disequilibrium in the international power structure which has compelled India into creating ‘policy changes to protect its perceived national interest’.
One of these policy changes to protect its national interest has been to engage in an Indo-Pacific region to promote cooperation, improve strategic relationships, and strengthening India’s influence in the region. The emergence of the term ‘Indo-Pacific’ conveys the deepening interdependence and connectedness of South Asia, East Asia, and Southeast Asia. This interconnectedness has created a multilateral strategic system linking these regions as well as exhibiting an orientation towards India and China’s maritime and their objectives to increase their domain of power beyond their subregions. Ergo, the emergence of the Indo-Pacific region exhibits ‘the widening of India’s perceived area of strategic influence and reveals the country’s emergence as a pan-Asian rather than merely South Asian power.’ Furthermore, India’s role in promoting an Indo-Pacific region is partly due to countering China’s influence.
The dispute in the South China Sea involving China has seen India promoting its position on the ‘freedom of navigation, maritime security, expeditious resolution of dispute’ in accordance with international law and the UN Convention of the Law of the Sea. India is threatened by the increased military presence of China in the South China Sea because more than 40% percent of its trade travels through this area.
In efforts to counter China’s influence, India has sought to deepen engagement with the US. The Joint Strategic Vision between India and the US has aligned India’s AEP and the US’s pivot to Asia. This demonstrates India’s aim of expanding ‘its geo-strategic space to contend with China’s growing assertiveness and foster balanced relations’. The success of this policy can be seen through the joint efforts between the India and US to safeguard “maritime security and ensuring freedom of navigation and overflight throughout the region, especially in the South China Sea”. Furthermore, this strategic alignment, between India and the US, reflects a ‘shared commitment to a rules-based order in the maritime domain’ and has also been illustrated through joint naval exercises.
The initiation of the AEP is an acknowledgment of the Eastward shift in India’s trade to over 50% now. The shift includes Bangladesh and Myanmar as well as the member countries of ASEAN. Another motivation for the AEP is the failure of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) to accomplish the South Asian Economic Union. South Asia’s trade within the region is lower than its trade with the rest of the world. South Asia’s intra-regional trade comes in at around 5% of the total trade of SAARC countries.
Whilst some critique the AEP as a simple ‘renaming’ of the already in place LEP, there are several significant areas where the AEP have gone much further than the LEP ever did. Under the current shifting geopolitical structure, mainly in relation to China’s rapid and assertive rise, AEP has strengthened its ties with ASEAN. This can be seen through the increased travel by India’s top leaders. Over the last 24 months the president, vice president, and prime minister have visited nine out of ten ASEAN members. Alliances. previously deteriorating, are now revitalising.
India has agreed to promote connectivity through Thailand and Myanmar as well as with other ASEAN member states. Modi granted $1 billion to stimulate interconnectivity at the India-ASEAN Summit in Kuala Lumpur in 2015. This allocation prioritised “connectivity, culture, and commerce”. Furthermore, India has recognized that the success of the AEP is influenced by its contributions to the economic and security development of Northeast India.
Correspondingly India’s relations with ASEAN have been diversified to include “security, political, counterterrorism, and defense collaboration in addition to economic ties.” due to the rising influence of the Islamic State, cooperation to hinder terrorism has taken priority. Additionally, defense partnerships have been advances among ASEAN members.
In economic terms, the conclusion of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) agreement has spurred India to swiftly finish negotiations on the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) agreement. In 2016, a Free Trade Agreement on Investment and Services among India and ASEAN promoted the development of all member countries contributing to the strengthening of the alliance and region.
As noted earlier AEP sought to expand its geographical sphere of alliances and influence to incorporate states such as Japan, Australia, the Pacific Islands, Mongolia, and South Korea. This is inclusive of India’s increased Pacific orientation. India and Japan’s relationship has seen great improvements and has resulted in a “Special Strategic and Global Partnership”. Additionally, Japan committed to investing $35 billion in India. India and Australia’s relationship has also been improved with Raja Mohan noting that the AEP has put Australia and the South Pacific back on “India’s political radar”. The Indian Prime Minister also visited Australia for the first time in 28 years. Whilst Mongolia hosted the prime minister for the first time ever. Another success for India in its Pacific orientation was the establishment of the India-Pacific Islands Cooperation Forum. These are examples of India’s successes in engaging in bilateral strategic partnerships in the Indo-Pacific region.
On the contrary, India’s AEP has been critiqued as a simple ‘renaming’ or ‘third phase’ of the already in place LEP. Claims that the AEP has gone further in the deepening and broadening of India’s engagement in the region does not stand up to empirical inspection. Firstly, it can be argued that the action of expanding to the east and beyond to increase domain was already apparent during an earlier phase of the policy. For example, in spite of the claims of India and Japan’s growing relationship, economic, political and strategic interactions between the two states were already present during earlier phases of the policy. Since 2006, both countries have held annual summit meetings. Outcomes of these summits include a “strategic and global partnership”, the start of a strategic dialogue, and concluded a Free Trade Agreement in 2011. Japan has been a source of foreign direct investment and overseas development assistance for India for some time already.
Comparably, Australia and India held their first strategic dialogue in 2001. Here, they already had a successful integrative relationship. In 2006, they instigated a memorandum in understanding defense cooperation. In 2009, a joint declaration on security cooperation followed. Furthermore, a dialogue partnership between India and the Pacific Islands Forum was created in 2003. The advancements in relations listed above all preceded the official initiation of the AEP. This evidence disparages the successes claimed by the AEP suggesting that AEP itself hasn’t successfully implemented the policy as it was already in motion, but rather has effectively maintained the policies.
Secondly, regardless of the claims that under AEP India’s relations have peaked, India is burdened with the reputation of being the least significant country among the region’s major powers. In regards to economic progress, a further unsupported claim of deeper economically integrated relations within the region under AEP can be criticised. Since 2015 India was still only ASEAN’s ninth largest trading partner. Several other much smaller economies had higher trade levels, including both Taiwan and Hong Kong. Ergo despite the FTA between India and ASEAN, India is yet to decently merge into manufacturing supply chains within the region. Furthermore, “in economic terms at least, India is yet to prove that it is a nation of consequence”. Although, there is still potential for India’s economic relations with the region to strengthen under the trade in services agreement with ASEAN, especially considering India’s comparative advantage in service-oriented industries.
Hindering the success of India’s AEP is the country’s internal economic reforms. The internal economic reforms will dominate the swiftness at which India is able to further integrate with the economies of the region. The Modi government has tried to project an investor-friendly image. However, India’s “historically protectionist and conservative economic policies remain well-entrenched.” Despite attempts to increase connectivity, for example with talks of developing India’s north as a gateway to Asia, persistent delays in other infrastructure projects, such as the India-Myanmar-Thailand Trilateral Highway and the Kaladan Multi-modal Transit project, act as obstacles to advancing infrastructure interconnectedness.
Similarly, concerns are observed in regards to India’s security diplomacy towards the East Asian region. Ongoing timidness towards expanding India’s domain of power beyond adjacent neighbours remains in its foreign policy development. These issues are aggravated by the relatively slow modernisation of India’s military. Further inflamed by the lack of diplomatic resources deployed to its neighbouring territories. Shadowing India’s military potential is China’s military might in the region.
Further shadowing the AEP is assertive foreign policies by other powers in the region. China’s Belt and Road Initiative, the US’s pivot to Asia (although the effects of this remain unclear as it’s existence is questioned under Trump), Japan’s renewed initiative to engage with the region under Shinzo Abe’s ‘Democratic Security Diamond’, and China’s ‘Plus One’ strategy to diversify FDI, act as “crowding out” factors that undermine India’s AEP.
AEP’s goal to adopt a greater strategic geography region expanding from the Indian Ocean to the Pacific discloses a potential flaw to the AEP as it becomes too expansive a region without clear and, or significant strategic focus. This factor could also dilute ASEAN’s ‘centrality’ principle that was traditionally the basis of the LEP. AEP does attempt to counter this negative effect by officially mentioning the ‘centrality’ principle as a core proposition. On the other hand, India’s continuing engagement in a growing number of bilateral and small multilateral relations excluding ASEAN hints towards moving beyond ASEAN in the pursual of India’s eastward engagement policy. These groupings include a trilateral dialogue between the foreign ministers of India, the US and Japan; a foreign secretary-level dialogue between Australia, India, and Japan, and India, Australia and Indonesia dialogue on the Indian Ocean; a dialogue track two dialogue between India, South Korea and Japan; a track 1.5 dialogue between India, China and the US; and a cooperation agreement between India, Japan and Vietnam. The success in opening several dialogues with states in the Asia Pacific region shows good development in the goal of eastern engagement. These dialogues also show a pattern of regional powers moving beyond ASEAN security. Furthermore, the development of the Indo-Pacific Quad, an informal strategic dialogue between India, the US, Japan, and Australia has been said to be necessary to counter China’s growing power in the Indo-Pacific region. The Quad presented hope for a strong alliance helping India to increase its influence and domain of power in the region. Although, currently Trump’s leniency towards bilateral agreements calls into question America’s strategic investment in the partnership, and the future effectiveness of the Quad remains uncertain.
Consequently, the effectiveness of the AEP is unclear, concerns remain as to whether or not this new ‘phase’ of the LEP is simply that, a rebranding. The key factors of the AEP such as broader strategic cooperation with states such as Japan and Australia were already evident during the earlier phases of India’s goal of eastward engagement. Additionally, an Indo-Pacific oriented approach presents obstacles and ambiguities. A potential obstacle being the lack of clear strategic goals and benefits in such a vast geographical space leading to the dilution of ASEAN’s centrality principle. In this aspect, the AEP persists as a progressing foreign policy that is awaiting clearer definition.
The AEP was adopted to rejuvenate the LEP and take a more active stance in eastward engagement. Eastward engagement is a priority for India to make it a more influential power in the region and to expand its domain of influence. This more action-oriented approach was triggered by factors such as the rising power of China and to coordinate with the US’s pivot to Asia. The AEP’s effectiveness is questionable, however, the principles that they promote are paramount to ensuring ‘peace and progress in the East and also the whole world in the true spirit of vasudhaiv kutumbkam – “the world is one family”. Thus not much empirical evidence is available to support the effectiveness of the AEP, although it cannot be denied that same progress has been made. Moreover, I believe the principles the policies provide promote a rules-based cooperative order and free movement in the region, which are very important to establishing peace and cooperation, a fitting role for the world’s largest democracy.