National security policy in designed to protect the rights and freedoms of the United States and its citizens. This policy is drafted in different ways, for different purposes. In the field of international relations, it is important to understand why certain conflicts or crises different outcomes have when situations were similar or even if they were entirely different so that we can learn how and under what circumstances certain policies are created. The Haitian and Panama Crises present a unique opportunity to examine the outcomes of crises in nations that exist in the United States’ backyard. Using the Fishel text as the foundation and source for background information a comparison can be made between the Haitian and Panama Crises that shows that power and interest have a strong impact on how and which policies are commissioned and carried out in times of crisis.
Panama
Background
As a nation, Panama has seen its fair share of political violence and struggles. Beginning from its independence in the 1903, the state was seemingly dominated by the newly constructed canal and the hegemony in the hemisphere, the United States (Fishel 2017). The United States provide the military support needed for the nation until Jose A. Remon took office as president in 1953 and created the Guardia Nacional or the National Guard (Fishel 2017). The National Guard would play a large part in the events of January 1964 were there was a riot that was started because of an American Flag being raised over a Panamanian high school against the order of government officials (Sanchez 2002). As a result, the Panamanian flag was torn, and many Panamanians were killed, adding to the already tense conditions in the region (Fishel 2017). This was the first strike at the United States hegemony in the region. These riots led to some of the first major policy introduce in the area: The Carter-Torrijos Treaties (Fishel 2017). Furlong analyzed how Torrijos made necessary modifications, as an agreement in accordance with the that would allow for the US Congress to ratify the treaties that would allow for the democratization process to begin. (Furlong 1993). This treaty was the first step to the democratization of Panama and encompassed to the Defense and Panama Canal Treaties, which provide the frame would for an interagency system in Panama. The PCT create the Panama Canal Commission (PCC) which would be responsible for running the canal until December 31, 1999 (Fishel 2017). The PCC would be led by an American for the first several years with a Panamanian official as second in command. In January 1990, the roles would reverse, given the Panamanian control of the commission. The coordination between the United States Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) and the Panamanian government, thanks to the PCC and the Defense Treaty, would create a Combined board that would have access to politics between the two nations (Fishel 2017). It gave panama a chance to an almost mentorship agreement with the United States on how to run the Canal and how to become a stable democracy. Access to the combined board would be limited to those in USSOUTHCOM and the Guard. Several other agencies also had offices in the region including the DEA and the CIA which further complicated the environment in the region.
The Policy in Crisis: Panama
Panamanian President Torrijos was killed in a plane crash that many of his citizen believe had been orchestrated by other groups in the region (Fishel 2017). The second in command COL Florencio Flores took office but was oust in an agreement that included COL Ruben Paredes, LTC Manuel A. Noriega and LTC Roberto Herrera (Fishel 2017). Through this agreement Noriega grew to command the National Guard, because Parades would have to step down in order to abide by the constitutional law that stated that the general of the Guard must step down before the next presidential election, which was held in 1984 (Fishel 2017). Though Paredes ran for president, Noriega flipped the script on him and through his and the National Guard combined with the police and other security, through legislation to form the Panama Defense Forces (PDF), behind Nicolas Barletta (Fishel 2017). Barletta would go on to win the election. This election was contested by many including a scholar by the name of Dr. Hugo Spadafora. Because of his statements, he would be found dismembered and many credited his murder to Noriega (Fishel 2017). Noriega would go on to rise to power through the intimidation of Barletta and other and US officials would step in because of the affect that his actions were having detrimental effects on the US relations in the region and legitimate, Panamanian administrations.
General Fred Woerner took over SOUTHCOM in June 1987 (Fishel 2017). Woerner would become the key initiator in policy during the Panama Crisis. He had an impressive record of service being that he was fluid in Spanish, was very familiar with the region, and the top Foreign officer in the army (Fishel). Just as Woerner was taking office, Noriega arranged tohace mre legislation passed that would extend his tenure and commander of the PDF five more years to avoid retirement and loss of power (Fishel). He was challenged and ousted as Torrijos murderer, a drug trafficker, and working with Castro by Herrera, but it was to no avail because the evidence stated otherwise (Fishel 2017). The US increased forces and passed legislation on June 26th that would “restore constitutional rights and freedoms” in Panama (Fishel 2017).
Panama proves to be a situation where national security policy was made from below (Fishel 2017). After two United States Attorneys decided they were going to indict Noriega, Woerner began to plan for a contingency plan in case Noriega’s PDF became the enemy (Fishel 2017). The Fishel text paints the Panama Crisis as one where policy was used to continue the democracy and the safety of American and Panamanian citizens, but it is actually one where democracy in panama was essential to continue the hegemony in the region.
According to Robinson (1989), the United States missed important moments in this escalation that could have halted Noriega’s rise to power. Robinsons states that there sanctions through the International Emergency Economic Power Act (IEEPA) were simply just not strong enough to stop Noriega’s corruption and collusion with the Panamanian underworld (Robinson 1989). She states:
…the sanctions hurt but did not halt Panama's economy. Had the United States taken more drastic economic measures, such as a total trade embargo, the impact would have been enormous, given the large U.S. stake in the Panamanian economy… (Robinson 1989).
The American presidential administrations understood that if the policy regarding the sanctions had been more inclusive, they would have risked violating the Carter-Torrijos Treaties and destroyed arguable the strongest Gross National Income per Capita in Latin America (Robinson 1989). The United States handles nations in regard to national security policy on a case by case basis depending on the factors involved. During the Panama Crisis we saw the United States conduct policy from the bottom up (Fishel 2017). It was not dictated by those in congress or the NSC, but rather those who were seeing the escalation of the situation in the region first hand and eminent danger that one aspiring dictator posed. Manuel Noriega posed a significant threat to the United states’ hegemony in the region. He knew trade secrets, was accused of drug trafficking, and was colluding with known enemies of the state. Because of his unique position as a former asset to the United States, he had to be stop. But it had to be done carefully as to not involve the United States in another war while they were trying to heal the wounds left by the Cold War. The policy that was drawn up by General Woerner of SOUTHCOM as a response to the indictment of Noriega and the fear that his army, PDF, might grow hostile towards American leaders was carefully drawn out to prevent war, though it was not successful. It was drawn up on the premise that no one really knew the extent to which Noriega was working with or against the United States government.
Noriega was a threat to the United States because he was going rogue (Sanchez 2002). Sanchez elaborates on the idea that Noriega took control of the armed force in panama in the mid-1980s (Sanchez 2002). US officials were not worried at the time because though he was dabbling in the Panamanian drug trade and other illegal operation, he helped the United States take down the Sandinista Regime and was informing them on other issues happening in Central America (Sanchez 2002). Policymakers understood that he was a terrible human being but he “was like a Trujillo reincarnate; he was a SOB, but he was "our" SOB” (Sanchez 2002). The United State was not concerned with Noriega because he was not challenging the United Stat’s sovereignty in the region, Noriega was growing less controllable and was suspected to be trading secrets with hostile government (Sanchez 2002). Noriega completely disrupted Panama’s transition to democracy when he allegedly murdered Torrijos in 1981 (Furlong 1993). Torrijos provided the foundation for Panama to move into a new era and began the crisis that would serve to be a dangerous and deadly time in the history of Panama. The United States took notice and the leaders on the ground, like Woerner and the US Attorneys new that he would be a problem if he were allowed to rise and stay in power (Sanchez 2002). The policy that Woerner commissioned “Elaborate Maze” which was five phases of policy that could be executed together or separately (Fishel 2017). These plans would later be known as Post Time, Klondike Key, Blue Spoon, and Krystal Ball, but executed under other code names. Woerner understood the risk of losing power in the region and how it would affect power and policy and the region, so he acted quickly. National security policy in Panama was in response to interest and power, a very realist point of view. The drafting of Elaborate maze allowed for Woerner to adhere to the guidelines that were given to him which were “don’t get us in a war”. Phase I allowed for the united sate to ramp up its forces in panama with seeming like it was gearing up for war, Phase II allowed for the safe, and subtle, evacuation of now essential personnel from the nation, Phases II and IV would provide for defensive and offensive strategies against the PDF, and Phase V would cover the aftermath and occupation (Fishel 2017). Just like the carefully calculated sanction through the IEEPA were chosen because of their impact on the Panamanian economy and its alignment with the Carter-Torrijos Treaty (Robinson 1989), Elaborate Maze would carefully consider the escalation and de-escalation of the threat that was Noriega and the PDF.
Haiti
Background
The nation of Haiti has been ravaged by predatory regimes for decades. According to Fishel the states has been terrorized by dictators who employ “thugs” to overthrow sitting regimes, terrorize citizens, and undermine military and police for decades, including Guillaume Sam’s regime that snatch power in a coup in 1915 (Fishel 2017). Since then countless coup de tats have caused the deaths, asylum seeking, and resignations of for 40 heads of states between 1804 and 1994 (Fishel). This regime required the occupation of United States military forces from 195 until 1934 (Fishel 2017). Though the occupation allowed for the impoverished nation to gin some stability and establish some form or legitimate national guard, it quickly reverted to its predatory nature after the American occupation ended (Fishel 2017), leaving numerous officials to abandon their offices until Dr. Francois “Papa Doc” Duvalier took office in 1957 (Fishel 2017). His regime was no different than the predatory rulers that Haiti had seen before the US occupation. Fishel states, “The establishment of a militia of modern cacos, the Ton-ton macoutes or boogeymen” were used “to offset the power of the regular military and police” (Fishel 2017). Duvalier used his boogeymen to completely control the government, military, and police which created an oppressive state for Haitian citizens. Papa Doc would pass would pass in 1971 and his son Jean- Claude “Baby Doc” Duvalier would rule until 1986 when he fled to France (Fishel 2017). Several would take office between 1986 and 1990, but none would be permanent until Jean-Bertrand Aristide was elected to office in 1990 (Fishel 2017).
Jean Bertrand Aristide was educated and fluent in five languages (Fishel 2017). Though he was able to secure his bid for office though his large following and Aristide was elected to office in 1990 on the platform supporter by the poor and those who were strongly opposed to Baby Doc (Fishel 2017). He was able to gather the support of the elite mulattos as well. His movement never transitioned into a political party and his time in office would be short lived because of his ability to antagonizing the rich and the military (Fishel 2017). He sought to restructure the military and was able “to obtain the retirements of sic of the top seven commanders in the military” (Casimir & Canham-Clyne 1992). His dislike like for the military and elites, who he disliked for the privilege and link to power (Casimir & Canham-Clyne 1992), would lead commander of the Haitian Armed Forces, Lieutenant General Raoul Cedras, to overthrow his government in Fall 1991 (Fishel 2017). This coup would be the grounds for the Haitian Crisis.
Policy During Crisis: Haiti
As soon as Cedras too office, her created a puppet government with Jean-Jacques Honorat as the “head” of state (Casimir & Canham-Clyne 1992). This would force Aristide into exile and cause the deaths of at least 1,500 Haitians to be killed for any support of the former president of Haiti (Casimir & Canham-Clyne 1992). Cedras’ coup brought on an enormous international crisis as Haitians were fleeing the nation by the thousands to seek asylum. The Organization of American States (OAS) adopted resolutions and appoint a mediator, Columbian diplomat Augusto Ocampo, to attempt to restore Aristide (Fishel 2017). United Nations (UN) secretary general also appointed Argentine Dante Caputo as a special representative to Haiti (Fishel 2017). He was also appointed to try to restore Aristide administration. Each of them tried for months to reason with Cedras, but it was to no avail (Fishel 2017). The UN decide to impose sanctions on the small island nation, but it did not hurt the military or the elites, but it did hurt Aristide original supporters: the poor (Fishel 2017, Canham-Clyne 1992). The United States joined the sanctions and denounced Cedras’ coup. Doyle states:
"Until President Aristide's government is restored," said Secretary of State James Baker before the OAS in October, "this junta will be treated as a pariah throughout this hemisphere, without assistance, without friends, and without any future” (Doyle 1994).
They were also taking on thousands of Haitian refugees who were seeking asylum in Florida. The United States drew up policy that would promote the forced repatriation of Haitian citizens due to the high AIDS rate among the asylum-seekers (Fishel 2017). Though the United States stated that the junta would be treated as “pariah” in system, they instead treated asylum seekers that way. This policy continued from the Bush administration to the Clinton administration (Doyle 1994).
Policy that could have helped remedy Haitian Crisis was put on hold to push through policy that would secure the United States borders from economic asylum-seekers. Finally, the United States began drafting policy that would create a joint task force which coordinated with Colonel Pulley was established as the man in charge on land over force that were deployed in conjunction with the Governor Island agreement signed by Cedras and and Aristide. Commander Butcher would be the commander at sea answering to the Commander in Chief of the US Atlantic Fleet (Fishel 2017). Butcher commander the USS Harlan County, an landing ship, which was supposed to land in Port-au-Prince to take on Cedras’ junta (Fishel 2017). The ship did not land as there was a mob attack, orchestrated by Cedras, that kept it from doing so. US Official supported the decision of Commander Butcher to turn the ship around, despite Pulley insisting that it was just a hoax planned by the opposition (Fishel 2017). This was yet another example on the United States failure to follow through on planning and policy in regard to Haiti (Wucker 2004).
Before the Harlan County incident, the United State was planning to do a noncombatant evacuation operation, similar to the one that occurred in Panama in the 1980s (Fishel 2017). This plan was scratched, and a forcible entry operation was orchestrated to restore Aristide (Fishel 2017). Instead of drafting a tailored plan, officials found a plan from 1988 that might suit there need but the plan had no guideline for who troops would be used once they arrived on in Haiti (Fishel 2017). There would be multiple changes in policy including document that were to be drawn up by the National Security Council, but the buck would continue to be passed from department to department because of opposition to training Haitian police (Fishel 2017). OPLANS 2370. 2380, and 2375 would be changed time and time again until the Clinton administration finally approved bot OPLANS 2370 and 2380 to be executed with the anticipated deployment on September 10, 1994, three years after Cedras had taken control of the Haitian government (Fishel 2017). The plans were communicated through the proper channels and the hurdles of the plan not being known to member of the Haitian IWG were removed, the American public was briefed on the situation and the operation was scheduled to be carried out on September 19, 1994 (Fishel 2017). Before the United State could even intervene in the Haitian Crisis, officially, Former President Jimmy Carter had parachuted in as a request of Cedras to see if there was room to negotiate the restoration of Aristide (Fishel 2017). By the end of the September 18, 1994, Jimmy Carter combined with the notification that Cedras received that the 82nd Airborne was in bound, Cedras agreed to step down and the regime was overthrown (Fishel 2017). Former President Carter’s accomplishments were confirmed and the order to de elope a new plane to address the Haitian regime as friendly was made. Ambassador William Swing touched down and an officer assigned to the embassy greeted him. This visual was would come to known as the Inter-vasion of Haiti (Fishel 2017).
Policy in Haiti must be look upon as policy for show being that the United States had no interest or gains to be made in regard to Haiti until the refugee crisis began. Many criticized the United States government for their refusal “fused to sever diplomatic ties with Haiti, for example, and failed to freeze the personal financial holdings of Haitians involved in the coup” (Wucker 2004). But they successfully creation policy to protect their borders against those who were seeking asylum. The United States relaxing the sanction was not the best course of action either. Though the United States looked as if it was constantly creating policy in regard to Haiti it made several missteps. The first of those was putting money into the elections that happened shortly after Baby Doc left the nation (Wucker 2004). The democracy was extremely weak at this point and the potential for it to revert to a predatory state was likely (Wucker 2004). The United States never really fostered democracy in the region because it was so preoccupied with Post-Cold War politics. Even after the United States entered the Haiti and created the Multi-National force and reinstated Aristide as president there was still only one goal: “to hold an election and go home” (Fishel 2017). The United State was repeating mistakes that it had made for and so did Haiti regardless of the United Nations teams that were on the ground, and still remain there even today (Fishel 2017, Wucker 2004). The United States changed their policy and action regarding Haiti several times regarding OPLANS (Fishel 2017). There was no unique policy planning regarding Haiti most was taken from plans that were made regarding other crises and disputes (Fishel 2017). Haiti was a unique situation being that the state was and had been predatory for decades and had the possibility to return to that same condition even after policy was implemented but it was because the US wanted so badly to avoid war. More aggressive policy should have been taken toward the actual regime rather than the people who were already suffering.
Conclusion: Different Policy, Different Outcomes
In comparison Haiti was handled differently than Panama and the outcomes are representative of that. Though Operation Just Cause in panama was short and sweet, the nation did begin the transition to democracy (Furlong 1993). The gentle sanction placed upon the on the nation did not ease the issues within the nation because the United States was not the nation’s only stream of income (Robinson 1989). The only option after Noriega rose to power was war because of the threat and destabilization that he caused but it was put off for as long as possible because adequate attempts, though engineered to be as calm and unnoticeable as possible, were made. There was coordination among it forces that were on land and at sea, they answered to one commander, and were in support of the mission on land (Fishel 2017). Woerner was given the necessary power to attempt to foster the democracy in Panama in order for the United States hegemony to remain intact (Sanchez 2002). Elaborate Maze was commissioned especially for Panama so that success would be guaranteed whether the plan’s phases were carried out in succession, simultaneously, or otherwise (Fishel 2017). This careful planning came from the United States familiarity with the region, the interest and economics involved, and knowledge of the dictator and his forces. The policy was strategic. The same cannot be said for Haiti. The United States did really take on the Haitian crisis as a primary concern. There were preoccupied with the Russia and other conflicts abroad. The United Nations took on the primary consideration of the Haitian Crisis. They, along with the OAS, sent ambassadors to reason with the Cedras regime, this allowed for them to learn about the leader and reason regime so that they could make informed decision about the policy to enact regarding the crisis (Fishel 2017). The Haitian sanctions were harsh and only hurt those who were already poor, but the United States made no effort to freeze the assets of those who contributed to the coup (Wucker 2004). The cooperation that was mandated by the Goldwater- Nichols Act that was seen in panama was not seen here, neither was the military support of the mission in Port-au-Prince was not even close to that of the cooperation that Woerner had in Panama (Fishel 2017). Most of what the United States did was in respond to actions by the UN and to protect it border. Policy was not unique constructed for the delicate situation in Haiti as it was in Panama and the only reason for that is that the United States interest were not promoted or undermined in Haiti on the scale that they were in Panama.
The Fishel text taught in Chapter 1 that the United States operates on ever shifting balance that is rooted with in the realist paradigm (Fishel 2017). The Realist paradigm dictates that nations are concerned with power and that the policy is dictated by human nature. This hold true when comparing the cases of the Haitian Crisis and the Panama Crisis. The United States was preoccupied with power and interest in these situations. The United States knew that it had to keep the neutrality of the Canal sot that they could continue to gain revenue from it. The also had to keep hold of panama because the control of the canal only added to the United States power and influence in the region while insuring that its hegemony remained. Haiti simply did not provide any gains in regard to power and influence and that why policy was not carried out in the same matter. The purpose of national security policy is to promote and protect the rights, freedoms, power, and interest of the United States. Beyond the policy to protect the United States’ borders, US officials did nothing to promote and protect democracy in Haiti.