What were Hendrik Verwoerd’s key foreign policy strategies?
Hendrik Verwoerd (1901 – 1966) was the last prime minister of Union of South Africa from 1958 until 1961, subsequently shaping his legacy as the creator and the first prime minister, of the Republic of South Africa from 1961 until his assassination in 1966. Dr Verwoerd’s foreign policy was heavily shaped by his own authoritarian, socially conservative, Afrikaner nationalist views which were subject to great international opposition during the time of national liberation movements, which were sweeping across African colonies during his tenure. Throughout his political career, Verwoerd was described as ‘ambitious, energetic, pragmatic and opportunistic’ (Miller, 1993, p. 637).
The most notable examples of his foreign policy include the active defence of the apartheid, proclamation of the South African Republic in 1961, withdrawal from the Commonwealth, and intentional ideological isolation from global powers. In the context of the Cold War, South African foreign policy was extremely individualistic, based on theories of harsh realism and separatism which was in stark contrast to a world of developing unity and neo-liberalism. Verwoerd’s modus operandi was the domination of other non-white settlers, as well as indigenous blacks whom made up the majority of the South African population.
The logic behind his international strategies was to ‘uncouple’ domestic policies from foreign relations, in order to maintain Afrikaner separatist ideals, yet strived to avoid total isolation (Price, 1987, p. 103). Verwoerd attempted to provide maximum autonomy for South Africa, in his mind allowing the minority white power to thrive, whilst seeking partners in the international community who would be less sensitive to racial policies, at the core of South African ruling mandate.
The defence of the infamous apartheid, whom Verwoerd was deemed the architect, was the centre of South African foreign policy between 1958 and 1966, which essentially sought complete ideological isolation from both political West and East. The global community could no longer tolerate South African racism, as it was ‘outside the competence of international organisations’ (Barber & Barratt, 1990, p. 68). Indeed, what was indicative of South Africa’s foreign relations, even with one of its closes allies at the time, was a sense of estrangement for its racial policies. In his famous ‘Winds of Change’ speech on the 3rd February 1960 to the South African Parliament, British prime minister Harold Macmillan had ‘unearthed the fears of the whites; decolonisation, Western attitudes and the strength of African nationalism’ (Barber & Barratt, 1990, p. 68). In the meantime, the tragic event of police violence against native blacks in Sharpeville on 28th March 1960 set forward the notion of urgency to act against Verwoerd’s racial policies. Although this had galvanised ‘international reverberations’, it had also encouraged Verwoerd to pursue a more restrictive international strategy (Price, 1987, p. 105).
The United Nations had expressed ‘concentrated opposition’ against South Africa, as it appeared on the Security Council as a threat to international peace. Despite the UN forming a group of diplomats to investigate and potentially resolve the issue, Verwoerd had prohibited their entry to South Africa. The blockade of foreign diplomacy was a way of protecting the white minority from a feeling of external pressure, which Verwoerd felt posed a serious threat to the white supremacy embedded in the status quo. Following this chain of events, Verwoerd pursued republicanism as his October 1960 referendum, open only to the whites, decided that South Africa should become independent. On 31st May 1961, the Republic of South Africa was proclaimed, and it withdrew from the Commonwealth. This completed Verwoerd’s international strategy of removing ideological pressures to amend racial policies.
Why did he choose them?
Verwoerd was a vocal critic of apathy the West had shown towards whites in Africa; white refugees fleeing violence and prosecution in Congo, as well as the clashes between natives and whites in Kenya were abhorrent to him, and the only way to protect South Africa from this was to proclaim it as an independent power in the global world (Barber & Barratt, 1990, p. 68). Afrikaner nationalists theorised about the South African position in the international community as the victim of ‘a temporary sick liberalism’ (Appolus, 1964, p. 11). In the context of the Cold War era, this liberalisation meant the organic civil rights movements in the United States, the anti-colonial liberation movements in the rest of Africa, to some extent supported by the USSR, contrasting the conservative racial ideologies of South Africa. This entrenched their attitudes towards new movements which were creating hostilities to old orders. Verwoerd’s strategy to deal with such a phenomenon in foreign relations was to ‘keep […] a blood-and-iron grip on things until the wave […] finally passed over’ (Appolus, 1964, p. 11). Verwoerd’s tendencies were beyond political; upon deeper analysis of his strategies, it is obvious that they were based on solidifying white power in colonial sub-Saharan Africa (Price, 1987, p. 109). South African foreign strategy under Dr Verwoerd did not seek justice, rather to bring back order. Individualism was stressed in his policies, from international level down to domestic and racial. This contrasted the increased internationalism experienced elsewhere.
According to Verwoerd, the presence of the whites on the continent created an agency for nationalism and political awakening in black Africa, non-existent before. Verwoerd’s interpretation of political opportunities was ‘monolithic’ (Miller, 1993, p. 636). From the examples of his foreign strategy, clearly he was prepared to alter South Africa’s global positioning to maintain the racist status quo. Much of his political reasoning stemmed from his admiration of 1930’s American social engineering. Very often he would compare apartheid South Africa to racially segregated America, drawing upon contemporary social studies to provide answers to white struggles (Miller, 1993, p. 646).
To what extent were these strategies rational means of achieving their objectives given the international context of the time?
Dr Verwoerd’s ideas were born into a world hostile towards racial policies and segregation. Since the 1940s, there had been an international consensus to suppress racial oppression on the international level (Barber & Barratt, 1990, p. 104). The Afrikaner nationalists held a ‘haughty confidence in white power being superior to the liberation sweeping Africa’ (Vale, 1994, p. 80). Compared to other states of the Cold War, where public opinion was widely expressed on international policies, South Africa’s foreign policy remained confined to a white Afrikaner male elite (Vale, 1994, p. 80). Realistically, the encouragement of keeping foreign policy focused on ideological separation was the only rational strategy to achieve definite security for white power. This provides a stark contrast between South Africa and the remaining African states which were globalising. The South African Republic was a beacon of old order standing in a forward-moving global society, whose international discourse began to be shaped by notions of universal human rights, liberalism and international cooperation (Skinner, 2017, p. 116). However, victim mentality, meant South African policy makers strongly believed that the contemporary international order was just a phase, trusting white supremacy which to them seemed much more realistic and practical long term than liberalism (Nolutshungu, 1975, p. 86). Verwoerd denounced Pan-Africanism, alongside the growing consensus of removal of racial inequalities, focusing his energies on defence of white settler supremacy and complete rejection of the idea that the imperial political order couldn’t persist in the context of the Cold War (Nolutshungu, 1975, p. 81). One of his strategies was vocal defence of white power, and it’s benefits to Africa, most notably retaliating to Macmillan’s invalidating speech by stating that ‘the white man, therefore, had […] an undoubted stake in the right to the land which he developed into a modern industrial state’ (Verwoerd, 1960). Rationality of Verwoerd’s foreign strategy can be judged on the consequences of implementation of policies.
Despite his hopes to keep distance from anti-apartheid countries only on ideological level, in a world striving to achieve an international community, it was difficult to forge relationships with major corporations which had faced scrutiny for their ties to South African economy. Vital market links were increasingly severed, especially after the United Nations Security Council called for sanctions against South Africa following the Sharpeville incident in 1960. Tarnishing one’s reputation for trading with South Africa became a question many corporations had to ask themselves, as they were operating in world full of blooming economies without such faults (Nolutshungu, 1975, p. 82). This is not to say that the gold and diamond industry were completely resistible to markets; Nikita Khurschev, despite his public siding with the African National Congress, had co-operated with Pretoria on deals for the elements, claiming that such transactions were solely for the purpose of funding liberation movements (Barber & Barratt, 1990, p. 78).
Do any theories of Africa’s international relations help us understand the choices Verwoerd made?
Verwoerd’s international strategy can be explained using realism, as well as Pan-Africanism. His stubborn opposition to policing from supranational organisations, such as the Commonwealth and the United Nations, is a classic example of realism as Verwoerd firmly believed in theoretical anarchism within the international political system, which meant that ‘no supranational authority can enforce rules over the states’ (Goodin, 2010, p. 133). By pursuing republicanism on the basis of ideological freedom, Verwoerd was maximising the self-interest of the white minority rule, simultaneously entrenching the foundations of the new state (Goodin, 2010, p. 133). Realism argues that all states have the desire for power, which explains the fervour with which Verwoerd defended white settler colonialism in Africa. Also his passion for white supremacy in South Africa explained that by cutting ties with those who could harm such an ideology, it was an act of self-preservation. Verwoerd rejected socialism and collectivism, standing firmly by individualism, which was a trait he had gained from his studies of early 1900s American sociology (Miller, 1993, p. 657). South African global strategies had therefore reflected realism by acting as central actors defending the old segregated order in the international community, which was pre-occupied with siding with liberalism or communism at the time of the Cold War. These reactions were prompted by an international politics movement much closer to South Africa – Pan-African nationalism. Initiated by Kwame Nkrumah, it was a movement mobilising black Africa ‘along cultural, political, economic and military lines’, which utilised the notions of nationhood and African unity at the time of decline of colonialism. The rejection of inferiority by black Africa posed a direct threat to the strength of white power in South Africa, as well as exhilarating international humanitarian authorities (Legum, 1965, p. 17). The climate of a growing international authority looming over old orders, and the active threat of black political power forming, had only intensified the desperation with which Verwoerd had acted; this is especially notable in his policy of blockade of foreign missions coming into South Africa, as well as limiting black franchise and black freedom of expression after the Sharpeville massacre. Verwoerd was a strong believer in South African independence from ideologically restrictive supranational organisations.
Whilst Verwoerd’s international strategy can in many ways be explained by realism, some realists do stress the reactive and one-sided nature of the theoretical frameworks’ actors, whose actions make up the basis for their work (Donnelly, 2004, p. 193). Georg Schwarzenberger noted that realists should be ‘on guard against naïve day-dreaming on international politics’ (Schwarzenberger, 1951, p. xv). Verwoerd’s international strategy certainly recognised the threat, namely idealistic liberal supranational organisations, posed to his racial dogma. Schwarzenberger also stressed that realists should be on the guard against ‘pernicious extreme unrestrained cynicism’ (Schwarzenberger, 1951, p. xv). Therefore, from a realist perspective, Verwoerd’s withdrawal from the international community, was a strategic weakness for the continued international support for the white minority in South Africa. This was an obvious consequence of extreme unrestrained cynicism and a strategy driven by a narrow outlook, which had overlooked the importance of international co-operation for his country’s long term economic success. However, this can ultimately be explained by an apathy for economic ills which disproportionately effected the poor black population, allowing continued support for his administration which continued long after his death.