In Aristotle’s Physics 2.8, while on the path to uncovering the final causes and necessity in nature, the Greek philosopher pokes at the idea that things in nature happen for a reason. He does this by stating that there is no result of luck or chance in the recurrences of nature — contradictory to Empedocles and Democritus — instead that nature is a cause for something. In this essay, I will be speaking in favor of Aristotle’s claims, showing how his theory discredits what’s presented by the other philosophers.
Throughout the entirety of Book II, Aristotle is trying to understand the matter and form of nature as it differs from things that aren’t constituted naturally (192b14). He begins this discussion by providing his own definition of nature on 192b10, describing it as plants and animals, as well as earth, air, fire, and water. Aristotle then analyzes the topic through certain natural phenomena such as rainfall, and the teeth of animals. A natural process is always — if not mostly — the same and according to Aristotle the regularly occurring relationship between rain and crops makes it impossible for it to be a coincidental event (198b20). He proposes that a similar relationship exists in animals, and how the reason certain species have teeth ideal for chewing in the back, and biting in the front is not a result of chance (198b25). This then lead him to believe that products of nature are not by chance, concluding nature must be “for something”.
The following is what a complete reconstruction of the argument from Physics 198b33-199a8 would look like:
Premise 1: A natural process always or usually yields its result. (198b35)
Premise 2: No chance result occurs always or usually. (198b36)
Premise 3: So the products of nature are not by chance. (199a5)
Premise 4: If they are not by chance, nature is “for something”. (199a6)
Conclusion: So, nature is “for something”. (199a7)
To begin an evaluation of this argument, one should first remove the content within each stage to ensure that the argumentative structure is valid. Doing so would leave you with such a skeleton:
Premise 1: N can be P or Q
Premise 2: C cannot be P or Q
Premise 3: So N is not C
Premise 4: If not C, N is F
Conclusion: So N is F
After stripping everything down into its bare architecture, it is clear that anyone could input reasonable details for each variable and be left a stable argumentative framework. Therefore, in order to further verify Aristotle’s thinking on the form of nature one should examine the content of each premise on its own.
In premise one — the idea that natural events happen regularly — Aristotle discusses the nature of a predator’s teeth and how it is consistently beneficial to them that the species has sharp front teeth for biting, and broad back teeth most suited for chewing food. If such a composition were just a coincidental occurrence, it would be strange that every time the animal’s parts came together as though they were created for something, they survived. It would be equally as “puzzling” (198b33) if every other combination of animal that was not configured for something was being indefinitely being created and quickly destroyed, as Empedocles talks about with calves with the heads of men (198b30). Aristotle responds to these claims by stating that such a confusing world does not exist for the same reason we don’t attribute chance to winter rain or a summer heatwave — such things are natural, and occur with consistency. On the other hand, a summer storm or heat wave in the winter is a result of chance as nobody could see such a thing would happen with some form of regularity. Such a hypothetical segways the reader into premise two.
This second premise operates as an extension to the first by showing how chance can never happen frequently. If someone had a 99% chance to win the lottery and that person did, we wouldn’t consider the individual “lucky” since we expected him to win. However, if another person only had 1% chance of winning but still did, such a result would be due to chance as a result of its irregularity. Empedocles and Democritus, however, adopted the antithesis of this premise. They they felt that when rain helps corn grow, the rain isn’t falling for the sake of the a symbiotic relationship with corn, but is instead falling out of necessity for what is cooled to fall down, and the beneficial reaction with corn is simply coincidence. In response to this, Aristotle’s holds strong on his reference to the weather patterns of winter and summer to expose the regularity of this natural occurrence, implying the impossibility for the relationship to come from chance.
To form the third premise, Aristotle combined the preceding two premises to form the idea that products of nature are not by chance. This is again due to the fact that in nature the same thing happens always or often, which means it is impossible to be a chance result if such a premise is true. The justification for this premise is mostly provided throughout the first two of Aristotle’s premises, allowing us to move to a new concept brought up by premise four.
In premise four, the idea that nature is for something since it is not by chance is brought to the table by Aristotle. He believes that each step in nature is for the sake of interacting with the next — as if there is a sort of guideline that the world must follow (199a25). As Aristotle says throughout chapter 8, nature is acting in the interest of its form, meaning that it has a goal it strives towards while following the natural path of action. However, this process isn’t flawless and we tend to see things like mutations that may stray away from the determined form of a natural organism. Aristotle would be able to respond to such a criticism under the notion that even the best of those working for a cause make mistakes (199a35). For example, a doctor may cause an error during a surgery, but he/she is still working for an end — to save lives (199b1). Even though nature isn’t guaranteeing a flawless relationship between organisms, it is predictable enough for Aristotle to say that nature occurs with purpose.
The four premises above lead the reader to the final conclusion that nature operates for something (199a7). Without many ways to poke holes in the logic behind Aristotle’s other four premises, it is clear that he remains coherent in his argument which is convincing in proving his points. He is making observative inferences about the world without making boisterous claims, and even includes dialogue regarding his response to criticism from the other two philosophers. Overall Aristotle has crafted a solid opinion on the form of nature, providing an acceptable amount of evidence to support his points.