Sam Paddock
Introduction to Philosophy
11/11/18
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The nature of consciousness and its relation to our brains/bodies is a heavily argued concept in the field of Philosophy. Many different beliefs and theories such as Substance Dualism, Property Dualism, Physicalism, The Identity Theory, and Functionalism are used to propose the correct answer to the nature of consciousness and its relation to our brain/bodies. In this essay, I will argue that Substance Dualism as presented by René Descartes is the best—although, not perfect—theory to describe the nature of consciousness and its relation to our brains/bodies. Although, I believe that Descartes’ view is the best, there are objections and arguments against his view that I will also discuss in this essay as well.
One must first understand the basics of Descartes’ Substance Dualism before anything else. The key aspect of Substance Dualism is that it is the belief and theory that the mind and body are two distinct kinds of substances; minds are conscious, thinking things and are unextended, while bodies are not conscious, thinking things and are extended. This idea of being extended simply means being extended in space, so a body is something that takes of space, while the mind does not. Descartes shows this idea in his Meditation VI where he states, “…I have a clear and distinct idea of myself, in so far as I am simply a thinking, non-extended thing; and on the other hand I have a distinct idea of body, in so far as this is simply an extended, non-thinking thing….” Descartes is able to come to this conclusion by understanding two things. First, is that he knows that he exists. He gives evidence to this in his Meditation II where he explains that even though there is a deceiver of supreme power that is constantly deceiving him, which alone must mean he exists, there is also the fact that as Descartes states, “…he [deceiver] will never bring it about that I am nothing so long as I think that I am something….” Secondly, he knows that absolutely nothing else belongs to his nature or essence except that he is a thinking thing. He argues this by explaining that the one thing that he cannot doubt is the fact that he is able to think . With all of this put together Descartes is able to come to his conclusion, which creates the basis for Substance Dualism in that the mind and body are two distinct kinds of substances; minds are conscious, thinking things and are unextended, while bodies are not conscious, thinking things and are extended.
The question now is what makes Descartes’ theory of Substance Dualism the best explanation for the nature of consciousness and its relation to our brains/bodies? First, is the conceivability argument which Descartes explains in his meditation VI. This argument is beneficial to Substance Dualism because it explains that if one is able to clearly conceive themselves existing without a body, then it is possible to exist without a body since what you can clearly conceive must be possible. Therefore, if your existence is not dependent on being identical or part of your body, then Substance Dualism itself must be true. The next argument in support of Substance Dualism is the idea of privacy of the mental. This idea works to support Substance Dualism in that according to Leibniz’s Law of Identity, “Two things are identical if, and only if, they simultaneously share exactly the same qualities.” The idea of privacy of the mental which suggests that mental states are private in the fact that only those who possess them can know them directly . Suppose that I am craving a chocolate chip cookie, only I know that I have this craving unless I speak out loud of my craving. This shows that bodily and neural activities such as me speaking about my craving for a cookie are public, whereas my craving for a cookie without speaking on it is only known to myself. Since mental states (me craving the cookie) are private only to the people having them and brain states (me speaking out loud about my craving for a cookie) are not, then mental states cannot be identical to brain states because it goes against Leibniz’s Law of Identity, therefore furthering the support for Substance Dualism. The last argument supporting Substance Dualism is ***
One more argument that makes Substance Dualism closer to my own truth and better than the other arguments for the nature of consciousness and its relation to our brains/bodies is the fact that it appeals to religion. As a believer of the Christian faith, I believe in the idea of an afterlife. Substance Dualism allows for the separation of the mind and body, which satisfies the Christian idea that the soul (or mind) can exist eternally without a body due to previously mentioned ideas in an afterlife.
As I mentioned previously in this essay, I do not believe that Substance Dualism is perfect. There are objections to this view as there are for every opposing view as well. I also do not think there are definitive ways to fully expel each objection towards Substance Dualism, but I do think there is reason to believe these objections against Substance Dualism are not adequate reasons to reject the belief as a whole. For instance, the evolutionary problem is one often brought up when arguing the credibility of Substance Dualism. The evolutionary problem asks the question, “When in the course of evolution would minds have evolved?” Although the obvious answer may not fully dispel the objection for some people, it would satisfy Descartes and other people religious background. That answer would be that God, being omnipotent would have placed the ability to have a soul (or conscious mind) in the fetus at some point during the developmental process. Another problem opposing Substance Dualism is the problem of complexity, which claims that dualism is needlessly complex and violates Occam’s Razor Principle. In opposition to this problem, I believe that Substance Dualism is quite simple when the proper thinking is put towards it. Substance Dualism at its base is just the idea that the conscious mind is separate from the body and based off the ideas that Descartes lays out in his meditations, if one is able to think of a conscious mind being separate from the body, then it is possible for there to be separation between the two. Lastly, the observability problem which asks the question, “How can we know about or study minds if we can only observe our own?” and the mysteriousness problem, which claims that the mind is a mysterious thing that we are not able to say much about what it is, can be looked at together. Both problems focus on the fact that the mind is something that we do not know much about because we are not able to experience what is occurring in the minds of others, only our own. Although these two problems and even the problems that I was able to give an answer provide an argument against Substance Dualism, it must be considered that these problems themselves also do not provide their own respective answers to the problems they themselves arise. Since this is the case I do not believe that one can fully dispel Substance Dualism.
One major opponent to Substance Dualism is Gilbert Ryle who refers to Descartes’ theory as “the dogma of the Ghost in the Machine”. He tries to prove Descartes’ theory entirely false by claiming that he made a “category-mistake” in his theory due to the fact that he believes that Descartes is “…perfectly competent to apply concepts, at least in the situations with which they are familiar, but are liable in their abstract thinking to allocate those concepts to logical types to which they do not belong….” Ryle explains this using his example of a foreigner visiting a university. He compares the mind to something like the university in his example where it is just a construction of some basic things (the colleges, the library, etc.). These basic things to Ryle are the mental states and like the colleges explain what the university is, the mental states explain what the mind is. He also believes that the idea that there is a further story to be told about the mind is wrong and that is what Descartes is doing. What Ryle never claims is what the mind really is if it is not an immaterial object as Descartes explains it to be. A common theme being shown from the objections mentioned earlier and from Ryle as well is that none of them seem to give the correct answer to the problems they arise, which further proves that although there are objections to Descartes’ argument, there still is not adequate reason to dispel Substance Dualism.